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The aim of this work is focused on the development, testing and improvement of 
a methodology for the assessment of thermal hazards of chemical reactions, 
mainly oriented to be used at small and medium enterprises. The methodology 
consists on a checklist based system to identify thermal hazards, including tools 
easy to be followed by non experts in the field of safety. The origins of the 
development are two already existing tools known as HarsMeth and Check 
Cards for Runaway. Different approaches have been followed in order to come 
up with a reliable assessment tool. In the first place, the two mentioned 
methodologies were tested at different companies working on fine chemical 
production, which gave the possibility to determine strengths and weaknesses for 
both methodologies, and to profit from the identified strengths to combine them to 
create one single tool called HarsMeth version 2. Later, this version was 
thoroughly tested at two different companies to improve it, by detecting flaws and 
expanding the checklists in order to cover as many issues as possible in the 
assessment. Further work performed aimed at the development of tools for the 
theoretical estimation of reaction enthalpies and for the identification of thermal 
hazards in process equipment. A final version of the methodology was produced, 
called HarsMeth New Process, structured to perform the hazard assessment at 
every step followed in the development of a chemical process, starting from the 
design of the chemical reaction at the laboratory, followed by the study of stability 
and compatibility of the reactants involved, the bench scale analysis of the 
synthesis path chosen, the scale up of the process and the determination of the 
necessary safety measures for the implementation of the process at industrial 
scale in accordance with the hazards identified. Another strategy followed in 
order to improve the methodology has been to analyse the chemical accidents 
reported to the MARS database in order to establish lessons learned from such 
accidents, and to identify what topics of the methodology could have helped to 
prevent the accidents and to emphasize what aspects of chemical safety need to 





































1.- Introduction ……………………………………………………………………. 1
2.- Results and discussion……………………………………………………….. 29
2.1.- State of the art of chemical accidents in Europe: analysis and 
lessons learned……………………………………………………….. 31
2.1.1.- Location and severity of accidents…………………………………………. 34
2.1.2.- Identification and classification of the causes of the accidents…………. 37
2.1.3.- Lessons learned from chemical reactive accidents……………………… 39
2.2.- Development of the HarsMeth methodology………………………. 43
2.2.1.- Analysis of previous methodologies and development of HarsMeth v2.. 43
2.2.1.1.- HarsMeth v1 weaknesses………………………………………. 44
2.2.1.2.- HarsMeth v1 strengths…………………………………………... 50
2.2.1.3.- Check Cards for Runaways weaknesses……………………… 52
2.2.1.4.- Check Cards for Runaways strengths…………………………. 55
2.2.1.5.- Synthesis of the two methodologies…………………………… 56
2.2.2.- Validation of HarsMeth v2…………………………………………………... 64
2.2.2.1.- HarsMeth v2 weaknesses………………………………………. 65
2.2.2.2.- HarsMeth v2 strengths…………………………………………... 68
2.2.2.3- Proposal for a new draft version of HarsMeth…………………. 70
2.2.3.- Development of a system to identify chemical reactive hazards in unit 
operations equipment………………………………………………………. 72
2.2.4.- Development and validation of HarsMeth NP…………………………….. 88
2.2.4.1- Development of the structure of HarsMeth NP………………… 89
2.2.4.2.- Application of HarsMeth NP for the hazard analysis of a 
chemical process………………………………………………….. 98
2.2.4.3.- Application of HarsMeth NP as a tool for accident analysis…. 110
2.3.- Calorimetric study…………………………………………………….. 132
2.3.1- Reaction calorimetry results…………………………………………………. 134
2.3.2.- Differential scanning calorimetry results…………………………………... 142
2.3.3.- Criticality evaluation…………………………………………………………. 146
2.4.- Development of strategies for the theoretical estimation of 
reaction enthalpies……………………………………………………. 148
3.- Experimental part…………………………………………………………...… 157
4.- Conclusions ………………………………………………………………....... 169
5.- References ………………………………………………………………........ 175

















































Accidents in chemical industrial plants represent a high potential threat because 
of the dangerous substances that are usually handled and the conditions of the 
processes performed at these installations. These conditions often involve mixing 
of hazardous chemicals in large vessels at severe temperature and pressure 
values, kept under control by both human and technical measures. The failure of 
those measures or an incorrect design of process and equipment parameters 
may lead to a loss of control in the process, which can generate a runaway 
reaction. 
 
Many accidents involving chemical substances have generated human and / or 
environmental disasters in the past, not to mention the continuous concern of the 
population regarding the safety of industrial facilities. Particularly tragic was the 
accident that occurred in 1984 in Bhopal, India, where over 20000 people were 
killed or seriously injured (Gupta, 2007). Another important accident was the one 
that happened at Seveso, Italy, in 1976, which triggered the European 
Commission Directive 82/501/EEC (Council Directive, 1982) commonly referred 
to as the Seveso Directive. This Directive was renewed in 1996 with the so called 
Seveso II Directive, or Directive 96/82/EC (Council Directive, 1996) in order to 
clarify some of its contents, and later amended in 2003 (Directive, 2003) as a 
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result of other accidents like the ones occurred in Enschede, The Netherlands, in 
2000, or in Toulouse, France, in 2001. 
 
The Seveso II Directive states in its Annex I the criteria under which it is 
determined whether an establishment falls under the regulation or not, based on 
the type and quantities of the substances handled. For those sites that are 
concerned by the regulation, the Directive states in its Article 9 that a hazard 
identification of the processes carried out at the establishment must be 
performed, as well as providing the necessary safety measures to prevent an 
accident from occurring. 
 
Several systems to perform hazard analysis of chemical processes have been 
developed in the last decades (CCPS, 1985; Khan and Abbasi, 1998). Checklists 
are the simplest method available, and different versions have been widely used 
by the chemical industry in the past years. Structured and organized checklist 
systems for hazard identification of chemical processes date from as early as the 
mid 1960’s (The Dow Chemical Company, 1964), and have been broadly 
developed ever since (Lees, 2005). They consist on a set of questions that 
engineers or operators must answer in order to verify that no safety requirement 
is neglected. In general, checklists are a good method to be used by untrained 
personnel and are not time consuming. On the other hand, it can provide limited 
information if answers are restricted to ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, it can focus on a single item 
at a time, and its effectiveness is limited to the ability and experience of the 
person preparing it, with a significant probability of some item being neglected. 
 
A very popular tool for hazard identification is Hazop (Hazard and Operability). 
This method was initiated at ICI in 1974 and further developed and described by 
Kletz (1992). The basis of Hazop studies is a systematic analysis of design and 
operation documents by a group of experts, in which the use of guide words (e.g. 
more, none, less and so on) are applied on the different process parameters (e.g. 
flow, temperature, concentration and so on) to analyse the effects that such 
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variations will have on the evolution of a process. Hazop can be performed with 
the aid of PI&Ds (Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams) or flow sheets of the 
process applied to different units of a plant. 
 
Since Hazop is based on the variations of normal process conditions, it assumes 
that those conditions are correctly designed, so it cannot identify hazards related 
to design failures. Furthermore, it is also extremely dependent on the expertise of 
the users, and it requires large inputs of time and expert manpower. But in spite 
of those limitations, it is still nowadays one of the preferred systems for hazard 
identification because it helps to prioritise hazards, it gives ideas on mitigation 
measures and it can be performed either at design stage or during operation 
stage, as well as providing a basis for subsequent steps in the risk management 
program (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is an analytical tool that uses deductive reasoning to 
determine the occurrence of an undesired event. FTA was first conceived in 1961 
by the Bell Telephone Laboratories in connection with a US Air Force contract to 
study the Minuteman Missile launch control system. In the following years it was 
reviewed extensively (Lee et al. 1985). FTA, along with component failure data 
and human reliability data, can enable the determination of the frequency of 
occurrence of an accidental event. However, the accuracy of prediction is limited 
and it depends upon the reliability and failure data of components of the fault 
tree. Besides, it requires considerable time and effort by a skilled team of 
analysts. 
 
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) consists on an examination of individual 
components such as pumps, pipes, valves and so on to identify the likely failures 
which could have undesired effects on system operation. FMEA was originally 
developed in the mid 1970’s by the USA Department of Navy (MIL, 1974); it is a 
qualitative inductive method and it is relatively easy to apply. It is assisted by the 
preparation of a list of expected failure modes. It is an efficient method of 
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analysing elements which can cause failure of the whole plant, but it is less 
suitable when complex logic is required to describe system failures. It is unable 
to deal with the interaction among different components and it needs a highly 
expert team with sufficient experience and time to carry out the study. 
 
‘What if’ analysis (CCPS, 1985) is a technique that involves asking a series of 
questions beginning with ‘what if’ as a means of identifying hazards. These 
questions address different possible failure situations of plant equipment. The 
result is a qualitative tabular summary of identified hazards, with questions that 
can be used throughout the life of a project. On the other hand, it requires a team 
of experts to perform the study, and the results will be extremely dependant on 
the experience and intuition of the study team. 
 
Another available system to analyse hazards are the Hazard Indices. These 
provide a measure of hazards in different contexts. The most widely used is the 
Dow Index, originally published in 1964 by the Dow Chemical Company for fire 
and explosion hazards. The procedure is to calculate the fire and explosion index 
(F&EI) following a structured system taking into consideration general and 
specific process factors and exposure estimations, and to use these to determine 
fire protection measures and, in combination with a damage factor, to derive the 
base to determine a Maximum Probable Property Damage (MPPD) and the 
Business Interruption (BI) loss. 
 
The Mond Index is an extension of the Dow Index. It is intended to quantify fire, 
explosion and toxicity hazards, and was originally described by Lewis (1979) at 
the Mond division of ICI. It involves making an initial assessment of hazard in a 
manner similar to that used in the Dow Index, but taking into account additional 
hazard considerations. 
 
The Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss (IFAL) Index was developed by the 
Insurance Technical Bureau (1981) initially for insurance assessment purposes. 
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The procedure for calculation of the Index involves considering the plant as a set 
of blocks and examining each major item of process equipment in turn to assess 
its contribution to the index, considering fire and explosion issues. It is more 
complex than the previous indices since it requires computational calculations. 
 
In the recent past, different index based systems have been developed in order 
to quantify the safety of industrial installations (Heikkilä, 1999; Khan and 
Amyotte, 2004; Chen and Yang, 2004). Usually these approaches try to quantify 
the overall risk through the combination of different factors, which are rated 
according to predefined scales or ‘weighting’ systems. These methods are 
usually derived from the indexes mentioned earlier (Dow, Mond, IFAL), and they 
consider the damage potential related to different sections of an establishment, 
according to plant and process characteristics, and taking into consideration the 
available hazard control measures. 
 
However, in spite of the fact that the previously described methods have been 
available and used by process industries for a long time, accidents are still 
happening in the European chemical industry. One reason for this fact could be 
that most part of the chemical production in Europe is performed by Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) (Nomen et al., 2002) with less time, human and 
economic resources than big companies to perform extensive and sophisticated 
hazard analysis of their processes. In this sense, the development of simple tools 
that can be easy to use by non experts in the field of safety could be of interest 
for the small chemical companies in Europe. As it has been mentioned in the 
previous description of available hazard assessment methods, checklists are the 
only system that do not require either long time or high degree of expertise for 
their completion. In this sense, it is considered that the development of a 
checklist system specific to identify chemical reactive hazards could be of great 
help for the European process industries. These system should try to eliminate 
the flaws pointed out for checklists as a tool for hazard identification, basically the 
limitation of the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ answers, the requirement to focus on one item at a 
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time, and the necessity to rely on the expertise of the person preparing the 
checklist. 
 
As it has been mentioned, accidents in European chemical industries are still 
happening nowadays. Recent studies (Sales et al., 2007a) show that in the 
period from 1994 to 2004, 301 Major Accidents happened in European process 
plants generating 153 fatalities. This study has been based on the accidents 
reported to the Major Accident Reporting System (MARS, 2007), established in 
1984 and managed by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) of the Joint 
Research Centre of the European Commission, so it must be taken into 
consideration that those accidents are exclusively major accidents as described 
in Annex VI of the Seveso II Directive, which specifies the criteria under which an 
accident must be reported by Competent Authorities of the different Member 
States of the European Commission to MAHB. 
 
MARS is a distributed information network (Mushtaq et al., 2003), consisting of 
27 local databases on an MS-Windows platform in each Member State of the 
European Union and a central version at the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre in Ispra, Italy. The main scope of MARS (Mushtaq and 
Christou, 2004) is to fulfil the requirements of the Seveso II Directive, which 
under its articles 14, 15, 19 and 20 describes the tasks that have to be performed 
by the Member States in case of a major accident. These tasks basically concern 
the responsibilities regarding the collection and submission of information relating 
to the circumstances of the accident and to ensuring the availability and analysis 
of the information in order to prevent major accidents from recurring. 
 
The information contained in the accidents reported to the MARS database is 
divided into different sections and type of information. Two reporting forms have 
been established: the “short report” is intended for immediate notification of an 
accident, and the “full report” is prepared when the accident has been fully 
investigated, and the causes, the evolution of the accident, and the 
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consequences are fully understood. Next to those two forms, a report profile 
stores the necessary administrative information, regarding issues like the name 
of the company, the date of the accident or the Member State reporting the 
accident. Only the information contained in the “short report” is available to the 
general public, while the contents of the “full report” and the report profile are 
kept confidential for internal use of the Commission and the Member States. 
 
The “short report” gives essential information concerning the accident, including 
both selection boxes and free-text format, under the following headings: 
 
• accident type 
• substances directly involved 
• immediate sources of accident 
• immediate causes 
• immediate effects 
• emergency measures taken 
• immediate lessons learned  
The “full report” is much more analytical, and it involves more work in its 
preparation. While there are always free-text fields available to describe facts 
connected with an accident, different selection lists have been generated by 
definition of descriptive codes, so the accidents can be classified under common 
patterns. There are almost 200 different headings (data variables), for example: 
• type of accident 
• industry where accident occurred 
• activity being carried out 
• components directly involved 
• causative factors (immediate and underlying) 
• ecological systems affected 
• emergency measures taken 
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The analysis of past accidents can be a useful tool to establish causes and to 
learn lessons that can help to better understand what went wrong for an accident 
to occur (Gustin, 2002). This is a task in which MAHB has been particularly 
active in the recent past (Drogaris, 1993; Kirchsteiger, 1999; Christou, 1999 
Mushtaq et al., 2003) with the information contained in the MARS database, in an 
attempt to help organizations to learn from past mistakes, in order to improve 
their future hazard assessment systems. 
 
Taking into consideration the fact that SMEs require assistance in the hazard 
assessment of their chemical processes, and that there seems to be a 
deficiency, either at disseminating the available methods or regarding their 
application, a large group of chemical companies (both small and big ones), 
universities and research centres created HarsNet in October 1998, under the 
initiative and the co-ordination of the PQAT research group of the Institut Químic de 
Sarrià – Universitat Ramon Llull (Nomen et al., 2002). The acronym HarsNet 
stands for “Thematic Network on Hazard Assessment of highly Reactive Systems”. 
HarsNet was not a research project, but a thematic network partially funded by the 
European Commission, included in the Industrial and Materials Technologies 
Programme (Brite EuRam). Its aim was the creation of an extensive forum within 
which universities, research centres and industries could collaborate to improve 
dissemination of the fundamental knowledge that can be used for hazard 
assessment of reactive systems, in order to improve the global safety of the 
chemical industry and to reduce long term costs in the Research and Development 
(R&D) phase. A total of 33 partners from 11 countries in the European Union took 
part in HarsNet, being the participation of the chemical industry in the network of 
about 58% of the consortium. HarsNet was active until September 2002. 
 
The main objectives of HarsNet were a consequence of the urgent need to 
introduce hazard assessment techniques for reactive chemicals into the normal 
working procedures of small and medium enterprises. One of the aims of this 
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network was to contribute to the design of intrinsically safe processes, giving 
precedence to prevention in front of protection, and reducing the probability of 
the runaway to a minimum. New guidelines should be produced including a step-
by-step assessment procedure based on literature surveys, simple predictive 
calculations and laboratory based testing in easily available equipment. Such 
procedures should be designed to detect the situation in which more sophisticated 
tests should be performed by external laboratories or specialised experts. 
 
The work developed by the HarsNet team was subdivided in the following tasks. 
 
• Task 1: also named HarsNet forum, it contained two sub tasks named 
HarsBase, a database on available calorimetry techniques and equipment, 
and HarsBook, a guide for experts in the field of chemical hazard 
assessment which was published by Dechema at the end of HarsNet 
(HarsBook, 2003). This task contemplated all the work and exchanges of 
information done inside the network. 
 
• Task 2: it was created for supporting the SMEs and it had three sub tasks; 
HarsMeth, a short cut method for hazard assessment, HarsRes, which 
collected the different research activities of the consortium, and 
HarsSMEs, which joined the most important objective of the network, the 
interaction with the European chemical industry. 
 
• Task 3: this task contemplated the dissemination of the results to the 
whole interested society, and again was divided into three sub tasks, 
named HarsWeb, HarsEdu (focusing on academic requirements for safety 
engineers) and HarsNet publications. A global task for co-ordinating and 
managing the network ran from its beginning. 
 
All information about the HarsNet group and its research are available nowadays 
through the HarsNet internet website (HarsNet, 2007). 
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The participation of big chemical companies in HarsNet gave the opportunity to 
the consortium to learn what techniques for hazard assessment are used in such 
companies, in order to understand how their philosophy can be introduced into 
the policy of SMEs. Even though big companies use a wide variety of the 
previously described tools, the checklists used by “Ciba Speciality Chemicals” 
(1998) and “The Dow Chemical Company” (2000) were analysed. 
 
The Ciba Risk Analysis is subdivided in two parts: a set of forms, generated with 
the purpose of guiding a team through all steps of a risk assessment and also to 
document the findings at each step in a standardised way, and a guidance 
document that gives the necessary instructions to fill up the forms and the 
theoretical basis of the main aspects analysed. 
 
This tool is very exhaustive and it was clear from the start that it would have been 
too difficult for many SMEs to collect all the data required. However, it provided 
interesting ideas from the point of view of considering each synthesis step at a 
time when making the analysis, and keeping separated data collection sheets. In 
fact one of the problems of small and medium enterprises is to find all necessary 
data for a safety analysis, and most of the time understanding where data have 
been noted is problematic. Therefore, it was thought that definitions of what is the 
basic set of data and where it has to be written would have been important. The 
use of a compatibility chart is also a very easy approach, although not very quick, 
to consider all possible interactions between the chemicals involved in the 
process. 
 
The checklist part of the safety analysis performed in the Dow Chemical 
Company was studied with the same intent. In this tool, many aspects of the 
process are analysed, such as data on reactive chemicals, raw materials, 
construction and maintenance materials, reactive conditions, catalysts and 
inhibitors, control systems, waste handling, storage, training and failure 
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scenarios. Specific questions for each aspect are defined. As in the case of the 
Ciba tool, the approach to the safety analysis was very interesting, but some 
questions were too complex to be easily answered. Moreover, the amount of 
information and the level of control needed to fill up the checklists turned out to 
be too demanding for the resources of a SME. 
 
From this early study of existing methodologies, the HarsNet group decided that 
the checklists method would have been the most simple way to obtain a tool 
sufficiently easy to understand and quick to perform to comply with the needs of 
SMEs. In this way, the knowledge of experts on safety analysis, the literature 
search and the help given by existing methodologies could be used in order to 
develop a hazard assessment tool oriented to SMEs. 
 
As it has been mentioned, HarsMeth was one of the tasks of the HarsNet project. 
Its aim was to produce and to check a methodology for the hazard assessment of 
chemical processes. It should offer assistance for the safety analysis of batch as 
well as semi-batch processes in an easy structured way by using basic rules and 
methods designed as an interface between experts and SMEs. The main part of 
the first draft version of HarsMeth represented a short cut procedure for the 
safety assessment of chemical processes working as an interactive online tool. 
Next to it, a document containing different checklists was available. The 
assessment was based on safety data entered by the user and it gave general 
indications concerning hazardous process conditions. 
 
All the questions were subdivided in different checklists concerning the different 
aspects of the process considered. The intent of this structure is to consider as 
many different factors that form the basis of process safety as possible. Three 
principles are considered fundamental for process safety: 
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• Good Engineering Design: unless good basic chemical engineering 
standards are met, no amount of additional data or analysis will redeem 
the situation. 
• Good Process Design: if a process cannot meet the requirements of 
quality, yield and throughput, it will be constantly changed and updated to 
meet demand, and this updating could lead to unsafe conditions unless 
strict control of the process changes is maintained. 
• Good Basic Data: about the materials used and about the process. It is 
imperative that the fundamental thermo-kinetics of the desired process 
and any side reactions or decompositions are determined and understood, 
as well as physical data on raw materials, intermediates and final 
products. 
 
These elements must be brought together in a systematic manner by means of a 
risk analysis. After that, measures can be put in place to control the risks to an 
acceptable level or, better, to eliminate it. Then all these elements can be 
Planned, Organized, Controlled, Monitored, Audited, Reviewed and Spot-
checked (POCMARS) by a Management System. In order to assist companies in 
the assessment of all these elements, five checklists are included: the Good 
Engineering Design, the Good Process Design, the Good Basic Data, The Risk 
Analysis and the Good Management System checklist. A scheme of this 
structure is shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
The Good Basic Data checklist is based on a shortcut methodology which 
intends to obtain the necessary data to carry out the analysis, with the minimum 
time, money and human investment possible. Four checklists were provided in 
order to obtain the proper data depending on the kind of process considered, 







































Figure 1.2. - Short cut methodology for HarsMeth. 
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Once the proper checklist has been filled up, the answers obtained have to be 
evaluated. It is necessary to determine, according to the answers provided, 
which issues regarding the process are likely to trigger a runaway. Clearly the 
details of the runaway theory are not provided in the methodology since it is 
intended to be used by non experts in the field of chemical safety. Instead, 
simple tools are proposed in HarsMeth in order to facilitate the user the 
comprehension of the thermal hazards associated to a chemical process. 
 
A runaway reaction is usually considered as an unexpected and undesired event, 
in which the progressive generation of heat from a chemical process occurs due 
to the rate of heat production being greater than the rate of heat removal (Barton 
and Rogers, 1997). This means that the plant equipment is unable to eliminate all 
the heat generated by an exothermic reaction, leading to higher temperatures 
than those for which the process was designed. 
 
Under a runaway scenario, some chemical systems are likely to accelerate even 
more the rate of heat production, in a runaway loop as shown in Figure 1.3. This 
effect can trigger secondary undesired reactions or even the decomposition of 
the reaction mass, which can generate uncontrolled amounts of gas, increasing 
the pressure inside the reactor vessel up to extremely high values. The ultimate 
consequence of this situation can be the explosion of the vessel if it is not 























Figure 1.3. - The Runaway loop. 
 
Runaway reactions represent a specific hazardous situation due to the fact that 
these events usually start at a slow path and remain unnoticed for a while, but 
since the rate of heat generation increases exponentially, they can suddenly 
accelerate the temperature increase, so when the runaway is detected, little time 
is left for process operators to react and try to regain control of the situation 
(Barton and Rogers, 1997). According to these authors, the causes for runaway 
reaction accidents are mainly found on the lack of knowledge of process 
chemistry and thermochemistry, inadequate engineering design for heat transfer, 
inadequate control systems and safety back-up systems, and absence of 
operational procedures, including training. 
 
However, it is clear that a hazardous chemical scenario does not necessarily 
come from a reactive step. The presence of unstable substances in a chemical 
establishment, even in storage facilities, is likely to generate an accident if the 
conditions under which those substances are handled are not kept under strict 
control. Some hazards related to unstable substances can be decomposition of 
thermally unstable substances generating large amounts of pressure or release 
of toxic substances, unexpected mixing of incompatible substances generating a 
runaway, or the generation of a fire if flammable reactants are involved. 
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Considering a simplified approach for the heat balance of a chemical reactor 
(Stoessel, 1993), two terms can be considered; the heat production due to the 
reaction and the heat removal by heat exchange with the cooling system. The 
heat production, or heat release rate of a reaction (Eq. 1.1), is proportional to the 
rate of the reaction (Eq. 1.2), to the enthalpy of the reaction and to the volume of 
the reaction mixture. The model, as originally developed by Semenov (1928), 
assumes a zero order reaction that follows Arrhenius law, which means that the 
rate of reaction increases exponentially with temperature. 
 

















V is the volume of the reaction mixture   [m-3] 
ΔHr  is the reaction enthalpy     [J·mol-1] 
k0 is the pre-exponential factor, units depending on reaction order (n) 
n
AC  is the concentration of reactant A    [mol·m
-3]n 
AE  is the activation energy     [J·mol
-1] 
R is the universal gas constant    [J·mol-1·K-1] 
T is the temperature      [K] 
 
On the other hand, the heat removal rate of a reactor by heat exchange with the 
cooling system (Eq. 1.3) is proportional to the temperature difference between 
the reaction mixture and the cooling system, to the heat exchange area and to 













U  is the heat transfer coefficient   [J·s-1·m-2·K-1] 
A  is the heat transfer area    [m-2] 
Tr  is the process temperature    [K] 
Tc  is the temperature of the cooling system  [K] 
 
If the heat removal from an exothermic reaction fails, the evolution of the process 
may vary greatly. This situation is shown in Figure 1.4, as developed by 
Semenov (1928). 
 
Figure 1.4. - Semenov heat balance diagram 
 
This diagram represents the evolution of heat versus temperature, reflecting the 
exponential increase of the heat released by the reaction with the reaction 
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temperature, and the linear dependence of the heat exchanged with the cooling 
temperature. If a deviation occurs in reaction temperature working at the stable 
point (Trs), the system will eventually return to that position, since the cooling 
power will be greater than the heat generated by the reaction. However, at the 
unstable point (Tru), any oscillation above reaction temperature will lead to a 
runaway. The limit point (Trl) defines the maximum temperature for coolant that 
allows the process to be run under safe conditions. 
 
The analysis of the situation of any batch or semi-batch chemical reactor 
depending on the evolution of the situations described in Figure 1.4 can be done 




Figure 1.5. - Schematic presentation of a cooling failure scenario. 
 
This Temperature vs. Time diagram shows how the loss of control of the desired 
synthesis reaction leads to a temperature level above the normal process 
temperature and therefore may trigger a secondary reaction. The main features 




• A = desired reaction B = loss of cooling  C = runaway 
• 1: time to cooling failure. 
• 2: temperature increase under normal operating conditions. 
• 3: time to reach the maximum temperature due to synthetic reaction. 
• 4: temperature increase due to loss of cooling. 
• 5: time to maximum rate under adiabatic conditions, TMRad. 
• 6: temperature increase due to secondary reactions. 
 
The parameter MTSR shown in Figure 1.5 stands for to the Maximum 
Temperature attainable by the synthesis reaction, and it corresponds to the 
process temperature plus the adiabatic temperature increase (i.e., the 
temperature increase that occurs due to a failure scenario as seen in Figure 











  adTΔ  is the adiabatic temperature rise  [K] 
Pc  is the specific heat of the reaction mixture [J kg
-1 K-1)] 
RQ  is the energy of reaction   [J kg
-1] 
Y    is the degree of accumulated reactants (Y=1-conversion) 
 
MTSR should be calculated in the worst case scenario of the considered 
process. Whereas in the batch case MTSR corresponds always to the maximum 
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adiabatic temperature increase, for the semi-batch case three scenarios can be 
considered (Serra et al., 1997): 
 
• Batch: all reactants are mixed at the beginning of the process, adiabatic 
conditions are assumed. 
• Stop: dosing is stopped after a cooling failure. Only the actual 
accumulation is considered at each time. 
• Non-stop: dosing is not stopped when adiabatic conditions are 
established. Actual accumulation and remaining heat of reaction should be 
considered.  
 
The Time to Maximum Rate is the time taken for a material to self-heat to the 
maximum rate of decomposition from a specific temperature (normally the 
MTSR), under adiabatic conditions, and it can be determined according to Eq. 
1.5. It should not be mistaken with the adiabatic induction time, which is 
considered as the time interval, starting at a normal operating situation, after 











  Pc  is the specific heat of the reaction mixture  [J kg
-1 K-1] 
  R  is the universal gas constant    [J mol-1 K-1] 
  0T  is the initial temperature of the runaway  [K] 
  0q  is the heat output at 0T      [W kg
-1] 





This formula is established for zero-order reactions, but it can also be used for 
other reactions if the influence of concentration on reaction rate can be neglected 
(Stoessel, 1993). 
 
It is helpful for the evaluation of the runaway scenario to discuss some 
temperature levels and their interactions. This procedure is known as the 
Stoessel (1993) method. This is a useful system to perform a preliminary 
evaluation of the thermal hazards of a chemical process, and it is based on the 
possible different positions of four temperature levels relative to each other, and 
the classification of the process under certain levels of criticality. The Stoessel 




Figure 1.6. - Scenarios with increasing criticality according to Stoessel. 
 
The temperature values considered by Stoessel are: 
 
• The process temperature, TP. 
• The temperature to be reached under upset conditions, MTSR. 
• The boiling point of the reaction mass Tb. 
• A safety maximum temperature value considered, ADT24. 
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ADT24 is considered as the temperature limit before a decomposition process 
falls out of control. It corresponds to the temperature at which the adiabatic 
induction time is less than 24 hours. This parameter can be determined by 
means of adiabatic calorimetry. 
 
The descriptions of the 5 scenarios described by Stoessel are the following: 
 
• Case 1: in a case one scenario, neither the boiling point of the mixture nor 
the dangerous region in which the decomposition reaction becomes 
effective within a critical time is ever reached. Such processes may be 
regarded as inherently safe with respect to the process deviation 
evaluated. 
 
• Case 2: also in the second case, which differs from the first by the 
absence of the boiling point barrier between MTSR and ADT24, the 
process may be regarded as safe. 
 
• Case 3: in the third case, the boiling point with its latent heat of 
evaporation may be looked upon as a safety barrier, provided the 
condenser is adequately designed. However, it must be considered that 
for some mixtures, evaporation of solvent during some time can reduce 
the ADT24 value of the mixture. If the process is performed in a closed 
system, the apparatus must be designed for the maximum expectable 
overpressure or be equipped with a pressure relief device. 
 
• Case 4: scenarios with case four characteristics must be evaluated as to 
whether or not the evaporation capacity provides sufficient safety. If this is 
not the case, additional organizational or technical measures have to be 
implemented. Should the operation be performed in a closed system, then 
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the temperature corresponding to the set pressure of the relief valve may 
not be much higher than the level of Tb. 
 
• Case 5: the fifth case must in any case be rated as problematic. Plant and 
/ or process modifications usually cannot be avoided in such situations. 
 
The combination of the expertise of the HarsNet members with easy to 
understand methods like the Gygax and Stoessel diagrams resulted in the first 
draft of the HarsMeth methodology, known as HarsMeth version 1. The next step 
was to test this draft version at different SMEs involved in the HarsNet network to 
obtain their feedback, check their needs and determine how the methodology 
could be improved to help them in the hazard assessment of their chemical 
reactions. 
 
Another research activity launched by the PQAT research group was the ART 
project (Thermal Risk Audit), with the financial support of the “Generalitat de 
Catalunya”. As a part of this project, another methodology called ‘Check Cards 
for Runaway’ (Pey, 1999) was developed at the TNO (Apledoorn, The 
Netherlands) in collaboration with IQS. The main target was to obtain a simple 
tool for industrial inspectors in The Netherlands to quickly evaluate the safety 
level of a chemical plant liable to suffer a runaway reaction, with the possibility to 
be used also for the assessment of the process engineering during the design 
stage. 
 
The first part of this methodology (Nomen et al., 2004b) is to define which data 
are required to assess each potential hazard. Once the data are defined, the 
necessary tests are selected and run. For this purpose, a set of Data Collection 
Cards, divided in different tables to introduce data are provided, including a 
chemical compatibility chart. The tool is based on the definition of possible critical 
factors that may generate a runaway during a chemical process. Different sets of 
 26 
questions were developed in order to try to identify hazards that can appear 
related to each factor. Critical factors considered in the CCR methodology are: 
 
• Wrong Chemicals 
• Auto catalytic Reactions 
• Segregation 
• Accumulation 
• Temperature Hazard 
 
The methodology is divided into three sections, depending on the stage of the 
analysis of the process: 
 
• Storage: considering hazards of stored substances. 
• Physical processes: considering physical changes in substances and 
mixtures. This introduces the issue of assessing chemical hazards at 
process equipment different from the chemical reactor. 
• Reaction: covering the reaction step of a process, where both physical 
and chemical changes take place. 
 
The tool is designed in a card-shape system that enables the user to keep track 
of the information provided and of the results of the analysis. 
 
A preliminary analysis of both methodologies (HarsMeth v1 and CCRs) was done 
at IQS (Ghinaglia, 2002). This analysis revealed some deficiencies in both tools 
regarding the ease of use and understanding of the terms involved. It became 
clear that testing both methodologies with different chemical SMEs could be a 
good step towards producing a reliable and easy to use assessment 




Thus, the main objectives of this PhD work are: 
 
To analyse the information contained in the MARS database regarding chemical 
accidents in European industries, in an attempt to learn lessons from previous 
incidents and to extract information as to what are the key issues to take into 
consideration when trying to prevent such accidents. 
 
To develop a tool for the hazard assessment of chemical processes specifically 
designed for SMEs. This tool will consist on a checklist based methodology that 
will be generated from the synthesis of the HarsMeth v1 and the CCRs methods 
already existing. It will also include the expertise of the HarsNet group and it will 
be tested at different SMEs, with the objective to reduce the dependence of the 
quality of checklists on the ability of the person preparing it. An attempt to 
eliminate the rigidity of the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers for checklists will also be made. 
 
The tool will be focused on thermal hazards of chemical reactors, eliminating or 
better assuming the weakness of the checklist system to assess one item at a 
time by concentrating the key target of the analysis. The possibility to expand its 
philosophy to chemical hazards in other process equipment apart from the 
chemical reactor itself will also be taken into consideration. 
 
 



































2.1.- Analysis of chemical accidents in Europe and lessons learned 
 
The final scope of a methodology for the hazard assessment of chemical reactions is 
to avoid accidents in the process industries. In this sense, it is of great importance to 
know and to understand why and how accidents in chemical plants have occurred in 
the past. Indeed it is also interesting to know what has been the evolution of the 
number and severity of the chemical accidents that have taken place in Europe in the 
recent past, in order to determine tendencies and to understand the true needs in the 
field of accident prevention. 
 
The Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) contains 588 reports at the time of the 
present work. 301 accidents were reported by EU 15 Member States during the 
period between 1994 and 2004 (Sales et al., 2007a). The evolution of these 























Figure 2.1. - Number of major accidents per year for the period 1994-2004 in EU 15 
countries reported to MARS. 
 
From the previous figure, it can be seen that there is a tendency which indicates that 
the number of major accidents is being reduced. Moreover, there seems to be a trend 
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starting from the year 1996. According to that trend, accidents could be grouped in 
periods of three years. In each group, the number of accidents decreases, but at the 
beginning of the next cycle (1999, 2002) there is an abrupt increase in the number of 
accidents. However, an overall decrease in the number of accidents seems to be 
hinted comparing the first (1996-1999-2002), second (1997-2000-2003) and third 
(1998-2001-2004) respective years of each cycle. The only exception is found in the 
year 2004, in which there was one more major accident reported compared to the 
year 2001. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the number of accidents that reported at least one fatality and the 
number of fatalities generated by the accidents, compared to the total number of 
accidents reported as shown in Figure 2.1. A total of 63 accidents had one or more 





























accidents accidents with fatalities fatalities  
Figure 2.2. - Comparison of the number of accidents, number of accidents with 
fatalities and number of fatalities. 
 
It can be seen that from the year 2000 there has been an increase in the number of 
fatalities. The high numbers of fatalities shown for the years 2000 and 2001 
correspond in great measure to the accidents that happened in Enschede (The 
Netherlands) and in Toulouse (France), which were key events for the launching the 
amendment of the Seveso II Directive in 2003. It can also be seen that the number of 
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fatalities in the years 2002 and 2003 were higher than in any of the other years of the 
1990’s. The number of accidents reporting fatalities increased constantly for the 
period 1999 and 2002, being this last one the year with more accidents with fatalities, 
a total of 11, for the whole period analysed. 
 
These figures show that despite the progressive reduction in the number of major 
accidents, the consequences generated by such events that are still happening in 
process industries are serious enough to continue the efforts of improving safety in 
European process plants. The next step is to try to obtain as much information as 
possible from the data included in the reports from the MARS database and to 
determine how similar events can be avoided in the future. 
 
Many of the accidents reported to MARS involve chemical reactions either intended 
or unintended. An analysis of such accidents has been performed in order to identify 
the causes, both technical and organizational that led to the occurrence of those 
accidents (Sales et al., 2007b). This kind of analysis gives the possibility to learn 
lessons with the objective to improve safety conditions throughout the European 
process industries. Moreover, it can be a valuable aid to improve hazard assessment 
methodologies in order to identify gaps and to test the reliability of such tools. 
 
The criteria to select the cases to analyse for this work was based on the interaction 
of two or more chemical substances that created or could have created a dangerous 
situation, or the incorrect handling of some specific substances, considered as 
potentially dangerous given their chemical properties. This includes not only the 
study of runaway events that take place during a chemical reaction, but also those 
chemical accidents that involve other zones of an industrial establishment, such as 
storage facilities, transfer systems, or other equipment related to a process. A total of 
132 accidents of the total 588 reports included in the database have been identified 
and analysed; a list of these accidents can be found in Appendix 2.1, with brief 
indications of the chemicals involved and the main causes identified for each 
accident. 
 
Even though MARS includes accidents that happened as early as 1980, it was not 
until the early 1990´s that the reporting system was standardised in an attempt to 
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improve the quality of the reports. Therefore, the quality of the information provided is 
quite heterogeneous; some cases include very detailed explanations of the 
accidents, but unfortunately, in some cases, the information provided is quite scarce. 
For this reason, some accidents that matched the selection criteria have not been 
included in the analysis, given the difficulty to extract reliable conclusions as to the 
causes or consequences of the accidents. 
 
2.1.1.- Location and severity of the accidents 
 
At a first stage, the accidents have been classified according to the location within the 
establishment where they have taken place. Figure 2.3 shows the different process 










Figure 2.3. - Number of accidents that occurred in different areas of industrial 
establishments. 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 2.3, the majority of accidents involving chemical 
interactions occur during the reaction stage. However, the number of accidents that 
occurred elsewhere in an establishment is significant enough to understand that 
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chemical reactivity is an issue that must be taken into consideration at any stage of a 
process. Figure 2.4 further analyses the 22 accidents identified in “other process 










Figure 2.4. - Number of accidents identified in the “other process areas” category, 
involving specific equipment. 
 
The numbers shown in Figure 2.4 demonstrate that chemical accidents can occur at 
a wide variety of plant equipment during the development of a chemical process. 
When performing hazard analysis for unit operations, some hazards can be identified 
due to the severe temperature conditions under which some substances are handled, 
but reactivity hazards are frequently ignored since no chemical reaction is expected 
at the equipment detailed in Figure 2.4. 
 
It is relevant to identify the process areas or equipment that present a higher number 
of accidents and their severity. Table 2.1 presents the numbers of fatalities, injuries, 
and number of accidents involving a fatality or an injury in each of the process areas 
presented in Figure 2.3. Table 2.2 gives percentages of fatalities and injuries per 














Reaction 41 7 25 10 275 
Other process 
areas 
22 3 11 4 171 
Storage 27 2 15 2 168 
Handling and 
transport 
20 1 14 1 148 
Maintenance and 
cleaning 
22 12 17 31 100 
 
Table 2.1. - Severity of the accidents involved in each process area. 
 




% of accident 
with fatalities 
% of accident 
with injuries 
Reaction 0.24 6.71 17.07 60.98 
Other process areas 0.18 7.77 13.64 50.00 
Storage 0.07 6.22 7.41 55.56 
Handling and transport 0.05 7.40 5.00 70.00 
Maintenance and cleaning 1.41 4.55 54.55 77.27 
 
Table 2.2. - Ratios and percentages of the severity of the accidents related to 
process areas. 
 
From the numbers shown in the previous tables, three classifications of industrial 
operations can be established in terms of severity of consequences: 
 
• Storage and handling operations: this is the category with the lowest number of 
fatalities per accident. There are two reasons for this figure. Firstly, accidents at 
storage facilities can happen at times when there is no personnel present near the 
equipment involved in the failure. Secondly, accidents involving handling 
operations can result in the release of toxic material due to spills, loose joints, and 
so on. This effect is usually less likely to be lethal than a fire or an explosion 
(Sales et al., 2007a), mainly because usually there is time for the employees to 
evacuate the facility once the release has been identified. However, the number 
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of accidents (47) in this category and the amount of injuries (6.72 per accident) 
are strong enough reasons to take chemical accidents very seriously at storage 
facilities, not to mention the economic loss usually involved. 
• Reaction and other process areas: in this category the severity of the accidents is 
slightly higher than in the previous one, mainly due to the fact that usually there 
are employees in charge of the operations in the vicinity of the equipment 
involved in the accident. In these situations, physical and chemical interactions 
are expected and usually possible failure scenarios have been identified in a risk 
analysis. In these cases the implementation of mitigation measures is usually 
more extended to take these interactions into account in order to reduce the 
severity of the accidents. 
• Maintenance and cleaning operations: it is in these situations where accidents are 
the most severe. It has to be remarked that more than half of the accidents 
studied under this category (54.55%) resulted in human fatalities, and that there 
was an average of 1.41 deaths per accident studied. The reason for these 
elevated numbers is mainly that usually these accidents take place during manual 
operations being performed close to the equipment that is involved in the 
accident. Also, employees may not be trained in the specific hazards involved, 
therefore being unaware of the risks and without knowledge of how to react. 
 
2.1.2.- Identification and classification of the causes of accidents 
 
In terms of learning lessons the most valuable data on accidents is the information on 
their causes. The selection fields in the “Full report” of the MARS reports are useful 
for statistical and trend analysis, and in order to facilitate this effectively, predefined 
selection lists have been produced by expert technical working groups, for inputting 
data in the majority of the fields, including the causes of accidents (Mushtaq et al., 
2003). Out of the 132 accidents analysed, 95 include the “Full report”. A further 
examination of the information contained in the “Short Report” of the remaining 37 
accidents has been performed; this has given the possibility to relate the information 
to the classification system used in the “Full report”. Table 2.3 shows the results 
obtained for technical and physical causes, while Table 2.4 presents the number of 




TECHNICAL AND PHYSICAL CAUSES Number of 
instances 
% 
Unexpected reaction / phase transition 30 22.9 
Runaway reaction 21 16 
Component / machinery failure / malfunction 13 9.9 
Vessel / container / containment equipment failure 12 9.2 
Electrostatic accumulation 9 6.9 
Instrument / control / monitoring device failure 7 5.3 
Loss of process control 6 4.6 
Corrosion / fatigue 6 4.6 
Blockage 4 3.1 
Utilities failure (electricity, gas, water, steam air, etc.) 4 3.1 
Natural event (weather, temperature, earthquake, etc) 3 2.3 
Other 3 2.3 
Transport accident 1 0.8 
 
Table 2.3. - Number of reports analysed involving technical and physical causes. 
 
HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL CAUSES Number of 
instances 
% 
Process analysis (inadequate, incorrect) 53 40.5 
Organized procedures (none, inadequate, inappropriate, unclear) 49 37.4 
Design of plant / equipment / system (inadequate, inappropriate) 42 32.1 
Operator error 36 27.5 
Training / instruction (none, inadequate, inappropriate) 26 19.8 
Management organization inadequate 13 9.9 
Management attitude problem 9 6.9 
Supervision (none, inadequate, inappropriate) 7 5.3 
Maintenance / repair (none, inadequate, inappropriate) 7 5.3 
Testing / inspecting / recording (none, inadequate, inappropriate) 5 3.8 
User unfriendliness (apparatus, system, etc.) 3 2.3 
Staffing (inadequate, inappropriate) 2 1.5 
Manufacture / construction (inadequate, inappropriate) 2 1.5 
Installation (inadequate, inappropriate) 2 1.5 
Isolation of equipment / system (none, inadequate, inappropriate) 2 1.5 
Other 2 1.5 
 




It should be kept in mind that many accidents have multiple causes. It can be seen 
that the most common causes of failure are those issues related to inadequate or 
inappropriate organized procedures, process analysis, equipment design, training 
and human error. The safety management system, which includes organized 
procedures and training, is of special importance in order to promote an appropriate 
safety culture inside the establishment. In some cases the hazards related to a 
chemical process are unknown to, or underestimated by those operators that must 
carry out the process in the plant. 
 
2.1.3.- Lessons learned from chemical reactive accidents 
 
Taking into consideration all the information contained in the MARS reports and the 
analysis of the causes that has been described previously, different lessons can be 
generated. The most common issues involve deficiencies in the process analysis, the 





Process conditions must be studied in order to identify possible hazards related to a 
process. From the accidents analysed, it is clear that special attention must be given 
to the following issues. 
 
• Identification of properties of the substances involved in the process related to 
chemical or physical stability, including safety margins for temperature, 
humidity, storage time, and so on. 
• Identification of incompatibility of the mixtures that could be generated 
(intentionally or unintentionally) in the chemical establishment. Compatibility 
with auxiliary and construction materials must also be studied. 
• Identification of those physical and chemical parameters (temperature, pH, 
reaction time, or any other critical process condition), the variation of which 
could lead to a loss of control of a chemical reaction or other process 
operations. 
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• Identification of possible protective measures (e.g. inhibition, extra cooling, 
containment, venting or quenching) that could be taken in order to stop a 
runaway event. 
• Identification of possible physical consequences (toxic release, explosion and / 
or fire) that could be originated as a result of a runaway. 
 
Safety measures and control systems 
 
It must be ensured that any parameter identified as critical for the safety of the 
process will always be kept under safe conditions no matter what deviation may 
occur. If a loss of control is still regarded as possible, the necessary safety barriers to 
avoid a hazardous situation or to mitigate its consequences must be put in place. 
Some of the actions that can be taken are listed below: 
 
• Whenever a hazardous substance has been identified, it should be replaced, if 
possible, with a less hazardous one, or at least its use should be minimized. 
• For storage and transport, the control and monitoring of critical parameters of 
unstable substances must be made available. These may include, among 
others, temperature and humidity control, and verification of storage periods. 
• Measures must be introduced to ensure that incompatible substances will not 
come into contact at any stage of the process. 
• When using flammable materials, if their use cannot be avoided, two 
conditions are of great importance. First, to avoid oxidant atmospheres that 
may trigger an explosion; this can be achieved by the use of inert gases like 
nitrogen. Second, to avoid ignition sources such as static electricity, hot 
surfaces, or sparks originating from other operations such as welding works. 
• For reaction and process operations, sensors to monitor the evolution of 
critical safety parameters identified during process analysis should be 
incorporated into the plant equipment. These sensors should be interlocked 
with the equipment devices (such as cooling system, reactant dosing devices, 
agitation system, and so on), so that the control system can act to restore 
appropriate process conditions. 
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• The correct functioning of the control system must always be guaranteed, for 
this reason redundant control systems should be provided whenever 
necessary. These must also be effective and reliable when called upon. 
• If a loss of process control should happen, it must always be possible to stop 
the activity. For this reason, reactors and other process vessels should be 
provided with systems to “kill” a reactive process, such as introduction of 
inhibitors, addition of solvent to quench a reaction, or transfer of reaction mass 
to catchment tanks. 
• The implementation of mitigation measures should also be considered in case 
the risk analysis has identified the potential for an accident to occur, even if it 
is considered unlikely. Some possibilities would include the use of water 
curtains or foam sprays to dilute toxic releases, relief valves or rupture discs or 
other devices to deal with pressure increases in order to avoid explosions, and 
fire containment and extinguishing systems. 
• It must be guaranteed that, in case they should be necessary, safety 
measures are always effective and correctly designed. For this, the analysis of 
a possible runaway event must be highly accurate. Also, it must be granted 
that supply lines such as electrical power, cooling circuits, air, steam or 




The development of a safety management system is indispensable in order to spread 
an appropriate safety culture in a chemical establishment. Some of the lessons 
learned regarding the management system are presented: 
 
• Preparation of training systems is of primary importance. Workers must be 
aware at any point of the hazards involved in chemical processes. This 
training must be extended to any temporary worker even if they are present in 
the establishment for a short time. Training procedures should include case 
studies, describing possible effects of chemical accidents. 
• Detailed maintenance and cleaning procedures must be implemented. These 
have to take into account the incompatibility of substances used for these 
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operations. Also, an effective system of work permits must be used to ensure 
safe conditions when such works are to be performed. 
• Emergency plan systems must include the activation of defence systems, 
evacuation routes, identification of personnel on site during an accident, 
correct alarm systems, and so on. 
• Appropriate operating procedures must be provided, according to the process 
analysis. After evaluating the hazards of a chemical process, the appropriate 
methods to perform common operations should be decided. Some examples 
are: 
o Implement correct labelling rules and procedures, including verification, 
to avoid mishandling of chemicals. 
o Provide description of requirements for safe handling of chemicals for 
transport and loading operations. This should include personal 
protection measures and equipment (isolation, connections, and so on). 
o Ensure fluent communication throughout a process. 
o Ensure appropriate supervision of hazardous activities. 
 
The previous lessons learned, obtained through the analysis of past accidents in 
chemical industries, should be evaluated by any company working in the production 
of potentially hazardous chemical processes, and adapted to the safety management 
systems whenever it is considered appropriate. It must be taken into consideration 
that even the conclusions from this analysis related to technical issues, like process 
analysis or the determination of safety measures are strongly related to 
organizational and management issues. As it has been mentioned, it must be a policy 
for chemical companies to implement an appropriate safety culture throughout the 
whole plant, related to every stage of the development of a process, to ensure that all 
the necessary aspects related to chemical safety have been correctly covered. 
Learning from past accidents occurred in plants or processes similar to those 
performed at existing chemical plants, and introducing the lessons learned from such 




2.2.- Development of the HarsMeth methodology 
 
2.2.1.- Development of HarsMeth v2 
 
The analysis of past accidents and the establishment of general lessons learned, 
derived after analysing the causes that led to those accidents, provides a valuable 
first step in the objective of understanding the key issues that need to be covered 
when performing a hazard assessment of chemical processes. In other words, the 
analysis described previously can be a good system to lay the base of the contents of 
a hazard assessment methodology. It must be considered that, as it has been stated 
previously, usually the most common cause for an accident is the lack of knowledge 
of operators or management staff of the hazards involved in the process, either from 
a technical point of view or from an organizational perspective, so it is clear that 
efforts have to be made to highlight those hidden hazards and “bring them to the 
surface”, especially when a process is performed at small and medium enterprises 
with fewer resources and expertise on safety issues. 
 
The objective of this work is to produce a hazard assessment tool based on the 
existing methodologies HarsMeth and CCRs, as well as from the conclusions of the 
accidents analysis. With this goal, it is necessary to determine the strengths and 
weaknesses for each one of those methodologies. For this reason, it was decided 
within the HarsNet group to test them at different SMEs. Five Spanish enterprises 
working in fine chemicals production in the Barcelona area were visited and they 
were asked to try to use HarsMeth and the CCRs methodologies. Usually, they use 
multi-purpose plants, where different processes can be carried out at different 
periods of time without significant changes in plant design. The variability of 
production is one of the reasons that make it difficult to perform a complete safety 
analysis for each process with the resources typically available at these SMEs. 
 
The meetings with these companies were structured as workshops in which a 
number of persons involved in the process were invited at the same table. During the 
first meeting, the HarsMeth methodology and the CCRs were presented. The SMEs 
were asked to choose one process as a case study for these methodologies to 
understand how they work and to detect possible changes to be introduced. During 
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further meetings (from three to five depending on the case), both methodologies were 
applied to the process chosen by the SME, together with the personnel from the 
company. People participating in the workshops were asked to explain the 
deficiencies they encountered while applying both methodologies, also what features 
should be included in a hazard assessment tool according to their experience and 
needs. Next, the feedback obtained was presented, structured according to the 
weaknesses and strengths identified by the personnel of the 5 companies that 
participated at this stage of the project. The versions used of HarsMeth and CCRs 
can be found in Appendices 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. 
 
2.2.1.1.- HarsMeth weaknesses 
 
Each checklist included in HarsMeth was analysed and a number of weaknesses 
were identified. The most significant difficulties pointed out are described next: 
 
1.- The Good Basic Data section is not useful 
 
The first general conclusion obtained from the meetings is that the chapter “Good 
Basic Data” of HarsMeth is not always useful. The problem is found in the lack of 
resources necessary to calculate the required parameters. Indeed, this chapter only 
gives an indication of what information should be provided. Calorimetric studies 
usually come from university laboratories or research centres, not from inside of the 
SME. This can lead to a low level of understanding of the parameters involved in the 
safety of the process. An improvement of the basic knowledge on the interpretation of 
the results of the most relevant thermal analysis and calorimetry techniques would be 
necessary for engineers and operators of chemical SMEs. 
 
HarsMeth suggests the use of historical data when no experimental results are 
available. In many cases this cannot be considered an appropriate procedure to 
induce safety conclusions. The fact that a process never registered any accident 
does not mean that it is safe nor does it imply that safety is ensured just by 
maintaining the same conditions as in previous operations. 
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2.- “All answers should be YES” is a limiting condition 
 
The main characteristic of the first two checklists (“Good Engineering Design” and 
“Good Process Design”) is that all the questions need a “yes” answer to avoid a 
hazard to be generated, as stated in the methodology. The questions are quite 
generic in order to try to take into account as many cases as possible. This aspect 
turned out to be a disadvantage, because in some cases the question was not 
applicable. As a consequence, it was not possible to answer “yes” to all the 




• Question 1.13 in the Good Engineering Design checklist regarding critical liquid 
levels: in one case, the answer to all the questions was “no” because these 
liquid levels in vessels were not considered critical for the safety analysis. 
 
3,- A place where to justify the given answers is missing 
 
Apart from the possibility of answering “no” or “not applicable” in some cases, a field 
where to add explanations about the non-applicability or about the way how problems 
have been solved should be added. This would be useful for the person that is using 
the methodology, who needs to deeply analyse the question in order to give an 
explanation of his / her answer. Moreover, this practice will become a way to collect 
information about the process and its characteristics, and a useful base of knowledge 
for following safety analysis. 
 
For example: 
• Questions 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 in the Good Engineering Design checklist regarding 
addition of reactants: most of the time, the addition is not automatic but it is 
controlled by an operator. As a consequence, the shut-off valve can be turned 
on only manually. Therefore, it cannot be automatically linked to a temperature 
or an “agitation status” indicator. It would be better to ask about “system” and 
not about “shut-off valve”, in order to consider the possibility of manual control. 
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Moreover, the “temperature high and low” indicators are not always necessary; 
therefore, the question is not always applicable. 
• Questions 1.8 and 1.12 in the Good Engineering Design checklist, regarding 
computer control: computer control is not frequently used in Small and Medium 
Enterprises. 
 
4.- Some questions are too generic and do not help in identifying possible safety 
hazards 
 
If the intent of the methodology is to help to reduce the possible lack of knowledge in 
SMEs, the questions should help to identify the possible causes of a hazard. For 
example, the knowledge of experts can be used to define not only the situation in 




• Question 1.1 in the Good Engineering Design checklist, regarding critical 
instruments: this question should include a list of critical instruments related to 
the installation and to the different processes (e.g. security valves, rupture discs, 
controlled gas output to the atmosphere). 
• Question 1.2 and 1.3 in the Good Engineering Design checklist regarding 
calibration and maintenance: it is not necessary to make a distinction between 
instruments related or not to safety, since when dealing with maintenance 
practically everything is related to safety. 
• Question 1.2 in the Operational Risk Analysis checklist, regarding charging with 
partly used drums: it should be asked if the charged quantities are adjusted for 
critical reactants or raw materials. 
• Question 1.6 in the Operational Risk Analysis checklist, regarding the criticality 
of addition rate: the possibility of making the addition slowly (as some SMEs use 
to do) should be added, as an indication in the case of “yes” answer. 
• Management System checklist: all the items included are put forward using the 
verb “should”. It would be better to use “have to”. In this way it would be more 
clear that the presented requirements are essential for the safety management 
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and that the company needs to comply with all of them. Besides, the limits of the 
adopted policy should be specified with more detail and a section concerning 
the application of the policy is missing. 
 
5.- Some questions are not clear, or they are difficult to understand 
 
In some cases, it was not exactly specified what was actually asked or in which 
conditions it had to be calculated. 
 
For example: 
• Question 1.9 in the Good Engineering Design checklist, dealing with heat 
generation: it should be specified whether the heat generated should be 
considered under normal conditions or under uncontrolled conditions. 
• Question 2.5 in the Good Process Design checklist, regarding compatibility: in 
the proposed form, this question is considered a trap, since the use of the word 
“unaffected” can easily lead to confusion. 
• Question 2.10 in the Good Process Design checklist, regarding accumulation: it 
is not clear if this question is referred to normal operation conditions or to upset 
conditions. Moreover, no indication is given as to when to consider accumulation 
as high or low. 
• Question 2.5 in the Existing Semi-batch Process checklist, dealing with 
accumulation: the meaning of the word “dramatically” cannot be easily 
established. 
• Question 1.8 in the Operational Risk Analysis checklist, about temperature 
control in the reactor: it is not clear to which conditions the question is referred, 
i.e. during the reaction or at the end of it. 
 
6.- Some checklists cannot be filled in taking into account the whole process 
 
All the questions included in the “Shortcut method” need to be related to a specific 
step of the reaction, because the conditions may change depending on the stage of 




7.- Some of the limits defined may not be acceptable in some cases 
 
Some of the values given in order to evaluate possible changes in the behaviour of 
the process are not always coherent with those used by the SMEs. 
 
For example: 
• Question 2.3 in the Good Process Design checklist, regarding temperature 
variations: deviations of ± 10°C cannot be evaluated as small in some cases. It 
would be better to eliminate the word “small” and use a percentage of 
temperature variation instead of the ±10°C margin. 
• Question 2.3 in the Good Process Design checklist, regarding yield: in 
discontinuous processes the average yield is often under 90%. For this reason, 
it would be more useful to ask if the reaction is being carried out at the 
maximum possible chemical yield. 
• Question 1.14 in the Management System checklist: as most of the productions 
take less than five years to be completed, it would be useful to define the 
frequency (in months) of revision of the risk analysis. 
 




• Question 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12 in the Good Engineering Design checklist, related 
to permit to works and management of change: they should be moved to the 
Management System checklist. 
• Question 1.16 in the Good Engineering Design checklist regarding 
overpressure: a question about “blow up” and where it discharges should be 
added. 
• Question 2.7 in the Existing Semi-batch Process checklist, regarding changes in 
process conditions: according to SMEs experts, these conditions can be 
changed only in exceptional cases, and if so, the process has to be considered 
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as a different one. Moreover, this question should be moved to the Management 
System checklist. 
• Good Process Design checklist: in the opinion of most SMEs, it would be useful 
to add questions about the physical state of raw materials and to specify to 
which conditions the questions are referred to. 
 
9.- Some values asked are too difficult to know by SMEs 
 
TMRad is generally an unknown value and it is asked in all the checklists of the 
“Shortcut method” in the Good Basic Data section. Likewise, the ADT24 asked in the 
Stoessel thermal evaluation is a value that is hardly used in the SMEs. Most of the 
times, the knowledge of the process was not deep enough to allow them to answer 
the questions about the effects of temperature changes on the adiabatic temperature 
rise or on the heat of reaction as asked, for instance, in the New Semi-batch Process 
checklist. For the same reason, the percentage of accumulation which is asked in the 
same checklist is usually not known. 
 
In any case, a first general lesson that can be derived from the work developed with 
the 5 companies, is that the level of knowledge regarding safety parameters of 
chemical reactions is not always as good as it would be desirable, especially if it is 
compared to the knowledge of such variations in other process parameters. 
 
For example: 
• Question 2.3 in the Good Process Design checklist, regarding temperature 
variations: it happened in some cases that the engineers from the SMEs knew 
exactly what would be the consequences of variations in the temperature 
margins from the point of view of quality, yield and so on, even with details 
regarding the physical state of the product (e.g. colour, viscosity or polymorphic 
form), but the consequences from the safety point of view would remain 






10.- Some aspects that are important for the safety evaluation are missing 
 
For some of the SMEs visited, it would be useful to consider also the following 
aspects: 
 
• Human error and personnel training. 
• Services failure. 
• Where and how to perform an emergency stop. 
• Physical properties and quality of raw materials. 
 
2.2.1.2.- HarsMeth strengths 
 
1.- Useful methodology especially for non experts in safety analysis 
 
One of the aims of this tool was to help those enterprises for which performing a 
complete safety analysis would need too many human and economic resources. In 
this sense, although it may be not complete, the first version of HarsMeth gives the 
possibility to analyse the chemical process hazards even in case of few human 
resources. As it has been mentioned, the checklist method is the best tool for this 
purpose. According to its flexibility of use, it gives the possibility of improving the 
efficiency of the methodology by using the experience of those that are making the 
analysis in order to increase the effectiveness of the questions. Another advantage of 
the checklist method is its simple applicability. The ease-to-use is one of the main 
targets that can be achieved by means of this tool. For this reason, in this case the 
feedback received has been very positive and important for further developments. 
 
2.- The methodology is useful in order to let the workgroup think 
 
Another important advantage of this methodology is to help people in the SMEs to 
consider possible hazard sources that normally are not taken into account. The 
formula of applying HarsMeth by a group of personnel from different areas of the 
SME gives the possibility to improve the knowledge of the process of the whole 
group, taking advantage of the heterogeneous know-how of the process that each 
member of the group can supply. The discussions that arose during the application of 
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the methodology were a very positive result, since it turned out that one of the main 
problems of SMEs is the lack of exchange of information between different 
departments involved in the process. This exercise can be very helpful for the 
engineers of SMEs to fully understand every detail related to the safety of the 
chemical reactions performed in the plant. 
 
For example: 
• Question 1.10 in the Good Engineering Design checklist, regarding permit to 
work systems: most of the SMEs use a batch card, in which information about 
causes of malfunctions and possible accidents are not included, but it was 
generally agreed that they should be taken into consideration. 
• Question 1.11 in the Management System checklist, about systems to ensure 
operability of safety measures: this is not a frequent practice, but almost all the 
SMEs found it a good way to improve safety in the process. 
• Question 1.13 in the Management System checklist, dealing with periodical 
reviews of safety: in most cases, a yearly review of the safety of the process is 
not performed but almost everybody thinks that it would be very useful. 
 
3.- The Stoessel method is quick and gives an idea of the criticality of the process 
 
This way of evaluating the criticality of the process was very appreciated by the 
SMEs because of its simple applicability. One problem was found, however, in the 
calculation of ADT24: if another safety value could be used instead of it as a 
decomposition temperature of the reaction mass, this method would be very useful. 
 
4.- The Management System checklist was considered adequate 
 
This checklist gives the possibility to organize and standardize the safety policy of the 
company. It was considered quite exhaustive and easy to apply. 
 
As a summary, it can be stated that, according to the feedback received from the 
SMEs, the two first checklists in HarsMeth needed to be fully revised, considering 
both their comprehensibility and the effectiveness of the questions. The “Shortcut 
method” was found not adequate in order to analyse the hazards of chemical 
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reactions. Moreover, it was considered not clear the reason why the questions have 
to be different when analysing new or existing processes. 
 
Other findings were that the Operational Risk Analysis checklist was missing some 
aspects that are considered important from the safety point of view. Moreover, 
something needed to be changed in the structure of the methodology, to make it 
possible to justify those cases in which a question is not applicable. In this way, the 
identification of the hazardous aspects would be easier, considering only those 
situations that really require special attention. 
 
2.2.1.3.- Check Cards for Runaway weaknesses 
 
As it was done with HarsMeth, a series of deficiencies where detected for this tool 
during the meetings with the SMEs. The main results are described next. 
 
1.- The use of empirical values can represent a risk and should be used with care 
 
As seen for the HarsMeth methodology, the use of empirical values can lead to errors 
if used for safety purposes. For example, the calculation of the heat of reaction by 
means of bond energies as suggested by the HarsNet group (HarsBook, 2003) is 
reliable only for simple reactions, but for complex ones the results can be significantly 
different from the experimental values. 
 
2.- Some data are not easy to obtain 
 
Some of the data included in the two tables of the Data Collection Cards were not 
easy to calculate, such as: 
 
• Phase stability vs. T and P 
• Total adiabatic temperature rise 
• Thermal activity at temperature at which the substance should be stored, 
TSTORAGE 




Some of them were considered unnecessary for the evaluation (e.g. phase stability 
vs. T or P, or thermal activity). Since the other ones were considered necessary for 
the analysis, it was clear that a basic calorimetric study was unavoidable in order to 
assess the hazards of chemical reactions. Moreover, in some cases it is difficult to 
take into account all the substances and the mixtures involved in the process, and to 
fill in the tables with all of them. A selection among those that are considered 
possible sources of hazards should be done. 
 
3.- The filling in of all the tables can be time consuming and difficult 
 
The amount of information required in order to perform the analysis needs to be as 
little as possible. For some of the SMEs the two tables were too long and too difficult 
to fill in. Moreover, the way to calculate some of the parameters and their meaning for 
the hazard analysis was not explained enough in the methodology. 
 
4.- The separate answer forms generates confusion 
 
The fact of having a sheet for the answers separated from the questionnaire can lead 
to confusion. The “tree structure” was found useful and clear, but the questions and 
the answer should be combined in a single form. 
 
5.- Some questions can be considered general for the whole process 
 
The questions concerning the critical factor “Mistaken Chemicals” in the Process 
section can be asked only once during the analysis of the process instead of doing it 
for each considered step, since the answers received would be the same for each 
process step. 
 
6.- Some of the questions can be answered only from a general point of view 
 
In some cases, the behaviour of the reaction mass under certain conditions is known 





• Question 6 in the Reaction section, regarding the dosing rate: most of the times 
only the “order of magnitude” of the maximum dosing rate is known. And, in 
some cases, the minimum dosing rate should be considered too. 
• Question 8 in the Reaction section, regarding accumulation: the way the 
accumulation can be affected by a variation of the temperature of the reaction 
mass is known, but many times only in a qualitative way. 
 
7.- Some questions need to be more clearly explained and some aspects are not 
analysed deeply enough 
 
For example: 
• Question 1 in the Reaction section, related to formation of dangerous mixtures: 
it would be useful to consider also the solvents as chemicals involved in a 
possible dangerous mix formation. 
• Question 2 in the Reaction section, dealing with solvents: the flammable 
behaviour of the solvents should also be considered. 
• Question 10 in the Reaction section, dealing with cooling: it is not clear if 
“cooling system” means the general capacity of the plant or the cooling system 
of the considered reactor. Moreover, the reasons why the capacity of the cooling 
system of the reactor may decrease should be analysed too. This question asks 
whether the system works at 80% of its maximum capacity. It should be 
discussed why this is considered an appropriate value. Ideally, under this 
situation there is a margin for the cooling system to increase its capacity in case 
a runaway occurs, and there should be a need for more cooling. But the safety 
margin depends on the dimensioning of the runaway, which will be different for 
different reactions, and an extra 20% of cooling capacity may not be enough to 
regain control of the reaction in every situation. 
• Question 13 in the Reaction section, dealing with interlocks: It should be 
specified that, in case of manual control, the operator can act as an interlock 
between the failure of the cooling system and dosing stop. The training of the 
operators needs to be checked in this case. 
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• Process section: some questions concerning the inerting, by-products and 
residues treatment should also be considered. 
• Question 4.1 in the Process section, regarding homogeneous temperature 
distribution: as the non homogeneous distribution can be hardly checked by the 
temperature control, it would be better to ask if there is a way to avoid hot spots 
from being generated. 
 
8.- The ADT24 is a difficult value to obtain 
 
As it has been mentioned, The ADT24 is a value that SMEs hardly ever use. The 
reason is that it is quite difficult to determine. Only when adiabatic calorimetry 
experiments have been performed by external laboratories this value is available, 
and even then the knowledge that personnel from the SMEs have of it is quite limited. 
 
2.2.1.4.- Check Cards for Runaway strengths 
 
1.- The Reaction section is adequate for identifying hazards 
 
The analysis made in the Reaction section was considered quite complete, and the 
structure used to detect the hazard turned out to be useful and easy to follow. 
 
2.- Almost all the questions can be answered with the knowledge of the SMEs 
 
As with HarsMeth, It was found very useful the possibility to take advantage of the 
know-how of the people applying the methodology, in order to obtain the necessary 
knowledge of the process. Most of the times, they know very well the behaviour of 
the process, but they are not able to calculate some specific data. The structure 
adopted to perform the analysis permits to use this “practice” knowledge in order to 






3.- The compatibility chart included is very useful and it is a tool that usually SMEs do 
not know 
 
Although it can take quite a long time to fill it completely, the compatibility chart is an 
important tool to analyse the behaviour of substances and mixtures. It is structured in 
a way that is clear and easy to understand. The possibility to use the information 
included in the general compatibility chart helps in those cases where the knowledge 
of the chemical behaviour of the substance is missing. In any case, it should be used 
with care, considering that general information cannot be exhaustive and that some 
interaction could be ignored by the method. 
 
4.- The methodology is useful in order to let the workgroup think about safety 
 
As seen for the HarsMeth methodology, the CCRs helps to consider the possible 
hazard causes that normally are not taken into account. For example, in one of the 
considered processes, a possible cause of dangerous mix formation was detected 
because of the absence of a pre-charge zone nearby the reactor. In another case, 
the use of partially used bags or drums was detected as another possible cause of 
this kind of hazard. Another fundamental aspect in order to avoid mistakes in the 
process is the necessity of training carefully and controlling the operators: in some 
cases, deficiencies were found in the way the company normally checks the work 
done by an operator. A possible solution is to nominate a supervisor responsible for a 
specific part of the process. 
 
This methodology was not as easy to use as HarsMeth. On the other hand, it gave 
better results than HarsMeth in the detection of possible hazards, especially for those 
hazards related to the chemical reaction. Some of the SMEs estimated that it 
required too many resources to be used. 
 
2.2.1.5.- Synthesis of the two methodologies 
 
Once the feedback described above was collected, a way to respond to the needs of 
SMEs had to be developed. It was quite clear that both methodologies needed to be 
reviewed, and that some changes had to be introduced. In particular, some of the 
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SMEs found the HarsMeth method more useful and complete than the CCRs 
method, while some others thought the opposite, depending on what they usually 
consider more important to assess the safety of a process (e.g. the design and the 
engineering of the process or the way it is actually carried out in the plant). Analysing 
the comments received from the SMEs, especially the weak points, it turned out that 
both tools could be considered complementary: those points that are detected as 
weaknesses in one of them can be adequately improved by means of the strengths 
of the other methodology. Thus, while HarsMeth was considered more complete as 
an overall assessment tool and easier to follow, the CCRs proved to be more efficient 
to identify the specific hazards of chemical reactions. For this reason, it was decided 
to combine both tools and to produce a new methodology for the assessment of 
chemical reactive hazards. 
 
The adopted strategy was to try to take advantage of the structure of the HarsMeth 
methodology and to implement the CCRs as a part of it. The reason is that the 
HarsMeth tool was identified as the more complete of the two, while the CCRs turned 
out to be more specifically focused on the way the reaction is carried out. As a result, 
HarsMeth can be completed with some checklists specific for the process evolution 
that will substitute the “Short-cut method”. They are included as a new chapter, called 
“Good Process Practice”. 
 
The new methodology developed, which was called “HarsMeth version 2” (Nomen et 
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Figure 2.5. - Structure of HarsMeth version 2. 
 
With this kind of structure, the basic data necessary to perform the analysis is 
collected at the beginning of the analysis. Then, the checklists are presented. They 
are subdivided in three groups and each group analyses a different aspect of the 
process. The “Good Process Engineering” and the “Good Process Design” checklists 
are those already included in the HarsMeth methodology. Some changes have been 
introduced in order to respond to the needs of the SMEs, as described in the analysis 
of the feedback received. The “Good Process Practice” checklist derives from the 
CCRs questions. As in the CCRs, each step has to be referred to one specific 
process area (Storage, Process or Reaction) and then the adequate list of questions 
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has to be followed. As it was done with the first two checklists, some changes have 




The way data are collected in the CCRs method is considered suitable in order to 
keep all the data together and available in one document. These data tables can 
improve the Good Basic Data chapter in HarsMeth. The subdivision in substances 
and process properties introduced in the CCRs methodology is maintained. The 
compatibility chart specific can be included in this chapter, seeing that it is an 
important instrument for the safety analysis and much appreciated by the SMEs. As it 
was established from the feedback collected, some of the data may not be necessary 
for the safety analysis. However it was decided not to eliminate any field from the 
tables at this stage of the development of the methodology. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show 













































Figure 2.7. - Data collection table for process conditions included in HarsMeth v2. 
 
Determination of MaxTsafe 
 
As it has been mentioned in the analysis of the weaknesses of HarsMeth and the 
CCRs, the use of the ADT24 value proposed in the Stoessel methodology as a 
temperature safety limit is not considered to be appropriate by SMEs since it is a 
parameter that they are not familiar with. For this reason, it was decided to include in 
the new methodology another way to establish a maximum safety temperature 
barrier, known as MaxTsafe, which could require less safety knowledge and less 
complicated techniques. Hence, if adiabatic calorimetry is not available, MaxTsafe 
(Serra et al., 1999) can be obtained by means of a dynamic differential scanning 
calorimetry register of the reaction mass, with a heating rate of 5 K/min. The value 
can be determined, at a first step, as the temperature of the first exothermal peak 
less 70 °C. Then it has to be compared with the MTSR. In case the difference 
between the two values was greater than 50 °C (|MTSR – (Tpeak – 70 °C)| > 50 °C), 
then the determination of MaxTsafe can be considered correct. If this is not the case, 
then it is necessary to perform an isothermal DSC1 at MTSR, followed by a dynamic 
register to understand the mutual position of MTSR and MaxTsafe and to decide to 





                                             
1 When performing an isothermal DSC, it can be considered that a 12 hours experiment should be 
long enough. 
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• If MTSR>Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does not reveal any significant 
change of the reaction mass, and the dynamic register is equivalent to the first 
DSC performed, then it can be concluded that MaxTsafe>Tpeak-70 and 
therefore MaxTsafe>MTSR. 
• If MTSR>Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does reveal significant change of the 
mass reaction (low velocity of the exothermal phenomena at the process 
temperature can be a problem for detection), and the dynamic register is not 
equivalent to the first DSC performed, then the approximation MaxTsafe=Tpeak-
70 can be considered correct. 
• If MTSR<Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does not reveal any significant 
change of the mass reaction, and the dynamic register is equivalent to the first 
DSC performed, then the approximation MaxTsafe=Tpeak-70 can be 
considered correct. 
• If MTSR<Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does reveal significant change of the 
mass reaction, and the dynamic register is not equivalent to the first DSC 
performed, then it can be concluded that MaxTsafe<Tpeak-70 and therefore 
MaxTsafe<MTSR. 
 
Another value frequently used in the literature that can be estimated by means of a 
DSC register is the Tonset, which corresponds to the temperature at which exothermic 
activity is first detected. However, this possibility was not consider as a reliable value 
as a safety barrier temperature in the analysis of the criticality of a chemical reaction 
(Serra et al., 1999), because this parameter is strongly dependent on the sensitivity 
of the apparatus, on the behaviour of the considered reaction and on the way the 
value is calculated, making it unreliable. 
 
Restructure of the existing checklists 
 
The structure from the CCRs methodology was used to rearrange the checklists for 
“Good Process Engineering” and “Good Process Design” included in HarsMeth. In 
this way, the detection of possible hazards follows a path that was found to be very 
effective during the meetings with the SMEs. The separation between questions and 
answers forms from the CCRs is changed in order to add the answer field in the 
same place of the questions, as generally required. This way, the analysis becomes 
62 
easier to understand and to keep track of it. The questions are structured so that at 
the end of each branch of questions only three possibilities remain: a justification of 
the given answer if the result is that no hazard can be generated from the parameter 
asked in the question, a review of the existing safety measures in case a hazard is 
identified, or a check request in case the answer is unknown. 
 
The implementation of the “tree structure” requires a radical change in the way the 
questions are asked. The path followed by the CCRs is considered more effective, so 
the questions were changed in order to analyse, in the first place, whether the 
hazardous situation can occur, and then, to consider if enough measures are 
implemented to control it. As a result, the questions in the new methodology are 
rewritten so that the “tree structure” used in the CCRs is combined with the 
requirement of comprehensibility pointed out during the meetings. The questions are 
structured in such a way that, at the end, three possible levels of answers are 
available. These possible answers are classified as follows: 
 
• Justify your answer. This answer will be given in case a specific parameter is 
regarded as safe, and no hazard will be generated from the item analysed. In 
such case, a written justification is required in order to explain the reason for 
this consideration. 
 
• Review your safety measures. It means that a hazard may be derived from the 
parameter studied. In this case, either the process development should be 
modified, or the plant set-up must be adapted to reduce, mitigate or prevent 
such hazard, and its possible effects. 
 
• Check it! This indicates that the answer to the question put forward is 
unknown. In this case the user should stop completing the questionnaires and 
seek the answer to the question. 
 



















Figure 2.8. - Example of the structure of the questions included in HarsMeth v2. 
 
The questions included in the HarsMeth “Operational Risk Analysis” that were 
considered relevant were relocated in the other checklists. Hazards are classified in 
two categories, knowledge and process hazards. The knowledge hazard comes from 
unknown chemical or physical values of substances or mixtures. All these cases lead 
to a ”Check It” at the end of a branch of a set of questions as seen in Figure 2.8. If a 
risk of this kind is detected, the unknown values need to be determined before going 
on with the analysis. On the other hand, process hazards are a consequence of the 
industrial activity itself. The number of occurrences of this kind of hazard encountered 
gives an idea of the level of safety of the process. This kind of hazards leads to a 
“Review your safety measures” at the end of the tree of questions. 
 
Evaluation in steps 
 
As it has been seen from the feedback obtained, some of the questions included in 
HarsMeth could not be answered taking into account the whole process. Maintaining 
the subdivision in steps adopted for the CCRs methodology in the new chapter “Good 
Process Practice”, those questions that have been found to be problematic during the 
testing sessions can be moved to the adequate checklist (Storage, Process or 
Reaction) and be analysed considering single step conditions. 
 4 Is showing any of the substances involved (or a mixture of them) an autocatalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5 Is there the possibility of crystallisation or formation of a segregated phase in the reaction mixture (especially on cool down 
operations and at minimum jacket temperature)? 
YES Can it affect thermal behaviour of the reaction mass or T control, or is the phase thermally unstable? 
YES Are there measures to manage or prevent it (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
6 Is the maximum dosing rate known? 
YES Does it exceed the maximum safe dosing rate? 
YES REVIEW REACTOR SETUP 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 




Once a hazard of any kind has been identified, prevention or protection measures 
have to be put in place. Even though some general ideas or guidelines are given, 
these measures should come from operators and engineers of the SME carrying out 
the analysis. The philosophy of HarsMeth at this stage of development of the tool is 
that engineers and operators from SMEs are the best experts in the process, the 
plant and the company’s capabilities. The experience of the people working on the 
process can be used to define which measures can be better applied to each single 
case. It must be remarked that one of the objectives of this tool is to make people 
think about the safety of the process. Moreover, during the meetings it was found to 
be quite difficult to define safety measures applicable to every kind of process. So, 
specific sessions using adequate methodologies for problem solving might be 
planned according to the results produced by the hazard analysis. Nevertheless, very 
basic guidance regarding possible measures to eliminate some of the hazards 
identified developed by the HarsNet group was included in HarsMeth v2. 
 
2.2.2.- Validation of HarsMeth v2 
 
To assure the reliability of the new version of HarsMeth developed, it was decided 
that it was necessary to test the methodology in the day to day work routine at a 
chemical industry, applying it to as many different situations as possible. In order to 
fulfil this goal, the methodology was applied during one year at the pharmaceutical 
company C1, its name being omitted due to a confidentiality agreement between the 
company and IQS. The intention was to improve the methodology with the 
experience acquired during the application of the tool and from the feedback received 
from the company C1, by eliminating possible vagueness that still remained from the 
previous revision, completing it with the addition of new questions taking into account 
new hazards and adapting it to the actual way of development of a chemical process 
in order to fulfil the real needs of the SMEs. 
 
The approach used in order to improve HarsMeth v2 was firstly to observe and 
analyse the different working procedures used to perform a chemical process in the 
plant, at the facilities that the company C1 has in the surroundings of the Barcelona 
area, especially the safety policies followed and safety measures used. All the 
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information required to complete the questionnaires was asked during this stage to 
the personnel in charge of the different operations. Besides, different calorimetric 
experiments have been performed, which will be described later, in order to 
determine the criticality of a specific chemical process performed at the company C1 
(cfr. page 132) according to the requirements of the methodology. Once the criticality 
of the process studied was determined by means of the necessary experiments, a 
critical review of the checklists included in HarsMeth v2 was performed, in a similar 
procedure to the one described previously for the first version of HarsMeth and the 
CCRs. 
 
From the experience gained during the observation step, together with the 
experience of operators and engineers from the company, it was possible to state the 
different weaknesses and strengths of HarsMeth v2 that were identified at this stage 
(Romero, 2004). 
 
2.2.2.1.- HarsMeth v2 weaknesses 
 
1.- Some questions are too generic and others present available answers which are 
too general and limited 
 
In order to ensure a reliable identification of the hazards related to a chemical 
reaction, the questions put forward in the methodology must be clear and should not 
generate any doubt as to under which conditions they should be applicable. 
 
For example: 
• In the Good Basic Data section, when the compatibility chart is filled in, there 
should be an indication as to extend the analysis to any possible mixture that 
could be formed unexpectedly between process substances and auxiliary 
services (e.g. water or fluids for heating and cooling). 
• Question 2.2 in the Good Process Design checklist, regarding quality and yield: 
it should be specified at what stage of process development (laboratory scale, 
pilot plant scale) should yield results at industrial scale be compared with and 
evaluated. 
66 
• Question 3.2 in the Good Process Practice checklist, in the storage section: 
Depending on the type of substance, the specific hazards and the amounts 
involved, the use of inhibitors may or may not be necessary. In fact, it is possible 
to keep autocatalytic substances in small containers (e.g. 5 L) with no inhibitor 
control, according to operators from the company C1. In this case the 
methodology would identify a hazard when the situation should actually be 
regarded as safe. 
• Question 5.11 in the Good Process Practice checklist, in the reaction section, 
dealing with temperature control when the reaction is ended: at the company C1 
the procedure used is to control temperature unless the situation is considered 
to be safe. Strictly, the given answer when completing the methodology will give, 
in the majority of cases, “Review your safety measures”, even if the situation is 
considered as safe at a given temperature. For this reason, it is considered that 
this question should come after a comparison of the temperature evolution after 
completion of the reaction and the temperature at which it is considered that the 
reactor can be left without temperature control. 
 
2.- Some values or conditions asked are too difficult to know, or the way to determine 
them is not clear enough 
 
For example 
• In the section corresponding to the analysis of a runaway scenario, it is specified 
that the MTSR parameter should be calculated in different possible scenarios 
(i.e. batch or semi-batch), however it is not specified how this parameter can be 
calculated. Moreover the knowledge of processes from SMEs in most cases is 
not deep enough to allow them to calculate this parameter because of the lack 
of resources or procedures to estimate it. 
• In the section of Good Basic Data: there are no specifications as to how to 
obtain the required data on thermal activity at the temperature of storage, nor 







3.- The conditions to evaluate the answers to the questions are sometimes not 
appropriate for hazard analysis 
 
In some cases, HarsMeth v2 asks for an evaluation during normal process 
conditions, but it would be more interesting to assume upset conditions in order to 
identify unexpected situations. It is clear that an appropriate process design must 
ensure safe conditions during normal operation. 
 
For example: 
• Question 2.3 in the Good Process Design checklist, dealing with cooling 
capacity: it is clear that the cooling system must be designed to remove the heat 
generated by the reaction in normal conditions. However, the really interesting 
question is whether the cooling system is prepared to eliminate the heat 
generated in a possible malfunction scenario in order to avoid a runaway 
reaction. As it was pointed out in the previous analysis that led to the 
development of HarsMeth v2, this type of questions generate an internal 
discussion about the evolution of a possible runaway scenario, the available 
intervention measures and the readiness or adequate infrastructures available in 
the plant (e.g. cooling systems), which could create a synergy in the 
development of the process. 
• In the Good Basic Data tables, in the column referred to the thermal activity at 
the storage temperature: it is clear that it is necessary to know the thermal 
behaviour of a substance at normal conditions, but it would also be necessary to 
know the stability of substances or mixtures at extreme conditions, like the 
MTSR, or under conditions such as, for instance, a fire at the storage facility that 
would increase the temperature in the containers. 
 




• The Good Process Practice checklist should include hazards related to 
transportation or wrong handling of containers. Besides, indications on the 
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hazards of picking substances from the wrong container due to incorrect 
labelling should also be considered. 
• The Good Process Engineering checklist does not cover issues such as wrong 
temperature measurements, wrong venting systems design or two phase flows. 
 
5.- Some information is repeated as the user proceeds to complete the methodology 
 
The structure given in HarsMeth v2 can generate sometimes a considerable amount 
of checklists containing the same information, which can lead to excessive time, 
fatigue by the person or persons completing the assessment and neglecting key 
items in the analysis. Moreover, the fact of including generic checklists applied for 
different reactions, storage and unit operations performed at one single process 
makes it difficult to come up with a specific checklist for a stage or set of stages that 
would require a more careful assessment, with the risk of leaving out some important 
hazards unnoticed. 
 
6.- The level of safety of the process is not specified after completing the 
methodology 
 
Once HarsMeth v2 has been applied to a process, the result is a set of hazards and 
parameters that may be unknown, as well as a classification according to the 
Stoessel method, but it is not clear whether there are enough safety measures 
available in case of a runaway. 
 
These drawbacks have been addressed by suggesting some modifications to the 
methodology (review of existing questions, new questions added and changes in the 
structure) to improve the reliability of the tool. 
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2.2.2.2.- HarsMeth v2 strengths 
 
1.- Useful methodology for companies with few resources to perform a complete risk 
analysis; easy to follow and to understand 
 
One of the main objectives of the methodology is to help SMEs with few resources 
(either human, time or economic) in performing a hazard analysis and to offer them a 
useful tool in the field of safety. In this sense, even though the methodology may not 
be complete at this stage, and it cannot replace a complete and thorough risk 
analysis, it gives the possibility to perform a preliminary hazard assessment. 
 
Another objective of the methodology is to be easy to apply and to make it available 
to be used by personnel with little experience in the field of process safety. Again the 
Stoessel evaluation of the criticality of a chemical reaction is much appreciated by the 
engineers and operators from the company, since it is very intuitive and provides a 
first idea on whether the chemical reaction will need further safety measures to be 
performed at plant scale. 
 
2.- The methodology allows identifying a great variety of possible hazards and critical 
elements for the process from the thermal point of view 
 
Even though HarsMeth v2 only takes into consideration the hazards originated by 
thermal conditions, the tool includes a wide number of possible hazard sources in a 
chemical process. The fact that this is a specific methodology to identify thermal 
hazards gives the SMEs the opportunity to learn and to gain experience in this kind of 
hazard analysis; another advantage that was pointed out previously is that the 
methodology is a useful tool to help the personnel of the SME to think about the 
safety of the process while it is being used. This feature proved to be very useful 
when it was applied at the company C1. This also gives the possibility in the future to 
introduce more complex systems that could perform a more complete risk analysis. 
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3.- The flexibility of the tool allows its use at any point of the development of a 
process and to extend it in the future 
 
The division of the HarsMeth v2 in different sections with separated checklists gives 
the opportunity to complete each one of those sections independently. This is 
considered to be especially interesting in order to evaluate the safety at different 
stages of the development of the process (e.g. initial synthesis investigation, scale-up 
procedures and so on). This feature makes it also easy to introduce more items in the 
future, either with general questions for the different checklists or with particular 
issues that might be of specific interest for the SME using the tool, company C1 in 
this case. 
 
2.2.2.3.- Proposal for a new draft version of HarsMeth 
 
In the first place, the Safety Management System checklist should be expanded, 
adding new sections regarding the training plan for operators and description of the 
emergency plan procedures. This new questions were a direct input from the 
experience of the personnel in charge of developing and putting the emergency plan 
into practice, and they indicate some basics requirements under an emergency 
situation. Other questions should be included in this checklist taking into account the 
possible hazards that may arise due to the loss or poor communication or transfer of 
documentation between different departments in the company while performing the 
process. Finally, a system to collect information from near misses or historical failures 
occurred in the plant should be provided in order to keep track of those events and to 
learn lessons to avoid similar situations in the future; it was detected that a 
considerable number of possible malfunction scenarios, written in the text description 
of the methodology, were usually neglected or ignored in the checklists. 
 
After revising HarsMeth v2 and applying it into different processes performed at the 
company C1, it was stated that, following the method of application of the different 
checklists, an important number of completed questionnaires contained, in many 
cases, the same information. This was mainly due to the fact that for one single 
process, different reactive stages can be involved, as well as a great number of 
process operations (like distillation, drying or filtering) that caused an excessive and 
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repetitive information being generated, increasing the time necessary to complete the 
methodology. This makes it more difficult to extract possible conclusions, since it can 
lead to an excessive fatigue in the person or persons completing the methodology. In 
order to solve this problem a new division was proposed in each checklist of the 
Good Process Practice section (Reaction, Process and Storage), which is explained 
next: 
 
• The “Reaction” checklist was proposed to be divided in two parts: first, a 
“General Reaction” checklist, which would contain the common hazards that 
could arise from the general procedures of performing chemical reactions like 
connections between agitation and dosing or general procedures that could 
lead to the formation of hazardous mixtures. Next, a “Specific Reaction” 
checklist, which will contain the intrinsic hazards to the particular reaction 
analysed like the solvents used, accumulation, temperature control, and so on. 
Therefore the “General Reaction” checklist must be completed once for all the 
process and the “Specific Reaction” checklist must be completed for each 
reaction step in the whole process. 
• The “Storage” checklist should also be divided in two parts: a “General 
Storage” checklist, which will be applied to the general storage facility of the 
plant, defined as the place where all the substances are stored for an 
indeterminate period of time, and that should be completed in a prefixed time 
frequency, and a “Specific Storage” checklist for reactants and products, which 
is to be applied to the place where these are stored for a brief period of time 
(before starting the reaction or when they are generated). 
• Finally, the “Process” checklist was considered to be too generic, and it was 
suggested that its structure should be modified completely. A new “General 
Process” checklist was created, which would be completed once for the whole 
process, and a series of “Specific Process” checklists, referring each one to 
one of the common operations done in the process apart from the chemical 
reaction steps, to be completed every time that one of these operations is 
performed in the process. The “Specific Process” checklists generated in this 
first approach are Addition / Dosing of substances, Distillation / Reflux and 
Extraction / Drying / Centrifugation. These checklists were considered as 
preliminary versions of a system that should be further developed in 
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successive improvements of the methodology to cover all the unit operations 
that could be involved in a chemical process. 
 
The new schema proposed at this stage of the development of HarsMeth for the 
“Good Process Practice” section is presented in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.9. - New schema proposed for the “Good Process Practice” section of 
HarsMeth v2. 
 
All these modifications were adopted by the company C1, and the version HarsMeth 
v2 with the mentioned changes is a key tool for this company nowadays to perform 
hazard analysis of their chemical processes. The new checklists generated can be 
found in Appendix 2.3. 
 
2.2.3.- Development of a system to identify chemical reactive hazards in unit 
operations equipment 
 
As it has been described, all the effort in the development of HarsMeth has been 
related so far to the identification of chemical hazards in the reaction stage, as well 
as during the storage of hazardous materials. Some questions have been included 
referring to physical processes, but it was stated at all stages of the validation of the 
tool that this section should be extended further, in order to identify chemical reactive 
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With the intention to fulfil this requirement, HarsMeth was again tested at a chemical 
company during several months. The company C2, its name being omitted due to a 
confidentiality agreement signed between the company and IQS, is another 
enterprise specialized in fine chemicals production. The intention this time was to 
focus on specific unit operations involved in the processes performed at the plant of 
the company C2 in the surroundings of Barcelona and to prepare specific checklists 
according to the hazards involved in those operations. The checklists for process 
operations developed at the company C1 as described in Figure 2.9 were used as a 
starting point, using the same philosophy in presenting the questions as for the other 
checklists of HarsMeth v2. Specifically, checklists were developed for the following 
unit operations (Roma, 2006). 
 
• Charging / Reaction 
• Addition / Dosing 
• Distillation / Reflux 
• Precipitation 
• Centrifugation 
• Filtration / Mass transfer 
• Extraction / Decanting / pH fixing 
• Drying 
• Micronization / Grinding 
 
All these checklists can be found in Appendix 2.4. Again, the strategy to develop 
these questionnaires was the analysis of the operations performed in the plant, with 
the help of operators and engineers from the company C2, and to decide which were 
the specific hazards related to each one of the operations studied. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this strategy can give limited results, since it is restricted 
to the experience gained by working with processes performed by one chemical 
company. Therefore it becomes necessary to develop a more generic system to 
identify all the possible reactive hazards that can be generated during every single 
physical operation that is used in the chemical industries these days. A method for 
this purpose was developed under the umbrella of the Safety to Safety (S2S) 
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network. S2S was another European Commission sponsored network, coordinated 
by the PQAT research group of IQS that aimed at improving the safety of SMEs that 
perform chemical processes. The project deliverables were knowledge bases, 
training modules and assessment tools on areas like toxicity, fires & explosions and 
reaction hazards among others. Those deliverables are freely available through the 
S2S website (S2S, 2007). The project has been active during the period 2002 – 
2006, and it included most of the partners that were involved in HarsNet. 
 
As it has been described earlier (cfr. page34), nearly 70% of the reactive chemical 
incidents take place in equipment or units other than the chemical reactor itself. 
When analysing such incidents in terms of causal effects it can be concluded that the 
inadequate recognition of reactive hazards is one of the main causes that lead to the 
occurrence of those accidents. This is usually due to the fact that the equipment 
types and process steps are diverse. The diversity makes it difficult to detect patterns 
and to transfer the knowledge to operators and engineers. For this reason, a teaching 
concept should be developed based on commonality. 
 
A training and assessment tool for unexpected reactors (Weve et al., 2007) has been 
developed by the S2S network, which includes the following features: 
 
• A training concept that helps to recognize how deviations from design 
intention will result in reaction hazards. 
• A method to generate general mechanisms for such deviations and to input 
them as user specific questions, known as ‘decisive questions’. 
• A database containing the above knowledge in tables that was built from a 
limited number of incidents. 
• A spreadsheet containing the logic programmed as Microsoft Excel® 
macros to access the database. 
 





For a reaction2 to occur at any part of a chemical plant, a combination of 3 factors 
needs to be fulfilled: 
 
• Concentration of reactants. 
• Temperature of reactants. 
• Time for reaction. 
 
This can be described in a triangle similar to the fire triangle (Amyotte, 2003) as seen 
in Figure 2.10. 
 
 
Figure 2.10. - The reaction triangle. 
 
The reason why these three factors are chosen is that they also represent the most 
important degrees of freedom in process operation and design. As with the fire 
triangle, a reaction requires an appropriate combination of these three factors: 
reducing the contribution of concentration, temperature or residence time within the 
triangle will reduce the possibility of a reaction to take place. 
 
There are some special reactions that need a catalyst or high interfacial area 
between phases (V/L, L/L, S/L or V/S) in order to obtain sufficient reaction speed. 
These factors should be added to the Time-corner, in the sense that they ‘help’ the 
time factor. They both determine the speed of the reaction and can be varied 
independently of the concentration and temperature. More so, they are frequently 
                                             
2 The method implies the assumption of simple reactions such as A+B  C and A  C+D 
 
Concentration 




used to reduce the time for reactions to complete and could rightfully take the place 
in the reaction triangle. The Time corner could then be replaced by the TIC corner 
(Time/Interface/Catalyst). 
 
In order to better understand the idea behind the reaction triangle and how it can be 
linked to process equipment, a series of examples can be introduced: 
 
Example 1: A reactor is evidently equipment located near the middle of the triangle. 
 
Example 2: A feed pre-heater in a process with a fast reaction, for instance, can be 
considered as equipment on the temperature-time side of the triangle. This means 
that it is supposed to heat a substance to reaction conditions, and it cannot avoid 
substantial residence time (typically 1-5% of the reactor time), so it should have a low 
concentration of one of two reactants to prevent unintended reactions. So, what is 
needed to turn this equipment into an unintended reactor? The answer would be to 
increase the missing axis of the triangle, which is concentration. This situation would 
be generated by an unexpected event, maybe backflow from the reactor, maybe 
product residues from another process step in a multipurpose plant. 
 
Example 3: A centrifugal pump for a thermally unstable liquid can be designed to 
operate in the concentration corner of the triangle. Then, two things are needed to 
turn the pump into an unexpected reactor: temperature and time. This situation can 
be achieved by a blocked inlet or outlet (time) and a pump motor that keeps running 
and generates heat (temperature). 
 
Like the feed pre-heater and the pump, all unit operations have been conceptualized 
with a specific task and are used with assumptions on their capabilities. Conceptually 
they can all be positioned on the sides of the reaction triangle, and they will not pose 
hazards unless they move towards the middle. There are several ways in which 
equipment can vary their position in the reaction triangle: there are outside / process 
failures (like backflow), equipment failure modes (e.g. pipe bundles in heaters leak 
and foul) and equipment inherent side effects (e.g. pumps generate heat). Some of 
the equipment effects are specific to the product or process properties. For example, 
if a thermally unstable product is involved, it will reduce the temperature margin for 
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safety operation; a heater or a system using an evaporative coolant / diluent can 
evaporate a product and therefore bring the equipment closer to the concentration 
corner of the triangle. 
 
Like the fire triangle, the main factors that contribute to the hazard are easily 
recognized and provide a simple concept to learn. Unlike the fire triangle which 
serves as a tool to solve a single situation, the reaction triangle is meant as a 
complete description of the process. It helps understanding of how the process 
design aims to avoid reaction hazards and how deviations can overcome the design 
intentions. 
 
The goal of the method is therefore to provide a system that will allow the user to 
identify the possible ways in which the equipment used in an installation could ‘move’ 
process streams with their properties over the triangle map, hence generating a 
possible hazardous situation.  
 
General Mechanisms for Reaction Hazards 
 
A non-reactor equipment item has the potential to move its process stream from a 
side of the reaction triangle towards the centre, thereby creating a reaction hazard. 
This potential is not always recognised. However, the mechanisms involved in the 
movement can be generalized. The benefit of generalization is that the knowledge 
can be applied in a wider range of cases than that from which the generalization 
derived. This is especially important when analysing incidents, where there is a 
desire to derive as much learning as possible from a few cases. Generalizations 
require deep understanding of the physics and the design intent, skills that are not 
usually accessible in the team that performs the risk analysis. Once they have been 
developed they can be applied by people with less experience. 
 
The generalized mechanisms developed for the preparation of the assessment tool 
have been divided in three classes: 
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• Failure: equipment specific failure is also related to the way the equipment is 
designed to accomplish its design intent. As an example, all coolers need a 
cooling medium, which may mix with the process fluid through leakage. 
• Side effects: equipment inherent side effects are related to the way the 
equipment is designed to accomplish its design intent. For instance, a pump 
can also be considered a small mixer. Normally these side effects will focus on 
physical phenomena such as phase behaviour, friction, turbulence, dynamics, 
stability and driving forces like gravity, heat and pressure. 
• External causes: mechanisms that are not caused by the equipment 
themselves but by general events in the process. As an example, solar 
radiation may sometimes heat a drum up to a decomposition reaction 
temperature. 
 
Mechanisms can be developed from scratch using theoretical and practical 
knowledge of equipment and chemistry behaviour but it is also possible to develop 
them based on an incident. The mechanism will subsequently be tested for its 
potential to occur in other equipment. Sometimes it is found that the mechanism itself 
involves specific physical and chemical properties of the process or process 
materials. An example is shock-sensitivity. 
 
Example 4: decomposition reactions can be triggered by the presence of rust in the 
bottom of a distillation column. The following generalizations can be derived from this 
example: 
 
• Triangle generalization: it was a move towards the time (Time / Interface / 
Catalyst) corner.  
• Physical generalization: particles can accumulate by settling out in a stagnant 
zone with a low liquid velocity. The mechanism can therefore be expected in 
vessels, tanks and heat exchangers. 
• Process generalisation: There are many process materials that are 
incompatible with rust and may decompose. 
• Failure generalization: carbon steel being a common construction material, 




Generating the ‘Decisive Question’ 
 
It is clear that having a set of generalized mechanisms involved in potential hazards 
does not constitute a training / assessment tool in itself, especially if a combination of 
general mechanisms and factors is needed to pose a hazard. There are two 
problems that need to be addressed, the delivery of the information and the accuracy 
of the method. In the proposed method, both problems are handled through the so 
called ‘User Specific Decisive Question’. 
 
Since the objective of the tool is to train people in recognizing reactive hazards, the 
entire mechanism will be split in just two parts: a condition and a consequence. 
 
IF condition THEN consequence 
 
The user will have to supply the ‘condition’ by answering a final Decisive Question in 
order to learn the ‘consequence’ of the potential hazard. This forces the user into an 
active role and regulates the flow of information. To stimulate thinking, the Decisive 
Question should preferably suggest to the mechanism involved. To limit the amount 
of information, the user first selects from a list what equipment and process 
properties he / she wants to consider. 
 
Looking at example 4 (cfr. page 78), if the user has selected the process property 
that rust may catalyse reactions and that there is a tank, then the following question 
will be generated: 
 
Can the equipment upstream form rust (e.g. it is made from carbon steel)? 
 
If the answer is positive, the consequence will be displayed as: 
 
This equipment can accumulate rust and provide both a high temperature and 




The set of generalized mechanisms for a standard set of equipment and process 
properties are broad enough to describe most potential hazards, but would generate 
too many false positives (identifying a potential hazard where the likelihood is very 
low). The risk of many false positives is that the attention of the user is diverted from 
the more realistic potential hazards. The accuracy can be improved by asking the 
user to supply additional information on the likelihood themselves. The information 
can come from the process design and control, construction materials, and so on, 
and essentially it moves a conditional aspect from the entire mechanism into the 
Decisive Question. 
 
Looking at example 3 (cfr. page 76), if the user has selected a pump and a thermally 
unstable product, then the potential hazard can be described in the general 
mechanism as: 
 
IF product=unstable AND equipment=pump 
THEN potential-hazard=”If the flow can be blocked then the temperature rise due 
to dissipation of heat may be sufficiently high to initiate a decomposition reaction.” 
 
With a User-specific, Decisive Question “Is it possible to block flow through this 
equipment?” The user provides the unknown likelihood and the potential hazard 
becomes more relevant: 
 
IF product=unstable AND equipment=pump AND condition=TRUE 
THEN potential-hazard=”The temperature rise due to dissipation of heat during 
blocked flow may be sufficiently high to initiate a decomposition reaction.” 
 
Building a database from incidents 
 
A knowledge database was build using different sets of incident sources, both from 
open literature and proprietary information. The main source of information used has 
been the IChemE Accident database (IChemE, 2007). A query was performed on the 
database as to identify incidents with unwanted chemical reactions as triggering 
causes of the events and yielded a total of 631 cases for analysis. From the public 
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information of the accidents reported to the MARS database (MARS, 2007) 68 useful 
cases were identified. Incident descriptions and summaries were interpreted and 
generalized using the concepts described previously. Some cases are also used as 
examples in the tool. 
 
The resulting database consists of tables for 16 equipment types, 7 process 
properties, 22 User Specific Decisive Questions, 25 general mechanisms and 61 
incident examples. Matrices are used to assign process properties to general 
mechanisms and to equipment Matrices and Decisive Questions to General 
Mechanisms. The complete tables are downloadable from the S2S website (S2S, 
2007). 
 
Implementation of the assessment tool 
 
The S2S training & assessment tool for unexpected reactors has been implemented 
as a Microsoft Excel® Worksheet included in the S2S website (S2S, 2007), and it is 
included in the CD attached in this PhD work. It can be run either on-line at the S2S 
web portal or downloaded for use off-line. The tool has the following functionality: 
 
• Simple user interface including time-stamped print. 
• Executing the knowledge contained in the database. 
• The knowledge database can be viewed / modified by specialists. 
• Language portability. 
 
The tool requirements are limited to Excel® 2000 with macros enabled option. 
 
The tool developed is started from the S2S website by double-clicking on the 
corresponding link. This will automatically launch Excel® to display & run the tool as 
shown in Figure 2.11. The User interface is a main screen with access to the main 
functions: Help, Assessment & Print. The Assessment itself cycles through the 
screens and displays tables to complete and results to view & print. The macros are 
triggered by jumping to the next or previous page. Thus the list of Decisive Questions 




Figure 2.11. - First page of the S2S training & assessment tool for unexpected 
reactors. 
 
The knowledge of the database is executed using Visual Basic Macros to perform the 
following logic steps. 
 
1) Display an ‘Equipment Table’ (see Figure 2.12) and a ‘Process Properties Table’ 
(see Figure 2.13) in which the user selects which equipment and process 
properties combinations are to be assessed. 
2) It pre-selects possible mechanisms from the ‘Equipment-Mechanism Matrix’. 
3) Using the ‘Mechanism-Properties Matrix’, it removes mechanisms that need a 
process property that was not selected. 
4) For the remaining possible mechanisms, it builds a list of ‘Decisive Questions’ 
from the ‘Mechanism-Question Matrix’. 
5) A ‘Decisive Questions’ list is displayed, which the user must answer with Yes or 
No. In order to facilitate the visualization of the hazards that the tool intends to 
identify, different examples based on real accidents triggered by such hazards are 
available for each of the Decisive Questions generated.  
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6) For each positively answered Decisive Questions, a table listing the relevant 
mechanisms will be displayed as well as the equipment, process properties and 





























Figure 2.13. - Process Properties table included in the S2S assessment tool for 
unexpected reactors. 
 
Assessment Tool for Unexpected Reactors         -          S2S - A Gateway for Plant and Process Safety
Present?
 y/n Equipment type Comment
y VESSELS
any pressure vessel with/without stirring, cooling, heating etc. (not 
necessarily a reactor)
y PIPES
y VALVES all types: control, isolation, check
y SHARED SYSTEMS
Examples are: weighing vessels, pumps, temporary connections, 
drums, storage tanks
y PUMPS any pump, compressor, expander 
y CENTRIFUGES
y FILTERS











K.O DRUM a vessel that separates liquid from a liquid/vapour feed
y STORAGE
a vessel connected to the process meant for a longer storage then in 
a process vessel, usually atmospheric and at ambient temperature.
Equipment: Select the equipment you want to consider for the analysis
NextPrevious
Assessment Tool for Unexpected Reactors         -          S2S - A Gateway for Plant and Process Safety
Present?
 y/n Process Property Comment
y Shock sensitive friction or shock will result in a explosion impact 
sensitivity
y thermally unstable At storage or process conditions the product or reactant undergoes a 
(slow) reaction or decomposition resulting in temperature or pressure 
build-up
ADT24
y 2 immiscible liquids L/L reaction occurs on the interface of 2 liquid phases, e.g. neutralising 
acid traces by a caustic wash
y Light solvent/diluent V/L(1) reactants are diluted by a lighter solvent to increase process safety




y Pyroforic Process feeds or (by)products are pyrophoric (reacts spontaneously 
on contact with air)
pyrophoricity
y Water Sensitive Process feeds or (by)products reacts spontaneously on contact with 
water or humidity from air.
reaction with 
water
Process: Select the general Process Properties that you want to consider 
NextPrevious
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Figure 2.14 shows all the possible Decisive Questions included in the tool. This page 
includes examples describing how the question posed is related to past accidents 
that are included either in the IChemE database or in the MARS database. The user 























Figure 2.14. - Decisive Questions included in the S2S assessment tool for 
unexpected reactors. 
 
In order to better illustrate the functioning of the tool, let us assume a case in which 
the user has selected the presence of vessels, pipes, valves, pumps, heat 
exchangers, distillation and dryers as equipment present in the plant, as well as the 
handling of thermally unstable, immiscible liquids and water reactive substances. In 
Assessment Tool for Unexpected Reactors         -          S2S - A Gateway for Plant and Process Safety
 y/n Question
y Are parts of the plant exposed to direct sunlight or to nearby heat sources (heaters, motors) 
y Can the equipment be heated through heating coils, jacket heating, heat tracing etc.
y Does the equipment need external cooling to prevent an unintended reaction
y Does the equipment have a stirrer or agitator (either mechanical or flow based, like jet/vortex mixers) 
y Does the equipment have a seals, bearings, motor, gearbox or shaft connected (like a mechanical 
stirrer)
y Can the feed enter at a too high temperature
y Do you use a vacuum to evaporate a product, reactant or solvent?
y Do you use a low boiling solvent or reactant excess to reduce the reaction hazard
y Will a reactant or solvent evaporate when the pressure in the process is reduced
y Do you process streams with large differences in viscosity, density or streams that are not miscible in 
each other.
y Do you use high surface area solids like glasswool piping insulation, filter aids or adsorption materials 
in driers
y Do you use a washing or "polishing'" step to remove unwanted byproducts or unreacted material?
y Do you have a phase separation (Vapour/Liquid, Liquid/Liquid, Solid/Liquid etc) to remove a catalyst 
or reactant from the reaction mixture.
y Do you process incompatible materials with just a single barrier againt unintended mixing?
y Are parts of the plant made from (normal) Carbon Steel 
y Do you have different materials of construction in your process because of incompatibilities between 
process and equipment materials (e.g. corrosivity). 
y Could you have dead zones in you process equipment and piping?
y Do you operate a batch or semi-batch process with a  long waiting time between batches?
y Is the reaction residence time or space velocity important to control the extent of the reaction?
y Can the failure of a single pump or valve result in a flow reversal / change in the pressure difference. 
Are there large pressure differences in the process
y Do you need to inspect or clean this equipment and open it to the atmosphere 
y Do you use or produce water sensitive substances
Questions for selected Equipment and Process
Nextincident example for cursor row Previous
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Figure 2.15. - Decisive Questions generated for a limited number of inputs selected 
by the user. 
 
This list is shorter than the one shown in Figure 2.14 since the system has eliminated 
some of the questions considered as not relevant depending on the inputs selected 
by the user. Now, let us assume that, after carefully considering the questions put 
forward, the user has decided that the only questions that truly concern the situation 
at his / her plant are the possibility of heating through coils, a too high temperature of 
feeds, differences in viscosity and the presence of dead zones, as shown in the 
selection column in Figure 2.15. In this case, the result of the assessment would be 
given as shown in Figure 2.16. 
 
 
Assessment Tool for Unexpected Reactors         -          S2S - A Gateway for Plant and Process Safety
 y/n Question
n Are parts of the plant exposed to direct sunlight or to nearby heat sources (heaters, motors) 
y Can the equipment be heated through heating coils, jacket heating, heat tracing etc.
n Does the equipment need external cooling to prevent an unintended reaction
n Does the equipment have a stirrer or agitator (either mechanical or flow based, like jet/vortex mixers) 
y Can the feed enter at a too high temperature
n Do you use a vacuum to evaporate a product, reactant or solvent?
n Do you use a low boiling solvent or reactant excess to reduce the reaction hazard
y Do you process streams with large differences in viscosity, density or streams that are not miscible in 
each other.
n Do you use high surface area solids like glasswool piping insulation, filter aids or adsorption materials 
in driers
n Do you use a washing or "polishing'" step to remove unwanted byproducts or unreacted material?
n Do you have a phase separation (Vapour/Liquid, Liquid/Liquid, Solid/Liquid etc) to remove a catalyst 
or reactant from the reaction mixture.
n Do you process incompatible materials with just a single barrier againt unintended mixing?
n Do you have different materials of construction in your process because of incompatibilities between 
process and equipment materials (e.g. corrosivity). 
y Could you have dead zones in you process equipment and piping?
n Do you operate a batch or semi-batch process with a  long waiting time between batches?
n Is the reaction residence time or space velocity important to control the extent of the reaction?
n Can the failure of a single pump or valve result in a flow reversal / change in the pressure difference. 
Are there large pressure differences in the process
n Do you use or produce water sensitive substances
Questions for selected Equipment and Process



















Figure 2.16. - Results of the assessment generated for a limited number of inputs 
selected by the user. 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 2.16, the results to the questions considered include 
descriptions of what the hazard related to the specific question would be, and the 
equipment that may be related to such a hazard. 
 
The database can be customized to change the language of the assessment and to 
change the knowledge database (modify or extend equipment, process properties, 
mechanisms and so on). The Excel® sheet can be switched between a protected 
runtime (=user) mode and an unprotected maintenance mode. The switch is possible 
with two buttons that are located two pages down on the start screen. After the 
modifications, the Excel® sheet can be saved under a new name. 
 
The language of the tool can be changed by replacing the English texts in the Excel® 
tables. Furthermore, a new Assessment Case can be defined for a new potential 
reactive hazard. The user must provide definitions for new elements to be included in 
Assessment Tool for Unexpected Reactors         -          S2S - A Gateway for Plant and Process Safety
Answer Question Result
Y Can the equipment be heated through heating 
coils, jacket heating, heat tracing etc.
Hazard type: Temperature Hazard
Equipment: VESSELS, PIPES, HEAT EXCHANGERS, DISTILLATION, DRYERS, 
Properties: 
Hazard: The temperature of the heating medium is usually higher then the onset 
temperature for a runaway reaction.
Hazard type: Temperature Hazard
Equipment: VESSELS, PIPES, HEAT EXCHANGERS, DISTILLATION, DRYERS, 
Properties: 
Hazard: Too high temperatures can enhance reactions and results in excessive 
temperature and pressure (LOC), or it can start other reactions like decomposition
Y Can the feed enter at a too high temperature Hazard type: Temperature Hazard
Equipment: VESSELS, PIPES, DISTILLATION, 
Properties: 
Hazard: Cooling capacity may be designed for cold feeds and insufficient cooling can 
result in runaway. Cooling requirements may have been overlooked in the process 
design if that assumed a fixed feed temperature.
Y Do you process streams with large 
differences in viscosity, density or streams 
that are not miscible in each other.
Hazard type: Mixing Hazard
Equipment: VESSELS, PUMPS, 
Properties: 
Hazard: For effective mixing of these streams external energy is required. The 
hazard is accumulation of reactive material when the mixing is poor
Y Could you have dead zones in you process 
equipment and piping?
Hazard type: Mixing Hazard
Equipment: VESSELS, PIPES, VALVES, PUMPS, HEAT EXCHANGERS, 
DISTILLATION, DRYERS, 
Properties: 






the tables, along with their relevant combinations for the new cases. This is done by 
completing the 2 matrices that define the equipment and process properties for which 
the mechanism is valid: in the Equipment-Mechanism matrix, all Equipment that can 
exhibit the mechanism is defined by a 1; in the Property-Mechanism matrix, all 
Process Properties that are essential to exhibit the mechanism are defined by a 1. 






Equipment A short (2 words maximum) description of the type, plus a help 
sentence explaining details of the equipment where confusion 
might exist. 
Process type A short (2 words maximum) description of the type, plus a help 
sentence clarifying details of the Process, plus a multi-character 
abbreviation identification 
Mechanism A paragraph explaining how external causes, equipment failure or 
equipment side effects can cause a movement in the reaction 
triangle and hence pose a hazard, plus a mechanism type 
number indicating the type of movement done in the reaction 
triangle, plus a Decisive Question number that needs to be 
answered affirmative in order to make the hazard relevant. 
Decisive Question A question that can be answered by yes or no and, if answered 
positively, displays to the user the mechanism of the hazard. 
 
Table 2.5. - Summary of necessary information to create a new Assessment Case. 
 
When developing an Assessment Case, an effort should be made to identify all 
equipment that could have a similar mechanism and reconsider modification of 
Mechanism & Decisive Questions in order to combine them in a more general 
mechanism. The advantage of fewer mechanisms is fewer questions for the same 
number of equipment-mechanisms. The disadvantage of too little general 
mechanisms is that the abstraction level increases and that the hazards may become 
too general. 
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2.2.4.- Development and validation of HarsMeth NP 
 
At this point of the development of the HarsMeth methodology, the strategy followed so 
far was deeply analysed. It has become clear that testing HarsMeth at different SMEs is 
a very useful system to identify a great number of possible hazardous sources at 
establishments working with fine chemicals production. The possibility given to some 
companies to work during several months with the tool has helped them to improve the 
knowledge of safety issues of their engineers and operators, and indeed the 
improvements in the checklists developed are currently being used by both the 
companies C1 and C2 for the hazard assessment of their processes, which also leads 
to an improvement of their safety procedures. Moreover, it has been proved that it is 
relatively easy for any company to extend the methodology with any particular issue 
relevant to that company by adding more questions, using the philosophy of completion 
of the checklists included in HarsMeth v2. 
 
However, implementing all the suggestions given by these companies into further 
versions of HarsMeth also presents some drawbacks. Clearly those companies become 
experts in the use of HarsMeth after a long period of time working with it, so it is 
relatively easy for them to understand why the different changes are introduced. It must 
be kept in mind that the objective is to obtain a methodology that is easy to use by all 
the SMEs working in chemical production. As it has been mentioned, developing the 
methodology with the results obtained at one company may limit the hazard 
identification to those items that are particularly critical to the processes developed at 
that company. Besides, the questions proposed are usually put forward in a way that fits 
better the internal working procedures of the company introducing such questions. 
 
Different suggestions have been described so far in order to expand the methodology 
with further questions, checklists and so on, to an extent in which it is possible to 
redefine the objective of developing a tool for a preliminary hazard assessment, to 
create a system that gives the possibility to perform, if not a complete safety analysis, at 
least a well structured procedure to identify the main chemical reactive hazards of a 
process at each stage of the development of the process. In order to achieve this goal, 
it is clear that a new structure is required, so that the methodology can be applied at any 




2.2.4.1.- Development of the structure of HarsMeth NP 
 
The structure of the checklists included in HarsMeth v2 combined the identification of 
hazards with the suggestion of possible safety measures, so the questions were rather 
extensive. They can be appropriate for a small number of issues, but as the 
methodology grows it can become tedious and confusing since the questions occupy a 
lot of space. So the intention at this point was to separate the hazard identification from 
the suggestion of possible actions to deal with the hazards, which enables the user to 
perform the analysis at different stages of the process, so the necessary safety 
measures will be pointed out as a consequence of the hazards identified, stressing only 
those measures that are really necessary. On the other hand, it is also necessary to 
include guidance on how to obtain some of the data required in the methodology, since 
this is a point that has often been required by the SMEs working with HarsMeth. 
 
The distribution of questions in checklists considering engineering, design or practice of 
the process as shown in Figure 2.5 (cfr. page 58), turned to be somehow confusing, as 
sometimes it became difficult to decide under which section a specific question should 
be included, especially since a high number of questions were suggested after testing 
the tool at different SMEs. Even though the information and the questions in the tool 
were considered useful, it became necessary to rearrange the information included in 
HarsMeth v2. 
 
There are different approaches that can be followed to perform a hazard assessment 
of chemical processes. However, there are some concepts that should always be 
present in a reliable decision making tool (Steinbach, 1999). These concepts are: 
 
• Definition of process and plant characteristics. 
• Identification of hazards at normal operating conditions. 
• Identification of possible process deviations and hazards associated to them. 
• Evaluation of plant conditions in order to carry out the process within safety 
margins (related to the hazards previously identified). 
• Determination of necessity to modify process or plant conditions. 
90 
 
Besides, it must be a company policy to register the results, to keep these results 
available for engineers or operators who carry out the process, and to review this 
procedure from time to time, or whenever a significant change is introduced in the 
process or in the plant. A good example of the strategy to follow is the PHASE 




















Figure 2.17. - Procedure for process safety evaluation. 
 
Such concepts have been implemented in the HarsMeth methodology in an attempt 
to cover the different stages in the development of a process, generating a new 
version of the tool called HarsMeth NP (Nomen et al., 2007), and it can be found in 
Appendix 1. NP stands for New Process, stressing the idea that a good hazard 
assessment should start at the earliest stages of Research & Development, covering 
different aspects as the industrial process is developed. The structure and main 
information included in this new version is shown in Figure 2.18. 
Start
Process definition and plant 
specification
Safety assessment of the process under 
normal operating conditions
Systematic identification of possible 
deviations from normal operation
Can the process still be controlled under the 
upset operating conditions?
Can the process now be controlled?
Technical measures? Organizational measuresand / or
Assessment of the next possible 
deviation identified
Documentation and stop
























Figure 2.18. - Structure of HarsMeth NP. 
 
HarsMeth NP is based in three concepts: 
 
• Inherent Safety. A system is considered to be inherently safe if it remains in a 
non-hazardous situation after the occurrence of unintended deviations from 
normal operating conditions (Kletz, 1985). Even though it is impossible to 
achieve a 100% inherently safe process, the intention is to determine all the 
possible sources of hazards from the safety point of view previously to the 
plant development of the process. In order to achieve an inherently safe 
process, the main need is to be able to perform thorough hazard identification. 
To achieve this, the process is analysed at three different stages. 
 
o Preliminary stage. All the different possible synthetic routes for a 
reaction are studied, and different screening tests are performed to 
have a general idea of the hazards of each route. 
o Bench scale stage. A reduced number of possible synthetic paths can 
be studied here. Each one of them has to be deeply studied, 




Implementation of safety measures
Industrial Scale












•Selection of synthesis route
•Analysis of stability and 
reactivity
•Basic data and methods
•Thermal evaluation & 
criticality classification of 
chemical reactions
•Study of possible reaction 
failures
•Methods to obtain data.
•Planning & training system. 





o Pilot Plant Scale. One single process should be studied here. Emphasis 
must be placed on correctly dimensioning the equipment to be used at 
industrial scale. Hazard assessment of unit operations that are going to 
be used in plant should be performed here. 
 
• Basis of Safety. It includes the implementation of preventive or mitigation 
measures, besides process control requirements, that a process needs to be 
carried out safely. For each process, they will depend on the hazards defined 
in the previous section. In case those hazards cannot be completely removed, 
measures must be included at the industrial production stage to ensure the 
reduction of likelihood or effects in case an incident occurs. 
 
• Safety Management System. Differentiated from the previous points, it is 
independent of the chemical process to be developed. It deals with the safety 
policies of the company, with a special focus on how routine operations are 
carried out at the chemical plant. The objective is to differentiate the inherent 
safety, or better said, the inherent hazards related to the chemistry itself, and 
the added on hazards that can come from incorrect working procedures or 
company organization, since a hazard will be easier to keep under control if its 
origin is correctly understood. 
 
The hazard identification is performed through a set of checklists that cover all the 
aspects that may have an influence in the safety of a chemical process. It is intended 
that, by answering those questions, all the possible hazards that may arise from a 
process developed at industrial scale can be determined. There are 5 checklists 
included in HarsMeth NP, one for each section included in the methodology. It is 




1. Safety Management System. 
2. Preliminary Reaction Analysis. 
3. Bench Scale Analysis. 
4. Pilot Plant Analysis. 
5. Industrial Scale Analysis. 
 
While checklists number 1 and 5 are simply an inventory of suggested issues, which 
the user must indicate whether they have been considered or not, the questions in 
the checklists 2, 3, and 4 are structured in such a way, that only three levels of 
answers are available, following the same system that was developed in HarsMeth 
v2 (cfr. page 62), including the possibility to provide a comment to support the 
answer. Any question that leads to a “Review your Safety Measures” type of reply in 
any of those checklists will have a corresponding evaluation in the Industrial Scale 
checklist, proposing measures to avoid the hazard or to mitigate the consequences of 
any incident derived from such hazard. All the information contained in these 
checklists is derived from the contents included in the previous versions of the 
methodology. Next, those sections are explained further. 
 
Safety Management System 
 
This section has not been excessively modified from the different revisions of 
HarsMeth. Basically it contains a selected list of items that a chemical company 
should check in order to avoid chemical accidents generated by a deficient Safety 
Management System. The information contained is distributed in the following 
sections. 
 
• Planning & Safety training 
• Maintenance & Management of change 
• Emergency plan 
• Operational Practice System 
 
The Operational Practice System section corresponds mainly to the Good Process 
Practice checklist included in HarsMeth v2. This section refers to common routine 
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operations performed during chemical processes that can trigger a hazard, which are 
more related to management issues than to the hazardous nature of chemical 
substances or reactions (e.g. systems to ensure that the appropriate chemicals are 
selected, details of working procedures and permits, and so on). 
 
Even though HarsMeth NP is considered a technical guide for hazard assessment, it 
is clear that some basic management requirements should be met from the safety 
point of view. While the issues included in HarsMeth NP are considered a minimum 
safety provision, a more complete safety management assessment tool has been 
developed by the S2S network, which can be found at the S2S website (S2S, 2007). 
HarsMeth NP strongly suggests the use of this tool for a more complete assessment 
of the Safety Management System of a chemical company. 
 
Preliminary Reaction Analysis 
 
It should be considered that the safety analysis of a chemical process must begin at 
the earliest stage of the development of the process. At this stage, different paths to 
obtain a desired product could be put forward, where different combinations of 
reactants, solvents, catalysts, products and by-products can be involved. It is usually 
unavailable to perform a rigorous safety study on every single combination. 
Furthermore, other parameters different from safety can be of importance in the 
election, such as cost, yield, quality or environmental policies. Nevertheless, an 
orientation on the possible hazards to each possible synthesis path must be given in 
order to take a decision on the choice of a chemical route. Basically, the information 
to be given for each combination of reactants is divided in two groups. 
 
• Chemical stability of reactants and products. 
• Reactivity and Compatibility of chemicals. 
 
This section contains some of the data tables included in the Good Basic Data 
section of HarsMeth v2, as well as a checklist to identify specifically hazardous 
properties of substances and mixtures such as flammability, shock sensitivity and 
dangerous incompatibilities. Different available techniques (both theoretical and 
experimental) that can help to determine every single parameter required are 
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described, focusing on those that are considered to be reasonably simple and not 
excessively costly. Among these techniques are included: 
 
• Different literature surveys and available safety indexes. 
• Theoretical methods for determination of formation enthalpies by use of 
Benson groups, as will be described later (cfr. page 148). 
• Experimental techniques such as Dewar calorimetry and DSC. 
• Chemical compatibility tables and available software. 
 
General descriptions on how and when to use these techniques are also provided, as 
well as further references in order to obtain more information. 
 
Bench Scale Analysis 
 
The Bench Scale Analysis section introduces the user of HarsMeth NP into the 
basics of thermal evaluation of chemical reactions. A brief explanation of the theory 
of runaway reactions is provided, together with a description of some of the most 
common hazards related to chemical processes, such as accumulation, segregated 
phases or formation of hot spots in the reaction mixture, and the failures that can 
generate such hazards (e.g. loss of cooling power or excessive dosing speed). This 
section includes also descriptions of the Gygax and Stoessel diagrams, as well as 
the parameters required in each one of those tools, with descriptions of the main 
techniques available in order to obtain those parameters, which are reaction 
calorimetry and adiabatic calorimetry (DSC is already presented in the previous 
section). Since the use of adiabatic calorimetry is rarely available in most SMEs, 
alternatives to the use of this analysis have to be provided. For this reason, the 
procedure for the calculation of MaxTsafe previously described (cfr. page 60) is also 
given. 
 
This section includes some of the tables provided in the Good Basic Data section 
from HarsMeth v2, as well as some checklists to identify the critical parameters from 
the safety point of view of a chemical reaction, such as dosing system, agitation, 
temperature control and so on. Finally, further references to obtain more information 
on the topics covered are also provided. 
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Pilot Plant Analysis 
 
This section was not considered in previous versions of HarsMeth, but it was thought 
to be necessary during the testing phase of the methodology. Indeed there are 
different hazards associated with changing of scale procedures during the 
development of chemical processes that must be taken into account. Some 
explanations of those hazards, related to topics like mass transfer, heat transfer, 
momentum transfer and kinetics are provided, together with a checklist to identify 
those hazards. 
 
Furthermore, the Decisive Questions developed for the S2S training and assessment 
tool for unexpected reactors (cfr. page 84) have been implemented in a HarsMeth NP 
checklist as the strategy to follow in order to identify hazards related to unexpected 
chemical behaviour during unit operations in chemical processes. The knowledge 
developed during the testing of HarsMeth at the companies C1 and C2 has also been 
used. Descriptions of each of the questions put forward in this checklist are also 
provided in order to help the user to understand the scenarios that should be 
identified in this section. 
 
Industrial Scale Analysis 
 
The last section included in HarsMeth NP aims to determine the basis of safety 
required to perform the chemical process safely at an industrial scale. This section 
describes commonly available alternatives to control any possible failure in the 
process, according to the hazards identified in the previous sections of HarsMeth NP. 
Simple suggestions are given, since the idea is still that the user should come up with 
the best solution for the process, seeking further advice if necessary. Topics like time 
factor or systems to stop reaction (e.g. quenching or the use of inhibitors) and 
process control systems (e.g. interlocks between reactor equipment) as well as 
pressure relief systems are described. Nevertheless, the objective should always be 
to avoid hazards as much as possible rather than providing numerous safety 




This section includes a checklist which contains a selection of items that should be 
considered in case a specific hazard is identified. The checklist is divided into the 
following topics: 
 
• Stability and compatibility 
• Reaction 
• Unit operations 
• Process and plant design 
 
The stability and compatibility section in this checklist should be considered for the 
whole plant, but especially in the storage area where there is supposed to be a 
limited handling of the chemical substances. The process and plant design section 
contains very basic requirements from the point of view of engineering design. 
Clearly it will be difficult to run a process under safety conditions unless specific 
quality standards in process and plant design are met. However, it must be stressed 
that these considerations fall out of the scope of the methodology, as so does the 
identification of other type of hazards that should always be taken into consideration 
when running a chemical process, such as dust explosions or toxic effects. 
 
The result of the new structure introduced in HarsMeth NP is a better organized 
system to follow a process from the R&D stage until the implementation in plant 
scale, even though it can also be applied to already existing processes. The method 
includes simpler questions, better targeted to identify the specific hazards at the 
correct moment, keeping only track of those that are really related to the process, 
which allows the user to come up with specific safety measures appropriate for the 
hazards identified. When applying HarsMeth NP to a process, the user should not 
move to another checklist until all the aspects required in the previous one have been 
filled correctly and fully understood. This means that in case the answer to one 
question is unknown, it should be checked before going any further. This way, it is 
assured that the process development is stopped at the earlier stages, instead of 
carrying it on industrial scale with uncertainties in the safety issues involved. 
Moreover, it is advised that the user should seek further information before actually 
performing any experimental test based on the information included in HarsMeth NP. 
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2.2.4.2.- Application of HarsMeth NP to the hazard analysis of a chemical process 
 
In order to test the efficiency of HarsMeth NP, the tool has been used to analyse the 
hazards of a real process tested in the laboratory for its implementation at industrial 
scale (Nomen et al., 2007). The process chosen is the production of macrocyclic 
peroxides from catalytical oxidation of cyclohexanone with hydrogen peroxide as 
seen in Figure 2.19. This reaction is the first step in the production of macrocyclic 
lactones, and it should be followed by decomposition (thermal or photochemical) of 


















Figure 2.19. - Reaction scheme for the oxidation of cyclohexanone by hydrogen 
peroxide to obtain cyclohexanone diperoxide or triperoxide. 
 
In the past, this reaction was performed using perchloric acid as a catalyst (Story et 
al., 1968), which is strongly toxic and hazardous. More recent research on the 
synthesis (Avilés, 2004) has replaced it by a safer substance, the phosphotungstic 
acid hydrate. Moreover, the hydrogen peroxide concentration has been reduced to 

















+    3H2O2 +    H2O
+    H2O






The reaction conditions were roughly optimised concerning reaction temperature, 
reaction time, molar relation of the reactants and amount of catalyst. 
 
Preliminary Safety Analysis 
 
The first step when applying HarsMeth NP would be to complete the Safety 
Management System section. However, in this case this checklist is left out of the 
analysis since it is more related to company issues and falls out of the scientific 
scope of the study of the chemical reaction itself. Therefore, the analysis begins with 
the preliminary evaluation of different synthesis paths proposed to obtain the desired 
product (Avilés, 2004). All the synthesis routes studied are based on the reaction 
between cyclohexanone and hydrogen peroxide with the following specifications: 
 
1. Hydrogen peroxide 90% and perchloric acid as catalyser. 
2. Hydrogen peroxide 35% and sulphuric acid as catalyser. 
3. Hydrogen peroxide 35% and phosphotungstic acid hydrate as catalyser. 
 
For each possible synthesis route, reactants must be analysed and a table with their 
main characteristics must be filled in. Table 2.6 shows a summary of those tables. 
Next, for each one of the substances shown in Table 2.6, a checklist is filled in order 
to identify possible stability hazards. This checklist must be filled with the help either 
of bibliographic references (material safety data sheets, handbooks, reliable indexes, 
and so on) as suggested in the methodology. Table 2.7 summarizes the results 
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Table 2.6. - Summary of the information required for each substance at the 
Preliminary Reaction Analysis section of HarsMeth NP. 
 
Is any of the substances 
considered to be potentially as: 
CYC H2O2 HClO4 H2SO4 PAH 
Susceptible of decomposition with 
time 
NO NO NO NO NO 
Thermally unstable YES YES NO NO NO 
Self reacting / autocatalytic / 
polymerizing 
NO NO NO NO NO 
Water reactive NO NO YES YES NO 
Oxidizer NO YES YES YES NO 
Reducer YES NO NO NO NO 
Flammable YES NO NO NO NO 
Corrosive NO YES YES YES YES 
Pyrophoric NO NO NO NO NO 
Shock sensitive NO NO NO NO NO 
Explosive YES YES NO NO NO 
Toxic YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Table 2.7. - Compilation of the possible hazards associated to the different chemical 
substances involved in the different synthesis paths. 
 
Some of the answers in Table 2.7 may be dependant on the environment and 
conditions at which each substance may be used or stored. For this reason, it is 
important to write a justification in the space provided for each question. For instance, 
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it is reported by Avilés (2004) that, since it contains a large number of water 
molecules of crystallisation (up to 29), phosphotungstic acid dehydrates 23 molecules 
of water around 100 ºC and the remaining 6 around 200 ºC, but without thermal 
decomposition reported up to 1000ºC. 
 
The following step is to analyse the compatibility between the different combinations 
of chemicals for each synthesis route. Another checklist is provided in HarsMeth NP 
for this objective, asking whether the combination of two substances may pose a 
hazard, related to the possible generation of heat, fire or hazardous substances. A 
chemical compatibility chart based on the risk of combining different functional 
groups is appended in the methodology as a help for the user, but other available 
methods are also indicated. 
 
It is stressed in the methodology that other materials different from the listed 
chemical substances should be included in the compatibility analyses. HarsMeth NP 
advices to include water and iron (as the most common construction material), but 
the user should include any other auxiliary materials (oils, cooling fluids) if it is 
considered that they may pose a hazard if they come in touch with chemical 
reactants. 
 
The main conclusions from the compatibility analysis for the three synthesis paths 
are: 
 
• Cyclohexanone and hydrogen peroxide are likely to react with violence 
generating heat (including also the effects of the desired reaction), fire or even 
explosion hazards. 
• Hydrogen peroxide will react with water, metals and organic substances. The 
liberation of oxygen during the decomposition reaction will increase the 
explosive range of possible unexpected reactions. 
• Sulphuric acid is also likely to react with water, most common metals and 
organic materials, releasing hydrogen and increasing flammability and 
explosion hazards. 
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• Perchloric acid is incompatible with a wide variety of substances, including 
both organic and inorganic. Its reaction with wood, paper and other cellulose 
products may lead to explosion. 
• Phosphotungstic acid hydrate is a less reactive substance. It may generate a 
reactive hazard if exposed to strong bases, alkali or other more active metals, 
metal oxides and strong reducing agents. 
 
Finally, a comparison of the hazards identified for the three synthesis paths must be 
given in order to select one of them for a deeper hazard analysis. This comparison 
can be seen in Table 2.8. 
 
Chemical synthesis path ID Stability and reactivity hazards Other aspects 
1 H2O2 90%; HClO4 
Hazardous catalyst and 
concentration of H2O2 
Low selectivity & yield 
2 H2O2 35% H2SO4 
Lower H2O2 concentration, less 
hazardous catalyser 
Low selectivity & yield 
3 H2O2 35% PAH 
Lower H2O2 concentration, less 
hazardous catalyst 
Improved selectivity & 
yield 
 
Table 2.8. - Summary of the hazards identified for the three synthesis paths studied. 
 
It must be stated that at this stage of the analysis, other parameters different from 
safety issues may be considered in the final decision as to which should be the 
synthesis route chosen. A chemical path that provides poor results in yield will not be 
interesting from an industrial point of view. In any case it is clear that, given similar 
results in yield, the safer option should always be preferred. Previous works with this 
synthesis (Avilés, 2004) have compared the results of the three synthesis paths, 
showing that the use of phosphotungstic acid hydrate is safer because of the lower 
concentration of peroxide and the characteristics of the catalyst, and it also gives 
better results regarding selectivity and yield. Therefore, it is the route selected to 




Bench Scale Analysis 
 
It has been demonstrated (Avilés, 2004) that the reaction generates the best yield 
results when it is performed using 0.05 g of phosphotungstic acid per gram of 
cyclohexanone as catalyst and 35% hydrogen peroxide as the oxidising agent in 10% 
excess, temperature 65 ºC and 2 hours of reaction, with molar cyclohexanone / 
hydrogen peroxide relation of 0.9. The reaction is performed in semi-batch mode, 
dosing the H2O2 on a reactor containing cyclohexanone and phosphotungstic acid in 
stoichiometric quantities. 
 
A safety study of the reaction conditions and their possible variations in case of a loss 
of control of the process has also been performed (Avilés, 2004). This study has 
been done by means of different experiments involving reaction calorimetry and 
differential scanning calorimetry techniques, and it intends to determine the 
necessary safety measures or precautions that would be required to prevent or 
mitigate a runaway scenario if the reaction has to be performed safely at an industrial 
scale. The main results from the experiments performed are given in Tables 2.9 and 
2.10 (Avilés, 2004). 
 
Step description Quantity of heat released / J*g-1 
Heat release 
rate / W*kg-1 
Quantity of gas 
generated / L 
per g H2O2 
Gas generation 
rate / L*h-1 per g 
H2O2 
Dosing of H2O2 969.2 264.3 0.12*10-3 83.6*10-3 
 
Table 2.9. - Values for heat and gas generation for the synthesis studied. 
 
Process 





heat /    
J*kg-1*K-1 (3) 
Adiabatic T 









65 969.2 2000 215 280 116 70 19 
 
Table 2.10. - Thermal values for the assessment of a possible runaway scenario for 
the synthesis studied. 
                                             
3 The specific heat of the mixture changes during the reaction from a value of 1961 J*(kg*K)-1 to 3335 
J*(kg*K)-1. For this reason, a conservative value of 2000 J*(kg*K)-1 has been applied for calculations. 
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In order to better illustrate the results given in Table 2.10, it is interesting to view the 
Gygax diagram corresponding to this reaction, which is shown in Figure 2.20. 
According to these results, the reaction analysed would be classified as level 5 in the 
Stoessel scale. This is considered the worst possible scenario because, in case of a 
loss of control in the reactor during normal operation (T=65 oC), the temperature 
evolution in the reactor will reach the MaxTsafe value before MTSR or Tb, hence 
leading to a runaway. This is represented in Figure 2.20 by the continuous line 
starting at 70 oC, generating an uncontrolled temperature increase, as opposed to 
the, in principle, safer evolution of the temperature leading to MTSR, represented by 
the discontinuous line, which will not happen under this situation. This scenario will 
initiate the decomposition of the reaction mass, which would eventually lead to an 
overpressure in the reactor. 
 
Figure 2.20. - Cooling failure scenario diagram for the reaction analysed. 
 
Another parameter that gives an indication of how inherently safe or unsafe is a 
reaction, is the Time to Maximum Rate (TMR). This value refers to the time that the 
decomposition reactions will need under adiabatic conditions to reach a maximum 
temperature value. As it can be seen in Table 2.10, the value of TMR for the reaction 
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The analysis of the experimental values shown before already indicates that the 
reaction will be inherently unsafe. The first suggestion would be to modify process 
conditions. However, it has been seen previously that there are no other alternatives 
that allow the reaction to be performed safely in a profitable industrial process (at 
least in a discontinuous mode), so specific safety measures will have to be provided. 
Next, the different process conditions required to perform the chemical reaction 
(temperature, dosing, agitation and so on) are analysed to determine which one will 
require special attention in the industrial implementation of the process. Table 2.11 
shows the checklist used in HarsMeth NP for this analysis and the answers for the 
studied reaction. 
 
Can variations in the following parameters affect the normal evolution of the 
process? 
Process temperature / cooling failure? 
YES; Safety measures or control systems will 
be required for this parameter 
Catalyst concentration? 
YES; Safety measures or control systems will 
be required for this parameter 
Solvent concentration? NO; No solvent is required for the reaction 
Reactants concentration? 
YES; Safety measures or control systems will 
be required for this parameter 
pH? 
YES; Safety measures or control systems will 
be required for this parameter 
Reaction time / delayed reaction start? 
YES; Safety measures or control systems will 
be required for this parameter 
Dosing rate / dosing failure (including 
wrong order of addition)? 
YES; Safety measures or control systems will 
be required for this parameter 
Agitation speed / agitation failure? 
YES; Safety measures or control systems will 
be required for this parameter 
Contamination of reactants? 
YES; Safety measures or control systems will 
be required for this parameter 
 
Table 2.11- Analysis of the possible critical parameters for the synthesis studied. 
 
As it can be seen, all the parameters considered in the methodology are regarded as 
potentially hazardous (except the solvent concentration). This is obviously related to 
the criticality level determined for the reaction as it has been previously stated. 
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HarsMeth NP requires at this point a description of the items identified as critical in 






If reactants are mixed at a too low temperature, the reaction rate might be very 
small, generating accumulation. If afterwards the reaction mixture is heated up 
to the reaction temperature the accumulated reactants might react very fast 
and lead to a runaway. 
Temperature 
If the cooling system fails, the heat of the primary reaction and the 
decomposition reactions cannot be removed properly. This will cause a high 
and possibly fast temperature increase, which might lead to a runaway. 
Delayed start 
Any unexpected delay in the reaction start may lead to the accumulation of 
reactants, which could result in a faster than expected exothermic process 
when the reaction starts. 
Dosing 
If the rate of addition compared with the rate of reaction is too high, quantities 
of the reactants can accumulate. The reaction can lead to a runaway like a 
batch reaction. 
Agitation 
If mass transfer is too slow, e.g. because of failure of the agitator in a semi-
continuous process, an accumulation of reactants is possible. If the mass 
transfer is intensified later, e.g. by switching on the stirrer again, the 
accumulated substances can perform a fast reaction of the type of a thermal 
explosion. 
Concentration 
If the concentrations of the chemicals change significantly (e.g. concentration 
of hydrogen peroxide), the decomposition process might be much faster than 
found in the reactions so far evaluated. This might lead to a fast temperature 
rise, which can also lead to a runaway of the reaction. 
Contamination / 
pH / catalyst 
concentration 
The decomposition of hydrogen peroxide is strongly dependent on the 
presence of catalysts and on pH, so the variation of any of these will probably 
trigger a runaway. Contamination of hydrogen peroxide also contributes to a 
more rapid decomposition. Specifically the presence of metals and alkalis 
should be avoided. 
 







Industrial Scale Analysis 
 
Once the critical parameters and main hazards for the process have been identified, 
the necessary safety measures must be put in place. Since HarsMeth NP is designed 
as a hazard assessment tool for any chemical process, it can only provide basic 
general guidance on appropriate safety measures for the identified hazards. The final 
decision on what specific solutions should be taken is left in the hands of the 
engineers and operators of the process, since they know better what the specific 
process conditions and resources of their company really are. In any case, the advice 
of a safety expert should be considered whenever necessary. 
 
Following the analysis detailed previously, the main actions to be taken have to be 
selected by the person or persons using HarsMeth NP. Tables 2.13 and 2.14 show a 
summary of the main recommendations given by the methodology depending on the 
hazards identified in the Preliminary Reaction Analysis section and in the Bench 
Scale Analysis section respectively. It must be stressed once again that the reaction 
has been categorized as very hazardous, so the following measures have to be 
totally reliable. 
 
Make sure that chemicals are stored and handled under compatibility criteria 
Make sure to establish effective and easy to follow storing and labelling rules 
Introduce measures to monitor and control the conditions of any parameter identified as 
critical (T, P, pH, concentration, physical characteristics of product…) 
Introduce measures to detect long periods of storage (periodic sample analysis) 
Avoid possible ignition sources 
Avoid possible oxidant atmospheres (use of inert gases) 
Introduce fire detection systems 
Introduce fire protective systems 
Introduce toxicity protective systems 
Provide pressure relief systems for vessels 
Consider the possibility of two-phase flow when designing relief systems 
 
Table 2.13. - Safety measures recommended by HarsMeth NP related to the hazards 




Make sure that cooling system is started before starting addition of reactants 
Make sure that stirring system is started before starting addition of reactants 
Introduce measures to ensure correct charging operations (appropriate chemicals, 
quantities, order…) 
Introduce measures to follow state of product for any parameter identified as critical (T, P, 
viscosity, pH, concentration, physical characteristics of product…) 
Prepare a dumping system in order to stop the reaction in case of a runaway 
Prepare solvent for quenching (consider volume requirements for reactor) in case of a 
runaway 
Include interlock between temperature measurement and quenching and / or dumping 
vessel valve  
Include interlock between dosing valve and cooling system to stop dosing in case of 
cooling failure 
Include interlock between temperature measurement and dosing valve in order to stop 
dosing in case of temperature value increases unexpectedly 
Include interlock between temperature measurement and cooling system in order to 
increase cooling power if temperature value increases unexpectedly (example break of 
dosing valve). 
Include interlock between stirring failure and dosing valve in order to stop dosing in case of 
loss of agitation 
Improve agitation systems to avoid possible dead zones in vessels where reactants can 
accumulate  
Include multiple temperature measurements in order to detect non homogeneous 
distributions of temperature 
Include systems to restart agitation safely (speed control) in case of loss of agitation 
Include multiple temperature measurements in order to detect non homogeneous 
distributions of temperature 
Include a pressure relief system (bursting disk, relief valve, depressurisation, 
containment…) 
Consider the possibility of two-phase flow when designing relief systems 
 
Table 2.14. - Safety measures recommended by HarsMeth NP related to the hazards 




It has to be stressed that the Pilot Plant Analysis section has not been completed 
since it would require an analysis of the subsequent treatment of the obtained 
products which is not available at the present time. However, the strategy to 
complete the checklist would be the same as for the Preliminary Analysis and Bench 
Scale Analysis, followed by a determination of the appropriate safety measures for 
the change of scale and for each of the unit operations required. Nevertheless, 
considering the high number of safety measures suggested should bring to 
consideration the possibility of changing the process conditions. Changing from a 
semi-batch process to the use of a continuous reactor should be analysed, as is 
stressed in HarsMeth NP as a part of the attempt to achieve an inherently safe 
process. Indeed the work performed by Avilés (2004) gives details on the 
specifications that a continuous reactor should meet in order to perform the industrial 
production of macrocylic peroxides in a safe way. 
 
As it can be seen, the new version of HarsMeth provides a more coherent way to 
perform the analysis of a chemical process under development. In fact, it can be 
considered as a more complete analysis of the hazards involved in the process than 
what could be achieved with HarsMeth v2. Besides, even though HarsMeth NP has 
been designed to perform the hazard analysis of a new process, it can be easily 
applied to already existing processes by studying the specific hazards at each 
section of the methodology, starting with the safety management system, and 
following with the stability and compatibility hazards, reaction hazards, change of 
scale hazards and implementation of safety measures. However it would be very 
problematic to analyse a new process with the structure of HarsMeth v2, especially 
considering the proposals for enlargement of that version of the methodology. The 
level of accuracy of the analysis, however, will depend on the safety knowledge of 
the user and the resources available, which will have to be considered when 
evaluating the results. 
 
The main goal of this tool is to guide SMEs in a preliminary hazard assessment of 
their processes, even though the degree of detail achieved in this version is very 
high, considering the topics covered and the information provided. In fact, the 
methodology can also be very helpful for big chemical companies as a preliminary 
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assessment tool or as a back up system to support management in the decision 
making process regarding their safety assessments. Basic tools and methods to 
avoid expensive experiments during the hazard assessment are described in 
HarsMeth NP (such as the Benson groups theory for determination of reaction 
enthalpies or the use of Dewar Calorimetry), but it must be stressed that if the results 
obtained with these methods are unclear or the reaction is regarded as potentially 
hazardous, then more detailed calorimetry tests will be required. 
 
2.2.4.3.- Application of HarsMeth NP as a tool for accident analysis 
 
A good validation exercise in order to test the efficiency of HarsMeth NP is to profit 
from the accident analysis described previously and try to match the identified causes 
that triggered those accidents with the topics covered by the methodology. With this 
goal, a further revision of the chemical accidents reported to the MARS database 
shown in Appendix 2.1 has been performed. 
 
Apart from the selection fields described in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 (cfr. page 38), the 
MARS reports contain text descriptions of the evolution of the events, which many 
times provide more detailed information than the one that can be extracted from the 
classification fields in order to find which were the direct and underlying causes that 
led to the accidents. An exhaustive analysis of each case description has been 
performed in order to extract as much information as possible from each one of the 
cases studied. 
 
Many of the causes described in the MARS reports can be linked to the issues 
covered by HarsMeth NP. In order to test the reliability of the methodology, the 
causes identified for the accidents have been grouped under different categories of 
topics covered by HarsMeth NP (Sales et al., 2007d). A table has been produced for 
each category, indicating the number of accidents in which a common failure was 
identified as a cause for the accident. The results are presented with some examples 
from the list of accidents analysed given in Appendix 2.1, to illustrate how the use of 








The development of appropriate procedures detailing how to perform chemical 
operations in a safe manner is of great importance for any chemical company. 
Especially, the issue of appropriate work permits is essential. These work permits 
must ensure correct plant and process conditions by means of accurate and detailed 
instructions on how to carry out a process, in order to enable any activity to be 
performed safely. There exist, however, a number of specific “incorrect” operations 
that have been found to be repeated frequently as potential sources of accidents, 
often involving situations that could have been easily avoided by means of a correct 





Incorrect chemicals used 15 
Bad connections 12 
Incorrect treatment of waste streams 7 
Corrosion / fatigue 6 
Introduction of chemicals in vessels already in use 6 
Incorrect handling of chemicals 4 
Failure of utilities supply 4 
 
Table 2.15. - Incorrect operations detailed in HarsMeth NP identified as sources of 
the accidents studied. 
 
These situations should be preventable by the implementation of appropriate 
operating procedures detailing how to perform any operation when hazardous 
chemicals are involved. Such procedures should reduce the possibility of using 
incorrect substances or mistaken vessels by introducing adequate verification 
systems. 
 
Waste products should be treated with extreme care, since the diverse nature of the 
substances involved can make it difficult to predict their behaviour. Mixing of waste 
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streams should be avoided unless it can be ensured that the substances present are 
not going to create hazardous situations due to incompatibilities. 
 
The failure of utilities supply should always be accounted for during process analysis. 
This includes electrical power supply, and auxiliary services such as nitrogen, water, 
or steam feeds. An interesting accident analysed is A-082. In this case, an accident 
occurred at some place in the installation, so it was decided to turn off the electricity 
supply. This decision affected other parts of the plant that were functioning normally, 
generating a second accident. 
 
But the analysis of past accidents provides a great deal of information apart from that 
included in Table 2.15. For instance, three of the studied cases (A-084, A-118 and A-
125) reported that similar incidents had happened at the establishment in the past. 
The study of past near misses was not included in previous versions of HarsMeth, 
but it is indeed a very valuable tool for hazard analysis, and it has been incorporated 
in the latest version of the methodology. 
 
Stability and compatibility of substances and mixtures 
 
It is obvious that many accidents involving chemicals occur because there is a lack of 
knowledge of the behaviour of certain substances under specific circumstances. 
From the analysis of the MARS data, at least 56 accidents have been identified that 
involved an incorrect process analysis related to the unexpected chemical behaviour 
of substances. Compatibility studies and stability tests of all the substances to be 
used should be performed. Also, possible mixtures that are not supposed to form, but 
might do due to unexpected situations, should be considered and accounted for. 
Some of the issues related to the stability and compatibility of substances, that have 




STABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY CONDITIONS 
Number of 
instances 
Mixture of incompatible substances 28 
Water reactive substances 20 
Thermally unstable substances 9 
Compatibility with construction materials / auxiliary services 8 
Pyrophoric substances 6 
Shock sensitive substances 5 
Polymerizing substances 5 
 
Table 2.16. - Stability and compatibility conditions detailed in HarsMeth NP identified 
as sources of the accidents studied. 
 
Most of the cases involving the incorrect use of chemicals, or other causes described 
previously as incorrect operations (cfr. page 111) generally involve the mixing of 
incompatible chemicals. It is therefore important to know the compatibility of 
substances, to be able to establish correct procedures and training plans, so that 
these situations can be avoided and to be aware of safety procedures to be followed 
in case they should occur. For instance, case A-129 describes how an inexperienced 
worker erroneously mixed sodium dichloroisocyanurate and sulphuric acid (instead of 
the expected sodium sulphate) generating a toxic cloud of chlorine. The worker 
should have been made aware of the incompatibility of the mixed substances by 
means of appropriate operating instructions, and he should have been supervised 
while performing the activity. 
 
When considering possible incompatibilities, it is particularly important to identify the 
effects of possible impurities. For example, case A-009 describes an explosion during 
a process involving distillation of nitroanthraquinone due to the catalytic effects of 
inorganic salt impurities present in the distillation mixture. The presence of these 
impurities remained unnoticed by plant personnel during the process. 
 
It is interesting to highlight the number of cases involving water reactivity. This can be 
related to many issues. For example cleaning operations in which there have been 
failures to verify that the vessel to be cleaned did not contain a substance 
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incompatible with water, as occurred in case A-041, where residues of sulphur 
chloride reacted with the cleaning water generating a toxic cloud. Also, weather 
effects can be of importance, since some substances react with ambient moisture. In 
accident A-003, ethylene oxide was released through a leak and reacted with 
moisture to form a polymer that auto-oxidized generating an explosion. Reactivity 
with water should always be taken into account, for example, in cases involving the 
transport of chemicals inside the installation. It is possible that a spill of a product 
containing a water reactive substance enters a drainage channel, bringing it into 
contact with water, or the break of a refrigerant system using water could bring into 
contact reactive materials. This occurred in cases A-080, where a faulty pipe junction 
released polychloroacetone, which entered the drainage system and reacted with 
water generating a toxic cloud, and A-010, where the cleaning of the cooling circuit 
generated a leak within the circuit, and the released water reacted with process TiCl4 
generating a violent explosion. 
 
It is strongly recommended in the HarsMeth NP methodology that compatibility 
studies should be extended to any auxiliary services or utilities (nitrogen, air, oil, 
water, etc) used during the process, as well as construction materials. As an example 
of this possible source of accidents, in case A-002 a leak in a pipe released ethylene 
oxide, which reacted exothermically with the auxiliary equipment, generating an 
explosion. It is also interesting to consider the formation and behaviour of unexpected 
substances during a runaway reaction. For example, in case A-130, hydrogen 
chloride was formed; this generated corrosion on the reactor wall, which reduced the 
mechanical resistance of the vessel leading to an explosion at a lower pressure than 
would have been expected. 
 
For particularly hazardous substances, specific tests should be conducted in order to 
determine the optimum process conditions, and measures should be put in place to 
guarantee that those conditions will always remain unaltered in case of process 




Chemical reaction failures 
 
When performing a chemical reaction, it must always be ensured that any hazard 
arising from a possible deviation from process conditions has been identified. Of the 
132 accidents analysed, 41 occurred during a reaction stage. A study of the failures 





Dosing failure 12 
Impurities / contamination of reaction mixture 8 
Mischarging 7 
Cooling failure 3 
Agitation failure 3 
Supply failure 3 
Unknown 5 
 
Table 2.17. - Failure situations for chemical reactions detailed in HarsMeth NP 
identified as sources of the accidents studied. 
 
It can be seen that the most common failure in these cases involves the dosing 
system. An alteration in the quantity or the rate of dosing of reactants will modify the 
expected kinetics of the process. This can lead to the development of secondary 
reactions, the consequences of which are often unknown. This is particularly 
important, for example in polymerization reactions, which are amongst the most 
common type of reactive systems generating accidents (EPA, 1999). Of the 41 cases 
analysed that happened during chemical reactions, 13 were identified as 
polymerization processes, being the polyvinylchloride and the phenol-formaldehyde 
reactions the most common processes leading to accidents of this kind, with 5 and 3 
cases respectively. 
 
Failures in cooling systems, agitation, or any other auxiliary device, as well as the 
presence of impurities, can also alter the evolution of the reaction temperature, 
leading to possible secondary processes that may generate a sudden increase in the 
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gas generation rate, hence increasing the pressure and generating an explosion 
hazard. The number of cases in which the causes of the runaway event were not 
identified reveals that chemical reactions are sometimes performed without the 
necessary awareness of the hazards involved. In fact, in some of the cases in which 
an item from Table 2.17 was identified as a source of an accident, it was also 
unknown that a failure in the reported device could generate the consequences that 
followed the accident. In these cases, a deficiency in process analysis should also be 
reported. 
 
Determination of safety measures 
 
The first action that has to be taken when a hazardous substance or mixture is 
identified should be to try to replace it by a less hazardous one, or to reduce its use 
as much as possible to make it inherently safer. If this is not possible, additional 
safety management or technical measures must be proposed and implemented. 
Table 2.18 lists some of the most common safety systems that could have helped 





Introduce measures to follow state of product 47 
Use of pressure relief systems 39 
Chemicals stored / handled under compatibility criteria 38 
Avoid ignition sources 24 
Use of inhibitors for substances or mixtures involved 19 
Use of interlocks for reactor components 16 
Introduce appropriate labelling rules 13 
Use of inert gases 13 
 
Table 2.18. - Safety measures specified in HarsMeth NP related to the accidents 
studied. 
 
For those substances that are considered unstable under certain situations, it is 
necessary to include monitoring and control of critical properties. Among the most 
common of these properties are temperature, humidity, storage time, concentration, 
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pH, and so on. Such control should be applied at storage facilities and to reaction 
processes whenever it is considered necessary. To illustrate the need of substance 
control, case A-111 describes an incorrect mixing operation due to erroneous pH 
control that generated an explosion during the charging of oxyethilenic tensioactives. 
 
One important issue from the management point of view is to ensure correct labelling 
procedures, which can also be reinforced by double checks to avoid the use of 
mistaken chemicals. This is emphasized in case A-020, where a vessel typically used 
to store sodium hypochlorite was exceptionally loaded with hydrogen chloride, 
labelled and put aside for some time. Due to weather effects the label became 
detached, so when the vessel was refilled with hypochlorite, nobody remembered 
that it still contained the acid, which subsequently resulted in an explosion. 
 
If a pressure increase inside a vessel is considered a possible consequence from an 
accident scenario, it is clear that a pressure relief system should be provided. At the 
same time, if it is known that the decomposition of a substance or a runaway event 
can be controlled by emergency cooling systems, or by the use of inhibitor 
substances, these options should always be available. Of the 41 cases associated 
with chemical accidents reported in MARS, 9 cases state that a safety system was 
implemented but did not respond adequately. This fact suggests either a failure in the 
design of equipment, or the underestimation of the possible consequences of a 
runaway event. For example in accident A-130, which has already been highlighted, 
hydrogen chloride formed during a runaway scenario corroded the reactor wall, 
attacking the construction material of the vessel. This affected the mechanical 
resistance of the reactor, so the pressure that it could withstand was less than the 
design for the pressure relief system, which failed, generating a violent explosion. It is 
also interesting that extra cooling was provided as a safety measure but it did not 
avert the accident. This shows that even though sometimes a hazard can be 
identified, there can be a failure in the appropriate design or maintenance of safety 
devices (Sales et al., 2007c). 
 
Moreover, in the case of chemical reactions, the determination of critical parameters 
during the safety analyses should determine a series of interlocks to be included in 
the reactor vessel. Devices such as cooling, dosing, or agitation systems, which are 
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commonly known critical equipment for safety as can be seen by the results 
presented in Table 2.17 (cfr. page115), should be linked to temperature control 
systems and other devices in order to stop the reaction in case of a runaway. This 
can be done by stopping the dosing of reactants when an unexpected temperature 
rise is detected, increasing cooling power, or introducing inhibitors in the vessel. 
Furthermore, it should be a policy to provide redundant control systems and safety 
measures for critical parameters identified in the hazard assessment. 
 
It is clear that the selection of safety measures must be in accordance with the nature 
of the hazard identified as a possible source of an accident. To demonstrate this, in 
case A-117, two substances were supposed to be mixed in a container, without any 
particular hazard identified in the operation. In one occasion there was an explosion 
in the vessel under normal process conditions. Further investigations revealed that 
one of the reactants had been supplied out of specification. For this case, it is not 
absolutely necessary to provide the vessel with a pressure relief system, even though 
an explosion did occur; instead, appropriate procedures to check the conditions of 





In order to better understand the analysis performed, some case studies extracted 
from the MARS database are described in detail. These cases have been selected 
because they present an accurate and detailed description of the circumstances that 
led to the accidents, and they are considered to be representative of the whole set of 
accidents analysed, since they share many causes with the rest of the events studied 
and have similar circumstances that led to the accidents being realised. Moreover, 
they are considered to be particularly illustrative as to show how the use of HarsMeth 
NP might have helped to prevent the accidents. Some of the following accidents 
happened during a reaction step, but others occurred elsewhere in the chemical 
plants (e.g. distillation, pipelines, storage), stressing the idea that chemical reactivity 
must be kept under control anywhere in an industrial establishment. For each case, 




Case 1: A-131 
 
In a reactor for the production of ortho-nitroanisol (a substance used for painting 
material and pigments production), methanol and ortho-nitrochlorobenzene were 
mixed. The vessel was shut down and nitrogen impressed. Then, without the stirring 
apparatus connected, the reactor was heated at the established reaction temperature 
and caustic soda was pumped in. After waiting of the prescribed reaction time, it was 
observed that the stirring apparatus did not run. At that point an operator controller 
switched it on. This accelerated the running exothermic reaction, with a temperature 
rise from 95 to 115 degrees Celsius. The reactor pressure rose from 9 to 16 bar. The 
safety valves opened, and about 40% of the reaction mixture, approximately 10 tons, 
was released. During normal process, the products from the reaction are ortho-
nitroanisol, common salt and water. Due to the alteration in the process, other 
products like dichlorazobenzene and dichlorazoxibenzene were generated. The 
released reaction mixture was dispersed over an inhabited area of 25-30 ha, where 
more than 2000 people lived, covering it with a yellow sediment. In total about 100 
people in the following days suffered from head aches, irritation of the breath ways 
and mucous membrane, and received on demand ambulatory care. 
 
After the accident, the following measures were established by the company: 
 
• Improvement of the training / instruction of the personnel. 
• Better knowledge of the chemistry of the reaction. 
• Improvement of the operating procedures (particularly with reference to the 
filling of the reactor and the checks to be carried out on the recipe). 
• Re-design the sizing of vents and safety valves. 
 
The key factor involved in this accident was, as stated in the lessons learned, the 
lack of knowledge of the chemistry of the reaction. The hazard of agitation failure 
during an exothermic reaction and restart of the agitation after the reactants have 
been mixed and heated is well known (Barton and Rogers, 1997), and it is described 
in HarsMeth NP as a common source of hazards for these kinds of reactions. 
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It must be highlighted that the failure in performing a hazard analysis was the main 
cause leading to the accident, and that all the other items mentioned in the 
description of the accident or the lessons learned are secondary. Obviously if the 
hazard is unknown, it cannot be included in the operating procedures or training 
programmes for operators. Besides, the effect of such a hazard on the evolution of 
the reaction is unknown, so the consequences of the accident, as mentioned in the 
description, were totally unexpected. Furthermore, the safety systems put in place, as 
mentioned in the lessons learned, where not effective. But before thinking about 
including safety measures in the reactor set up, it is necessary to perform a thorough 
process analysis of the reaction and of all the possible failure modes in order to 
identify the possible consequences of an accident. 
 
Case 2: A-130 
 
The accident occurred during the polymerization of vinylchloride in an organic 
chemical industry for latex production in a reactor heated with steam at a temperature 
of 165-175 °C. Due to a human error, a mixture of PVC-latex with insufficient 
ammonia was used. Ammonia is used in latex production as a stabilizer agent to 
prevent polymerization and to act as pH modifier. Since the reaction was carried out 
without an adequate addition of ammonia, the normal small hydrogen chloride 
production to be expected during the process could not be compensated. Hence, the 
excess of hydrogen chloride destabilized the suspension of PVC-latex which 
coagulated. The coagulation of the latex caused the mixer failure but there was no 
indication of it. Consequently, a local overheating resulted and decomposition of PVC 
occurred because the steam temperature (165-175 °C) was higher than the PVC 
decomposition temperature (144 °C). Being the PVC decomposition exothermic, the 
heat caused an expansion of coagulated latex which clogged the piping system 
including the inlet to the bursting disc and to the safety valve. The uncompensated 
hydrogen chloride started to react with the material of the reactor (stainless steel was 
not resistant against hydrogen chloride at high temperatures). Even though the steam 
supply had been stopped and the external cooling started (activated by the release of 
hot gases from the reactor), the vessel burst because the wall thickness was reduced 
from 9.8 mm to 2 mm. Activation of the sprinkler system enhanced reactor cooling 




After the accident, the following lessons learned were established by the company: 
 
• Substitution of the plasticizing agent and use of steam with a maximum 
temperature of 127 °C (latex starts decomposing at 140 °C). 
• Installation of a double signalling device on the mixer for the detection of 
malfunctions. 
• Interlock of the steam supply to the mixer so that the steam supply will be 
automatically shut off in the case of agitator failure. 
• Installation of two independent temperature sensors. The steam supply will be 
automatically shut off if any of the sensors indicates a temperature above 100 
°C or when there is a substantial difference in indications of the two sensors. 
• Installation of a level switch, which will automatically shut off the steam supply 
when a high level in the reactor is reached. 
• Installation of a pressure switch (set at 1 bar overpressure) which will 
automatically shut off the steam supply when a high pressure is reached. 
• All these steam shut off actions to be coupled to an alarm signal in control 
room. 
• During the process the pH to be monitored through regular sampling; the 
possibility of continuous pH-monitoring to be investigated. 
 
This is an interesting case of a runaway reaction in which the addition of a wrong 
quantity of one of the reactants generates a hazardous situation and eventually a 
runaway. The lessons learned reported for this case give specific details on issues 
that are covered in HarsMeth NP. First of all, the company decided to modify the 
process substances and conditions by replacing PVC as plasticizing agent and 
reducing the steam temperature below latex decomposition point. Then, a set of 
safety measures such as double signals, interlocks and sensor redundancy were 
introduced in the reactor setup (which is important considering that the failure of 
mixing was not registered during the accident), as well as monitoring of critical 
parameters for safety such as pH. 
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However, there are no indications in the MARS record about improving working 
procedures to avoid introducing wrong quantities of a reactant during the process. 
This topic is covered in the Safety Management System checklist of HarsMeth NP, 
and it was actually the main cause that triggered the runaway. If it is not taken care 
of, a similar accident could happen again in the future even if the process conditions 
are changed. The MARS report states that the use of a too low quantity of ammonia 
was due to a human error, without giving any more details. Appropriate working 
procedures such as weighing systems or double checks before loading should have 
been used, as well as specific training programs detailing the hazards of process 
variations such as the use of a too low quantity of stabilising agent. 
 
Case 3: A-120 
 
The accident occurred during the distillation of crude ortho-nitrobenzaldehyde. Six 
months prior to the final processing the material was oxidized with nitric acid and the 
products set aside. This led to the formation of appreciable amounts of thermally 
unstable ortho-nitrobenzylnitrate being formed. This was not recognized, and resulted 
in an earlier exothermic reaction and more vigorous acceleration of decomposition 
processes than had been anticipated. However, immediately prior to distillation, a 
sample of the crude product was tested using the differential scanning calorimetry 
method to determine the temperature at which an exothermic reaction would begin. 
The crude had been washed with water, toluene and caustic soda prior to testing but 
the test equipment differed from that specified, and the condensation of water within 
the equipment masked the identification of an exothermic reaction in the sample. 
With the information from the test indicating that there was no exothermic process 
likely at (or around) the operating temperature, the process of distillation of the bulk 
material was started. At about 140 °C an exothermic reaction occurred rapidly 
reducing the vacuum in the system to a positive pressure with a final violent runaway 
resulting in deflagration. The vessel (although equipped with a high-temperature 
alarm set at 140 °C, a high-temperature trip of the steam supply set at 150 °C and a 
second trip set at 170 °C activating the dumping of the heavy hydrocarbons) could 
not cope with this speed of reaction and did not prevent the runaway. It is thought 




After the accident, the company decided not to process the substance involved in the 
accident any further and to review all the management system and control of 
processes. 
 
This case shows the importance of the reliability of tests performed to determine the 
thermal stability of substances handled in a chemical establishment. This issue was 
not sufficiently stressed in previous versions of HarsMeth. The fact that past 
accidents have been reported in which failures during this kind of testing have been 
identified as a cause of the accidents, enforces the necessity of a hazard assessment 
tool to give some guidance or references to this matter, as has been included in 
HarsMeth NP. In this particular case, the failure to identify the exact temperature for 
decomposition led to an incorrect process analysis and to a failure in the design of 
safety measures, as the provided system of alarms and trips was not effective when 
the runaway took place. 
 
Case 4: A-103 
 
In a facility for chlorination used in the production of dimethyl-
phosphorochloridothioate (MP-2) and diethyl-phosphorochloridothioate (EP-2), a new 
reactor for production of MP-2 was used for the first time. Similar equipment was 
already in use at the same establishment, but the new reactor was microprocessor 
controlled, especially for controlling the chlorine addition rate and the cooling in order 
to maintain the process conditions (30 °C and atmospheric pressure) because the 
chlorination of dimethyl-phosphorodithiotic acid (MP-1) to MP-2 is exothermic.  
 
During commissioning, the temperature controller was blocked while testing the 
microprocessor and the connection was not re-established before starting operation. 
The production started at noon and the operators did not pay attention to the 
temperature that was recorded. Owing to a high chlorine addition rate and no cooling, 
the temperature rose to be in excess of 120 °C about 2 hours after starting 
production. The solvent (naphtha) evaporated and a sudden fast decomposition 
occurred. The reactor was equipped with a venting system and a relief pipe provided 
with a rupture disc but the relief capacity of the system was however insufficient 
compared to the amount of gases released during the fast decomposition of the 
124 
substances. The result of the accident was the fracture of the rupture disc, 
deformation of the reactor lid and the elongation of the bolts of the lid. Flammable 
gases were released through the venting system and through the open reactor lid 
into process hall. The vapour cloud was ignited when it reached the control room 
causing an explosion. On the basis of the deformations of the reactor and of the 
building, the company estimated that the pressure in the reactor reached values of 
25-35 bar and that the overpressure in the building reached values of 100-150 mbar. 
 
After this accident, the following lessons learned were provided as reported to MARS: 
 
• The buildings, the process and control equipment will be rebuilt and modified. 
• The emergency shut-down system to be independent from the unit (operation) 
control system. 
• Redundancy in the control system to be provided. 
• Process supervision (warning / alarm) signals to be improved. 
• Temperature and chlorine addition rate control systems to be improved. 
• Safety management system to be improved. 
• Man-machine communication system to be improved. 
• The control room structure should be strengthened and direct access from the 
production hall to it had to be eliminated. 
 
The lessons learned given for this case, even though are appropriate, are a bit too 
generic and do not analyse in depth the causes of the accident, which can be derived 
from the accident description. In the first place, there was a deficiency in the working 
procedures for the testing of the microprocessor. Besides, a lack of supervision and 
training of operators was probably involved in the failure of not re-establishing of the 
connection after testing. 
 
The fact that there was a relief system in place shows that the reaction was known to 
be potentially hazardous. However, its design was not appropriate for the 
consequences that could be generated from a loss of control of the reaction. Either 
the analysis of the runaway was not adequate or the dimensioning of the relief disc 
should have been improved for the situation of too high chlorine addition rate plus 
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loss of cooling. A better solution is, however, to provide measures in order to avoid 
starting operation without the signal of the microprocessor being in place. 
 
Case 5: A-085 
 
Phosphorous trichloride was released from the bottom of an iron tank during the 
separation of the two layers formed by decanting and transferring the layers to 
storage tanks linked to the installation. The released liquid, having got in contact with 
the water on the ground, caused a primary exothermal reaction forming a 
hydrochloric acid cloud, and secondary reactions forming flammable products, 
followed by the ignition of such products. The response action for extinguishing the 
fire with water and foam caused the formation of more hydrochloric acid in significant 
quantities and the further increase of the toxic cloud which moved towards an 
inhabited area outside the establishment, but did not generate consequences among 
the population. 
 
The MARS report states that the probable cause of the accident was the wrong 
positioning of the tank in respect to the withdrawal point for the transfer of the 
phosphorous trichloride to the plant, due to an error of an operator. The lessons 
learned reported are the following: 
 
• Modifications have been made in order to improve the discharge system of the 
iron tanks. 
• The accident demonstrates the need for a better training of the operators 
responsible for discharging operations. 
 
However, there is also a need to improve the analysis of compatibility of the 
phosphorous trichloride. A process analysis detailing the reactivity of this substance 
with water (as suggested in HarsMeth NP) should have been performed. This would 
have revealed the need to improve the design and training for the discharge 
operation, as mentioned in the lessons learned, and would have also made the plant 
personnel aware of the hazards of discharging this substance in an area where it 
could easily come in contact with water. 
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Case 6: A-060 
 
A tank containing benzoyl chloride was scheduled for emptying and cleaning 
operations. A few days before the accident occurred, it was impossible to empty the 
tank due to the presence of solid deposits of benzoic acid which had probably been 
formed by a slow decomposition reaction of the product. It was decided to dissolve 
the deposits by adding a solvent, and some tests were performed in the laboratory 
with methanol without any kind of reaction occurring. After a few minutes of pumping 
methanol into the tank, a small explosion caused by an overpressure in the tank took 
place and a gas cloud was released. Benzoyl chloride reacts with alcohols releasing 
hydrogen chloride. This is what occurred when methanol was added to the tank. The 
cloud formed in the accident reached some houses located 150 meters from the 
establishment. Some inhabitants suffered from severe eye irritation. The operators 
attempted to abate the cloud by setting up a water curtain and by spraying the tank. 
 
The analysis of the accident report and the on-site investigation has shown the 
following failures that have to be dealt with in the future: 
 
• Tests performed proved to be not sufficiently representative. Further tests 
performed after the accident showed an exothermic reactive behaviour of the 
mixture of methanol and benzoyl chloride above 30 °C. 
• Absence of a management representative on the site and failure in managing 
the organization and decision chain with respect to the safety issues. 
• Delayed instigation of the onsite contingency plan. 
• Organizational failure of the operator in managing the immediate 
consequences of the accident. 
• Overflow alarm of the tank not connected to the control room. 
• Poor condition of the joint on the man-hole flange of the tank. 
• Carrying out the emptying procedure presented a hazardous situation to the 
plant personnel and the environment consequent to a faulty hazard 
assessment. This led to the use of incompatible substances and an incorrect 
evaluation of the consequences of such an operation. 




Again the issue of representative hazard tests is given as a cause for the accident. 
The lessons learned from this report give a very good and comprehensive description 
of the failures that led to this accident, mainly the lack of training, process analysis 
and appropriate procedures for cleaning operations, as well as failures in the 
inspection of the flange and connections of alarms. 
 
Case 7: A-054 
 
During delivery of sodium chlorite to a chemicals warehouse, a violent explosion 
occurred when two products were mixed. Some sodium chlorite had been put in a 
container holding ferric chloride, which is incompatible with the delivered substance. 
Subsequent explosions in other containers were generated, and a toxic chemical 
cloud was formed, consisting of chlorine and chlorine dioxide. 
 
Even though the MARS record does not provide further information regarding the 
causes or the lessons learned from the accident, this is an obvious case in which it is 
clear that either the procedures for the operation were insufficient or they were not 
followed properly. There must be a system in place to verify the contents of a vessel 
before loading it with another chemical substance. Extending binary compatibility 
tests to all the possible chemical combinations of substances involved in a chemical 
plant, as suggested in HarsMeth NP, could help to raise awareness among process 
engineers and operators as to the possible hazards related to an unexpected 
chemical mixing. 
 
Case 8, A-040 
 
The accident occurred in one of the two hydrogen peroxide production units of a 
general chemical industry. Each production unit was composed of three sections: 
hydrogenation, oxidation and extraction. A pipeline containing hydrogen peroxide 
was ruptured due to the decomposition of this substance, leading to a release and 
subsequent fire of the decomposition products. The most probable cause for the 
decomposition of hydrogen peroxide was the presence of unstabilizing agents in 
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suspension (metallic particles due to rust). An abrupt increase of temperature from 70 
to 200 °C in less than 5 minutes was registered. 
 
The initiating event was the failure of the automatic control devices together with a 
series of human errors during the attempt to repair them. Particularly, the safety 
procedures followed were not suitable for the event. Furthermore these procedures 
were not fully applied. Some valves, that could be manually closed, remained 
opened. As those valves were necessary for the isolation of the various sections of 
the production chain, the solution passed from the oxidation to the extraction step 
and back again via the pipeline. An overflowing of the fire extinction water to the 
natural environment was generated, due to the under-dimensioning of the 
containment basin designed for this purpose. 
 
The activity of the destroyed production chain was suspended by the inspection 
authorities and a permission to restart the production will be given only by 
resubmission of a complete request for operating authorisation. This request has to 
contain a new safety report taking into account the results of the actual 
investigations. As far as the new start-up of the other production unit, the following 
measures were established by the authorities: 
 
• Prevention of hydrogen peroxide back flow to the oxidation section. 
• Improvement of the automatic control system. 
• Improvement of operators training and improvement of written procedures. 
• Increase of the retention basins capacity was required. 
 
In this case, the accident report and the lessons learned focus on the improvement of 
training for operators, written procedures and prevention of backflow. However, it is 
also necessary to control the presence of impurities in the pipeline, how and where 
they can be generated. Then, it is also necessary to ensure that those impurities, if 
formed, will never become in touch with the hydrogen peroxide, for example, by 
introducing measures to avoid the backflow. Hydrogen peroxide is known for being 
extremely reactive with metals, which catalyses the decomposition of this substance 
very fast, so it is necessary to provide all the required measures to avoid this 




Case 9: A-012 
 
A welding process (manual electrode welding) took place on the outside wall of a 
storage tank which was two thirds filled with formaldehyde (37% solution). The 
welding operation over the level of the liquid phase in the storage tank overheated 
the gas causing the explosion of the air / formaldehyde mixture and the release of 
vapours into the environment. Inside the establishment 2 people were killed and 10 
were injured by the explosion. 
 
After the accident the following measures were established by the company. 
 
• The storage temperature must be controlled. 
• The revision of the fire and explosion certificate is necessary. 
• Measures to match the state-of-the art in matters of safety have to be 
introduced. 
• Welding works to be performed only under management supervision. 
• Storage tanks have to be equipped with hermetic sealed pumps and leak proof 
fittings. 
 
This accident shows the importance of a correct check of the chemical conditions in a 
vessel when reparation works have to be performed. In this case, the flammability of 
the mixture and the hazards of providing a heat source such as electrode welding 
should have been analysed. Supervision during maintenance operations is also 
essential. Both issues (analysis of flammable mixtures and correct supervision during 
routine operations) are clearly stated in HarsMeth NP. 
 
Case 10: A-005 
 
An inspection of the level measurement device of a titanium tetrachloride (TiCl4) 
evaporator was being carried out. On disconnecting the signal wiring of the level 
measurement device, the process computer responded to this signal as empty and 
opened the control valve to fill the evaporator. The evaporator was not isolated prior 
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to the start of the work, so it started to fill with TiCl4, without anyone noticing. 
Meanwhile the work continued and the level measurement device was removed. At 
this moment the evaporator overflowed releasing TiCl4 on the first and second level 
of the reactor building. The high level alarm was silenced by the panel operator. TiCl4 
produces hydrogen chloride and TiO2 in contact with water (including air humidity), so 
rapidly a thick toxic white cloud was formed inside the reactor building. Two 
contractors working on the first floor could not locate an emergency ladder. Both 
were new to the installation and were trapped with very little visibility due to the thick 
white cloud. Both were found dead by search parties afterwards. 
 
The main lessons to be learned from this accident are: 
 
• Work permit system has to be used strictly. The installation was not properly 
isolated prior to the work. 
• Adequate training and supervision are necessary. This must include adequate 
information for contractor workers about safety in the installation, such us the 
use of safe evacuation routes. 
• Contractors cannot be relied upon to inform their personnel about the on-site 
safety information; a strict control system is necessary. 
• Improvement of control and alarm systems. There should be a clear difference 
between no signal and zero signals in the process computer. Also, an interlock 
system should be used to prevent overflow of the evaporator, and a better 
management of alarms should be introduced, to avoid neglecting critical 
alarms. 
• A management crisis team is necessary to ensure communications with 
external emergency services. A prompt alert for these services is also 
necessary. 
 
This case shows the importance of appropriate management for maintenance. As 
mentioned previously, procedures for correct inspection of plant equipment should 
have been put in place, especially those related to preparation of the equipment for 
maintenance. Furthermore, permit systems as well as training for contractors are 




As it can be seen from the descriptions of the previous case studies, chemical 
accidents can have a wide variety of direct or underlying causes. It is therefore 
necessary to try to take all the possible hazard sources into account in order to run 
chemical processes safely at industrial scale. The comparison of the causes of those 
accidents with the items covered in the HarsMeth NP methodology shows that in 
many cases the use of the methodology could have helped to identify the hazards 
that eventually led to the occurrence of the accidents. 
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2.3.- Calorimetry study 
 
HarsMeth version 2 has been used in order to establish the criticality of one of the 
processes under development at the company C1, according to the information 
required in the methodology. Different experiments have been performed to 
determine the required values asked in HarsMeth v2 to perform the hazard 
assessment of the studied process. 
 
Due to the confidentiality agreement signed between IQS and the company C1, in 
order to protect industrial property, only limited information regarding the chemical 
products involved in the analysis is given. Only reference codes can be given for the 
initial reactant (1474) and for the final desired product (1482). This limitation will not 
affect the essential information regarding the reactivity and hazards related to the 
process analysed. 
 
The process chosen for the study is related to the synthesis of a pharmaceutical 
compound produced at the installations of the company C1. The process involves 







Figure 2.21. - Synthesis path for the production of the pharmaceutical compound 
1482 according to the chemical recipe provided by the company C1. 
 
In order to determine the safety parameters required in HarsMeth v2, different 
experimental techniques are available. Reaction calorimetry is perhaps the most 
common method to determine the heat of a reaction (HarsBook, 2003). This 
technique has some disadvantages, mainly the higher cost compared to other 
methods like differential scanning calorimetry, or the lower sensibility compared to 
microcalorimetry. Besides, it can provide little information regarding undesired 
secondary reactions generated in the course of a runaway, even though some 
1. 1474 + MeONa R-SO3-R’ EQR.01
2. R-SO3-R’ + R’’-SH R-S-R’’ + R-SO3H EQR.02
3. R’-Cl + MeONa R’-OCH3 + NaCl EQR.03
4. R-OCH3 + H2O2 1482 EQR.04
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calorimeters provide the option of inducing such conditions by operating in pseudo-
adiabatic mode. In spite of these disadvantages, reaction calorimetry is a much 
appreciated technique in the measurement of the heat of chemical reactions. 
 
Reaction calorimetry is not only a key technique for risk assessment of chemical 
processes, but also an effective tool to determine the dimension of cooling systems 
for chemical reactors. In a final stage, the combination of reaction calorimetry with 
commonly available laboratory equipment can provide direct and accurate measures 
of the quantity and rate of gas generation during the desired reaction, so it is an 
appropriate tool for scale-up and optimization of processes. A wide variety of reaction 
calorimeters is available nowadays. They differ basically in the approach used for the 
measurement of the heat flux generated or absorbed by the reaction, and innovative 
methods to develop new calorimeters in order to improve the determination of the 
parameters involved in the heat balance of chemical reactions are constantly being 
developed (Sempere et al., 2003). Comparisons of the strengths and weaknesses of 
each type of existing calorimeters can be found in the literature (HarsBook, 2003). 
 
The best technique to obtain data from runaway reactions is adiabatic calorimetry. 
The term adiabatic refers to a system condition in which no heat is exchanged 
between the system and its environment (HarsBook, 2003). This is the situation that 
better represents a runaway scenario, considering that the rate of heat production in 
the reaction vessel is so high that the cooling capacity cannot remove the heat 
generated. Adiabatic calorimetry experiments are particularly useful in order to 
determine values related to the decomposition of chemical mixtures, such as the 
adiabatic induction time, (i.e. the time the system needs under adiabatic conditions to 
reach the point of highest temperature gradient), or the time to maximum rate of heat 
generation, TMRad. Another important feature is that it can also determine the gas 
generation rate in a decomposition process, giving accurate values for the pressure 
that can be reached during a runaway reaction. It must always be kept in mind that 
pressure increase is the final hazard in a runaway, since it is this phenomenon that 
can lead to the explosion of a reactor. However, adiabatic calorimetry experiments 
are expensive and require a high degree of expertise to perform them and to analyse 
the data obtained. For this reason, it is a technique that is hardly ever used in SMEs, 
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as has been repeatedly stated in the feedback received during the testing of 
HarsMeth. 
 
A basic technique to determine the thermal stability of a substance is differential 
scanning calorimetry, or DSC (HarsBook, 2003). It involves the measurement of the 
heat released or absorbed by a sample in comparison to a reference while they are 
both subject to the same temperature regime. This is a simple and easy to use 
method which is usually available at the majority of the chemical companies. DSC 
can be used to determine heats of decomposition of substances and mixtures, and its 
main advantages are the short time necessary to perform an experiment and the use 
of small sample quantities. This fact reduces the possible hazards associated to the 
reactants used, but it forces to ensure that the sampling is representative of the 
mixtures analysed. Another disadvantage of this technique is the fact that there is no 
possibility of including an agitation system, so it is difficult to provide appropriate 
mixing, especially when heterogeneous reactions are involved. Therefore, even 
though it can determine the heat of a reaction, the results may not be as reliable as 
those obtained by reaction calorimetry. Besides, the construction material of the 
sample container must be carefully chosen, since it may affect the results obtained 
during the analysis. 
 
2.3.1.- Reaction calorimetry results 
 
The Reaction calorimeter RC1® of Mettler-Toledo has been used to perform the 
experiments for each one of the four reaction steps described in Figure 2.21 (cfr. 
page 132), in order to obtain the necessary parameters to establish the criticality of 
the reactions. This calorimeter uses the method of heat flow calorimetry. The basic 
equation of this type of reaction calorimetry is the heat balance of a stirred tank 
reactor, described by Eq. 2.1: 
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 U is the heat transfer coefficient 
 A is the heat transfer area 
 rQ&  is the exothermic power of the chemical reaction 
 lossQ&  is the power of heat loss to environment  
 dosQ&  is the power of heat absorption / release by dosed substances 
  stirrQ&  is the power introduced by the stirrer 
 cQ&  is the power of the electrical (calibration) heater 
 
The respective signs (+/-) are introduced into the values according to the direction of 
the heat flow. The specific heat of the reaction mixture cpr and the global heat transfer 
coefficient U are determined by calibrations before and after the reaction. An 
interpolation is carried out between these values, the exact conditions of which are 
defined by the user. The power input of the stirrer stirrQ&  is obtained by measuring the 
torque of the stirrer shaft. The heat loss lossQ& of the reactor is usually determined by 
calibrations, but the use of a thermostated lid accomplishes that it can be usually 
neglected. In case of dosing or removal of material to or from the reactor a 
convective term must be considered, with the heat value being described by Eq. 2.2: 
 
 ( )rdpdddos TTcmQ −= &&  [Eq. 2.2] 
 
with Td = Temperature of the dosed substance. 
 
In perfect isothermal mode the control unit adjusts the jacket temperature in a way 
that the reaction temperature remains constant and thus the accumulation term is 
zero at all times. In adiabatic mode the control unit maintains the jacket temperature 
at any time just slightly above the reactor temperature to avoid heat flow to the jacket. 
 




RC results obtained for EQR.01 
 
The first step of the synthesis studied corresponds to an acid-base reaction. The 
procedure followed to perform the reaction consists on charging the reactant 1474 in 
the reaction vessel, and then MeONa (at ambient temperature) is dosed during 32 
minutes. The reaction is performed at a temperature of 4 oC. The power profile for 
















Figure 2.22. - Power profile for reaction EQR.01. 
 
The main results obtained from this calorimetry test are given in Table 2.19. 
 
Process stage Tr / oC Reaction mass / kg 
ΔrH / 
kJ*kg-1 (4) 
ΔTad / oC 
Charging of 1474 4 0.835 - - 
Dosing of MeONa 4 1.145 -30.95 17 
 
Table 2.19 - Calorimetry results for reaction EQR.01. 
                                             

















































































Two different zones can be seen in the power profile shown in Figure 2.22, which can 
be due to different physical-chemical mechanisms during the reaction. The first 
tendency corresponds to the time comprised between the beginning of dosing and 
the time when 32% of MeONa has been dosed. In this period, a peak of heat is 
generated (34 W per kg of reaction mass) and then the heat generation decreases 
progressively. At the end of this period, 23% of the total reaction heat has been 
generated. The second tendency corresponds to the time comprised between the 
32% of MeONa dosed until the time when dosing has been completed. In this period, 
the heat generation is totally controlled by the dosing speed of MeONa. 
 
The value for adiabatic temperature increase given in Table 2.19 is the highest value 
obtained, and it corresponds to the non-stop case (cfr. Introduction, page 22), in 
which it is considered that the dosing of MeONa would not be stopped under 
adiabatic conditions. 
 
RC results obtained for EQR.02 
 
The second reaction involved in the process is a sulphur alquilation. Figure 2.23 
shows the power profile of this step. 
 
The reaction is developed as follows: the reactant R-OSO2-R’ is charged in the 
reactor together with the solvent and the temperature of the reaction mass is set at 
10 oC. Next, methanol is added, followed by the solid reactant R’’-SH in the fastest 
possible way, after which the reaction mass is heated until 30 oC, and it is kept at that 
temperature during 2 hours. After that time, the reaction mass is ready to be 
discharged, after checking the conversion degree. The addition of solvent can be seen 
at t=1 min in Figure 2.23, while the addition of R’-SH corresponds to the period from t=6 
















Figure 2.23. - Power profile for reaction EQR.02. 
 
The main results obtained from this calorimetry test are given in Table 2.20. 
 
Process stage Tr / oC Reaction mass / kg 
ΔrH / 
kJ*kg-1 (5) 
ΔTad / oC 
Charging of R-OSO2-R’ 10 1.143 - - 
Addition of solvent 10 1.207 -1.22 0.5 
Addition of R’’-SH 10 1.507 -75.82 36 
 
Table 2.20. - Calorimetry results for reaction EQR.02. 
 
In this step, it has to be considered that the reactant R’’-SH should have been added 
instantaneously, but since it is a solid, it is added in the shortest possible time (15 
minutes), since otherwise it would have blocked the addition tube of the reactor. It 
must be noted that at the company C1, the reaction is performed at plant scale by 
adding R’’-SH at once, which could lead to a further increase of the reaction 
temperature. But even in the worst possible situation (total adiabatic behaviour of the 
                                             































































































reaction mass) the maximum temperature that could be reached by the reaction 
mass would be around 50 oC, at which there is no further evolution of the reaction. The 
value for adiabatic temperature increase given in Table 2.20 is calculated for the 
batch case, in which it is considered that the reactant is added instantaneously under 
adiabatic conditions. Therefore, if the addition is performed keeping the cooling system 
active during the whole process, there should be no problem in keeping the heat 
generation under control. 
 
RC results obtained for EQR.03 
 
The third step studied is a nucleophilic substitution on an aromatic ring. The power 















Figure 2.24. - Power profile for reaction EQR.03. 
 
The procedure followed for this step is the following: first the reactant R-Cl is charged 
in the reactor, then the reaction mass is heated until 30 °C. The catalyser is added 
(t=0) and the limiting reactant MeONa is dosed during 24 minutes, both substances 
added at ambient temperature. In this case, however, due to a problem with the 
dosing pump (from t=43 min until t=46 min), the total time for dosing was 46 min 






























































































The second step for the reaction consists on heating the reaction mass until 60 °C 
and keeping this temperature for 30 minutes. Then the reaction mass is distilled at 67 
°C until the distilled volume is 390 ml. At this point, the reaction is switched to reflux 
mode during 8 hours, according to the recipe for the reaction developed at the 
company C1. 
 
The main results obtained from this calorimetry test are given in Table 2.21. 
 
Process stage Tr / oC Reaction mass / kg 
ΔrH / 
kJ*kg-1 (6) 
ΔTad / oC 
Charging of R-Cl 30 1.503 - - 
Addition of catalyser 30 1.561 -13.22 6.3 
Dosing of MeONa 30 2.027 -44.75 23 
Tr set at 60 oC  60 2.027 -3.50 1.4 
 
Table 2.21. - Calorimetry results for reaction EQR.03. 
 
In this step, two different zones can be seen in the power profile shown in Figure 
2.24, which can be due to different physical-chemical mechanisms during the 
reaction. The first tendency corresponds to the period comprised between the 
beginning of dosing and the time when 29% of MeONa has been dosed. In this 
period the heat of the reaction is generated in different peaks, with a maximum value 
of 245 W per kg of reaction mass. At the end of this period, 50% of the total heat of 
the reaction has been generated. The second tendency corresponds to the period 
comprised between the 29% of MeONa dosed until the time when dosing has been 
completed. In this period, the heat of reaction generated is totally controlled by the 
dosing speed of MeONa. In this step, 99% of the heat of reaction is generated during 
the dosing of MeONa. 
 
The reaction takes place at the temperature of 30 oC during 30 minutes, and then the 
temperature is set at 60 oC. This generates an increase in the reaction speed, thus 
                                             
6 kg of reaction mass 
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increasing the heat generated. However, after 15 minutes of reaching the new set 
temperature, no further heat generation is observed. It must also be noted that no heat 
is generated during the distillation procedure. This part of the reaction is not shown in 
Figure 2.24 for practical reasons. 
 
The values for adiabatic temperature increase given in Table 2.21 correspond to the 
non-stop case for the dosing of MeONa, and to the batch case for the addition of the 
catalyser and temperature set at 60 oC. 
 
RC results obtained for EQR.04 
 
The final step for the synthesis of the product studied is the oxidation of the by-
product obtained in the previous step with hydrogen peroxide at 35% solution. To 
perform this step, the reaction vessel is charged with the initial reactant, the reaction 
temperature is set at 2 oC and the hydrogen peroxide (at ambient temperature) is 
dosed during 90 minutes. Then the reaction is left at the set temperature during 5 hours. 














































































































The main results obtained from this calorimetry test are given in Table 2.22. 
 
Process stage Tr / oC Reaction mass / kg 
ΔrH / 
kJ*kg-1 (7) 
ΔTad / oC 
Charging of R-OCH3 7 1.291 - - 
Dosing of H2O2 2 1.348 -82.70 35 
 
Table 2.22. - Calorimetry results for reaction EQR.04. 
 
From the power profile shown in Figure 2.25, it can be seen that there is an initial 
stage which corresponds to the period between the beginning of dosing and the time 
when 16 % of H2O2 has been dosed (which lasts around 15 minutes). In this period, 
the heat generation due to the reaction increases considerably. After this stage, it can 
be seen that the heat generation is nearly constant, even though it increases slightly 
until a maximum value of 16 W per kg of reaction mass. 
 
The heat release during the dosing of the hydrogen peroxide solution is relatively 
high, taking into consideration the mass of the limiting reactant dosed. However, due 
to the dilution of the reactant in the reaction mass, the effect generated is significantly 
lower. The highest part of the heat is generated during the dosing time (when dosing 
is finished, 86% of the total heat has been released by the reaction), but it continues 
around two hours after dosing is complete. 
 
2.3.2.- Differential scanning calorimetry results 
 
The determination of the stability of the products obtained after each one of the 
reaction steps has been performed using differential scanning calorimetry (DSC). A 
series of DSC experiments has been conducted in a Mettler-Toledo DSC30® in order 
to determine the decomposition energies and their temperature regions. 
                                             




DSC results obtained for EQR.01 
 
Table 2.23 shows the results obtained for the DSC experiments performed on the 
products of this reaction. 
 
Experiment Reference Tpeak / ºC 
Qpeak / 
W*g-1 ΔrH / J*g
-1 Tonset / ºC 











Table 2.23. - DSC results for reaction EQR.01. 
 
Two exothermic phenomena are identified in this reaction step. The first one could be 
due to the thermal evolution of some of the reactants in excess, maybe MeONa, 
which under the studied process conditions has a significant importance starting at 
96 ºC (Tonset in Table 2.23), which is a higher temperature than the one that could be 
reached if all the heat generated was accumulated in the reaction mass. The second 
peak observed in the DSC register probably corresponds to the decomposition of the 
final product. 
 
DSC results obtained for EQR.02 
 
Table 2.24 shows the results obtained for the DSC experiments performed on the 
products of this reaction. 
 
Experiment Reference Tpeak / ºC 
Qpeak / 
W*g-1 ΔrH / J*g
-1 Tonset / ºC 
EQR.02 β: 5 8473 222 0.27 -230.76 152 
 
Table 2.24. - DSC results for reaction EQR.02. 
 
The only exothermic peak that is observed for this DSC register probably 
corresponds to the decomposition of the final product, which under the studied 
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process conditions has a significant importance starting at 151 ºC (Tonset in Table 
2.24), which is a higher temperature than the one that would be reached if all the heat 
generated would be accumulated in the reaction mass. 
 
DSC results obtained for EQR.03 
 
Two DSC experiments were performed for this reaction. Table 2.25 shows the results 
obtained for these experiments. 
 
Experiment Reference Tpeak / ºC 
Qpeak / 
W*g-1 ΔrH / J*g
-1 Tonset / ºC 

















Table 2.25. - DSC results for reaction EQR.03. 
 
Experiment EQR.03-1 in Table 2.25 corresponds to the DSC register for the reaction 
mass at the end of this stage. Two exothermic phenomena are identified in this 
reaction step. The first one could be due to the thermal evolution of some of the 
reactants in excess, maybe MeONa, which under the studied process conditions has 
a significant importance starting at 80 ºC (Tonset in Table 2.25), which is a higher 
temperature than the one that could be reached if all the heat generated would be 
accumulated in the reaction mass. Again, the second peak observed in the DSC 
register probably corresponds to the decomposition of the final product. 
 
A complementary register (EQR.03-2) is analysed for the reaction product at the end of 
the step, since the difference between the value for MaxTsafe and MTSR for this 
reaction stage is less than 50 ºC, MaxTsafe being calculated as the first Tpeak in Table 
2.25 – 70 ºC, according to the strategy adopted for the determination of MaxTsafe (cfr. 
page 60) and established in 82 ºC. During the isothermal register (EQR.03-2 in Table 
2.25), no exothermal activity is observed, and during the subsequent heating at 5 K/min 
the same phenomena are registered with the same magnitude as for the equivalent 
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register (EQR.03-1 in Table 2.25). Therefore the value for MaxTsafe can be established 
in 82 ºC, determined following the previously mentioned procedure. 
 
DSC results obtained for EQR.04 
 
Four DSC experiments were performed for the final product of this reaction step. 
Table 2.26 shows the results obtained for these DSC experiments 
 
Experiment Reference Tpeak / ºC 
Qpeak / 
W*g-1 ΔrH / J*g
-1 Tonset / ºC 







































Table 2.26. - DSC results for reaction EQR.04. 
 
Experiment EQR.04-1 in Table 2.26 corresponds to the DSC register for the reaction 
mass before dosing the hydrogen peroxide. Two exothermic phenomena are 
identified in this reaction step. The first one corresponds probably to the thermal 
evolution of some of the reactants of the process studied (it could be the 
decomposition of R-OCH3), which under the studied process conditions has a 
significant importance starting at 130 ºC (Tonset in Table 2.26), which is a higher 
temperature than the one that would be reached if all the heat generated would 
accumulate in the reaction mass. The second peak observed in the DSC register 
probably corresponds to the combustion of methanol in gas phase, used as solvent in 
the reaction, which is known to behave as a gas above 240 ºC (Lide, 1993). 
 
Register EQR.04-2 in Table 2.26 corresponds to the DSC register of the product 
obtained from the reaction. Again, two exothermic phenomena are identified in this 
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register. The first one could correspond either to the thermal evolution of the product 
or to the excess of hydrogen peroxide, which under the studied process conditions 
could have a significant importance starting at 57 ºC (Tonset in Table 2.26); which is 
again higher than the temperature to be expected in case of accumulation of the heat 
generated in the reaction mass. As for the previous register, the second peak observed 
in the DSC experiment probably corresponds to the combustion of the solvent involved 
in the reaction. 
 
A complementary register is analysed (EQR.04-3 in Table 2.26) in order to determine 
whether the first peak from the register EQR.04-2 corresponds to the hydrogen 
peroxide. With this purpose, sodium bisulphite is introduced in the sample in order to 
eliminate the excess of this reactant. It can be seen from Table 2.26 that both registers 
EQR.04-2 and EQR.04-03 present almost identical values for Tpeak and Qpeak, so it is 
concluded that the first peak observed in register EQR.04-2 cannot correspond to the 
hydrogen peroxide. 
 
A first value for MaxTsafe has been calculated according to the strategy described 
previously (cfr. page 60), corresponding to 57 ºC. As for the previous reaction step, the 
difference between the value for MaxTsafe and MTSR for this reaction stage is less 
than 50 ºC. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse a complementary register for the 
reaction product at the end of the step. During the isothermal register (EQR.04-4 in 
Table 2.26), no exothermal activity is observed, registering the same phenomena with 
the same magnitude as for the equivalent register (EQR.04-2 in Table 2.26), during the 
subsequent heating at 5 K/min. Therefore the value of MaxTsafe can be determined in 
57 ºC following the previously mentioned procedure. 
 
2.3.3.- Criticality evaluation 
 
According to the results obtained from the RC and DSC experiments described 
previously, it can be concluded that the first three reaction steps (EQR.01, EQR.02, 
and EQR.03) show a significant exothermic activity starting at higher temperatures 
than those corresponding to the process temperature, the boiling point of the reaction 
mass, which is 67 ºC corresponding to the boiling temperature of methanol, used as 
solvent (Lide, 1993), and the temperature that could be reached if the reaction was 
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developed under adiabatic conditions in a closed system; as concerns the fourth 
reaction step (EQR.04), it can be concluded that it presents a significant exothermic 
activity starting at higher temperatures than those corresponding to the process 
temperature and the temperature that could be reached if the reaction was developed 
under adiabatic conditions in a closed system, but lower to the boiling point of the 
reaction, considered again as the boiling temperature of the solvent used. 
 
According to the Stoessel classification proposed in HarsMeth v2 to determine the 
criticality of the studied reactions, as shown in Table 2.27, it can be concluded that the 
first three reaction steps correspond to a criticality value of 1, whereas the fourth stage 
corresponds to a criticality value of 2. 
 
EQR.01 EQR.02 EQR.03 EQR.04 
Tp /ºC 10 Tp /ºC 25 Tp /ºC 30 Tp /ºC 2
MTSR /ºC 27 MTSR /ºC 61 MTSR /ºC 53 MTSR /ºC 37
Tb /ºC 67 Tb /ºC 67 Tb /ºC 67 Tb /ºC 67
MaxTsafe /ºC 96 MaxTsafe /ºC 152 MaxTsafe /ºC 82 MaxTsafe /ºC 57
 
Table 2.27. - Temperature values for the four reaction steps of the process analysed 
necessary to complete the Stoessel criticality evaluation. 
 
According to these results it can be concluded that the four steps of the process 
carried on in the conditions tested in these experiments are inherently safe, provided 
that the following generic recommendations are met: 
 
• The reactants and products used must be handled with care given their toxicity 
and flammability. 
• It is necessary to work with the condenser turned on and connected to the 
reactor; besides, the reaction mass should be kept the least possible time 
under the reaction conditions. 
• An appropriate agitation must be ensured throughout all the reaction steps of 
the process, since the reaction involves the use of solid reactants, to be sure 
that all solid substances are in suspension in the reaction mass. 
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2.4.- Development of strategies for the theoretical estimation of 
reaction enthalpies 
 
The results obtained in the experiments performed during the validation of HarsMeth 
v2 at the company C1 give the opportunity to accurately determine the criticality of 
the process analysed. However, as it has also been mentioned several times during 
the discussion regarding the validation of HarsMeth with different SMEs, these 
companies are not always familiar with the equipment and experiments presented 
earlier. In fact, the reaction calorimetry experiments that have been described were 
performed at the IQS facilities. Even though DSC is a technique that is commonly 
applied in SMEs, it is not easy to find reaction calorimeters prepared to perform the 
experiments that would help to perform the necessary calculations required in the 
Stoessel method at these chemical companies. However, for a preliminary hazard 
assessment, it is usually appropriate to use data obtained during the course of 
process development together with calculated, estimated or literature data. Predictive 
techniques are therefore a necessary part of the tools used in the assessment of the 
overall energy release of a chemical reaction, even though it is important to note that 
the sole use of predictive techniques in a complete hazard evaluation is a dangerous 
approach to use. 
 
In order to perform theoretical calculations of the heat of a reaction, a good initial 
estimate can be obtained by the difference between the heats of formation of the 
products and the reactants according to Hess Law, as seen in Eq. 2.3. 
 
 ∑∑ Δ−Δ=Δ tstanreacrproductsrr HHH  [Eq. 2.3] 
 
The precision of the results obtained depends on the accuracy of the determination of 
the heats of formation of the reactants and products and the level of completeness of 
the reaction, but it can be also affected by side reactions, changes of state or solution 
/ dilution effects. According to the literature (HarsBook, 2003; Domalski and Hearing, 
1993), the Benson method of group additivity (Benson, 1976) is probably the most 
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widely used and practical method for estimating thermodynamic data of organic 
substances. This method estimates the heat of reaction with more precision and 
reliability than any other current theoretical method available. So, this method can be 
used to estimate heats of formation of complex molecules for which data are usually 
not available. In addition, the heats of reaction can be estimated by analogous 
reactions using simpler species, where the heats of formation of these species can 
also be estimated using the Benson method of group additivity. 
 
The Benson method of group additivity introduced some improvements to the 
previous existing method, known as Average Bond Energy Summation (Benson, 
1965). This improved method takes into account: 
 
• The linking “envelope” effect to the main group / atom of the molecules 
considered 
• The rings effect 
• The isotopic effect (cis / trans, ortho / meta / para) 
• The non-linking interactions 
 
Previous studies (Frurip et al., 1995) have established that normally the uncertainty 
achieved by this method ranges between 9 to 13 kJ/mol for substances which contain 
the following atoms: C, H, N, O. On the other hand, the improved method is more 
complex to use and requires more data for parameterization, due to the higher 
number of groups used compared to the previous system. By means of this method, 
the gas-phase formation enthalpies of reactants and products or the reaction 
enthalpy can be calculated. Thus, the key point for an accurate estimation of the 
reaction enthalpy is the correct choice of the Benson Groups to be used. 
 
Probably the more widely used computer program for the estimation of 
thermodynamic data is CHETAH® (ASTM, 1998), which possibly includes the most 
extensive available database of Benson groups. However, there are two important 
limitations to this method: the first one is the lack of accurate data for some organic 
functional groups which are present in the complex molecules commonly used in the 
fine chemical industries; the second limitation is the fact that the majority of the 
methods for thermodynamic data estimation are only for gas species, whereas 
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usually, the organic reactions are carried out in the condensed phase. Thus, to take 
full advantage of the CHETAH® computer program, the adoption of an appropriate 
strategy in the definition of the calculations to be performed is essential in order to 
obtain the most accurate estimation. 
To show some of the possible strategies that can be followed when a necessary 
group is missing, different calculations have been performed using the CHETAH® 
v.7.2 program, in order to estimate the reaction enthalpy for the reaction step EQR.02 
of the process studied at the company C1, as shown in Eq. 2.4. 
 
 HSO'R''RSRSH''R'ROSOR 32 −+−−→−+−−  [Eq. 2.4] 
 
For the estimation of the heat of this reaction in gas phase, not all the necessary 
Benson groups were available in the current version of the computing program. In 
this reaction, the Benson groups which contain the molecular group SO2, as the 
central group or as the “environment” (The central group is to the left of the hyphen in 
the notation used in CHETAH® and the environment is to the right of the hyphen), are 
absent in the current literature because of the problems associated with their 
experimental determination (Liebman, 1991). 
 
Different strategies tested for the determination of the reaction enthalpy are 




It is recommended in the literature (Frurip et al., 1995) that, when dealing with an 
absent group, this can be substituted by another one of “similar” nature. Substitutions 
in the “environment” are allowable, but the environmental changes should be as 
similar as possible to the environment. Substitutions in the central group are not 
allowed in this technique. This strategy is applied to the reaction studied as follows: 
 
When the group SO2 belongs to the environment, it can be replaced by the known 
and relatively “similar” group CO. The absent Benson groups [O-(C,SO2)] and [OH-
(SO2)] have to be replaced by the known groups [O-(C,CO)] and [OH-(CO)]. When 
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the group SO2 is the central group (which cannot be substituted), the environment 
groups have to be replaced by known and “similar” Benson groups, while keeping the 
same central group. The absent Benson group [SO2-(O,C)] is replaced by the known 
group [SO2-(2C)]. Note that all the substitutions occur on the right-hand side of the 
hyphen in the modified notation which is the environment part of the group. 
 
The introduction of the detailed groups of this strategy in the CHETAH® program is 
presented in Figure 2.26. 
 
 
Figure 2.26. - Strategy one followed for the estimation of reaction enthalpy for 




The literature (Frurip et al., 1995) also suggests that the calculation can proceed by 
interpolation or extrapolation of known group values in a series of homologous 
groups in order to obtain a better accuracy of the estimated groups. It is important to 
realize that these operations should be performed in the “environment”. If that fails, 
an interpolation can be done in the central group, while keeping the environment 
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constant, but with lower accuracy. Thus, interpolation or extrapolation in the 
environment is preferable because environmental group changes lead to values that 
are not very different and errors will be minimized, whereas central group changes 
lead to potentially larger errors. 
 
Following this second strategy, the absent Benson group [SO2-(O,C)] can be 
estimated by interpolation in the series [SO2-(2C)] to [SO2-(2O)] (shown in Table 
2.28). From this result, together with a known value of the formation enthalpy of the 
gas molecule (CH3SO2OCH3), which contains the last absent Benson group [O-
(SO2,C)], and the knowledge of all the other Benson groups contained in this 
molecule, it is possible to estimate the value of the last absent Benson group [O-
(SO2,C)] (as will be later discussed). However, this strategy can only be applied if the 
property of bonding addition is fulfilled and, according to the literature (Liebman, 
1991), it is not the case in this example. 
 
Known Groups ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
SO2-(2C) -288 
SO2-(2O) -417 
Estimated Group ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
SO2-(C,O) -353 
 
Table 2.28. - Results from the estimation of the formation enthalpy of the SO2-(C,O) 




Finally, given that the value of the formation enthalpy of methanesulphonic acid in the 
gas phase can be determined and the formation enthalpy of the compound 
CH3SO2OMe is known, it is possible to obtain the values of the necessary absent 
Benson groups ([SO2-(O,C)] and [O-(SO2,C)]) to calculate the reaction enthalpy of 
the reaction under study. Application of this strategy to the reaction considered is 




• Because the value of the formation enthalpy of PhSO3H in the gas phase is 
known and using the specific relation shown in Eq. 2.6 (Liebman, 1991), 
(specific for a SO2 group linked to benzene), it is possible to obtain the 
formation enthalpy in the gas phase of methanesulphonic acid. 
 
 1.127)HPhSO,g(H)HSOCH,g(H 3f33f −Δ=Δ      kJ*mol
-1 [Eq. 2.6] 
 
• From this value and the knowledge of all the other groups which form this 
molecule (extracted from CHETAH®), it is possible to obtain the value of the 
unknown Benson group [SO2-(C,O)] (presented in Table 2.29). 
• Finally, from this value and the formation enthalpy of CH3SO2OMe it is 
possible to determine the last unknown group [O-(SO2,C)] (presented in Table 
2.30). 
 
Known Groups ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
PhSO3H, gas -376 
CH3-(SO2) -42 
HO-(SO2) -159 
Estimation using Eq. 2.6 ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
ΔfH (gas, MeSO3H) -503 
Estimated Group ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
SO2-(C,O) -302 
 
Table 2.29. - Results from the estimation of the formation enthalpy of SO2-(C,O) group 









Known Groups ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
CH3SO2OMe, liq. -564 
CH3SO3H 898 
Estimation ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
CH3SO2OMe, gas -475 
ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
Known Groups 
Str. 2 Str. 3 
CH3-(SO2) -42 -42 
CH3-(O) -42 -42 
SO2-(C,O) -353 -302 
ΔfH / kJ*mol-1 
Estimated Group 
Str. 2 Str. 3 
O-(SO2,C) -38 -88 
 
Table 2.30. - Results from the estimation of the formation enthalpy of O-(SO2,C) group 
using strategies two and three. 
 
All these values of formation enthalpy of Benson groups can be used to calculate the 
formation enthalpies in the gas phase of the reactants and products. Furthermore, 
these formation enthalpies can be used to calculate the reaction enthalpy (also in the 
gas phase) using Hess law. The values of the reaction enthalpy in the gas phase are 
corrected to obtain data under real process conditions, following the procedure 
described in Figure 2.27 (Romero, 2003). These values are shown in Table 2.31 for 
the different strategies used. These values are compared with the experimental result 
of the reaction enthalpy9 (-133 ± 5% kJ*mol-1) obtained using reaction calorimetry as 





                                             
8 This value corresponds to the vaporization enthalpy of the group. 
9 The experimental value for reaction enthalpy has been converted to kJ per mol of limiting reactant in 


















Figure 2.27. - Schema for the phase correction for the determination of the reaction 
enthalpy of EQR.02. 
 
Strategy Reaction Enthalpy / kJ*mol-1 Estimation Error / %
one -124 6.8 
two -182 37.0 
three -131.4 0.8 
 
Table 2.31. - Results obtained for the theoretical estimation of the reaction enthalpy of 
reaction EQR.02 compared with the experimental result, referred to mol of limiting 
reactant. 
 
The analysis of the results presented in Table 2.31 show that strategy one generates 
a good approximation to the experimental value (only 7% error), which is satisfactory 
for proceeding the next steps of the preliminary evaluation process of the reaction 
hazards. The accuracy of this estimation could come from the use of a similar 
functional group and the reliability of the data used to make this estimation. Strategy 
two generates an erroneous result (37% error), but since it is an error by excess, the 
R-S-R’’ (MeOH) + R’-SO2OH (MeOH)R’’-SH (MeOH) + R-OSO2-R’ (MeOH)
R-S-R’’ (s) + R’-SO2OH (s)R’’-SH (s) + R-OSO2-R’ (s)
R-S-R’’ (l) + R’-SO2OH (l)R’’-SH (l) + R-OSO2-R’ (l)
R-S-R’’ (g) + R’-SO2OH (g)R’’-SH (g) + R-OSO2-R’ (g)
Qr
ΔrH
ΔHdiss1 ΔHdiss2 ΔHdiss3 ΔHdiss4
ΔHfus1 ΔHfus2 ΔHfus3 ΔHfus4
ΔHvap1 ΔHvap2 ΔHvap3 ΔHvap4
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results obtained remain on the conservative side, so the analysis would force to work 
on a safe scenario, provided it is reasonably practicable. This error could come from 
the application of one of the estimation rules, which cannot be done in this case, as it 
is suggested in the literature (Liebman, 1991). Strategy three generates the most 
precise data (1 % error). The low error is probably due to the reliability of the data 
used and the fact that, in this strategy, the central group remains constant. However, 
if the results obtained for the gas-phase reaction enthalpy are not corrected by the 
change of phase enthalpies, the error obtained would be greater (for example for 

































The reaction calorimetry experiments have been performed with the RC1® 
reaction calorimeter by Mettler-Toledo at the PQAT research group from the 
Chemical Engineering Department of the Institut Químic de Sarrià. The reactor 
has been equipped during all the experiments with the following devices: 
 
• Glass reactor AP01 with 2L capacity 
• Thermostatic reactor cover MT01 using silicon oil as heating fluid 
• Anchor type stirrer 
• Pt 100 temperature probe 
• 5 W Calibration probe 
• Dosing pump Prominent gamma / 4 
• Pt 100 dosing probe 
• Mettler-Toledo Balance PM 4600 
• Condenser covered with polyurethane with differential temperature 
measurement with the refrigerant fluid 
• Thermostatic bath for the heating silicon for MT 01 cover, Julabo HC 
• Thermostatic bath for the refrigerant fluid of the condenser, Julabo HC 
• Periphery controllers Mettler-Toledo RD-10 









EQR.01 Calorimetry study for the process to obtain R-SO3-R’ 
EQR.02 Calorimetry study for the process to obtain  R-SO3H 
EQR.03 Calorimetry study for the process to obtain R’-OCH3 
EQR.04 Calorimetry study for the process to obtain 1482 
 
Table 3.1. - Reaction calorimetry experiments performed 
 
The quantities used for each of the reactants in 4 reaction steps, as well as the 
dosing times for each reaction are shown in Table 3.2. In order to comply with 
the confidentiality agreement signed between the company C1 and IQS, the 
names of the reactants are not given. 
 
Experiment Reactant Quantity / g tdos / min 
EQR.01 A 649.4 initial 
EQR.01 B 186 initial 
EQR.01 C 310.4 32 
EQR.02 A 649.4 initial 
EQR.02 E 319.1 initial 
EQR.02 F 58 addition 
EQR.02 G 465.6 24 
EQR.03 A 649.4 initial 
EQR.03 I 185.1 initial 
EQR.03 J 63.4 addition 
EQR.03 K 300 addition 
 
Table 3.2 (1/2). - Reactant quantities and dosing times for the reaction 




Experiment Reactant Quantity / g tdos / min 
EQR.04 M 945.6 initial 
EQR.04 N 200 initial 
EQR.04 O 10 initial 
EQR.04 P 12 initial 
EQR.04 Q 124 initial 
EQR.04 R 56.52 90 
 
Table 3.2 (2/2). - Reactant quantities and dosing times for the reaction 




The configuration of the RC1® calorimetry for the experiments is described next. 
For experiments EQR.01, EQR.02 and EQR.03 the configuration of the reactor is 
the same, and it is shown in Table 3.3. Table 3.4 shows the configuration used 
for experiment EQR.04. 
 
P control: 6 R: 200 rpm Tc necessary: -15 ºC 
Cooling water flow for the condenser: 0.3 L / min 
Cooling water temperature for the condenser: 20 ºC 
Nitrogen to the reactor: yes   
Gas measuring device: no     
 




P control: 7 R: 175 rpm Tc necessary: -15 ºC 
Cooling water flow for the condenser: 0.3 L / min 
Cooling water temperature for the condenser: 20 ºC 
Nitrogen to the reactor: yes   
Gas measuring device: no     
 
Table 3.4. - Specific RC1® Parameters for experiment EQR.04 
 
Table 3.5 shows the definition of analogical inputs for all the experiments 
 
Input Name Type 
A1/RD_2 T dos Temperature
A2/RD_2 delta TC Pressure 
A3/RD_2 T amb Temperature
 
Table 3.5. - Definition of analogical inputs for all the experiments 
 
Table 3.6 shows the definition of control loops for all the experiments. 
 
Name Mode Input Output Maximum deviation 
L1/RD_2 Dos B1/RD_2 C1/RD_2 0.1 
 
Table 3.6. - Definition of control loops for all the experiments 
 
Table 3.7 shows the definitions of safety limits for experiments EQR.01, EQR.02 
and EQR.04, while Table 3.8 shows the same data for experiment EQR.04. 
 163
 
Variable Minimum Maximum 
Tr - 75 
Tj - - 
Tc - - 
R 0 rpm 220 rpm 
 Tsafe: 5 ºC  
 
Table 3.7. - Definition of safety limits for experiments EQR.01, EQR.02 and 
EQR.03 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum 
Tr -12 ºC 40 ºC 
Tj - - 
Tc - - 
R 0 rpm 220 rpm 
 Tsafe: 5 ºC  
 




Once the experiments have been defined by introducing the previously 
mentioned parameters into the system, the necessary operations to carry out the 
experiments are performed, in the order specified in the RC1® manuals. 
 
Tables 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 show the sequences of actions programmed in 




# Action Duration # Action Duration 
1 Nitrogen connexion X 14 Stabilization 10' 
2 Addition A 1' 15 Dosing C 32' 
3 Addition B 2' 16 Vv 1' 
4 Addition A 1' 17 Stabilization 10' 
5 R = 200 rpm 1' 18 Calibration 10' 
6 Tr = 9 ºC 5' 19 Stabilization 10' 
7 Vv 1' 20 Tr = 10 ºC 12' 
8 Stabilization 10' 21 Stabilization 10' 
9 Calibration 10' 22 Calibration 10' 
10 Stabilization 10' 23 Stabilization 10' 
11 Tr = 4 ºC 10' 24 Sample 1' 
12 Stabilization 10' 25 Discharge 15' 
13 Calibration 10'       
 
Table 3.9. - List of actions in the RC1® for experiment EQR.01 
 
# Action Duration # Action Duration 
1 Nitrogen connexion X 21 Stabilization 10' 
2 Addition A 1' 22 Calibration 10' 
3 Addition E 5' 23 Stabilization 10' 
4 R = 200 rpm 1' 24 Tr = 60 ºC 30' 
5 Tr = 25 ºC 5' 25 Stabilization 10' 
6 Vv 1' 26 Calibration 10' 
7 Stabilization 10' 27 Stabilization 10' 
8 Calibration 10' 28 Vv 1' 
9 Stabilization 10' 29 Mode Di ΔT=8 1' 
 
Table 3.10 (1/2). - List of actions in the RC1® for experiment EQR.02 
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# Action Duration # Action Duration 
10 Tr = 30 ºC 10' 30 Distillation until VD=390  
11 Stabilization 10' 31 Mode Reflux 1' 
12 Calibration 10' 32 Stabilization 8h 
13 Stabilization 10' 33 Calibration 10' 
14 Addition F 1' 34 Stabilization 10' 
15 Stabilization 10' 35 Di ΔT + 4 X 
16 Calibration 10' 36 Stabilization 10' 
17 Stabilization 10' 37 Di ΔT – 4 X 
18 Vv 1' 38 Tr = 30ºC 20' 
19 Dosing G 24' 39 Sample 1' 
20 Vv 1' 40 Discharge 15' 
 
Table 3.10 (2/2). - List of actions in the RC1® for experiment EQR.02 
 
# Action Duration # Action Duration 
1 Nitrogen connexion X 11 Tr = 10 ºC 10' 
2 Addition A 1' 12 Stabilization 10' 
3 Addition I 5' 13 Calibration 10' 
4 Addition A 1' 14 Stabilization 10' 
5 R = 200 rpm 1' 15 Addition J 1' 
6 Tr = 15 ºC 5' 16 Addition K 5' 
7 Vv 1' 17 Vv 1' 
8 Stabilization 10' 18 Stabilization 10' 
9 Calibration 10' 19 Calibration 10' 
10 Stabilization 10' 20 Stabilization 10' 
 




# Action Duration # Action Duration 
21 Tr = 25 ºC 15' 28 Tr = 30 ºC 10' 
22 Stabilization 120' 29 Stabilization 10' 
23 Sample 1' 30 Calibration 10' 
24 Vv 1' 31 Stabilization 10' 
25 Stabilization 40' 32 Sample 1' 
26 Calibration 10' 33 Discharge 15' 
27 Stabilization 10'    
 
Table 3.11 (2/2). - List of actions in the RC1® for experiment EQR.03 
 
# Action Duration # Action Duration 
1 Nitrogen connexion X 13 Stabilization 10' 
2 Addition M 2' 14 Tr = 2 ºC 10' 
3 Addition N 2' 15 Stabilization 10' 
4 Addition M 2' 16 Calibration 10' 
5 Nitrogen connexion 1' 17 Stabilization 10' 
6 Addition O + P + Q(1) 3' 18 Sample 1' 
7 Nitrogen connexion 1' 19 Dosing R 90' 
8 R = 175 rpm 1' 20 Vv 1' 
9 Tr = 7 ºC 10' 21 Stabilization 50' 
10 Vv 1' 22 Sample 1' 
11 Stabilization 10' 23 Calibration 10' 
12 Calibration 10' 24 Stabilization 10' 
 
Table 3.12 (1/2). - List of actions in the RC1® for experiment EQR.04 
 
                                             
(1)  Substances [O, P, Q] are introduced in the reactor by means of previously prepared solutions. 
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# Action Duration # Action Duration 
25 Tr = -3 ºC 10' 32 Tr = 2 ºC 10' 
26 Stabilization 1h 30' 33 Stabilization 10' 
27 Sample 1' 34 Calibration 10' 
28 Stabilization 40' 35 Stabilization 10' 
29 Vv 1' 36 Tr = 25 ºC 10' 
30 Calibration 10' 37 Sample 1' 
31 Stabilization 10' 38 Discharge 15' 
 
Table 3.12 (1/2). - List of actions in the RC1® for experiment EQR.04 
 
The main features of the DSC experiments performed are shown in Table 3.13. 
 
Sample Reference Method M / mg
End of reaction 
EQR.01 
8472 
High Pressure Crucible (40 mL)  
from 0 to 400ºC – 5K/min 
8.646 
End of reaction 
EQR.02 
8475 
High Pressure Crucible (40 mL)  
from 0 to 400ºC – 5K/min 
5.451 
End of reaction 
EQR.02 
8485 
High Pressure Crucible (40 mL)  
Isothermal at 52ºC during 12h   
+  from 52 to 400ºC – 5K/min 
5.595 
End of reaction 
EQR.03 
8473 
High Pressure Crucible (40 mL)  
from 0 to 400ºC – 5K/min 
8.300 
 








High Pressure Crucible (40 mL)  
from -10 to 400ºC – 5K/min 
5.770 




High Pressure Crucible (40 mL)  
from -10 to 400ºC – 5K/min 
6.740 




High Pressure Crucible (40 mL)  
from -10 to 400ºC – 5K/min 
6.774 




High Pressure Crucible (40 mL)  
Isothermal at 36ºC during 12h   
+  from 36 to 400ºC – 5K/min 
7.287 
 
Table 3.13 (2/2). – Description of DSC experiments performed. 
 
 































A checklist based methodology for the assessment of the chemical reactive 
hazards involved in industrial processes has been developed and validated. The 
tool is especially designed to be used at small and medium enterprises working 
in the processing of chemical products. For this purpose several aspects have 
been reviewed: 
 
• A first draft of a hazard assessment methodology for chemical reactions 
was created from the merging of two existing tools, HarsMeth and the 
Check Cards for Runaway. These methodologies were tested at 5 
Spanish SMEs, and the strengths identified for each one were the basis 
for a new version of HarsMeth, called HarsMeth v2. Specific suggestions 
and findings from the collaboration with the companies were also included 
in the new tool. 
 
• The new version HarsMeth v2 was extensively tested at two chemical 
companies. In one case, a real process was analysed following the 
suggestions of the methodology, and different calorimetry experiments 
were performed, establishing the degree of criticality of the process 
analysed as relatively low. The strengths and weaknesses of HarsMeth v2 
were identified and further suggestions for the improvement of the 
methodology were put forward; in the other case, different industrial unit 
operations were analysed to prepare a set of checklists for the 
identification of chemical hazards involved in those operations. 
 
• A systematic approach has been used to develop a tool for the 
identification of chemical reactive hazards in process equipment. The 
combination of simple reactivity concepts included in a user friendly 
Microsoft Excel® based system allows the user to perform an assessment 
of the hazards that may be encountered during different unit operations of 
an industrial process. Moreover, the experience gained in the use of the 
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tool and the possibility to adapt it to new assessment cases gives the user 
the possibility to adapt it to the specific needs of a particular 
establishment. 
 
• The final version of the methodology, known as HarsMeth NP, is designed 
to perform the hazard assessment on a step by step basis, in order to 
cover the common stages involved in the research and development 
phase of a new chemical synthesis. The objective is to identify possible 
sources of a chemical runaway as early as possible in the development of 
an industrial process, providing at the end a set of safety measures 
depending on the hazards identified. This version of the tool also provides 
extensive information and further references on simple to use strategies 
and experiments to help SMEs to complete their hazard assessments. 
 
• HarsMeth NP has been tested with available information from a process 
developed at the PQAT research group at IQS. The checklists included in 
the methodology have been filled with the available data, which has made 
it possible to identify the hazards involved in the reaction, as well as the 
necessary safety measures in order to perform the process safely at 
industrial scale. 
 
• An analysis of the chemical accidents included in the MARS database has 
been performed. Most of the reported causes that triggered the accidents 
are covered by HarsMeth NP, which proves that the methodology helps to 
visualize and obtain a better understanding of those topics, especially for 
those SMEs that have less resources or expertise in safety issues. The 
analysis of past accidents also helps to improve the methodology by 
identifying possible gaps in the tool. 
 
• The main lessons to be learned from the accidents analysed have been 
established. Essentially these lessons can be grouped according to the 
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same sections included in HarsMeth NP. In the first place, a true 
commitment of management staff is required in order to establish an 
appropriate safety culture in the company, which must be correctly 
explained, understood and applied by all personnel involved at any stage 
of the industrial activity. Next, a deep knowledge of the chemistry involved 
in a process is necessary, both from the point of view of the stability and 
compatibility of chemical products as well as from the critical parameters 
related to chemical reactions. Once this information has been collected, it 
is possible to design plant equipment according to the required 
parameters of the process. It must be assured that such equipment is 
suitably reliable, by applying maintenance and process control principles. 
In a last stage, safety measures must be put in place wherever necessary 
in order to cope with the consequences of a potential runaway scenario. 
 
• In order to provide SMEs with simple tools to perform a hazard 
assessment, a system for the theoretical estimation of the reaction 
enthalpy of a chemical process has been developed. The Benson group 
theory has been applied and different strategies for the estimation in case 
of lack of information from one Benson group have been described. The 
results obtained have been compared with experimental values, obtaining 
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The contents of the different appendices included in this PhD work are described 
next. The main achievement of this work, the final version of the HarsMeth 
methodology (HarsMeth New Process) is included in Appendix 1; in the second 
appendix, a series of intermediate achievements are included, like the list of 
chemical accidents analysed from the MARS database, or the provisional 
versions of HarsMeth developed during the course of this PhD. Even though 
these are somehow extensive, they are considered essential in order to better 
understand the evolution of the work that led to the final version of the 
methodology. Appendix 3 includes the methodologies that existed before starting 
the present work, and which were the origin of what the HarsMeth tool has 
become. They are included in the present work due to the continuous reference 
done to those methodologies during the description of the procedure developed 
to obtain the final version of HarsMeth. Finally, an Excel® sheet containing the 
S2S training & assessment tool for unexpected reactors can be found in the CD-
Rom included with this PhD work. 
 
Thus, the appendices are structured as follows. 
 
• Appendix 1. HarsMeth New Process (NP). 
• Appendix 2. Intermediate achievements. 
o Appendix 2.1. List of chemical accidents analysed from the MARS 
database. 
o Appendix 2.2 HarsMeth version 2 
o Appendix 2.3 Draft proposal for extension of HarsMeth version 2 
developed at the Company C1. 
o Appendix 2.4. Checklists for hazard assessment of unit operations 
developed at the Company C2. 
• Appendix 3. Preexisting methodologies. 
o Appendix 3.1. HarsMeth version 1 




















































HarsMeth NP (New Process) 
 
 
A methodology for chemical process safety 
































2. Safety Management System 
Checklist I 
 
3. Preliminary Reaction Analysis 
3.1. Inherent Safety 
3.2. Chemical Stability 
3.3. Reactivity and Compatibility 
Checklist II 
 
4. Bench Scale Analysis 
4.1. Thermal Evaluation of Chemical Reactions 
4.2. Test Methods for Runaway Assessment 
4.3. Other Hazards Related to Chemical Reactions 
Checklist III 
 
5. Pilot Plant Analysis 
5.1. Change of Scale 
5.2. Unit Operations 
Checklist IV 
 
6. Industrial Scale Analysis 
6.1. Basis of Safety 
6.1.1. Process Control 
6.1.2. Protective Measures 















In the year 1998, a group of 35 European partners created HarsNet, a thematic 
network on hazard assessment of highly reactive systems (Nomen et al., 2002), with 
the financial support of the European Commission. The aim of the implementation 
phase of HarsNet was the creation of an extensive forum within which universities, 
research centres and industries involved in the network collaborated to improve 
dissemination of the fundamental knowledge in the field of thermal hazard 
assessment of chemical processes. Preparation of short-cut, stepwise, 
methodologies that use simple, non expensive, techniques were in the focus of this 
project, in order to improve the global safety of the chemical industry. The activities 
of the network finished in the year 2002. 
 
One task included in the HarsNet network was HarsMeth. The objective of this task 
was to produce and to check a methodology for the hazard assessment of chemical 
processes, which could be applied by SMEs using commonly available equipment. 
This methodology, available at the HarsNet web page (Harsnet, 2007) provides 
assistance for the safety assessment of batch and semi-batch processes in an easy 
structured way by using basic rules and methods. HarsMeth was divided in two 
parts, one consisting on a short cut procedure that can be used as an interactive on-
line tool, and a written guide containing different checklists to identify possible 
hazards in a chemical process. 
 
In its initial stage, HarsMeth combined different short-cut methods already 
developed by some HarsNet partners (Nomen et al., 2004 (b); Ciba Speciality 
Chemicals, 1998; The Dow Chemical Company, 2000). All this elements were put 
together and combined to produce a first draft, which was improved through an intense 
interaction with different European SMEs working in the field of fine chemicals 
production. Co-operation between the network and more than 30 SMEs was generated 
during the last year of HarsNet, and the feedback received was used to fit the work 
developed to the real needs of SMEs (Nomen et al., 2004 (a)). 
 
The good acceptance and positive results obtained during the testing of HarsMeth 
suggested that further steps could be taken in the development of an integrated tool 
to help SMEs to perform hazard identification in their processes. The methodology 
was extensively tested at different chemical plants applying it at real production 
processes, in order to test its efficiency and to detect strengths, weaknesses and 
possible ways to improve it. Further revision of the method gave as a result the 
HarsMeth NP (New Process) version, structured to analyse specific hazards for 
each step involved in chemical production, from laboratory research to 
implementation of the process at plant scale. The method has been also improved 
under the umbrella of the Safety to Safety (S2S, 2007) network, involving most of the 
partners of HarsNet, which has developed other assessment tools in specific areas 
such as explosions, fires, unexpected reactions in common plant equipment or 
safety management systems. 
 
HarMeth is a guide for the safety assessment of chemical processes, and it is 
intended to identify the possible hazards that may be encountered during the 
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performance of a chemical process. It consists on a set of checklists that cover all 
the steps involved in industrial production. Besides, it provides guidance on available 
techniques for determination of safety parameters of chemical reactions, and 
available measures in order to reduce probability and severity of an accident in 
process plants. It must be clear that HarsMeth NP does not intend to replace a 
complete risk assessment of external experts. Its aim is to highlight possible hazards 
and critical elements of the process to the user's attention. For this reason, the 
authors refuse any responsibility on any incident derived from the application of 
HarsMeth NP, and it cannot serve as legal advice to any individual or entity. The 
initial target of this tool is small and medium enterprises working in chemical 
production, but this methodology can also be very useful as a preliminary guidance 
for international manufacturers with considerably big production plants. The wish to 
make this methodology applicable to as many companies as possible makes it 
impossible to include all aspects related to industrial safety, and only a brief 
inventory of items are included in each chapter. Some may find it too extensive, and 
others too elemental. The spirit of this work is that any non-expert in chemical safety 
can perform a preliminary analysis of a process, and through this, him or herself can 
determine what the safety requirements of a process are. The objective is to make 
people think on safety, given that it often happens that knowledge remains hidden 
under other aspects of process or plant specifications; the intention is therefore to 
“bring this knowledge to the surface”. In any case, the advice of safety experts 
should be sought anytime a doubt arises from the use of the methodology. 
 
 







Accidents in chemical plants represent a high potential threat because of the 
dangerous substances that are usually handled in that kind of installations. In a 
runaway situation the threat is even higher because the substances causing the 
accident are reacting during the event, many times in an unexpected way. This means 
that besides the release of dangerous chemical substances, a big release of energy will 
take place, for which the installation may not be prepared. Runaway reactions have 
been known for a long time, but they are still causing nowadays major accidents, the 
consequences of which are not only great economic losses, but also human lives and 
concern among the population. Recent studies (Sales et al., 2007 (a)) show that in 
many cases there is a lack of knowledge of the chemistry involved in reactive 
processes. Furthermore, deficiencies in management of operations necessary to 
develop a chemical reaction are still present. 
 
Many large companies are using robust hazard assessment methods (including 
sophisticated experimental techniques) and extensive management systems, to avoid 
chemical accidents and to reduce their severity in case they should occur. However, 
there is a failure to disseminate this best practice (including basic concepts and 
methodologies) to the large number of SMEs that are dedicated to the manufacture of 
fine and speciality chemicals in Europe. Moreover, the use of the expensive 
experimental techniques that are required for some studies limits their availability within 
many SMEs.  
 
In any case, reaction hazard assessment should be an integral part of the earliest 
stages of good Research and Development  with the objective of generating inherently 
safe designs of chemical processes. The experiments required can sometimes be quite 
inexpensive and easy to perform at a common chemistry laboratory, limiting the use of 
expensive testing and equipment to those cases where they are really necessary. 
 
There are different approaches that can be followed when performing a hazard 
assessment. However, there are some concepts that should always be present in a 
reliable decision making tool. The concepts are listed below. 
 
• Definition of process and plant characteristics. 
 
• Identification of hazards at normal operating conditions. 
 
• Identification of possible process deviations and hazards associated to them. 
 
• Evaluation of plant conditions in order to carry out the process within safety 
margins (related to the hazards previously identified). 
 
• Determination of the necessity to modify process or plant conditions. 
 
Besides, it must be a company policy to register the results, to keep these results 
available to engineers or operators who carry out the process, and to review this 
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procedure from time to time, or whenever a significant change is introduced in the 
process or in the plant.  
 
A good example of the strategy to follow is the PHASE method (Steinbach, 1999), 




Figure 1. Procedure for safety investigations. 
 
Such concepts have been implemented in the HarsMeth methodology in an attempt 
to cover the different stages in the development of a process (Figure 2). 
 
HarsMeth NP is based in the three following concepts: 
 
• Inherent Safety. A system is considered to be inherently safe if it remains in a 
non-hazardous situation after the occurrence of unintended deviations from 
normal operating conditions (Kletz, 1985). Even though it is impossible to 
achieve a 100% inherently safe process, the intention is to determine all the 
possible sources of trouble from the safety point of view previously to the 
plant development of the process. In order to achieve an inherently safe 
process, the main need is to be able to perform thorough hazard 
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identification. To achieve this, the process is analysed in three different 
stages.  
 
o Preliminary stage. All the different possible synthetic routes for a 
reaction are studied, and different screening tests are performed to 
have a general idea of the hazards of each route. 
o Bench scale stage. A reduced number of possible synthetic paths can 
be studied here. Each one of them has to be deeply studied, 
considering normal and all kind of possible failure conditions. 
o Pilot Plant Scale. One single process should be studied here. 
Emphasis must be placed on correctly dimensioning the equipment to 
be used at industrial scale. Hazard assessment of unit operations that 
are going to be used in plant should be performed here.  
 
• Basis of Safety. It includes the implementation of preventive or mitigation 
measures, besides process control requirements, that a process needs to be 
carried out safely. For each process, it depends on the hazards defined in the 
previous section. In case those hazards cannot be completely removed, 
measures must be included at the industrial production stage to assure the 
reduction of likelihood or severity in case an incident occurs. 
 
• Safety Management System. Differentiated from the previous points, it is 
independent of the chemical process to be developed. It deals with the safety 
policies of the company, with a special focus on how routine operations are 
carried out at the chemical plant. The objective is to differentiate the inherent 
safety, or better said, the inherent hazards related to the chemistry itself, and 
the added on hazards that can come from incorrect working procedures or 
company organisation, since a hazard will be easier to keep under control if 
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The hazard identification is performed through a set of checklists that cover all the 
aspects that may have an influence in the safety of a chemical process. It is intended 
that, by answering those questions, all the possible hazards that may arise from a 
process developed at industrial scale can be determined. 
 
There are 5 checklists included in HarsMeth NP, one for each section included in 
the methodology. It is suggested that those checklists should be filled in the 
following order: 
 
1. Safety Management System. 
 
2. Preliminary Reaction Analysis. 
 
3. Bench Scale Analysis. 
 
4. Pilot Plant Analysis. 
 
5. Industrial Scale Analysis. 
 
While checklists number 1 and 5 are simply an inventory of suggested issues, which 
the user must indicate whether they have been considered or not, the questions in 
the checklists 2, 3, and 4 are structured in such a way, that three levels of answers 
are available. These possible answers are: 
 
• Justify your answer. This answer will be given in case a specific parameter is 
regarded as safe. In such case, a written justification is required in order to 
explain the reason for this consideration. 
 
• Review your safety measures. It means that a hazard may be derived from 
the parameter studied. In this case, either the process development should be 
modified, or the plant set-up must be adapted to reduce, mitigate or prevent 
such hazard, and its possible effects. Any answer of this type encountered in 
the preliminary scale, bench scale and pilot plant checklists, will have a 
corresponding evaluation in the Industrial Scale checklist, proposing 
measures to avoid the hazard or to mitigate the consequences of any incident 
derived from such hazard. 
 
• Check it! This indicates that the answer to the question put forward is 
unknown. In this case the user of HarsMeth NP must stop completing the 
questionnaires and determine the answer to the question.  
 
When applying HarsMeth NP to a process, the user should not move to another 
checklist until all the aspects required in the previous one have been filled correctly 
and fully understood. This means that in case the answer to one question is 
unknown, it should be checked before going any further. This way, it is assured that 
the process development is stopped at the earlier stages, instead of carrying it on 
industrial scale with uncertainties in the safety issues involved. 
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Along the methodology, some theoretical and experimental methods are proposed in 
order to determine and interpret the required information. However, it must be clear 
that any user should seek further information before actually performing any 
experimental test based on the information included in HarsMeth NP, since the 
authors will accept no responsibilities on the possible consequences of such tests. 
 
HarsMeth NP can be used by any engineer or operator with basic knowledge on 
chemical and process safety. The questionnaires can be filled individually or in 
groups, but it is strongly suggested that after it is completed, it is reviewed by 
another person or group, including the company’s responsible for safety issues. 
Special emphasis on revision is encouraged in the validity of the Justify your answer 
type of answers. 
 
One version of HarsMeth NP should be used for every new process carried out in 
the plant. Also, every time a process is modified significantly, the results obtained by 
HarsMeth NP should be verified. Even though some sections are considered 
independent of the chemical process studied (for example the Safety Management 
System) it should always be checked if any changes could modify in any way the 
answers given. 
 
Finally, if more information on these issues is needed, one interesting source on the 
topic is another task developed by HarsNet called HarsBook (HarsBook, 2003). 
This task consists on a guide for experts and it describes the best methods currently 
available for predicting, assessing and minimising exothermic reaction hazards. It is 
structured in a way that covers all the steps related to a chemical process, from the 
research of information to the storage of unstable substances. Another useful source 
of information is the S2S web site (S2S, 2007), which includes other assessment 
and training tools for industrial hazards. 
 
 




2. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
 
The HarsMeth methodology intends to cover all the stages of a process, from the 
laboratory research until the production at industrial scale. However, it is clear that 
there are some procedures inside the chemical company that should be common to 
all the processes that take place at the industrial installation. Even though the focus 
of HarsMeth NP is the assessment of chemical reaction hazards, some 
recommendations are put forward for an appropriate safety management system. A 
more complete safety management assessment tool has been developed by the 
S2S network, which can be found at the S2S web page (S2S, 2007). The user is 
encouraged to use this tool for a better understanding of management system 
requirements. 
 
The Safety Management System should include standardized procedures in order to 
always carry out any kind of work in a safe way. It must involve the direction and all 
employees, and its specifications must be clear and easily available to anyone in the 
company. The elements covered in the following description do not form a rigid 
scheme, but are parts of an interdisciplinary flow of information combining elements 
common to all categories. 
 
Planning & Safety training. Planning in chemical safety includes elaboration of safety 
practice procedures for the whole process, as well as nomination of people 
responsible for ensuring that those procedures are followed. Special care must be 
provided in training workers with all the necessary information to perform plant 
operations in a safe way, mainly those involving reactive systems. 
 
Planning and training procedures should be subject to periodic revision and 
validation. It is the responsibility of the chemical company to establish a proper 
culture of safety in the establishment, where all workers (including those external to 
the chemical company) are always aware of the hazards related to the activities they 
perform. 
 
Maintenance & Management of change. Many incidents involving chemical reactivity 
occur during non routine procedures such as maintenance work (Sales et al., 2006 
(b)). These activities must be correctly assessed by defining safety precautions to be 
applied. Appropriate supervision of maintenance activities must be provided. Also, a 
rigorous system to avoid hazards deriving from changes in plant or process 
conditions must be put forward. 
 
Emergency plan. The actions to be taken in case of an emergency should occur 
must be clearly defined, explained, reviewed and practiced. It is important to assure 
that safe ways of stopping activities are provided and also that every worker 
(including external personnel) is aware of evacuation ways. 
 
A correct management of the alarm system is also necessary. Different alarm 
systems should be used to identify critical parameters of the process in order to 
establish different actions to be taken in each case. Also, management should 
include proper supervision on each alarm included. If alarms are not clearly 
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differentiated and identified, a critical signal could pass unnoticed and a hazardous 
situation may take place. 
 
Operational Practice System. This section covers some routine actions to be taken 
during process operations. These are supposed to be performed in the same way no 
matter what the chemical process is. There should be specified procedures detailing 
how these should be carried out in order to avoid hazardous situations. 
 
The permit to work is a protocol that assures that any work in the plant can be 
performed under safety conditions. This means, for instance, that welding operations 
should not be performed in a zone where flammable conditions might be present. It 
also implies that a procedure must be followed to assure that plant conditions allow 
the chemical process to be performed safely. For example, if an alarm, a probe or a 
safety measure has been deactivated for maintenance procedures, it should not be 
possible to reassume the process until it has been reconnected to the control 
system.  
 
The management of waste streams must be carefully performed in order to avoid 
unexpected hazards. These streams usually involve mixtures of different 
substances, the properties of which many times remain unknown. Solvent recovery 
in process plants may involve mixtures of different reactants, intermediates or 
impurities, including thermally unstable products that can lead to accidents under 
certain conditions (Lunghi et al., 1998; Goulding, 1994) 
 
The following checklist includes a relation of basic suggestions to cover the previous 
points. Since it is non dependent on the process, this checklist can be answered 










I. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM CHECKLIST 
 
 Planning and Safety Training OK 
I.1 The company must comply with all the required legislation for safety issues  
I.2 There should be a written policy stating how chemical processes must be carried out under safety 
conditions 
 
I.3 Responsibilities of personnel involved in chemical processes should be clearly established  
I.4 All personnel involved in chemical processes should have access to the policies established  
I.5 A fluent system of communication between personnel and departments should be enhanced  
I.6 Periodic audits of processes and procedures should be performed in order to assure they follow 
safety policies 
 
I.7 There should be a clear procedure to train operators in the hazards involved in chemical processes  
I.8 External workers should be clearly informed about the safety requirements of each process  
I.9 Case studies, lessons learned from past accidents and historical data should be used in safety 
training 
 
I.10 Training procedures should be reviewed periodically in order to avoid overconfidence  
   
 Maintenance and Management of Change OK 
I.11 There should be a written procedure detailing how to perform maintenance of plant equipment  
I.12 Design and maximum values of critical parameters (P, T, V, etc.) should be documented for all 
equipment  
 
I.13 There should be a system to assure that all required safety measures are always in place and 
operational 
 
I.14 Maintenance procedures should include calibration systems for sensors  
I.15 Maintenance procedures should include studies of corrosion, equipment oxidation and fatigue of 
construction materials 
 
I.16 Maintenance procedures should include studies on compatibility of cleaning products with process 
reactants 
 
I.17 There should be a system to assure that all alarms are operational and well heard throughout the 
plant 
 
I.18 There should be a system to assure that workers are able to identify and differentiate the various 
existing alarms 
 
I.19 There should be a written procedure detailing how to perform cleaning operations in plant equipment  
I.20 There should be a system to assure appropriate supervision for maintenance and cleaning 
procedures 
 
I.21 There should be a written procedure detailing how to manage process and plant modifications  
I.22 The management of change system should include detailed procedures for renewal of documentation 
and software 
 
I.23 A quality control system should be implemented  







 Emergency plan OK 
I.24 All possible accident scenarios should be considered and their possible consequences evaluated  
I.25 There should be a written procedure detailing what actions must be taken in order to mitigate releases 
of loss of containments 
 
I.26 All safety systems necessary to mitigate a loss of containment should be implemented  
I.27 Near misses should be correctly reported and investigated  
I.28 There should be an emergency valve test to assure that all equipment is protected against 
overpressure 
 
I.29 There should be a written procedure detailing what actions should be taken by each worker in case of 
an emergency 
 
I.30 Personnel in charge of coordinating emergency situations should be nominated  
I.31 There should be emergency teams available, like fire brigades or medical aid  
I.32 A coordination system with local authorities in case of an emergency should be established  
I.33 There should be an organised system of alarms, differentiated and identifiable by every worker  
I.34 Emergency drills should be performed periodically  
I.35 Emergency drills should include activation of defence lines and establishment of meeting points  
I.36 The efficiency of emergency drills should be evaluated  
I.37 There should be a written procedure detailing how to stop an activity in case of an emergency  
I.38 There should be a written procedure detailing evacuation routes in case of an emergency  
   
 Operational practice system OK 
I.39 There should be a permit to work system in operation, specifying each task assigned to each worker 
involved in the process 
 
I.40 There should be a written procedure detailing correct plant conditions for start up and shut down of a 
process 
 
I.41 There should be a system to assure appropriate supervision for process operations  
 There should be an established procedure to avoid hazardous situations due to:  
I.42 Wrong chemicals used (i.e. wrong labelling, wrong pick up)  
I.43 Wrong quantities used  
I.44 Unavailability of chemicals (reactants, inhibitors…)  
I.45 Bad connections or piping  
I.46 Use of the same equipment for different processes (multi-purpose plants)  
I.47 New chemicals added in vessels already in use  
I.48 Transport or wrong manipulation  
I.49 Mixing of waste streams  
I.50 Failure of power supply and auxiliary services (N2, air, water, oil, steam…)  
 
 




3. PRELIMINARY REACTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
The safety analysis of a chemical process must begin at the earliest stage of the 
development of the process. When a new chemical product is to be produced at an 
industrial scale, a synthetic route has to be determined. This will be done by testing 
the chemical yield of different reactants in the laboratory. At this stage, different 
paths to obtain the desired product could be put forward, where different 
combinations of reactants, solvents, catalysts, products and by-products can be 
involved. It is usually unavailable to perform a rigorous safety study on every single 
combination. Furthermore, other parameters different from safety can be of 
importance in the election, such as cost, yield and quality, environmental policies, 
and so on. 
 
Nevertheless, an orientation on the possible hazards to each possible synthesis path 
must be given in order to take a decision on the choice of a chemical route. 
Basically, the information to be given for each combination of reactants is divided 
into two groups. 
 
• Chemical stability of reactants and products. 
• Reactivity and Compatibility of chemicals. 
 
There are some preliminary tests that can provide fair enough values on these 
safety issues, considering that further and deeper tests will be performed in following 
stages. 
 
But before actually studying the hazards of chemical reactions, the concept of 
inherent safety must be introduced. This concept could be considered more like a 
philosophy that should be used during the whole life-cycle of industrial production. 
 
 
3.1. Inherent Safety 
 
 
The inherent safety approach for hazard assessment intends to ensure that a 
process will remain under safety margins of operability even if the process 
undergoes any deviations from the expected operation conditions. This implies that 
all the potential hazards have been identified, and process and plant designed in 
such a way that those hazards are eliminated introducing the necessary preventive 
measures. This can be achieved for example by changing reactants, reaction 
conditions, solvent, catalysts etc. (Rogers, 1991). The same is valid for any synthetic 
route or for the operation mode. Semi-batch processes should be preferred to batch, 
because the semi batch mode allows controlling the reaction through addition, 
besides fewer inventories have to be used for each reaction step. Likewise, if plant 
and organisational conditions allow it, changing to continuous production should be 
attempted. 
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Inherent safety was introduced by Kletz in 1985, and has been widely studied since 
that time. Four principles can be considered as the basis of the inherent safety 
concept. 
 
• Minimise (or intensify). Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances in the 
process at any time. 
 
• Substitute. Replace a material with a less hazardous substance or a 
hazardous reaction with a less hazardous one. 
 
• Moderate (or attenuate). Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous 
form of material or facilities which reduce the impact of a release of 
hazardous material or energy. 
 
• Simplify (or error tolerance). Design processes and equipment to eliminate 
opportunities for errors by identifying ways to eliminate excessive use of add-
on safety features and protective devices. 
 
Even though it is considered to be virtually impossible to completely eliminate all 
hazards, it should be a common practice in process development to apply inherent 
safety principles, under a basic general idea: to avoid a runaway rather than to 
mitigate its consequences. 
 
 
3.2. Chemical Stability 
 
 
The first thing that must be taken into account when considering the chemical 
products to use in a chemical reaction, is how stable this products are going to be. A 
good classification of stability hazards is provided by the CCPS (2001). 
 
• Unstable: referred to chemicals that have tendency to break down 
(decompose) over time or when exposed to conditions such as heat, 
environmental conditions, shock, friction or a catalyst with the resulting 
decomposition products often being toxic or flammable. Decomposition can 
be rapid enough to give an explosive energy release and can generate 
enough heat and gases for fires or explosions to take place. Different types of 
unstable materials can be considered, such as: 
 
o Decomposing 
o Thermally sensitive 
o Shock sensitive 
o Explosive 
 
• Polymerizing: tendency of some chemicals to self-react to form larger 
molecules, while possibly generating great amounts of heat or gases. 
 
• Pyrophoric: a substance is considered pyrophoric if it ignites spontaneously 
when exposed to air. 
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• Peroxide former: any chemical that has the tendency to react with oxygen, 
such as from being exposed to air, to form unstable organic peroxides. 
 
• Water reactive: a chemical that will react with water or moisture.  
 
• Oxidizer: chemicals that give up oxygen easily or readily oxidize other 
materials. 
 
• Reducer: chemicals that can reduce other materials generating dangerous 
amounts of heat. 
 
• Toxic: property of a chemical to have poisonous effects after a certain time of 
exposure to a given concentration. 
 
Even though there are currently no methods available for estimating the thermal 
stability of substances, a preliminary indication of this parameter can be found in the 
literature. However in the majority of cases some kind of experimental testing will be 
needed. Some first aid references and experimental techniques are outlined next. 
 
a) Literature surveys 
 
There are a great number of publications that can provide information on stability of 
chemical substances. Some classifications on the stability of functional groups can 
be helpful as a start (CCPS, 1995; Johnson et al., 2003; Barton and Rogers, 1997). 
Next some further literature references are cited 
 
• Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS). Suppliers of chemical reactants should 
always provide with MSDS, which should contain some section regarding 
Stability and Reactivity issues. Further Information on MSDS characteristics 
can be found at the S2S web site (S2S, 2007). 
 
• Bretherick’s Reactive Chemical Hazards. This work covers 4800 elements or 
compounds with an additional 5000 secondary entries involving two or more 
materials, with 30000 cross references, including case histories as examples 
(Bretherick, 1996). 
 
• Merck Index. Commonly available encyclopedia for nearly 10000 chemicals, 
containing stability data for many materials (The Merck Index, 1983). 
 
• NFPA. The compilation done by the US National Fire Protection Association 
includes different chapters such as hazardous chemical data, fire and 
explosion hazards, instability and reactivity hazards and a manual of 
hazardous chemical reactions (NFPA, 1991). 
 
b) Experimental techniques 
 
In order to perform preliminary tests to determine the stability of substances and 
mixtures, the following methods can be used. 
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• Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA). Consists on the measurement of the 
change of the difference in temperature between the sample and a reference, 
while they are subject to a particular temperature regime. DTA measurements 
are useful to determine possible exothermic activity of a sample (HarsBook, 
2003). 
 
• Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC). DSC involves measurement of the 
heat released or absorbed by the sample in comparison to a reference while 
they are both subject to the same temperature regime. DSC experiments 
provide information on thermal stability, such as the starting temperature of 
decomposition phenomena, or a possible autocatalytic behavior (HarsBook, 
2003). 
 
• Flash point tests. The flash point is the lowest temperature at which a 
substance can be ignited under certain conditions. There are a number of 
ASTM standard methods for these tests (D56, D1310, D93, D92, D3278) 
(ASTM, 2007) 
 
• Flammable limits. Upper and lower concentrations of a substance in a mixture 
which can be ignited by an ignition source. The experimental procedure 
consists on a chamber into which different concentrations of the mixture are 
introduced and subject to a spark or hot wire to determine at which 
concentration the mixture ignites (The Dow Chemical Company, 1997). 
 
• CHETAH (Chemical Thermodynamic and Energy Release Program). This is a 
software program developed to screen mixtures of chemicals for their 
potential to undergo a violent decomposition leading to a deflagration or 
detonation. The program can determine whether the explosion potential of the 
material is high, medium or low (HarsBook, 2003; CHETAH, 1998). 
 
• Drop weight test. This test gives an idea on how shock sensitive a substance 
is. It measures the susceptibility of a chemical to decompose explosively 
when subjected to the impact produced by dropping a weight onto a small 
sample on a metal cup. Results are not absolute and depend on the 
conditions of the test, but can be valid as a first guidance (The Dow Chemical 
Company, 1997). 
 
• Confinement cap test. This test is used to determine the detonability of a 
material using a blasting cap as an initiator. The blasting cap is ignited to set 
up a shockwave in the sample test in less than 1 millisecond. If the material 
detonates, it will add energy to the system, which will split the aluminum tube 
in which it is confined. The amount of splitting can be compared to known 
explosive materials (The Dow Chemical Company, 1997). 
 
• Explosibility test. A simple test to determine the possibility of delagration is to 
drop a few milligrams of the substance onto a hotplate or to heat it on a 
spatula. Rapid decomposition or burning suggests that the substance is 
capable of deflagration (Barton and Rogers, 1997). 
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• Dust explosions. A particularly hazardous operation is the handling of dust 
solids. Some preliminary tests can be performed, such as the so called 20 
liter sphere test (Steinbach, 1999). A preliminary estimation can be done 
regarding the particle size of the material handled. The smaller the particle 
size, the greater the hazard will be(The Dow Chemical Company, 1994). 
 
• Pyrophoric. A simple observation test can be performed, dropping a small 
amount of substance from a height about 1 meter and seeing whether it 
ignites or not during dropping (powders) or after some time (liquids). Test 
requires several repetitions for confirmation of results (CCPS, 1995). 
 
• Water reactive. A simple test consists on introducing a small sample in a flask 
containing water. The flask is connected to a gas volume metering device, in 
order to determine the amount and rate of gas generated. Such gas must be 
tested afterwards for flammability (CCPS, 1995). 
 
• Oxidizer. The first step should be to calculate the oxygen balance. This is the 
amount of oxygen, expressed as weight percent, liberated as a result of 
complete conversion of the material to relatively simple oxidized molecules. 
Further testing can be done mixing the substance with a combustible material 
in different concentrations, arranging different strips of the mixture which are 
later ignited. The burning time is measured and can be interpreted as a 
function of the oxidizing properties of the substance (CCPS, 1995). 
 
• Toxicity. Unfortunately there are no techniques that can be used to test 
toxicity outside a specialized laboratory. Typical experiments here are 
performed with animals exposed to different concentrations of the selected 
material. However, a preliminary bibliographic search can be done, either on 
MSDS or in different web sites like NIOSH. 
 
 
3.3. Reactivity and Compatibility 
 
 
Once the thermal behaviour of each substance is determined, it is also necessary to 
determine possible hazards arising from the interaction of the different chemicals 
involved. Here compatibility charts must be elaborated that clearly specify any 
possible hazardous consequence of mixing two chemicals at any step of the 
process. There exist some previously developed methods, outlining the following: 
 
• Compatibility Charts. There are different methods to determine the 
possible effects of the interaction between binary combinations of 
chemicals. A compatibility chart developed by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency is included (see annex I). This takes into consideration 
the effects of reactive functional groups. Substances must be classified 
according to the functional group that is considered more reactive, and 
then the possible effects of the different combinations of chemicals that 
can interact must be considered (EPA, 1980). 




• Reactivity Worksheet. The Chemical Reactivity Worksheet is a free 
available software developed by the US National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2004). It is a very helpful tool for the 
determination of hazardous chemicals interactions. It includes: 
 
o a reactivity database. This database contains information for more 
than 6,000 common hazardous chemicals. The database includes 
information about the special hazards of each chemical and about 
whether a chemical reacts with air, water, or other materials. 
 
o a way to virtually mix chemicals. Consisting of a program to find out 
what possible hazards could occur from accidental mixing. 
 
When performing compatibility studies, the following issues must be considered. 
 
1) Compatibility must be studied in front of any binary combination of chemicals 
involved in the process, independently of whether they must be mixed 
together during the industrial process. This procedure considers the 
possibility of using mistaken chemicals at any point of the process, or the 
possibility of mixing due to accidents at storage facilities or during 
transportation operations. 
2) Construction materials should be considered in front of any reactant. 
Particularly any metal container that could act as a catalyzer of possible side 
reactions (or any other material that is known to be incompatible). In fact, 
when using catalyzers it must be assured all binary combinations plus the 
possible catalyzers are studied. 
3) Finally, it must also be studied the possible interaction of any auxiliary 
material (nitrogen, oil, refrigerant fluids, cleaning or maintenance materials) 
with reactants and products. Special care must be taken with water, even if it 
is not directly involved in the process, since it can always be present due to 
weather effects. 
 
Regarding the reactivity of the desired process, the first consideration must be the 
amount and rate of heat generation by the synthesis reaction. Even though this will 
be deeply studied in following sections, a rough estimation can be performed with 
commonly available equipment. Besides, a first approximation on the amounts of 
gas that the reaction is going generate must be given in order to have an idea on the 
amount of pressure that can be generated during the reaction. Following, a list of 
simple techniques for preliminary results is given. 
 
• CHETAH. Although its chief aim is to predict deflagration/detonation potential 
from molecular structure, it can also be used to estimate heats of reaction, 
heats of combustion or heat capacities. Calculations are done using the 
Benson Group theory, and results can vary regarding how these groups are 
introduced in the program (Nomen et al., 2005), so the reaction conditions 
must be clearly defined. 
 
• DSC. DSC is a useful technique to determine thermal stability, but it can give 
more information than DTA. For example, it is a very good method to 
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determine the specific heat of a mixture, which is important for a complete 
thermal evaluation of a process (HarsBook, 2003). 
 
• Mixing calorimetry and gas evolution tests. At least one mixing calorimetry 
test must be performed for every possible synthetic route. These tests must 
include all the chemicals involved (reactants, catalysts and solvents) and 
follow the conditions indicated in the synthesis path (temperature, pH an do 
on). They can be performed using commonly available laboratory material on 
a small scale. The use of a gas buret to collect the reaction products can give 
an indication of the gas generation (The Dow Chemical Company, 1997). 
 
• Dewar calorimetry. The use of a stainless steel Dewar flask is the best way to 
simulate the loss of control of a reaction in the laboratory, but it can be 
replaced by any vacuum bottle equipped with thermocouples, in order to 
determine the temperature evolution of the reaction in absence of heat 
exchange. For pressure data, experiments should only be performed using 
the stainless steel vessel with a pressure gauge and assuring appropriate 
protective measures for personnel (HarsBook, 2003). 
 
 
It must be noted that the techniques mentioned in this section can only be taken as 
preliminary references. It is strongly recommended the search of further information 
before performing any of these tests in the lab. Interesting sources for more 
information can be the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM, 2007) or 
the European Chemicals Bureau (http://ecb.jrc.it). This has been developed by the 
European Commission, and it includes a selection of standardized methods for 
testing physical and chemical properties, classification and labeling databases, 
legislation issues, and other interesting information. 
 
The following section includes a table that must be used to specify the substances 
and mixtures used in the process; next, a checklist can be found that includes the 
basic hazards that should be identified at this stage of the process. One version of 
this checklist should be completed for each one of the possible synthesis paths 
considered so far, and results should be recorded and kept always present for 
further developments of the analysis. At the end of the checklist, a summary table 
can be found where the results of the analysis for each case should be compared. 
This table should also include non-safety related issues, in order to be able to 
perform a better comparison between all the possible paths, so that the analysis can 
be used as a trust worthy decision making tool. 
 




II. PRELIMINARY REACTION ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 
 
 
Substances and mixtures data: 
 
 















          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          






1. One copy of this table should be filled for every possible synthetic route. 
2. Consider all the possible phases that a substance can be present in the process (storage, reaction steps, etc). 
3. Use any internal identification reference for substances. 
4. Degree of purity as specified in each process. 
5. Inhibitors, triggering agents, chemical substances able to influence the rate of reaction, etc. 
6. Stable or unstable, considering the maximum storage period. 
 





 Is any of the substances considered to be potentially as: 
II.1 Susceptible of decomposition with time? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.2 Thermally unstable? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.3 Self reacting / autocatalytic / Polymerizing? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.4 Water reactive? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.5 Oxidizer? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.6 Reducer? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.7 Flammable? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.8 Corrosive? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.9 Pyrophoric (spontaneously combustible)? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.10 Shock sensitive? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.11 Explosive? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.12 Toxic? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 









 Can mixing of two substances generate a hazardous amount and/or rate production of: 
II.13 Heat? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 




YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
II.15 Known hazardous substances (peroxides, azides,…)? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
II.16 Toxic substance formation? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
II.17 Flammable substance formation? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
II.18 Explosive substance formation? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
II.19 Corrosive substance formation? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
II.20 Violent Polymerization? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 




 Do preliminary tests suggest potentially dangerous: 
II.21 Quantity and rate of heat production? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
II.22 Quantity and rate of gas generation? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 




















Use the following table to indicate the substances or mixtures identified as hazardous, and the 




3. Fire and Flammability. 
4. Toxic. 
5. Corrosive. 
6. Explosion or gas generation. 
 
Assure that compatibility tests include construction materials and auxiliary services 
 
 















Use the following table to indicate which synthesis path has yielded hazardous values for any of 
the items reviewed in this section (stability, compatibility, heat and gas generation…). Include 
also possible comments regarding other aspects of the synthesis studied not specifically related 
to safety (yield, reaction time, purity of final product, reactant consumption, wastes generated, 









Heat and gas 
generation hazards 
Other aspects
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     










4. BENCH SCALE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Once a synthetic route has been chosen as the best way to carry out the industrial 
production of the desired chemical compound, it must be thoroughly studied in the 
laboratory. Apart from the production tests carried out by synthesis chemists, the 
chemical reaction hazards must be studied. When doing so, not only the expected 
conditions of the process must be considered, but also scenarios that may occur due 
to any deviation from the normal evolution of the synthesis reaction. 
 
 
4.1. Thermal Evaluation of Chemical Reactions 
 
 
It is clear that the evolution of the temperature through the whole process must be 
well known after the study of the process on a laboratory scale. Thermal evaluation 
is the way to know the expected thermal behaviour (under normal or abnormal 
conditions) of a chemical synthesis. Even though this guide does not intend to cover 
to all extent the theory of chemical reaction engineering, the following concepts 
when studying reaction hazards must be taken into account. 
 
• Thermodynamics. The magnitude of the energetic change associated with the 
chemical reaction. 
 
• Kinetics. The rate of the energetic change (heat release rate). 
 
The importance of the temperature evaluation resides in the fact that generally the 
rate of a chemical reaction is governed by temperature in an exponential equation 
known as Arrhenius law (Barton and Rogers, 1997), whereas the cooling capacity of 
a typical reaction vessel is linearly proportional to the reaction temperature, in a 
relation that involves the heat transfer coefficient and the surface area between the 
reactor and the cooling device. If the evolution with temperature of both tendencies 
is compared (Figure 3), a differentiation between a stable and an unstable zone can 
be made (CCPS, 1995). 
 
A runaway reaction is usually considered as an unexpected and undesired situation, 
in which the progressive generation of heat from a chemical process occurs due to 
the rate of heat production being greater than the rate of heat removal (Chilworth, 
2001). It must be noted, however, that not always a runaway has to be hazardous. A 
temperature increase does not necessarily have to generate a safety problem. The 
problem comes when side effects are generated by this temperature increase, 
mainly being decomposition processes or secondary unexpected reactions that can 
lead to uncontrolled gas generation and consequently to dramatic pressure raises 
that can provoke the explosion of reaction vessels. Depending on the characteristics 
of gas generation in a runaway scenario, reaction systems can be classified as 
gassy, vapor-pressure and hybrid, depending on whether the pressure rise comes 
as an effect of permanent gas generation, increased evaporation of reactants, or a 
combination of both factors (Barton and Rogers, 1997). 




Figure 3. Comparison of typical evolution of heat generation (Q& ) as a function of 
temperature for an Arrhenius type reaction, and the cooling system of a reaction 
vessel. 
 
The first step must be a thorough study of the desired reaction in order to check that 
no hazard arises under normal operating conditions. Probably the preliminary tests 
described in the previous chapter have already proved this, but laboratory 
experiments should now determine the design of the cooling system, agitation, and 
other devices necessary to carry out the reaction safely. 
 
There are many factors that can alter the course of a chemical reaction produced at 
industrial scale, mainly due to equipment malfunction during the process. It has 
already been outlined in the Safety Management System how some actions (use of 
mistaken chemicals, and so on) can generate an accident, but also malfunctioning of 
reaction equipment can lead to hazardous situations. Some of these hazards can 
be. 
 
• Accumulation. It is a build up of non reacted chemicals inside the reaction 
vessel. This problem arises when the concentration of the controlling reactant 
in the bulk reaches a too high value, then the reaction is triggered too fast and 
high exothermal behaviour appears. Some causes that may lead to an 
increase in accumulation are: 
 
o Inappropriate dosing speed. A failure in the dosing system will alter the 
expected kinetics of the reaction, which will generate an increase in the 
concentration of non reacted chemicals. 
o Agitation failure. This will lead to an improper mixing. Reactants will not 
be put in contact, so the concentration of non reacted chemicals will 
increase 
o Too low temperature. A temperature drop can slow the rate of reaction 
generating an increase in accumulation. 
o Impurities. Any unwanted chemical present in the reaction mixture 
might inhibit the reaction making it slower. 




• Segregated phases. The formation of a segregated phase in the reaction 
mixture can lead to an unstable situation because such phase can be 
thermally unstable or can change the properties of the reaction mixture. 
Moreover, it can jam measurement devices like level, temperature or pressure 
probes (Nomen et al., 2004 (b)). Failures in agitation or too low temperatures 
are typical causes that can lead to generation of segregated phases. A 
scenario that must be particularly studied is the case of an unexpected stop of 
the stirrer. If a segregated phase is formed and the agitation is restarted, a 
great amount of heat can be suddenly released. 
 
• Hot spots. It is a too high local temperature. They are especially critical if the 
reaction mixture contains detonating, deflagrating or self-igniting substances, 
since it could trigger an explosion. This hazard is usually originated by 
insufficient stirring (Nomen et al., 2004 (b)). 
 
In order to identify when it is likely that a runaway can take place in a chemical 
reaction, some experimental determinations have to be made, regarding the 
possible levels of temperature that can be reached during the reaction. There are 
two simple methods that can be helpful for this determination, the Gygax and 
Stoessel methods.  
 
a) The Gygax diagram 
 
The Gygax (1988) diagram is a plot of Temperature Vs Time, which represents a 





Figure 4. Schematic presentation of a cooling failure scenario. 
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The main features included in the Gygax diagram are: 
• A = desired reaction B = loss of cooling  C = runaway 
• 1: time to cooling failure 
• 2: temperature increase under normal operating conditions 
• 3: time to reach the maximum temperature due to synthetic reaction 
• 4: temperature increase due to loss of cooling 
• 5: time to maximum rate under adiabatic conditions 
• 6: temperature increase due to secondary reactions 
 
It is helpful for the evaluation of the cooling failure scenario to discuss four 
temperature levels and their interactions. This procedure is known as the Stoeesel 
method. 
b) The Stoessel diagram 
The methodology developed by Stoessel (1993) is a useful system to perform a 
preliminary evaluation of the thermal risk that a chemical process might generate. It 
is based on the possible different positions of the temperature levels described 
above relative to each other, and the classification of the process under certain 
















Figure 5. Scenarios with increasing criticality according to Stoessel. 
 
The temperature values considered by Stoessel are: 
 
• The process temperature, TP. 
 
• The temperature to be reached under upset conditions, MTSR. 
 
• The boiling point of the reaction mass Tb. 
 


































The descriptions of the 5 scenarios described by Stoessel are the following: 
 
• Case 1: in a case one scenario, neither the boiling point of the mixture nor the 
dangerous region in which the decomposition reaction becomes effective 
within a critical time is ever reached. Such processes may be regarded as 
inherently safe with respect to the process deviation evaluated. 
 
• Case 2: also in the second case, which differs from the first by the absence of 
the boiling point barrier between MTSR and MAXTSAFE, the process may be 
regarded as safe. 
 
• Case 3: in the third case, the boiling point with its latent heat of evaporation 
may be looked upon as a safety barrier, provided the condenser is adequately 
designed. However, it must be considered that for some mixtures, 
evaporation of solvent during some time can reduce the MAXTSAFE value of 
the mixture. If the process is performed in a closed system, the apparatus 
must be designed for the maximum expectable overpressure or be equipped 
with a pressure relief device. 
 
• Case 4: scenarios with case four characteristics must be evaluated as to 
whether or not the evaporation capacity provides sufficient safety. If this is not 
the case, additional organizational or technical measures have to be 
implemented. Should the operation be performed in a closed system, then the 
temperature corresponding to the relief valve’s set pressure may not be much 
higher than the level of Tb. 
 
• Case 5: the fifth case must in any case be rated problematic. Plant and/or 
process modifications usually cannot be avoided in such situations. 
 
 
Whenever a possible runaway reaction is identified, it must be studied what possible 
actions can be taken in order to regain control of the process. Such actions generally 
include extra cooling, inhibition of the reaction, or introduction of relief systems in the 
reactor vessel. The chapter Industrial Scale Analysis deals with possible safety 
measures to carry out a process safely at plant scale.  
 
Along with uncontrolled gas generation leading to extremely high pressure values, 
possible hazardous effects of chemical substances generated during a runaway 
situation must be taken into consideration. This hazard is known to have generated 
accidents, as in the case of a reaction in which an unexpected generation of 
hydrogen chloride during a runaway corroded the metal reaction vessel, reducing its 
mechanical resistance. The consequence of this was that the design of the pressure 
relief system became incorrect, generating an explosion in the vessel at a lower 
pressure than expected (Sales et. al, 2007). 
 




4.2. Test Methods for Runaway Assessment 
 
 
In order to obtain accurate values for MTSR and MAXTSAFE, some calorimetric 
experiments must be performed. There are two main calorimetry techniques. 
 
a) Reaction Calorimetry 
 
This is the main technique to determine the heat of reaction, which is the total 
quantity of thermal energy liberated or absorbed during a chemical reaction. The 
heat release rate, or power released by the reaction can be determined as a 
difference between terms included in the heat balance (HarsBook, 2003). One of the 
values that can be calculated by this technique is the adiabatic temperature 
increase1, which together with the process temperature provides the MTSR value.  
 
MTSR should be calculated in the worst case scenario of the considered process. 
Whereas in the batch case MTSR corresponds always to the maximum adiabatic 
temperature increase, for the semi-batch case three scenarios can be considered 
(Serra et al., 1997): 
 
• batch: all reactants are mixed at the beginning of the process, adiabatic 
conditions are assumed. 
• stop: dosing is stopped after a cooling failure. Only the actual accumulation is 
considered at each time. 
• non-stop: dosing is not stopped when adiabatic conditions are established. 
Actual accumulation and remaining heat of reaction should be considered.  
 
Reaction calorimetry is not only a key technique for risk assessment of chemical 
process, but also an effective tool to determine the dimension of cooling systems for 
the reactor. In a final stage, the combination of reaction calorimetry equipment with 
commonly available laboratory equipment can provide direct and accurate measures 
of the quantity and rate of gas generation during the desired reaction. The different 
existing calorimeters have been widely studied and compared so far (HarsBook, 
2003). 
 
b) Adiabatic calorimetry 
 
The term adiabatic refers to a system condition in which no heat is exchanged 
between the system and its environment. This is the situation that better represents 
a runaway scenario, considering that the rate of heat production in the reaction 
vessel is so high that the cooling capacity cannot remove the heat generated. 
 
Adiabatic calorimetry experiments are particularly useful in order to determine values 
related to the decomposition of chemical mixtures, such as the adiabatic induction 
                                                
1 Adiabatic temperature increase is the temperature rise that will take place in case the system loses 
its capacity to exchange heat with its environment, e.g. a cooling failure. It can be calculated as the 
ratio between the reaction enthalpy and the heat capacity of the mixture.  
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time2, decomposition temperature gradients or time to maximum rate of heat 
generation (TMRad). Another important feature is that it can also determine the gas 
generation rate in a decomposition process, giving accurate values for the pressure 
that can be reached during a runaway reaction. It must always be kept in mind that 
pressure increase is the final hazard in a runaway, since it is this phenomenon that 
can lead to the explosion of a reactor. 
 
MAXTSAFE, considered as the temperature limit before a decomposition process 
falls out of control, can be determined by adiabatic calorimetry as the temperature at 
which the adiabatic induction time of a possible decomposition reaction falls below a 
specific limit value, ADT24 (adiabatic induction time less than 24 hours). If adiabatic 
calorimetry data is not available, MAXTSAFE can be obtained by means of a 
dynamic DSC register of the reaction mass, with a heating rate of 5 K/min, following 
the detailed procedure: 
 
• The value of MAXTSAFE can be determined, at a first step, as the 
temperature at the first exothermal peak less 70 K. This safety reference 
is more objective than the Tonset, since the later may depend on the 
precision of the apparatus. 
• It is necessary to compare this value with the MTSR. If ⏐MTSR-(Tpeak-
70)⏐>50, then the approximation of MAXTSAFE=Tpeak-70 can be 
considered correct. If this is not so, it is also required to perform an 
isothermal3 DSC at MTSR followed by a dynamic register.  
• If MTSR>Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does not reveal any significant 
change of the mass reaction, and the dynamic register is equivalent to 
the first DSC performed, then it can be concluded that MAXTSAFE>Tpeak-
70 and therefore MAXTSAFE>MTSR. 
• If MTSR>Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does reveal significant change 
of the mass reaction (low velocity of the exothermal phenomena at the 
process temperature can be a problem for detection), and the dynamic 
register is not equivalent to the first DSC performed, then the 
approximation MAXTSAFE=Tpeak-70 can be considered. 
• If MTSR<Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does not reveal any significant 
change of the mass reaction, and the dynamic register is equivalent to 
the first DSC performed, then the approximation MAXTSAFE=Tpeak-70 
can be considered. 
• If MTSR<Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does reveal significant change 
of the mass reaction, and the dynamic register is not equivalent to the 
first DSC performed, then it can be concluded that MAXTSAFE<Tpeak-70 
and therefore MAXTSAFE<MTSR. 
 
At this point of the evaluation, it might be interesting to address to the on-line tool of 
HarsMeth, which is available at the HarsNet web site. This is an Internet based 
program, which calculates the main parameters needed to perform the Gygax and 
Stoessel evaluations from experimental values. It is also very interesting the tutorial 
                                                
2 Adiabatic induction time: induction period or time to an event under adiabatic conditions starting from 
specified operating conditions. 
3 When performing an isothermal DSC, it must be considered that a 12 hour experiment should be 
long enough. Besides, low velocity of the exothermal phenomena at the process temperature can be 
a problem for detection. 
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included in this interactive part of the methodology, which guides the user through 
the whole process, offering detailed and graphic explanations on the terms used. 
 
Another interesting source of information is HarsBase, a database developed by the 
HarsNet group which includes a list of commercially available calorimeters, 
indicating all the possible operation modes, parameters to determine, and other 
characteristics. HarsBook is also a reference guide for details on calorimetry 
techniques. 
 
As it has been stated, the main (but not only) target of HarsMeth NP is SMEs, which 
usually have little resources to perform an accurate risk assessment. However, it 
should be a standard that at least one reaction calorimetry experiment on the 
desired reaction should be performed. Moreover, if it is found that the process could 
be considered potentially hazardous (Stoessel category 4 or 5), even adiabatic 
calorimetry tests should be carried out if the process is to be carried out in an 
industrial scale  
 
 
4.3. Other Hazards Related to Chemical Reactions 
 
 
While analysing the chemical reaction in the laboratory, it is important to be able to 
identify any necessary evolution in the final product after it comes out of the 
chemical reactor, in order to adapt it to its final use. This evolution may require 
changes in the physical conditions of the chemical substances involved in the 
process, which may also lead to hazardous situations.  
 
Flammable, toxic or explosive situations should be identified. These hazards have 
already been introduced in the preliminary reaction analysis section, but it is possible 
that the analysis in the laboratory brings some new ideas on the operations that 
must follow the chemical reaction that were not identified before. If such situations 
are encountered, the principles of inherent safety and experimental tests described 
previously should be applied. 
 
It is not the aim of HarsMeth NP to assess hazards other than those strictly related 
to the chemical reaction itself. However the user is encouraged to seek for further 
advice whenever any of these hazards are encountered. The S2S web site (S2S, 
2007) offers interesting assessment tools on fires and explosion hazards 
 
 
Next, a list of tables for process data and possible failure scenarios are presented, 
along with a set of questions to identify critical process parameters to identify 
hazards leading to runaway reactions. 
.




III. BENCH SCALE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 
 
Process conditions data 
 
 










       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       




1. Specify reactive step description, including substances involved, operations required (addition, heating, etc.) and process 
conditions, like temperature, pressure, etc. 
2. If there is gas generation during the process, include data for quantity and rate of gas generation in order to identify pressure 
increase associated to normal process operation. 













Data of possible failure scenarios 
 













          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
1. AdT=ΔHr / cp 
2. MTSR=Tp+AdT 
3. If adiabatic calorimetry data is available use the value for ADT24, otherwise see MaxTsafe description in this chapter. 
4. Class 1): Tp < MTSR < Tb < MaxTsafe 
Class 2): Tp < MTSR < MaxTsafe < Tb 
Class 3) Tp < Tb < MTSR < MaxTsafe 
Class 4) Tp < Tb < MaxTsafe < MTSR 
Class 5) Tp < MaxTsafe < MTSR < Tb 
5.  As a general rule, the following classification can be considered according to the TMR value 
Class 1): if TMR > 24 hours, the process can be operated safely 
Class 2): if 8 hours < TMR < 24 hours, the process requires observation and control 
Class 3) if 4 hours < TMR < 8 hours, the process requires special control systems 
Class 4) if TMR < 4 hours, the process should be modified, or additional safety measures should be implemented 
 





 Can variations in the following parameters affect the normal evolution of the process 
III.1 Operation mode (batch/semi-batch? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.2 Process temperature / cooling failure? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.3 Catalyst concentration? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.4 Solvent concentration? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.5 Reactants concentration? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.6 pH? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.7 % conversion? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.8 Reaction time / delayed reaction start? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.9 Dosing rate / dosing failure (including wrong order of addition)? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.10 Agitation speed / agitation failure? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.11 Flow rate of reactants? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY  
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 In case of a runaway scenario 
III.12 Is the nature (vapour, gassy, hybrid) and rate of gas generation known to be hazardous? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
III.13 Is the nature of substances formed (flammable, toxic, corrosive…) known to be hazardous 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer:  
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Use the following table to indicate the reactive steps identified as hazardous, the parameter the 




1. Unexpected reactions 
2. Decomposition of reaction mass 
3. Accumulation 
4. Segregated phases 




1. Pressure increase due to gas generation 
2. Formation of dangerous substances 
 
 
Step Critical parameter Hazard identified Possible consequences 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 




5. PILOT PLANT ANALYSIS 
 
 
Before a process can be carried out in a process plant, some design requirements 
must be taken into consideration to assure that the process studied in the laboratory 
can be performed under the same safety parameters at an industrial scale. A 
procedure to use can be to progressively perform the reaction in larger vessels. 
 
The pilot plant analysis is an intermediate step between bench scale analysis and 
the industrial production. It involves the change of scale of the process, which is a 
procedure to transform the laboratory operations into an industrial process that 
generates the quantity of the desired product required for its commercialisation. In 
this stage, other processes different from the chemical reactions can be studied, 
generally involving physical transformations of the product. These processes are 
intended to adapt the desired product for its final use by consumers. 
 
 
5.1 Change of scale 
 
The bench scale analysis of the chemical reaction should have allowed the 
identification of some elements that can be critical for the safety of the reaction. 
Effects in the change of agitation, dosing, cooling, or the possibility of inhibition of 
the reaction must be known by now. However, some of these parameters may have 
a different behaviour when the reaction is tested at a larger scale. Some of the 
elements to consider in the change of scale are: 
 
a) Momentum transfer 
 
It must be assured that the chemical mixture will always keep its homogeneity at the 
same level it was experienced in the bench scale analysis. Particularly important is 
to assure the thermal uniformity of the mixture, avoiding formation of hot spots or the 
accumulation of non reacted chemicals. Appropriate reactor design and selection of 
an appropriate agitation system is essential. It often happens that the agitation 
systems used in the laboratory do not provide a real mixing of the reaction mass. 
The objective should be to use the same power number and geometry of the system 
rather than agitation speed. 
 
b) Heat transfer 
 
In order to maintain the reaction temperature at the value determined in the 
laboratory experiments, it is essential to assure a correct heat transfer between the 
reactor and the surroundings. The main problem related to heat transfer is that the 
increase in the reactor volume generates a difference in the surface-volume ratio 
between the coolant and the reaction vessel. Heat released increases with the 
volume, but heat removed depends on the surface area, which is a cubic to square 
ratio, so cooling may become inadequate. This is important for example to determine 
the time it will take a reaction mixture to cool from 1°C in different reaction scales. 
Given the same reaction and surroundings temperatures, this time can increase at 
an exponential rate as the reactor volume increases (Chilworth, 2001). 




There are many possibilities for the design of heat exchange systems, ranging from 
jacket cooling, condensers, inner circuits (not appropriate for reactions involving 
solids) or external heat exchangers. Detailed guidance can be found in the literature 
(Wilson, 1915; Kern, 1950; Perry, 1998). Also construction materials must be taken 
into consideration, since steel reactors used for industrial process provide different 
heat conductivity and mechanical properties, compared to the typical glass 
equipment used in the laboratory. The influence of the vessel on the measure of the 
heat lost to the container is represented by the phi factor, which is the ratio between 
the sum of the specific heat of the reaction mixture and that of the vessel divided by 
the specific heat of the reaction mass. 
 
For plant scale vessels the phi factor is usually low, ranging between 1.0 and 1.2 
(Chilworth, 2001). These low factors should be reproduced at pilot plant scale, 
otherwise underestimation of decomposition temperatures and periods of runaway 




If the heat removal from an exothermic reaction fails, the evolution of the process 
may vary greatly. Here it is interesting to visualize the Semenov diagram (Figure 6) 




Figure 6. Semenov’s heat balance diagram 
 
This diagram represents the evolution of heat versus temperature, reflecting the 
exponential increase of heat with reaction temperature, and the linear dependence 
of the heat exchanged with the cooling temperature. If a deviation occurs in reaction 
temperature working at the stable point (Trs), the system will eventually return to that 
position, since the cooling power will be greater than the heat generated by the 
reaction. However, at the unstable point, any oscillation above reaction temperature 
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will lead to a runaway. The limit point (Trl) defines the maximum temperature for 
coolant that allows the process to be run under safety conditions. 
 
One way to keep the reaction temperature under control is to turn from batch to 
semi-batch processes, in which the dosing speed of one of the reactants can be a 
way to control the heat generation of the reaction. Dosage must have the same 
duration in plant as in the laboratory, since it is the concentration relations and not 
the volume that is important from a chemical point of view. For this reason, it must 
be assured that the system can always eliminate all the heat generated by the 
reaction, otherwise dosing will be slower and this may lead to a different process 
from that studied in the laboratory. 
 
As a conclusion, increasing the dosing time can be a way to keep control of the heat 
generated during the reaction, as long as it can be assured that the process remains 
unchanged. 
 
d) Mass transfer 
 
The key issue in mass transfer is to determine the homogeneity of the reaction 
mixture. Homogeneous systems with low viscosity are can be controlled by the 
kinetics of the reaction, while for heterogeneous systems the reaction time is defined 
by mass transfer coefficients. 
 
The objective should be to have a kinetic control on the reaction, this can be 
achieved by enlarging specific surfaces of catalyzers or by increasing agitation 
speed. As in the case of dosing, any modification should be assessed for unwanted 
effects, since a too high increase in agitation speed may lead to the emulsification of 
the reaction mixture or an excessive vortex. 
 
One particularly interesting consideration can be the scale-up of inhibition of a 
runaway reaction. It must be assured that the dispersion of inhibitor on a large scale 
will be enough to guarantee the efficiency of the inhibition (Snee, 2004). 
 
 
5.2. Unit operations 
 
 
The main source of chemical hazards in an industrial process is the reactor, due to 
the fact that it is in this equipment where substances are intended to interact 
generating new products. However, it must be considered that other operations in 
chemical plants are likely to generate reactive hazards due to possible unexpected 
conditions of the process. These operations involve mainly physical changes in the 
product in order to adapt it for its final transport to end users. In case of deviations in 
the expected conditions of the process, these changes may also lead to runaway 
situations. Unit operations are generally associated to normal process hazards 
involving many issues that fall out of the objective of HarsMeth NP. This section of 
the methodology aims to identify possible unexpected chemical reactions triggered 
by upset evolution of a process. 
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The assessment procedure for unexpected reactions outside chemical reactors has 
been developed under the S2S project and can be found at the network web site 
(S2S, 2007). The method purposed (Weve et al., 2007) is based on a set of simple 
questions regarding reactivity, such as: 
 
• Why is the reaction not taking place at process equipment other than the 
reactor? 
• What is needed to make such equipment behave as a reactor? 
• How can that happen in the process under study? 
 
The questions to apply will depend on the equipment used for the process. Besides, 
possible hazardous properties of the substances should be taken into consideration, 
as well as the phase systems involved (V/L, L/L, S/L or V/S). For this reason, the 
answers given in section 2 regarding stability and compatibility of mixtures should be 
available and taken into consideration when analyzing unit operation hazards. 
 
For a reaction to occur a combination of 3 factors needs to be fulfilled:  
 
• Temperature of Reactants 
• Concentration of Reactants 
• Time for reaction 
 
This can be described in a triangle like the fire triangle. 
 
 
Figure 7. The reaction triangle 
 
These three factors represent the most important free factors in process design and 
operation. As with the fire triangle, a reaction requires an appropriate combination of 
the three factors mentioned previously to take place; reducing the contribution of 
concentration, temperature or residence time in the triangle will reduce the possibility 
of a reaction to take place. There are some special reactions that need a catalyst or 
high interfacial area between phases. These factors could be added to the Time-
corner as well, in a sense they ‘help’ time. Mixing of unexpected substances should 
be considered in the concentration corner. 
 
A reactor would be precisely equipment somewhere near the middle of the triangle. 
A feed pre-heater, for instance, can be considered as equipment on the 
temperature-time side of the triangle. This means that it is supposed to heat a 
substance to reaction conditions, and it cannot avoid substantial time (2-5% of the 
reactor time), so it should have a low concentration of one of two reactants to 
prevent unintended reactions. In order to turn this equipment into an unintended 
Concentration 
Time Temperature H 
C 
T 
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reactor, it is necessary to increase the missing component, which is concentration. 
This situation would be generated by an unexpected event, maybe backflow from 
the reactor, maybe product remnants from another process step in a multipurpose 
plant. Like the feed pre-heater, all unit operations can be conceptualized with a 
specific task, and they can all be positioned on the sides of the reaction triangle. 
They will not pose hazards unless they move towards the middle. There are several 
ways in which equipment can vary their position in the reaction triangle. Some 
examples, related to each of the specified factors, could be: 
 
• Temperature factor 
 
o Weather effects. 
o Friction or vibration due to rotary equipment. 
o Loss of temperature control or equipment failure (e.g. cooling failure). 
 
• Concentration factor 
 
o Unexpected mixing of incompatible substances (e.g. backflow, 
corrosion, leakage, multiple feeds and so on). 
o Equipment failure generating accumulation of reactants. 
o Excessive evaporation leading to concentration of unstable products. 
 
• Time factor 
 
o Incomplete or inefficient separation processes generating excessive 
time of contact between unstable phases. 
o Dead zones generating irregular flow distributions. 
 
As a general rule, all the possible hazardous situations that have been studied in the 
previous sections should be considered here. For instance, if a substance is known 
to be pyrophoric or shock sensitive, measures should be put in place in order to 
avoid the hazards associated to these substances at any stage of the process. 
Again, inherently safer design should be applied when designing the process. If any 
operation is considered to be potentially hazardous, a better alternative from the 
safety point of view should be used where possible. For example, decanters or static 
filters could be used to replace centrifuge operations; thin film evaporation 
processes have been identified as a good option instead of batch distillation where 
unstable residues may be generated, by reducing temperature, hold-up and thermal 
exposure of the mixture (Suter and Glor, 2001). 
 
It is also important to notice that a hazardous situation might be generated at the 
reactor step, but only materialised downstream at other process equipment, as could 
easily happen with the accumulation hazard. It must be reminded that a global vision 
of the process hazards must be kept along the safety analysis, even if it is performed 
step by step. Review of hazards related to unit operations can be found in the 
literature (CCPS, 1999). 
 
In the following pages, a checklist for pilot plant analysis can be found.  




IV. PILOT PLANT ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 
 
 Are the hazards of scale up for the reaction been evaluated in front of the following parameters:  
IV.1 Cooling / Heat transfer? 
YES Justify your answer:  
NO REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.2 Dosing / reaction kinetics? 
YES Justify your answer:  
NO REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
IV.3 Agitation system? 
YES Justify your answer:  
NO REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES  
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
IV.4 Mass transfer? 
YES Justify your answer:  
NO REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 




Following is a list of typical operations or equipment in chemical plants. Next, a list of questions to 
identify reactive hazards in process equipment is included. Select those operations that are used in 
the process, and answer the questions that apply in each case. Use one copy of the checklist for 
each of the necessary operations. If there is more than one operation or equipment corresponding 
to the same group, consider the possibility of using different checklists if necessary. Identify each 




Operation / Equipment Number Answer question number 
Vessels   
Pipes   
Valves   
Pumps   
Shared systems   
Heat exchangers   
Distillation   
Absorber   
Adsorber   
Centrifuges   
Filters   
Extractor   
Dryers   
Mills   
Drumming   
Flash drum   









Operation / Equipment Name:                                       Description:                                                
 
IV.5 Is the equipment exposed to severe weather conditions or nearby heat sources? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.6 Does the equipment need external heating or cooling to prevent an unintended reaction? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.7 Does the equipment have a stirrer or agitator (either mechanical or flow based)? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.8 Does the equipment have seals, bearings, gearbox or shafts connected? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.9 Can the feed enter at too high temperature? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.10 Is vacuum needed to evaporate a product, reactant or solvent? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.11 Is a low boiling solvent or reactant excess used to reduce the reaction hazard? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.12 Are there a large pressure differences in the process? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.13 Are there two or more non miscible streams involved in the process at the same time? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.14 Are there high surface area solid materials (like glasswool piping insulation, filter aids or adsorption 
materials in driers) used? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.15 Is there a vapour / liquid separation involving a catalyst, unreacted product or thermally unstable 
phases used? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.16 Can unexpected mixing of substances take place during the process? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
IV.17 Can dead zones be generated during the process? 
YES REVIEW SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 










IV.5 Sunlight can result in unexpectedly high temperatures. Also other heat sources can radiate heat if they are 
close by and not insulated. This may remain unnoticed while liquid is flowing, but it becomes important in 
absence of flow, e.g. a blocked pipe section. On the other hand, at too low temperatures certain substances 
can start crystallization processes leading to a polymerization reaction that could block the system. 
IV.6 The heating medium for plant equipment usually has a higher temperature than the onset temperature of a 
reaction. Too high temperatures can enhance reactions or trigger decomposition processes. Appropriate 
agitation (mixing or flow) is needed to prevent local high temperatures. On the other hand, a cooling failure 
may result in a runaway reaction for exothermic reactions. Too low temperature due to control failure can 
result in accumulation of reactants. The hazard is a delayed reaction later, generally at too high rates, at a 
different batch step or downstream equipment. 
IV.7 Agitation is needed to prevent local high temperatures. Stirrers can fail by their power, engine, gear box, shaft, 
loosing impellers. Loss of agitation can result in local high temperatures, leading to accumulation of reactive 
materials. The hazard is a delayed reaction when the agitator is restarted, generally at too high rates, at a 
different batch step or downstream equipment. Generation of hot spots is another possible hazard arising from 
agitation failure. Besides, emulsification due to inadequate heat transfer areas leading to unexpected phase 
transitions can also be generated. 
IV.8 Bearings, seals, gearboxes, etc. can generate heat due to wear. Besides, friction or vibration due to rotary 
equipment can generate a decomposition hazard when using unstable or shock sensitive materials. 
IV.9 Cooling capacity may be designed for cold feeds, so insufficient cooling could result in a runaway. 
IV.10 If vacuum is lost for a (partially) boiling system, there may be a dangerous temperature increase. 
IV.11 Excessive evaporation due to external heating may result in both concentrating reactants and increasing the 
temperature. Both effects may accelerate possible unexpected reactions. An accidental loss of pressure for a 
reaction occurring at high pressure will also result in higher reactant concentration and may become 
dangerous if there is external heating to compensate for the evaporative cooling. 
IV.12 If a switch in pressure differences occurs, there may be a vapour phase generation that would result in 
concentration changes, increasing the hazard of an unexpected reaction. Besides, backflow of materials 
through equipment could be generated. Incompatible materials may come in touch generating an undesired 
reaction. 
IV.13 At normal operation, the surplus reactant will be separated. In finely dispersed systems, there is no separation 
and reactions can occur later or downstream in other process steps. An example is using a water or caustic 
wash to neutralise acid components in a organic product. Drumming the emulsion may result in a runaway 
during storage. If a substance is soluble in both phases, the concentration can change with the effectiveness 
of the process step. 
IV.14 Absorptive material may concentrate reactive components, and act as catalysers for unexpected reactions.  
IV.15 Foaming, liquid carry-over or leaking filters are some example of possible incomplete separation scenarios. 
These may result in unreacted product starting a runaway later, or a catalyst initiating a reaction at an 
unprotected process step. Overheating of products by removal of liquid from a thermally unstable phase is a 
common hazard in distillation processes. 
IV.16 There are many possibilities for unexpected mixing of chemicals; some of them, like mistaken chemicals for 
charging or not checking of equipment contents prior to charging have already been mentioned. If multiple 
feeds are possible at the same time, compatibility of substances must be evaluated. This should also be done 
in case of shared vent systems. For multipurpose plants, cleaning is essential in order to assure that all 
remains of previous processes are eliminated before starting a new one, in order to avoid unintended 
reactions due to incompatibilities. Rust generated by corrosion could act as catalyzer for unexpected 
reactions. Besides, if different construction materials are used in plant equipment, rust generated in metallic 
sections can be transported to other containers where it could catalyze unexpected reactions. Decomposition 
of peroxides in plastic containers is known to have happened due to rust generated otherwise in plant. In case 
of a leakage, released material may react unexpectedly with construction materials. 
IV.17 Presence of dead zones in equipment may lead to accumulation of reactive materials and also to partial 
decomposition. Irregular flow distribution can easily result in differences in residence time and hence introduce 
runaways. 
 




Use the following table to indicate the process operations identified as hazardous and the 
specific hazard associated to them, according to the following classification: 
 
For reactive steps, indicate what operation could generate a hazard from the change of scale 
point of view: 
 
1. Cooling / Heat transfer 
2. Dosing 
3. Agitation 
4. Mass transfer (including possible inhibition) 
 
For process operations: 
 
5. Temperature variations  
6. Concentration of reactive materials, including unexpected mixing 
7. Excessive residence time 
 
Operation / Equipment / Reactive step Identified hazard Substances involved 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








6. INDUSTRIAL SCALE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Once a reaction has been carried out successfully on a pilot plant scale, process 
conditions and equipment design should have been determined. The process can 
now be performed at full plant scale in safety, provided exactly the same conditions 
are applied each time. The challenge is therefore to assure the same conditions 
each time a reaction is carried out. But it is almost impossible to run a process 
repeatedly in time without error, change, failure or any external event that may alter 
the normal conditions of the process. For this reason, a system must be employed to 
ensure that whenever any kind of failure occurs there will be a back up system which 
will make the system safe. 
 
 
6.1. Basis of Safety 
 
 
Considering that sometimes a process will be carried out involving possible hazards, 
additional measures must be put in place to assure that no incident arising from the 
identified hazards will generate an accident. The relation of preventive measures 
taken in order to turn the process to be inherently safe and the additional safety 
measures will constitute the basis of safety of the process. 
 
Those additional measures will include the last barrier of defence for people and 
installations against the consequences of a possible accident, for this reason it is 
agreed that a basis of safety should be definitive and proven to be reliable for the 
worst case maloperation that can occur for a given process (Rogers, 1991). When 
defining a basis of safety, two types of measures can be put forward. 
 
 
6.1.1. Process Control 
 
Safety can be ensured by the use of the appropriate process control measures to 
guarantee that the system remains within a defined operating window. Critical 
parameters for the safety of the process must have been identified completing the 
previous sections of HarsMeth NP, as well as the safety margins for each one of 
those parameters. As seen before, the most common parameters to be determined 
are temperature margins, dosing rates, agitation speed, cooling capacity, gas 
generation, etc. However, any other specific property that may have been identified 
previously, the variation of which might be critical for the safety of the reaction 
should be considered in the design of the control system. 
 
Whenever any parameter is identified as critical, a safety interlock should link the 
sensor related to the measurement of that parameter to the control system and to 
any possible device in order to try to regain control of the situation. For instance, an 
interlock should be included between the temperature probe (or any other 
measurement system that may give indication of a possible runaway) and the 
cooling system to increase cooling power in case of an increase in temperature. 
Also, a shut off to the dosing valve should be linked to high and low temperature 
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values to stop adding reactants when the hazardous situation arises. Likewise, the 
dosing valve should be linked to the stirring system in order to stop the addition of 
reactants in case of failure of the agitation system. At the same time, the control 
system should link any of the sensors that may give indication of a runaway with 
actuation systems, like inhibitor or quenching vessels. 
 
Finally, it should be policy to fit redundant control systems (both human and 
software) for measurements of temperature or any other parameter critical for safety 
whenever necessary. 
 
6.1.2. Protective Measures 
 
Protective measures to ensure safe operation have to either deal with or mitigate the 
consequences of the runaway reaction. Since the initial conditions markedly affect 
the course of a runaway reaction, the critical aspect for all protective systems is the 
interrelationship between their design and the definitions of the worst case i.e. the 
conditions leading to the runaway. In addition to suitable detection methods and the 
availability of process compatible systems, protective measures need time to act, 
which must be considered during the design phase. Time plays a primary role in the 
efficiency of all measures. The following steps must be realised from the instant a 
failure occurs up to recovery of the control of the process. 
 
• Detection time. When a failure or a malfunction occurs, it must be first 
detected. The detection time can be influenced by the choice of appropriate 
alarm settings. But the most important is the choice of the adequate 
parameter that must be monitored to detect a malfunction. The design of 
alarms, interlocks and control strategies is an important part of process 
design. 
 
• Action time. Once the alarm is switched on, there is some time required for 
the measure to be applied. Quenching or dumping require some time to 
complete the mass transfer, an emergency cooling must be switched on, the 
cooling medium must flow at the required temperature with the required flow 
rate, an so on. 
 
• Time for effect. Time is required for the applied measure to become effective 
and influence the course of the runaway. This time factor must be estimated 
for an effective design of safety measures and compared with the dynamics of 
the runaway of the desired reaction and of decomposition reactions as shown 
in Figure 7. 
 




Figure 7. Time factors involved in preventing a runaway 
 
The most common safety measures to cope with a runaway situation are listed 
below. 
 
a) Emergency Cooling (Crash Cooling) 
 
In this system, forced cooling is applied when the reaction deviates from set limits or 
if the cooling system fails. It is important that the magnitude and rate of heat release 
is quantified in order that reaction control can be maintained with the applied cooling. 
With such a system, it is critical that the temperature does not fall below the 
solidification point of the reaction mass, otherwise a crust would form, resulting in a 
reduced heat transfer, which again may favour the runaway situation. The agitation 
of the reaction mass is also critical. Without stirring large reaction masses behave 
adiabatically even if cooled on the outside. Here the injection of nitrogen or other 
inert gas into the bottom of the reaction mass has proved to be helpful for 
emergency mixing. These measures must be tested under practical conditions.  
 
b) Quenching / Inhibition 
 
Quenching and inhibition involve the rapid addition of a diluent or inhibitor to the 
reactor contents to stop the reaction. This is sometimes possible for catalytic 
reactions and polymerisation reactions where a “catalyst killer” can be added in 
small amounts. For other reactions a dilution by an inert and cold material may lower 
the temperature and slow down the reaction. The choice of diluent or inhibitor, the 
amount and rate of addition, the temperature of the quenching material and the 
efficiency of mixing require careful investigation. The required empty volume must 
also be available in the reactor. Calorimetric methods are of great help in the design 
of such measures as they allow the measurement of the heat of mixing which often 
is important. More information on quench design can be found in the literature 
(Hermann, 1995). 




c) Dumping (Drown out) 
 
This measure is similar to the quenching, with the difference that the reaction mass 
is not kept within the reactor, but rapidly emptied into a dump tank containing the 
inhibitor or the diluting compound. This dump vessel must be prepared to receive the 
reaction mass at any instant during the process. The transfer line is critical for the 
success of this measure. It must be designed to allow an emergency transfer even in 
case of breakdown of services. This measure is particularly suitable in cases where 




Containment is becoming more common as environmental pressures on the release 
of chemicals increase. Both the reactor and all auxiliary equipment have to be 
designed for the peak pressures/temperatures that may be reached. The main 
limitations, as well as cost, are problems associated with design and operation. 
 
e) Controlled depressurisation 
 
If a runaway is detected in an early stage where the temperature and the pressure 
increases are slow, a controlled depressurisation of the reactor may provide a 
method to reduce the temperature and prevent the runaway. Heat is removed from 
the reaction mass by evaporation. Naturally the temperature must be above the 
boiling point and there must be sufficient solvent available for evaporation. In 
addition facilities such as a suitable scrubber and condenser must be available and 
designed to work during the emergency. 
 
f) Pressure relief (Venting) 
 
Emergency reactor venting involves the provision of either a relief valve or bursting 
disc, which opens at a set pressure. The venting of material from the reactor by 
either single or two phase flow tempers the runaway reaction by removing heat and 
therefore maintaining the temperature and also the pressure in the case of a vapour 
phase system. The gas generation system (gassy, vapour-pressure or hybrid) must 
be studied, and also the possibility of self-tempered systems; i.e. in vapour pressure 
and some hybrid systems, vaporization removes enough heat to keep the 
temperature constant (Barton and Rogers, 1997). For purely gassy and hybrid 
systems that do not temper, the vent is sized to be able to cope with the peak gas 
generation rate and thus preventing any pressure increase. The design of an 
adequate venting system is particularly complex in multipurpose equipment, where 
the choice of the appropriate runaway scenario, which changes depending on the 
reaction involved, is difficult.  
 
It is important to recognise that relief vents sized to cope with gas pressure and/or 
fire engulfment are rarely if ever adequate to provide protection against uncontrolled 
chemical runaway. The following steps are involved to ensure the design of an 
adequate emergency relief system: 
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• Identification of worst credible case scenario (upset conditions). 
• Determination of flow characteristics (single, two, multiphase). 
• Classification of reaction system type (gassy/vapour-pressure/hybrid). 
• Characterisation of runaway reaction at relief conditions. 
• Choice of relief device set pressure. 
• Calculation of required vent area. 
• Correction of vent area considering effect of piping, multiple choking, 
downstream equipment etc. 
• Application of safety factor. 
• Design of suitable disposal system. 
 
The required vent size can be calculated using the DIERS methodology (Fisher et 
al., 1992), which requires thermal data, flow regime and viscosity characterisation to 
be measured under runaway conditions. The use of venting as a basis of safety 
requires the provision of a safe discharge area. This will often involve a dump or 
containment tank, particularly where the reactants or products of decomposition are 
flammable or toxic. Further information on the design of emergency relief systems 
can be found in the literature (Etchells and Wilday, 1998; CCPS, 1998).  
 
 
6.2. Process and Plant Design 
 
 
Along with hazard identification and definition of safety measures regarding the 
chemical reaction studied, process and plant design standards must be followed in 
order to assure a high degree of reliability of the chemical plant. Clearly it is not the 
aim of HarsMeth NP to be used as a guide to assess general issues of plant and 
process design. However, standard procedures for mass and heat balances, as well 
as mechanical design for vessels should always be taken into consideration, 
because otherwise flow rates or pressure relief design will be erroneous. 
 
Some basic guidance for process and plant design can be found in the literature 
(McCabe et. al., 1993; Treybal, 1980; Kern, 1950; Perry and Green, 1998). 





In the following pages, a relation of possible measures (including prevention, control 
and protection) are put forward, related to the possible hazards encountered in the 
previous sections of HarsMeth NP. These have been divided into four areas, in 
order to facilitate implementation of measures. General recommendations included 
in the following checklist should always be taken into consideration regardless the 
hazard identified. 
 
• Stability and compatibility. This will include measures for every hazard 
identified for the substances and mixtures considered at the preliminary study 
of the reaction, plus any other substance that is going to be stored at the 
facility. 
 
• Chemical reaction. Measures described deal with the hazards encountered in 
the laboratory research performed on the synthesis reaction. It deals 
specifically with the reaction vessel and related equipment. 
 
 
• Unit Operations. This part will deal with specific hazards for unit operations, 
giving general possibilities to avoid unexpected reactions in plant equipment. 
 
 
• Process and Plant Design. This includes general recommendations for 








IV. INDUSTRIAL SCALE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 
 
Stability and compatibility 
 
 General Recommendations OK 
V.1 Make sure that chemicals are stored and handled under compatibility criteria  
V.2 Make sure to establish effective and easy to follow storing and labelling rules  
V.3 Include verification process for charge and discharge from suppliers (be aware of possible change of 
specifications) 
 
V.4 Introduce measures to monitor and control the conditions of any parameter identified as critical (T, P, 
pH, concentration, physical characteristics of product and so on) 
 
 
 Decomposition hazards OK 
V.5 Introduce measures to detect long periods of storage (periodic sample analysis)  
 Autocatalytic hazards OK 
V.6 Identify inhibitors for substances or mixtures involved  
V.7 Introduce control systems for inhibitors activity (temperature, concentration, handling and so on)  
V.8 Keep inhibitors accessible to vessels containing autocatalytic substances  
 Fire and Flammability hazards OK 
V.9 Avoid ignition sources such as:  
V.9.a Static electricity  
V.9.b Welding or cutting  
V.9.c Hot surfaces  
 
V.9.d Light metals or alloys  
V.10 Avoid possible oxidant atmospheres (use of inert gases)  
V.11 Introduce fire detection systems  
V.12 Introduce fire protective systems such as:  
V.12.a Fire extinguishers  
V.12.b Water sprinklers (study water compatibility)  
V.12.c Anti-fire doors and walls  
 
V.12.d Personnel protection systems (showers, blankets, fire suits and so on)  
 Toxic hazards OK 
V.13 Introduce toxicity protective systems such as:  
V.13.a Toxic dilution systems  
V.13.b Ventilation  
 
V.13.c Personnel protection systems (masks, eye wash and so on)  
 Explosion hazards OK 
V.14 Provide pressure relief systems for vessels  
V.15 Consider the possibility of two-phase flow when designing relief systems  
 Reactivity hazards OK 
V.16 Introduce measures to avoid reactivity conditions, such as:  
V.16.a Oxidizer hazard: avoid presence of chemicals likely to be oxidized  
V.16.b Reducer hazard: avoid presence of chemicals likely to be reduced  
V.16.c Water reactivity hazard: avoid presence of water and humidity   
V.16.d Pyrophoric hazard: avoid exposure to ambient and presence of air   
 
V.16.e Shock sensitivity hazard: avoid exposure to friction, vibrations or shocks  
 








 General Recommendations OK 
V.17 Make sure that cooling system is started before starting addition of reactants  
V.18 Make sure that stirring system is started before starting addition of reactants  
V.19 Consider the possibility of using cooling capacity below its maximum capacity, in order to be able to 
use extra cooling in case of any possible failure scenario 
 
V.20 Introduce measures to assure correct charging operations (appropriate chemicals, quantities, order)  
V.21 Introduce measures to monitor and control the conditions of any parameter identified as critical (T, P, 
pH, concentration, physical characteristics of product and so on)1 
 
 Unexpected reactions / Decomposition hazards OK 
V.22 Include multiple temperature measurements  
V.23 Always keep temperature control while reactor is full even if operation is ended  
V.24 Prepare a dumping system in order to stop the reaction  
V.25 Prepare inhibitor solution or solvent for quenching (consider volume requirements for reactor)  
V.26 Include interlock between temperature measurement and inhibitor/solvent vessel valve   
V.27 Include interlock between dosing valve and cooling system to stop dosing in case of cooling failure  
V.28 Include interlock between temperature measurement and dosing valve in order to stop dosing in case 
of temperature value increases unexpectedly 
 
V.29 Include interlock between temperature measurement and cooling system in order to increase cooling 
power if temperature value increases unexpectedly (example break of dosing valve). 
 
 Accumulation hazards OK 
V.30 If possible, increase the addition time  
V.31 Include interlock between stirring failure and dosing valve in order to stop dosing in case of loss of 
agitation 
 
V.32 Improve agitation systems to avoid possible dead zones in vessels where reactants can accumulate  
 Segregated phases hazards OK 
V.33 Include multiple temperature measurements in order to detect non homogeneous distributions of 
temperature 
 
V.34 Include interlock between stirring failure and dosing valve in order to stop dosing in case of loss of 
agitation 
 
V.35 Include systems to restart agitation safely (speed control) in case of loss of agitation  
V.36 Improve agitation systems to avoid possible dead zones in vessels where reactants can accumulate  
 Hot spots hazards OK 
V.37 Include multiple temperature measurements in order to detect non homogeneous distributions of 
temperature 
 
V.38 Improve agitation systems to avoid possible dead zones in vessels where reactants can accumulate  
 Explosion / gas generation hazards OK 
V.39 Include a pressure relief system (bursting disk, relief valve, depressurisation, containment and so on)  
V.40 Consider the nature of gas generation (vapour, gassy, hybrid) when designing relief systems  
V.41 Consider the possibility of two-phase flow when designing relief systems  
 
                                                
1 Temperature is the most common physical property to monitor when preventing a runaway. All interlocks suggested in 
this checklist are related to temperature measurement. However, if there is another specific physical characteristic that 
is known to be indicative of triggering a runaway (such as pH variations, formation of foam…), interlocks between 
sensors for those parameters and possible actuation devices should be included. 








 General recommendations OK 
V.42 Introduce pressure relief systems if there is the possibility of overpressure in process equipment  
V.43 Control formation of unexpected reactive substances during unit operations  
V.44 Consider the possibility of using alternative unit operations in case hazards are detected, such as:  
V.44.a Distillation: vacuum or azeotropic distillation to lower boiling point of solvents   
V.44.b Centrifuge: decanters or static filters  
 V.44.c Dryer: vacuum drying instead of atmospheric; cryogenic drying instead of vacuum rotary dryer  
 
 Temperature variations OK 
V.45 Introduce temperature control in process equipment  
V.46 Include multiple temperature measurements  to detect non homogeneous distributions of temperature  
V.47 Improve agitation systems to avoid generation of hot spots or segregated phases  
V.48 Provide systems to keep appropriate conditions of substances in equipment (heating, cooling)  
V.49 Introduce measures to avoid effects of friction or vibration in equipment  
V.50 Control efficiency of vacuum operations  
 Concentration of reactive materials OK 
V.51 Prevent process backflow in feed lines, auxiliary services and shared systems (shared vents, drains)  
V.52 Improve agitation systems to avoid possible dead zones in vessels where reactants can accumulate  
V.53 Control agitation in order to avoid excessive mixing leading to emulsification and segregated phases  
V.54 Control evaporation rates to avoid concentration of unstable material  
V.55 Avoid concentration of reactive materials generated by absorptive materials  
V.56 Improve ventilation systems in order to avoid build-up of unstable materials  
V.57 Introduce measures to avoid corrosion in equipment that could catalyze unexpected reactions  
V.58 Control the possibility of wrong mixtures coming from multiple feeds  
V.59 Assure appropriate cleaning of multipurpose plants between different batches  
V.60 Assure joints in process equipment are properly designed to avoid leakage  
 Time variations OK 
V.61 Control efficiency of separation processes to avoid excessive time contact of unreacted products  
V.62 Include sensors to detect blockage of equipment  
V.63 Control flow rates in order to avoid dead zones in equipment  
 





Process and plant design 
 
 General recommendations OK 
V.64 Assure that mass and heat balances for processes are reliable  
V.65 Assure that mechanical design for vessels and all plant equipment is reliable (including possible 
runaway scenarios) 
 
V.66 Assure that change of scale operations are reliable  
V.67 Arrange plant set-up according to ergonomic criteria to facilitate working procedures (separation 
distances) 
 
V.68 Provide confinement or shields for equipment to contain possible loss of containments (dikes, walls)  
V.69 Provide mitigation systems against releases (Foams, fans, water curtains)  
V.70 Calculate water supply for use simultaneously of sprinklers and hoses in various areas and 
maintenance of cooling in reactors and vessels 
 
 Control system OK 
V.71 Identify all instruments critical for safety (temperature probes, valves and so on)  
V.72 Use redundant control systems for any instrument critical for safety  
V.73 Identify possible critical liquid levels for measurements (probes, stirrers and so on)  
V.74 Assure that control system is connected to mitigation systems to provide actuation against releases  
V.75 Introduce measures to minimize time between detection and response in case of any emergency  
 
 
Maybe by the use of HarsMeth NP you are able to identify other measure that are critical for the 




 Other recommendations OK 
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• Accumulation. A build-up of unreacted materials. 
 
• Adiabatic. A system condition in which no heat is exchanged between the 
chemical system and its environment, i.e. no heat transfer occurs to or from 
the environment surrounding the sample, including the sample container. 
 
• Adiabatic induction time. Induction period or time to an event (spontaneous 
ignition, explosion, etc.) under adiabatic conditions starting at operating 
conditions. 
 
• Adiabatic calorimeter. A calorimeter in which reactions proceed with little 
exchange of heat between the sample container and its surroundings. 
Common types of adiabatic calorimeter include the ARCTM, PHI-TECTM and 
VSPTM. The RSSTTM calorimeter may be considered as pseudo-adiabatic 
under some circumstances. 
 
• Adiabatic temperature rise. The increase in temperature of a reacting 
mixture as a result of exothermic chemical reaction, when there is no heat 
transfer to or from the environment. 
 
ΔT = ΔH/Cp 
 
ΔT Adiabatic temperature rise (K) 
Cp mean heat capacity (J/kg/K) 
ΔH Heat release (J/kg) 
 
• Arrhenius rate equation. The rate of a chemical reaction (k) increases 
exponentially with increasing temperature (T). This relationship is represented 
by the Arrhenius equation 
 
k = A . exp (-Ea/RT). 
 
• Autocatalysis. The increase of the rate of reaction due to the catalysing 
effect of the reaction products. 
 
• Basis of safety. The combination of measures relied upon to ensure safety. 
The basis of safety for a reactor highlights those aspects of the design and 
operation (hardware, protective systems and procedures) that are safety 
critical. The basis of safety can only be selected once all the significant 
hazards have been identified and evaluated. 
 
• Batch process. An operation in which all the reactants including any solvent 
are added to a reactor at the start of a reaction. 
 
• Calorimeter. See reaction calorimeter. 
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• Containment. A condition in which under no condition reactants or products 
are exchanged between the chemical system and its environment. 
 
• Continuous process. A process that is characterised by a continuous flow of 
reactants into and out of the reaction system. Common examples of 
continuous reactors are the Plug Flow Reactor (PFR), the loop reactor and 
the Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR). 
 
• Decomposition. The breaking up of a chemical compound into by products. 
The temperature at which decomposition is observed depends on scale and 
is markedly dependent on the sensitivity of the measuring equipment. 
 
• Decomposition energy. The decomposition energy is the maximum amount 
of energy, which can be released upon decomposition. The product of 
decomposition energy and total mass is an important parameter for 
determining the effects of a sudden energy release, e.g. in an explosion. The 
decomposition energy can occasionally be obtained from literature or 
calculated theoretically, however it is mostly determined experimentally, often 
by DSC. 
 
• Decomposition temperature. Temperature at which spontaneous 
decomposition occurs. In practice, it is impossible to indicate the exact value 
of this temperature, because the reaction rate is only zero at absolute zero 
temperature (0 K) conforming to the equation of Arrhenius. Therefore, in 
measuring the decomposition temperature both sample quantity and 
sensitivity of the measuring device are very important. (See also onset 
temperature). 
 
• DIERS. Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems; Institute under 
auspices of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers founded to 
investigate design requirements for vent lines in case of two-phase venting. 
 
• Dewar. A jacketed vacuum flask that can be used in calorimetry. The low rate 
of heat loss means that it can be used to simulate the behaviour of large 
reactors. See also adiabatic. 
 
• Differential scanning calorimetry (DSC). A technique in which the change 
of the difference in the heat flow rate to the sample and to a reference sample 
is measured while they are subjected to a temperature regime. Note that in 
many process safety laboratories DSC and DTA are used interchangeably. 
 
• Differential thermal analysis (DTA). A technique in which the change of the 
difference in the temperature between the sample and the reference sample 
is measured while they are subjected to a temperature regime. Note that in 
many process safety laboratories DSC and DTA are used interchangeably. 
 
• Endothermic. A reaction is called endothermic if energy (heat) is absorbed 
during the reaction. 
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• Exothermic. A reaction is called exothermic if energy (heat) is released 
during the reaction. 
 
• Explosion. A release of energy sufficient to cause a pressure wave. 
 
• Hazard. A chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing 
damage to people, property, or environment. 
 
• Hazard assessment. The process of identifying the hazards present in any 
undertaking (whether arising from work activities or other factors) and those 
likely to be affected by them. 
 
• Hazardous chemical reactivity. Any chemical reaction with the potential to 
exhibit rates of increase in temperature and/or pressure too high to be 
absorbed by the environment surrounding the system. Included are reactive 
materials and unstable materials. 
 
• Heat of reaction. The total quantity of thermal energy liberated or absorbed 
during a chemical reaction. 
 
• Induction period/time. Time interval (starting at operating conditions) after 
which a runaway shows its maximum effects. 
 
• Inherently safer. A system is described as inherently safer if it remains in a 
non-hazardous situation after the occurrence of unintended deviations from 
normal operating conditions. Inherently safer is used, rather than inherently 
safe, because it is not possible to eliminate all hazards. 
 
• Inhibition. A protective measure where the reaction can be stopped 
chemically by addition of another material. 
 
• Kinetic data. Data associated with the conversion rate of a reaction, such as 
the activation energy, pre-exponential factor and order of reaction. (See 
Arrhenius rate constant). 
 
• Maximum pressure after decomposition. The maximum pressure, which is 
obtained in a closed vessel. This pressure depends on the adiabatic 
temperature rise and the specific gas production. 
 
• Mitigating measures. Measures to reduce the consequences of a runaway 
to an acceptable level. 
 
• MTSR Maximum Temperature of the Synthesis Reaction. The maximum 
temperature reached following the occurrence of the desired (synthesis) 
chemical reaction under adiabatic conditions starting at the designed process 
temperature. For a batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process 
temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the desired reaction. For a 
semi-batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus 
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the adiabatic temperature rise of the synthesis reaction for those reactants 
that have accumulated during dosing. 
 
• Preventive measures. Measures taken at the initial stages of a runaway to 
avoid further development of the runaway or to reduce its final effects. 
 
• Products. Chemicals produced during a reaction process. 
 
• Quenching. Rapid cooling of the reaction system in a short time (almost 
instantaneously). This condition 'freezes' the status of a process and prevents 
further reaction or decomposition. 
 
• Rate of reaction. The rate at which the conversion of reactants takes place. 
The rate of reaction (r) is a function of concentrations (F(c)) and the reaction 
rate constant (k). 
r = k.F(cA, cB,....,CX) 
The heat (q) produced by a reaction is a linear function of the rate of reaction, 
which makes the rate of reaction a basic parameter in determining the 
required cooling capacity during all stages of the reaction process. 
 
• Reactants. Chemicals that are converted into (the required) products during 
the reaction process. 
 
• Reaction. The process in which chemicals (reactants) are converted into 
other chemicals (products). 
 
• Reaction calorimeter. A laboratory test apparatus for measuring thermal 
effects of chemical reactions or processes. For the purpose of this guidance, 
types of reaction calorimeters include isothermal, isoperibolic and adiabatic 
systems. 
 
• Reaction kinetics. The complex of data that determine a reaction rate. 
 
• Reflux. An operation, in which vapour is produced, condensed and 
subsequently returned to the originating vessel. 
 
• Runaway. A reaction that is out of control because the rate of heat generation 
by an exothermic chemical reaction exceeds the rate of cooling available. 
 
• Semi-batch. An operation in which some materials are added to the reactor 
at the start, with one or more other reactants added in a controlled manner 
during the reaction. See also semi-batch reactor. 
 
• Thermally unstable. Chemicals and materials are thermally unstable if they 
decompose, degrade or react as a function of temperature and time at or 
about the temperature of use. 
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• Thermodynamic data. Data associated with the aspects of a reaction that 
are based on the thermodynamic laws of energy, such as the enthalpy (heat) 
of reaction. 
 
• TMR Time to maximum rate. The time taken for a material to self-heat to the 
maximum rate of decomposition from a specific temperature, usually under 
adiabatic conditions. 
 
• TMRad. Time to maximum rate from a specified temperature under adiabatic 
conditions. 
 
• Thermal runaway. see runaway. 
 
• Unstable substance/material. Substance or material that decomposes either 
in the pure state or in the state as normally produced. 
 
• Venting. Emergency flow of vessel contents out of the vessel. The pressure 
is reduced by venting, thus, avoiding a vessel rupture due to over-
pressurisation. The vent flow can be single or (a) multi-phase (one) with 
consequent differences in flow and depressurisation characteristics. 
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8. ANNEX I. 
 
 
8.1. Chemical Compatibility Chart. 
 
 
The following chart should be considered as overview guidance to detect possible 
hazards due to incompatibilities between different substances. Substances must be 
classified according to the functional group that is considered more reactive. It is 
important to notice that only those substances that are likely to be in contact during 
the process should be considered, but possible mixing of substances due to wrong 
labelling could also take place, so this possibility should not be ignored. 
 
Because of the differing activities of the thousands of compounds that may be 
encountered, it is not possible to make any chart definitive and all-inclusive. It cannot 
be assumed to ensure compatibility of wastes because wastes are not classified as 
hazardous on the chart, nor do any blanks necessarily mean that the mixture cannot 
result in a hazard occurring. Detailed instructions as to hazards involved in handling 















30 H, P 30
31 H 31
32 U 32
33 H, GT 33
34 H, P H, P U H, P 34
1 1 101 H, F, GT 101
2 2 102 H, E H, E H, E H, E H, E 102
3 G, H 3 103 P, H P, H P, H H, E 103
4 H H, F H, P 4 104 H, E H, F H, F H, G H, F H, F, 
GT
H, F, GT H, F, G H, F, G H, E H, F, 
GT
104
5 H, P H, F H, P 5 105 H, E H, E H, GF H, GT, 
GF H





6 H H, GT 6 106 GT, GF GF, GT 106
7 H H, GT H H 7 107 107
8 H, G H, GT H, G H, G H 8 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 101 102 103 104 105 106 107
9 H, G H, GT H, G 9
10 H H H H H, G 10
11 GT, GF GT, GF GT, GF G 11
12 H, F, GF H, F, GF H, GT, GF GT, GF U H, G 12
13 H H, F H, G H 13
14 H H, F 14
15 GT GT GT 15
16 H, F 16
17 H, GT H, F, GT H, GT H, G H, GF H 17
18 H, G H, F, GT H, G H, P H, P H, G H, P, G H, G U 18
19 H H, F H, G H H 19
20 GT, GF H, F, GT H, G H H H 20
21 H, F, GF H, F, GF H, F, GF H, F, GF H, F, GF GF, H GF, H GF, H GF, H GF, H GF, H GF, H, GT GF, H H, E GF, H GF, H GF, H 21
22 H, F, GF H, F, GF G, F H, F, GT U GF, H H, E GF, H H, F, GF 22
23 H, F, GF H, F, GF H, F, G H, F 23
24 S S S S S S 24
25 GF, HF H, F, E H, GF H, E, GF GF, H U H, G U GF, H GF, H GF, H GF, H U GF, H GF, H E 25
26 H, GT, GF H, F, GT H U H, P S GF, H 26
27 H, F, GT H H, E H, E, GF H, E, GF
28 H H, F H H, E
29 H, F
30 H, G H, E H, F H, G H, GT H, F, E H, F, GT H, E, GT H, F, GT H, E H E H, F, GT H, E H, G H, G H, E, GF H, P, GT
31 H H, F H, G H, P GF, H GF, H
32 H, GT H, GT U H, E H
33 GT,GF HF, GF GT H E H
34 H, P H, P H, P H, P U H, P H, P H, P H, P U H, P H, P H, P H, P H, P
101 H, G H, F, GT H, F, GT H, F, GF
102 H, E H, E H, E H, E H, E H, E H, E H, E H, E E E
103 P, H P, H P, H P, H P, H P, H P, H U P, H P, H P, H P, H P, H
104 H, GT H, GT H, F H, F H, F, GT H, F, GT H, E H, F, GT H, E, GT H, F, GT H, F H, F H, F H, GT H, F, GT H, F H, F, GT H, F, E H, F, E H, F H, F, E H, F, GT
105 H, GF H, F, GT H, GF H, F, GF H, F, GF H, GF H, G H, GT H, F H, F, E H, E H, GF H, GF H, GF H, GF
106 H H G H, G H, GF H, GF S H, GF
107
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
<-EXTREMELY REACTIVE!!!! DO NOT MIX WITH ANY CHEMICAL OR WASTE MATERIAl->
<---------EXTREMELY REACTIVE!!!! DO NOT MIX WITH ANY CHEMICAL OR WASTE MATERIAL-------------->








No. Reactivity Group Name
15 Fluorides, Inorganic
Code Consequences 16 Hydrocarbons, Aromatic
H Heat Generation 17 Halogenated Organics
F Fire 18 Isocyanates
G Innocuous and non-flammable gas generation 19 Ketones
GT Toxic Gas formation 20 Mercaptans and Other Organic Sulfides
GF Flammable Gas formation 21 Metals, Alkali and Alkaline Earth, Elemental
E Explosion 22 Metals, Other Elemental & Alloys as Powders, Vapors, or Sponges
P Violent Polymerization 23 Metals, Other Elemental & Alloys as Sheets, Rods, Drops, etc.
S Solubilization of toxic substance 24 Metals and Metal Compounds, Toxic
U May be hazardous, but Unknown 25 Nitrides
26 Nitriles
No. Reactivity Group Name 27 Nitro Compounds, Organic
1 Acids, Mineral, Non-oxidizing 28 Hydrocarbons, Aliphatic, Unsaturated
2 Acids, Mineral, Oxidizing 29 Hydrocarbons, Aliphatic, Saturated
3 Acids, Organic 30 Peroxides and Hydroperoxides, Organic
4 Alcohols and Glycols 31 Phenols and Cresols
5 Aldehydes 32 Organophosphates, Phosphothioates, Phosphodithioates
6 Amides 33 Sulfides, Inorganic
7 Amines, Aliphatic and Aromatic 34 Epoxides
8 Azo Compounds, Diazo Compounds and Hydrazines 101 Combustible and Flammable Materials, Miscellaneous
9 Carbamates 102 Explosives
10 Caustics 103 Polymerizable Compounds
11 Cyanides 104 Oxidizing Agents, Strong
12 Dithiocarbamates 105 Reducing Agents, Strong
13 Esters 106 Water and Mixtures Containing Water
14 Ethers 107 Water Reactive Substances
LEGEND






The colours at the bottom of the table are referred to the NFPA index. This is an identification process that can facilitate the comprehension of the 
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1.- Interaction with water and iron must be considered for all processes.











Table 1. Summary of the NFPA identification codes. 
 
 
4 Danger May be fatal on short exposure. Specialized protective equipment required
3 Warning Corrosive or toxic. Avoid skin contact or inhalation
2 Warning May be harmful if inhaled or absorbed
1 Caution May be irritating
0 No unusual hazard
4 Danger Flammable gas or extremely flammable liquid
3 Warning Flammable liquid flash point below 37 ºC
2 Caution Combustible liquid flash point of 37 ºC to 93 ºC
1 Combustible if heated
0 Not combustible
4 Danger Explosive material at room temperature
3 Danger May be explosive if shocked, heated under confinement or mixed with water
2 Warning Unstable or may react violently if mixed with water
1 Caution May react if heated or mixed with water but not violently
0 Stable Not reactive when mixed with water
Water Reactive
Oxidizing Agent









































List of MARS accidents analysed 
1 
Accident chemical description Main features of accident
A-001 acid-base reaction; NaClO + acid waste tanks connected erroneously; blocked valve dueto crystals formation
A-002 ethylene oxide reacted with ancillary equipment leakage; possible hot spot in column
A-003
ethylene oxide reacted with moisture to form non-volatile
polyethylene glycols in the insulation material which auto-
oxidized
leakage in weld due to fatigue
A-004 phenol crystallization  lack of pipe heating led to blockage
A-005 TiCl4 reacted with water
control system not disconnected during
maintenance led to tank overflow; external
operators did not know way out
A-006 ethylene mixed with air, oxygen started decompositionof ethylene incorrect purging of installation
A-007 decomposition of nitro compounds due to temperaturerise
climatic conditions lead to freezing of waste
condensate 
A-008 unexpected formation of methylnitrate in tank containingchlorine residuals
introduction of hydrogen chloride contaminated
with methanol
A-009 decomposition of 1-nitro-anthraquinone unknown catalytic effect of impurities (inorganicsalts) 
A-010 TiCl4 reacted with water from cooling circuit
leakage in cooling circuit made water mix with
TiCl4; leakage due to corrosion for incorrect
cleaning procedures
A-011 self-ignition of substances in storage area unexpected unstable behaviour of substance
A-012 mixture formaldehyde/air exploded due to a temperatureincrease
welding operation in a tank containing flammable
mixture generated an explosion
A-013 mixture of zinc powder and air explosion due to hitting equipment with ahammer generating a hot nucleus of zinc powder
A-014 NaClO + HClO releasing chlorine labels of tanks had been interchanged
A-015 decomposition of crystallized hypophosphorous acid;formation of explosive air/phosphine mixture
formation of crystalline incrustation in tank;
failure in steam supply line
A-016 flammable vapours ignited excessive heating from worn bearing of theagitator
A-017 mixture of methanol, methylacetate and air ignited incorrect maintenance procedures
A-018
crystalline SO3 formed due to contact between oleum
and ammonium sulphate
introduction of air increased pressure in blocked
pipe
A-019 acid mixture in contact with water generated release ofnitrous gases
storage tank not properly emptied, cleaning water
reached tank
A-020 NaClO + acid releasing chlorine label mismatch, tank used for NaClO wasexceptionally loaded with acid, then forgotten
A-021 self-ignition of substances in storage area for wastes unexpected unstable behavior of substance
A-022 ferric chloride sulphate + sodium chloride releasedchlorine no verification of vessel contents
A-023 decomposition of H2O2 due to presence of impurities
ventilation pipe used for safe drainage of H2
blocked, possibility of product backflow
A-024 aqueous caustic soda solution + alkyl residuesgenerating flammable gases
the container had been sealed infringing
operating instructions
A-025 uncontrolled formation of phenylphosphine unexpected unstable behaviour of substance
A-026 flammable vapours ignited ignition due to use of halogen lamp in highlyflammable tank
A-027 ignition of polyvinylpyrrolidine oxidation and ignition due to atmospheric air feedinstead of nitrogen
A-028 release of polychloroacetone faulty pipe connection
A-029 release of phenol-water solution operator erroneously opened valve
A-030 mixture of air/styrene vapours ignited mixture ignited due to static electricity
A-031 release of acetylene and decomposition products leakage of pipe
A-032 release of SO2 due to different exothermic reactions incorrect storage procedures; no toxic detectors
A-033 decomposition of fertilizers producing NOx vapours dueto wrong mixture of products containing Cu and Cl incorrect process analysis  
List of MARS accidents analysed 
2 
Accident chemical description Main features of accident
A-034 ignition of air/ethyl alcohol mixture mixture ignited due to static electricity
A-035 ignition of flammable materials due to overheating incorrect storage procedures
A-036 explosion of mixture of volatile elements and fuel-oil unexpected unstable behaviour of substance
A-037 NaClO + HCl releasing chlorine tank rupture; pipe containing incompatiblematerials broke as well
A-038 fire of sodium dichloroisocyanurate associated with therelease of chlorine
rupture of bag, product reached drainage, ignited
in touch with wastes and oils
A-039 decomposition of fertilizers  incorrect storage procedures
A-040 decomposition of H2O2 due to presence of impurities
control failure + human error; valves opened that
should have been closed
A-041 release of hydrochloric acid and sulphur dioxide due tomixture of sulphur chloride and water operator cleaned tank with water
A-042 spontaneous ignition of pyrophoric iron sulphidesdeposit no verification of vessel contents
A-043 NaClO + HCl releasing chlorine chemicals picked from wrong container
A-044 trichloromethylsilane + water releasing chlorine operator mixed wrong chemicals
A-045 isocyanuric acid + water label mismatch 
A-046 ignition of sodium chlorate + combustible substances instorage area incorrect storage procedures
A-047 explosion of sodium hydroborate unexpected unstable behaviour of substance
A-048 sulphuric acid + sodium bisulphite released SOx  no verification of vessel contents, wrongchemical used
A-049 release of SO2 wrong handling of chemical drum
A-050 spontaneous combustion of sodiumdichloroisocyanurate polluted with organic compounds
incorrect storage procedures; hazard was
foreseen but no measures put in place
A-051 ethoxyalkylphenol + water operator mixed wrong chemicals
A-052 water + benzoyl chloride leakage due to failure of joint in condenser
A-053
tosyl isocyanate + metal container released H2S, HCl,
sawdust added as inhibitor but did not work
incorrect operation procedures; addition of
sawdust to inhibit reaction did not work
A-054 sodium chloride + ferric chloride
NaClO introduced erroneously in tank containing
FeCl3
A-055 dust cloud ignition chemical reacted with container material;blockage of aerosol outlet
A-056 decomposition of 2-azo-bis-methylbutyronitrile one plate of the dryer was broken; excessiveheating over safe temperature
A-057 release of HCN incorrect process analysis
A-058 reaction of water + toluene diisocyanate leakage
A-059 KMNO4 + ethanol solution no verification of compatibility of mixture
A-060 benzoyl chloride + methanol released HCl verification of compatibility of mixture inadequate
A-061 release of SO2
accumulation of product in equipment;
improvement of agitation systems required
A-062 trichloromethylbenzol reacted with humidity releasingHCl wrong connections
A-063 formation of polymer of ethylene oxide valve blockage
A-064 self-ignition of white phosphorus air admission in drum during loading
A-065 release of vapours and ignition due to welding incorrect procedures for maintenance
A-066 ignition of vapours wrong application of foam; compatibility ofauxiliary services
A-067 decomposition of azodibutyronitrile unexpected unstable behaviour of substance
A-068
mixture of H2, light hydrocarbon gases and CO ignited
by pyrophoric carbon deposits
incorrect maintenance procedures
A-069 ignition of different materials accumulated long overheating of materials; incorrect tests todetermine thermal stability
A-070 ignition of unstable residues containing nitrotoluenesand nitrocresols
incorrect management and maintenance; failure
of tests for stability  
 
List of MARS accidents analysed 
3 
Accident chemical description Main features of accident
A-071 mixture of water with SO3 releasing H2SO4
erroneous introduction of water, no verification of
vessel contents
A-072 sodium chloride + epichlorohydrin generated anexothermic reaction            no verification of vessel content
A-073 SCl2 + water releasing SO2 
monochlorobenzene provided by supplier
contaminated with water
A-074 release of hydrogen sulphide gas, formed when wastechemicals were mixed incorrect process analysis
A-075 ignition of methoate operator forgot to switch off heater, lead tooverheating
A-076 ignition of solvent vapours, acetone, methanol static electricity from polyethylene bags
A-077 powdered pharmaceutical product ignited static electricity, incorrect process analysis
A-078 explosion of highly flammable liquids teflon coating worn out, metal-to-metal contactgenerated the explosion
A-079 explosion of methanol vapours/air mixture no inertization, monitoring of flammables,explosive or smoke detectors
A-080 nitric acid + formic acid wrong connections; mistaken tank
A-081 explosion of different solvents unknown catalytic effect of impurities (inorganicsalts) 
A-082 release of flammable hydrocarbons + NaOH solution
human error during diluting mixture; flammable
reached zone of welding work; stop of electricity
supply induced explosions in other zones
A-083 ignition of acrylonitrile, vinyl acetate polymers accumulation of product in equipment; ignitiondue to friction generating sparks
A-084 explosion involving thioridazine hydrochloride
residues from previous process, incomplete
cleaning of vessel; ignition due to static
electricity; no investigation of previous incidents
A-085
release of PCl3 in contact with water generates HCl and
phosphines which self-ignited
wrong connections; reaction with rain water;
extinguishing with water increased HCl cloud
A-086 decomposition of organic peroxides overheating; incorrect procedures for heating;control and management failures
A-087 flammable vapours ignited due to self-heating incorrect process analysis; no flame arrestorsinstalled
A-088
TiCl4 and AlCl3 + water pressure increase and HCl
release
deposit of AlCl3 and TiCl4 formed in tube
A-089 decomposition of NO2 due to overheating
overheating due to pump bearing; pumps
inadequately cooled
A-090 polymer waste explosion operators not aware of possible flammablesinside vessel
A-091 ignition of flammable materials  leakage + ignition due to welding operations
A-092 phenol-formaldehyde polymerization mischarging; operator error, lack of training
A-093 polyvinylchloride polymerization supplies failure
A-094 epichlorohydrin polymerization cooling failure
A-095 copper phthalocyanine + chlorosulphonic acid dosing failure; no interlock between sensors
A-096 azo compounds for paints agitation failure; operation error restartingagitation 
A-097 nickel-metal + nitric acid cooling failure
A-098 ketone-colors manufacture, Dimethylaniline Chloroform,Phosgene and Dyphenilketone dosing failure; erroneous use of water
A-099 unknown, dymethilsulphate involved dosing failure; operator error
A-100 azo compounds for paints impurities / contamination
A-101 azo compounds for paints impurities / contamination
A-102 resin synthesis (maleic anhydride, lithium hydroxide…) mischarging; control system erroneouslyprogrammed
A-103 production of dimethyl-phosphorochloridothioate anddiethyl-phosphorochloridothioate dosing failure; insufficient cooling
A-104 polyvinylchloride polymerization pressure increase due to unknown reasons;safety valve did not work
A-105 unknown, involved SO2
impurities / contamination; presence of water
unnoticed  
List of MARS accidents analysed 
4 
Accident chemical description Main features of accident
A-106 polyvinylchloride polymerization supplies failure; inhibition did not work
A-107 polyvinylchloride polymerization dosing failure; rupture disk broken releasing gasin the atmosphere
A-108 fine chemical production (sodium borohydride)
pressure increase due to unknown temperature
rise, breaking down process intermediate;
reactor was on stand by
A-109 synthesis of 3-methylthioaniline dosing failure; inversion of order in reactants
A-110 styrene polymerization supplies failure; false indication in control room
A-111 various chemicals for production of textile and plasticindustries; emulsion oil and water mischarging; incorrect pH control
A-112 production of zirconium sponges (involving Mg) impurities / contamination
A-113 synthesized active ingredients for the pharmaceuticalindustry,
dosing failure; incorrect working procedures;
inexperienced worker
A-114 production of pectines dosing failure
A-115 phenol-formaldehyde polymerization supplies failure; incorrect working procedures
A-116 phenol-formaldehyde polymerization dosing failure; incorrect working procedures
A-117 pharmaceutical synthesis (p-chlorobenzaldehydeinstead of o-chloronitrobenzene) mischarging; labelling mismatch from supplier
A-118 H2O2 + alcohol vapours
impurities / contamination; bursting disks did not
work; no investigation of previous similar
incidents
A-119 fertilizers production impurities / contamination
A-120 o-nitrobenzylnitrate was produced instead of o-nitrobenzaldehyde
impurities / contamination; dumping system did
not operate
A-121 difluoronitrobenzene contaminated with water
impurities / contamination; decomposition T of
intermediates were known, but unexpected that
the presence of water could generate such T
raise
A-122 ethylene production
unknown causes for the runaway; isolation and
dump valves did not work; hot carbon particles
generated during the fire ignited vapours
A-123 unknown (involved ethanol and Ni Raney) cooling failure; control failure; pyrophoric nickelas source of ignition 
A-124 dosing failure involving H2O2
dosing failure; operator error; failure of
quenching system
A-125 hydrogen explosion
leakage; ignition due to static electricity; agitator
failure; no study of previous incidents; failure of
bursting disk
A-126 manufacture of bulk fine chemicals (1-methyl-2-fromyl-1-nitroimidazole)
unknown; incorrect laboratory analysis
procedures; accident during change of scale
trials
A-127 isopropyl alcohol recovery unknown; potential for runaway not detectedprevious to production
A-128 phthalocyamines process unit dosing failure; operator error; no monitoring ofpH; pressure relief system inadequate
A-129 production of chemicals to reduce grease mischarging; wrong chemicals; inexperiencedoperator; no emergency measures available
A-130 polyvinylchloride polymerization
mischarging; operator error; extra cooling didn't
work; formation of corrosive substance attacked
reactor wall; sprinkler system worked
A-131 polymerization of dicyclopentadiene mischarging; incorrect working procedures;inadequate training
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In order to carry out chemical reactions on a plant scale over a long period of years in safety, it is 
necessary to control many different factors over the life of the process.  However at the very basis 
of process safety, its fundamentals, are four principles: 
 
1) Good Basic Data (about the materials used and the process). 
2) Good Process Engineering. 
3) Good Process Design. 
4) Good Process Practice (State Evaluation) 
 
1) GOOD BASIC DATA 
It is imperative that the fundamental thermokinetics of the desired process and any side reactions 
and decompositions are determined and understood. In addition much physical data on raw 
materials, intermediates and final products is required. 
 
Tables of the data required and their methods of procurement are detailed (Section II). 
 
2) GOOD PROCESS ENGINEERING 
Clearly, unless good basic chemical engineering standards are met no amount of additional data 
or analysis will redeem the situation. For example, if the electricity supply is subject to frequent 
(more than once a month) and prolonged (more than one hour) interruption then THIS is the 
problem and it must be fixed first. A similar argument applies to all other utilities, water, steam, air, 
nitrogen, communications and computer functions. At a lower level each safety element (e.g. a 
thermometer or pressure gauge) must have normal industrial reliability and good standards applied 
to purchase and maintenance are essential. 
 
In order to assist companies assess their chemical engineering systems a checklist is provided 
(Section III). 
 
3) GOOD PROCESS DESIGN 
Good robust process design is also essential. If a process cannot meet the requirements of quality, 
yield and throughput it will be constantly changed and updated to meet demand. Eventually this 
updating process will lead to unsafe conditions unless strict control of the process changes is 
maintained. 
 
In order to assist in the production of a good basic process a checklist is provided (Section IV). 
 
4) GOOD PROCESS PRACTICE 
After design and engineering have been completed, it is necessary to have a tool to follow up the 
evolution of the process. This tool must be clear and efficient so that workers and engineers can 
easily identify possible risk arising from the way they carry out their processes. 
A number of questions structured as a “yes/no tree” are proposed. Each step of the process has to 
be referred to one process area and then the proper list of questions has to be followed. The what 
if/checklist questions are structured in the way that at the end of each “tree” of questions only tree 
possibilities can be achieved: justification of the answer given, a review of existing safety 
measures, or a check request if unknown. 
 
In order to assist in the evaluation of the process, tree-structured checklists for each step are 
provided. 
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5) RISK ANALYSIS 
These elements must be brought together in an interactive and systematic manner by means of a 
Risk Analysis. The Risk Analysis will identify hazards arising from 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the interaction 
between them. These will be classified in two kind of hazards: knowledge or process hazard. 
Knowledge hazard will come from unknown chemical or physical values of substances or mixtures 
or from unknown parameters or safety measures adopted in the process. If a risk of this kind is 
determined, this means that the unknown ones have to be determined before going on with the risk 
analysis. Process hazards are a consequence of the industrial activity itself. The number of this 
kind of hazards encountered will give an idea of the safety of the process. 
Once the Risk has been assessed, measures can be put in place to control the Risk to an 
acceptable level or better still eliminate the Risk completely. Even though some general ideas or 
guidelines can be given, this measures must come from the workers and engineers of the SME 
carrying the analysis. It must be taken into account that the enterprises are the best expert of the 
process: the experience of the persons that are working on it can be used to define which 
measures can better be applied to each single case. 
An intent of the previous checklists is to make thinking the persons that are performing the safety 
analysis in order to generate a discussion in which the knowledge of the process can be improved 
and all necessary measures to manage all possible risks arisen form the analysis can be defined. 
 
Once these 5 elements are in place: 
 
1) Good Basic Data  
2) Good Engineering Design 
3) Good Process Design 
4) Good Process Practice 





Then all five elements can be Planned, Organised, Controlled, Monitored, Audited, Reviewed 
and Spot-checked (POCMARS) by a formal (written) according to ISO 14000, for example, or 
informal Management System. The system is shown schematically in the appended Process 
Safety Overview (Figure 3) and a checklist for a basic management system is appended. 
 
Clearly few companies will run formal management systems which cover every aspect 
referred to in the overview, except possibly for high hazard operations. 
 
However the basic elements of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 must be in place to ensure a minimum 
level of safety. 
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  1.-.Considered in the all possible phases on which the substances are used in the process (storage steps, reaction steps, etc). 
  2.-.Enterprise's internal identification of the substances. 
  3.-.Degree of purity as specified in each process. 
  4.-.Inhibitors, triggering agents, chemical substances able to influence the rate of reaction, etc. 
  5.-.Temperature to leave of which a different phase from the one expected under normal conditions appears. 
  6.-.Pression to leave of which a different phase from the one expected under normal conditions appears. 
  7.-.In case of lack of data for mixtures, make one medium of the values of the single substances. 
  8.-.Stable or unstable, considering the maximum storage period. 
  9.-.High, medium, low. 
  CALCULATE ALL THE VALUES USING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM UNITS. 
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REACTION and PROCESS CONDITIONS 
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  1-Subdivide the process in steps and define if the step refers to process (P) or reaction (R). 
  2-Consider all the substances present in each step. 
  3-Use the experimental value if known, otherwise consider one medium of the values of the single substances. 
4-It can be known from: experimental calculations, literature or internet source (see DATA SOURCE)or simulations programs (as 
CHETAH). 
5-The maximum temperature reached following the occurrence of the desired (synthesis) chemical reaction under adiabatic 
conditions starting at the designed process temperature. For a batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus 
the adiabatic temperature rise of the desired reaction. For a semi-batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature 
plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the accumulated reactants of the desired reaction. 
  6-Specify if the reaction is an Arrhenius, catalytic (homogeneous or heterogeneous) or autocatalytic type.  
7-Increase of temperature of the reaction mass under adiabatic conditions due to accumulation of the heat released, coming from 
both the synthesis reaction and all the possible secondary reactions involved. 
8-If known, use ADT24; if not, MAXTSAFE can be calculated as the critical T at which in a short time decomposition or other thermal 
evolution of the final reaction mass takes place. It can be evaluated with a DSC, considering the T of the first exothermal peak less 70º (if 
beta=5K/min) or less 100º (if beta=10K/min). 
  CALCULATE ALL THE VALUES USING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM UNITS 
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6    6
7   7
8   8
9      9
10     10
11      11
12      12
13         13












2-Construction materials and wastes have to be included in the substances 
considered.
3-The colors at the bottom of the table are referred to the NFPA index. 
Include this identification in order to better comprehend the substance's 
chemical behaviour.






Solubilization of toxic 
substance
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III. GOOD PROCESS ENGINEERING 
Note: This checklist is not exhaustive but represents minimum standards of good. 
All the answers must be given from the safety point of view. 
 
CHK.1 CHECKLIST 
1.1 Are there critical instruments in the process? 
YES Have you identified those critical for safety (see list 1 on next page)? 
YES Has calibration and maintenance schedule been set for safety critical instruments? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
1.2 Are the reagents in use compatible with the material of construction (see compatibility chart in Good Basic Data)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
1.3 Is computer control used? 
YES Do safety critical instruments have a control system that can be used in case of computer failure? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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1.4 Can cooling (condenser or jacket) remove the heat generated during the reaction under normal operating conditions? 
YES How is it assured? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
1.5 Are there critical liquid levels for: 
Agitation? YES Are they controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Temperature measurement? YES Are they controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Maximum allowed volume? YES Are they controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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Sampling points? YES Are they controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Heels? YES Are they controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Dip pipes? YES Are they controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Others:_______________ YES Are they controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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1.6 Is it known which is the correct valve position before starting the process? 
YES How is it checked? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
1.7 Is overpressure relieve needed? 
YES Is it periodically revised? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
List for 1.1 
 Temperature probes 
 Pressure probes 
 Humidity probe 
 pH probe 
 Agitator axis rotation  
 Flow indicators 
 Security valves 
 Rupture disk 
 Addition valves and pumps 
 Blow up 
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IV. GOOD PROCESS DESIGN 
 
CHK.2 CHECKLIST 
2.1 Has the repeatability of the process been checked? 
YES How? 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2.2 Are quality and yield consistent under the proposed plant conditions? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2.3 Do small  temperature variations (at most ± 5ºC)  produce small changes in quality or yield? 
YES Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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2.4 Has the reproducibility of the process been checked? 
YES How? 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2.5 Have less toxic materials been considered? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2.6 Have non-flammable or less  flammable materials been considered? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
THEMATIC NETWORK ON HAZARD ASSESSMENT OF HIGHLY REACTIVE SYSTEMS 









3.1 Is there the possibility of dangerous mix formation due to: 
Wrong labelling? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
31.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Cleaning operations or reparation works? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
3.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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Adding new chemicals in vessels already in use? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
3.1.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Possibility of contact between substances? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and safety interlocks used? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
3.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3.2 Is showing any of the substances stored an autocatalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour (as polymerisation)? 
YES Is it controlled with inhibitors? 
YES Is their concentration controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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3.3 Is there the possibility of formation of a segregated phase (due also to weather effects)? 
YES Are the formed phases thermally stable? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO Are there measures to manage or prevent the segregation (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 





UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3.4 Is there the possibility of decomposition of any of the stored substances at ambient temperature? 
YES Is a cooling device installed and T controlled in the storage site of each unstable substance? 
YES Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 




• Report on chemical substances that can act as unexpected catalysts for exothermic reactions (impurities, etc). 
• Some basic safety scenarios (as loss of stirring, loss of cooling, longer storage period, missing of inhibitors, etc) have to be studied for each step. 
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4.1 Is there the possibility of dangerous mix formation due to: 
Wrong labelling or picking up from storage? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
4.1.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Cleaning operations or reparation works? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
4.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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Unavailability of chemicals? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
4.1.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Possibility of contact between substances? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and safety interlocks used? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
4.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4.2 Is showing any of the substances stored an autocatalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour (as polymerisation)? 
YES Is it controlled with inhibitors? 
YES Is their concentration controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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4.3 Is there the possibility of crystallisation or formation of a segregated phase (especially on cool down operations)? 
YES Are the formed phases thermally stable? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO Are there measures to manage or prevent the segregation (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 





UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4.4 Is there the possibility of hot spot? 
YES Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4.5 Is there the possibility of decomposition of any substances at process temperature? 
YES Is T controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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• Hot spots may be avoided by heating up not too quick and under turbulent flow conditions. 
• Report on chemical substances that can act as unexpected catalysts for exothermic reactions (impurities, etc). 
• Some basic safety scenarios (as loss of stirring, missing of inhibitors, etc) have to be studied for each step. 
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If the reaction is a full batch, is there a justification for not being semi-batch? 
 
CHK.5 CHECKLIST 
5.1 Is there the possibility of dangerous mix formation (involving both reagents and products) due to: 
Wrong order of adding? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
5.1.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Wrong chemicals used? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
5.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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Wrong rate of addition? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
5.1.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Wrong quantities of chemicals used? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
5.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5.2 Is a solvent used? 
YES  Is its amount controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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5.3 Are catalysts or inhibitors used? 
YES Is their concentration controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5.4 Is showing any of the substances involved (or a mixture of them) an autocatalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5.5 Is there the possibility of crystallisation or formation of a segregated phase in the reaction mixture (especially on cool down 
operations and at minimum jacket temperature)? 
YES Can it affect thermal behaviour of the reaction mass or T control, or is the phase thermally unstable? 
YES Are there measures to manage or prevent it (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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5.6 Is the maximum dosing rate known? 
YES Does it exceed the maximum safe dosing rate? 
YES REVIEW REACTOR SETUP 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
NO CHECK IT! 
5.7 Is dosing interlocked in any way with mixing to always assure turbulent conditions? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5.8 Will accumulation increase dramatically if the reaction temperature is low by 10K? 
YES Is T control interlocked in any way with dosing rate? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5.9 In case of automatic dosing, is it interlocked with cooling system? 
YES Can dosing be totally stopped (dosing set inherently safe)? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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5.10 Does cooling system work always below 80% of its maximum capacity? 
YES How is it guaranteed? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5.11 Is T controlled when the reaction is ended but the reactor is still full? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5.12 Is there the possibility of hot spot? 
YES Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5.13 Is any kind of interlock between cooling system failure and dosage stop present? 
YES How is it realised? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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• As a general rule, exothermic reactions need always T, dosing and stirring control. 
• Report on known quick ways to stop the desired reaction (extra cooling, chemical inhibition, venting, quenching, etc). 
• Hot spots may be avoided by heating up not too quick and under turbulent flow conditions. 
• Report on chemical substances able to influence the rate of reaction and substances that can poison catalysts and inhibitors or that can act as 
unexpected catalysts for the reaction (impurities, etc). 
• The maximum temperature that can be reached in case of cooling failure (MTSR) depends on the type of reactor. For example in case of a batch 
reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the desired reaction. For a semi-batch reactor the 
MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the “worst-case” accumulated reactants of the desired reaction. 
• Some basic safety scenarios (as loss of stirring, loss of cooling, dosing control, etc) have to be studied for each step. 
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  Schematic presentation of a cooling failure scenario according to Gygax. 
  Consequences:  a = desired reaction  b = secondary effects 
  1: time to cooling failure 
  2: temperature increase due to loss of cooling 
  3: temperature increase due to secondary reactions 
  4: temperature increase under normal operating conditions 
  5: time to reach the maximum temperature due to synthetic reaction (accumulation) 
  6: adiabatic induction time of the secondary process 
 
It is helpful for the evaluation of the cooling failure scenario to discuss four temperature levels and 
their interactions, as was first developed by Stoessel: 
 
• the process temperature, which corresponds to the initial temperature in a maloperation scenario 
(TP). 
 
• the temperature to be reached under upset conditions, e.g. the MTSR. 
NOTE: MTSR should be calculated in the worst case scenario of the considered process, e.g. for 
semi-batch should be considered three scenarios: batch (all reactants are mixed at the beginning 
of the process, adiabatic conditions are assumed); stop (dosing is stopped after a cooling failure. 
Only the actual accumulation is considered at each time); non-stop (dosing is not stopped when 
adiabatic conditions are established. Actual accumulation and remaining heat of reaction should 
be considered), and the worst one have to be considered. 
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• A safety maximum temperature value considered, MAXTSAFE. It can be determined by 
adiabatic calorimetry as the temperature at which the adiabatic induction time of a possible 
decomposition reaction falls below a specific limit value, ADT24. If adiabatic calorimetry data is 
not available, MAXTSAFE can be obtained by means of a dynamic DSC register of the reaction 
mass, with a heating rate of 5 K/min, following the detailed procedure: 
• the value of MAXTSAFE can be determined, at a first step, as the temperature at the 
first exothermal peak less 70 K.  This safety reference is more objective than the 
Tonset, since the later may depend on the precision of the apparatus. 
• it is necessary to compare this value with the MTSR. If ⏐MTSR-(Tpeak-70)⏐>50, then the 
approximation of MAXTSAFE=Tpeak-70 can be considered correct. If this is not so, it is 
also required to perform an isothermal DSC at MTSR followed by a dynamic register.  
• if MTSR>Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does not reveal any significant change of the 
mass reaction, and the dynamic register is equivalent to the first DSC performed, then it 
can be concluded that MAXTSAFE>Tpeak-70 and therefore MAXTSAFE>MTSR. 
• if MTSR>Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does reveal significant change of the mass 
reaction (low velocity of the exothermal phenomena at the process temperature can be 
a problem for detection), and the dynamic register is not equivalent to the first DSC 
performed, then the approximation MAXTSAFE=Tpeak-70 can be considered. 
• if MTSR<Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does not reveal any significant change of the 
mass reaction, and the dynamic register is equivalent to the first DSC performed, then 
the approximation MAXTSAFE=Tpeak-70 can be considered. 
• if MTSR<Tpeak-70, the isothermal register does reveal significant change of the mass 
reaction, and the dynamic register is not equivalent to the first DSC performed, then it 
can be concluded that MAXTSAFE<Tpeak-70 and therefore MAXTSAFE<MTSR. 
When performing an isothermal DSC, it must be considered that a 12 hour experiment should be 
long enough. Besides, low velocity of the exothermal phenomena at the process temperature 
can be a problem for detection. 
 
• the boiling point of the reaction mass (Tb). 
 
The possible different positions of the temperature levels relative to each other are presented in 
Figure 6, sorted by increasing degree of hazard (criticality). 
THEMATIC NETWORK ON HAZARD ASSESSMENT OF HIGHLY REACTIVE SYSTEMS 
















































































































Fig. 6. Scenarios with increasing criticality according to Stoessel. 
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CASE 1: in a case one scenario, neither the boiling point of the mixture nor the dangerous region in 
which the decomposition reaction becomes effective within a critical time is ever reached. Such 
processes may be regarded as inherently safe with respect to the process deviation evaluated. 
 
CASE 2: also in the second case, which differs from the first by the absence of the boiling point 
barrier between MTSR and MAXTTSAFE, the process may be regarded as safe. 
 
CASE 3: in the third case, the boiling point with its latent heat of evaporation may be looked upon as 
a safety barrier, provided the condenser is adequately designed. If the process is performed in a 
closed system, the apparatus must be designed for the maximum expectable overpressure or be 
equipped with a pressure relief device. 
 
CASE 4: scenarios with case four characteristics must be evaluated as to whether or not the 
evaporation capacity provides sufficient safety. If this is not the case, additional organisational or 
technical measures have to be implemented. Should the operation be performed in a closed system, 
then the temperature corresponding to the relief valve’s set pressure may not be much higher than 
the level of Tb. 
 
CASE 5: the fifth case must in any case be rated problematic. Plant and/or process modifications 
usually cannot be avoided in such situations. 
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VII. RISK ANALYSIS 
 
Once a reaction has been carried out successfully on a plant scale it can be repeated in safety 
provided exactly the same conditions are applied each time. 
The challenge is therefore to provide exactly the same conditions each time a reaction is carried out. 
This can only be done if no errors occur, no failures occur and no external events take part. 
Over the life of a process this also means that no deliberate or accidental changes to the process or 
process conditions (temperature, time, addition rate, order of changing, quantities etc.) can be 
allowed without risk. 
 
It is in fact impossible to run a process even a small number of times without error, change, failure or 
external event. So that a system must be employed to ensure that where change, failure external 
event or error occur there will be a back-up which will make the systems safe. 
 
The search for critical errors, failures etc. and the provision of back-up is called Risk Analysis and 
the back-up are called Measures. 
 
As a general rule for addition controlled exothermic reactions temperature control and agitation are 
essential. A shut-off to the feed should be hard wired to agitator stopped and temperature high and 
temperature low. This should be in addition to process control by operators or software. 
 
As a general rule temperature measurement is critical for process control. It should be policy to fit (or 
retrofit on a planned basis) dual cross checking thermometry probes (duplex thermometry). 
 
Overall where thermally critical conditions have been identified there are two general approaches: 
1. Fit an engineering solution, or 
2. Change the process to reduce the criticality. 
 
In general option 2 is to be preferred as it offers permanent solutions and reduces capital costs and 
levels of risk. 
 
1. Engineering Solutions 
 
The following list is provided to provoke thinking along the correct lines. The exact solutions for a 
determined hazard varies widely from case to case and expert advice should be sought where doubt 
exists. 
General 
• Avoid common mode failure. Whatever safety engineering solution is imposed it must work when 
the initial cause of the loss of control is still active e.g. loss of electricity, water etc. 
• Fit high reliability safety equipment. The safety system will be rarely activated but it must work 
with ultra high reliability if called upon. 
Test and Maintain 
• Essential safety equipment must be tested and maintained on a predetermined routine basis. 
Detailed Engineering Solutions 
• Drown out / Dump. In critical conditions send the batch to a drown-out vessel to cool, dilute and 
quench. Thinner, volume, mixing and transfer time need careful consideration under fault 
conditions. 
• Quench. In critical situations add a diluent to prevent runaway. Again all the consideration in the 
case above apply. Also an inhibitor can be added in some cases. 
• Vent and Contain. It may be possible to allow the reaction to runaway and safely discharge via a 
vent pipe and relief system to a safe place. Exact thermal data is required to size the vent and 
expert input is essential. 
• Back-up utilities. Back up supplies which avoid common mode failure are possible for electricity 
(diesel engines), water (header tanks), agitation (N2 purge), UPS for computer control, 
Instrument Air (local reserve cylinders), etc. 
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• Occasionally if jacket control is lost and reflux occurs, control can be re-established by an 
independent water supply to the condenser (also the reverse is occasionally possible if reflux 
control is lost). 
 
2. Change the Process 
 
• Reduce the amount of accumulation. High levels of accumulation can always be reduced. 
Typical methods to achieve this include: 
♦ Increase the addition time 
♦ Increase the reaction temperature 
♦ Change the catalyst 
♦ Reverse the additions 
♦ Dose wait, Dose wait 
♦ Vary the dose over the addition time 
♦ Dilute the reaction 
♦ Ultimately one can use a different synthetic route 
• Increase the TMRad 
♦ Dilute the reaction 
♦ Reduce the accumulation (lower MTSR) 
♦ Operate at a lower temperature 
♦ Use a different solvent or synthetic route 
♦ Consider continuous rather than semi-batch to reduce volumes 
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VIII. MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
NOTE: A checklist like the following one should be filled up for each plant considered. 
 
CHK.6 CHECKLIST DONE?
6.6 There should be a written policy of how chemical synthesis will be carried out in 
safety. 
 
6.2 The policy should be issued to all graduates, operators and managers allied to 
production. 
 
6.3 Senior managers should demonstrate their commitment to the policy.  
6.4 A plan to conform to the policy organisation should be drawn up.  
6.5 The person(s) responsible for obtaining the basic safety data must be 
nominated. 
 










The person responsible for implementing the measures must be named.  
6.8 The senior production manager must sign off the Risk analysis as acceptable 
and complete. 
 
6.9 The person responsible for supervising measures should authorise the start-up 
on the basis of a complete report of deficiencies at the start of production and 
expected completion date. 
 
6.10 A procedure of management of change to Monitor, Audit, Recover process plant 
and system must be in place. 
 
6.11 Production must ensure that all required measures are in place and operational 
on a routine basis. 
 
6.12 Senior management should promote an annual internal audit of all process to 
ensure they conform to policy. 
 
6.13 There should be an annual review of the process safety situation across all 










All processes Risk Analysis must be reviewed every 5 years or when a 
significant change occurs to the plant or the process. 
 
6.15 Is there a Permit-to-Work1 scheme in operation?  
Does the Management of Change include a written safety procedure for: 
• Plant modifications? 
 
• Process modifications?  
• Software modification?  
• Documentation modification?  









• Changes in raw materials?  
 
1- A Permit to Work is a written document system which assesses the hazard of any non-routine 
job to be carried out in a chemical area and defines safety precautions to be applied. 
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• Accumulation: A build-up of unreacted materials. 
• Activation energy: Constant Ea in the exponential part of the Arrhenius rate equation 
associated with the minimum energy difference between the reactants and an activated complex 
(transition state which has a structure intermediate to those of the reactants and the products), or 
with the minimum collision energy between molecules that is required to enable a reaction. 
• Adiabatic: A system condition in which no heat is exchanged between the chemical system and 
its environment, i.e. no heat transfer occurs to or from the environment surrounding the sample, 
including the sample container. 
• Adiabatic induction time: Induction period or time to an event (spontaneous ignition, explosion, 
etc.) under adiabatic conditions starting at operating conditions. 
• Adiabatic calorimeter: A calorimeter in which reactions proceed with little exchange of heat 
between the sample container and its surroundings. Common types of adiabatic calorimeter 
include the ARCTM, PHI-TECTM and VSPTM. The RSSTTM calorimeter may be considered as 
pseudo-adiabatic under some circumstances. 
• Adiabatic temperature rise: The increase in temperature of a reacting mixture as a result of 
exothermic chemical reaction, when there is no heat transfer to or from the environment. 
ΔT = ΔH/Cp 
ΔT Adiabatic temperature rise (K)  Cp  mean heat capacity (J/kg/K) 
ΔH Heat release (J/kg) 
• Apparent activation energy: In practice, reaction rates are often determined by physical 
processes (e.g. mass flow, diffusion, mass transfer area) as well as by chemical processes.  The 
activation energy observed in these cases is called the apparent activation energy. 
• Arrhenius rate equation: The rate of a chemical reaction (k) increases exponentially with 
increasing temperature (T). This relationship is represented by the Arrhenius equation k = A . 
exp (-Ea/RT). See also pre-exponential factor. 
• Arrhenius plot:  Graph that shows the logarithmic rate of heat production ln(q) versus the 
inverse temperature (1/T) in Kelvin. This results in a straight line with a gradient  
-Ea/R. In practice, the rate of reaction is often affected by physical processes (e.g. diffusion), 
which results in the occurrence of an apparent activation energy. 
• Autocatalysis: The increase of the rate of reaction due to the catalysing effect of the reaction 
products.  
• Basis of safety: The combination of measures relied upon to ensure safety. The basis of safety 
for a reactor highlights those aspects of the design and operation (hardware, protective systems 
and procedures) that are safety critical. The basis of safety can only be selected once all the 
significant hazards have been identified and evaluated. 
• Batch process: An operation in which all the reactants including any solvent are added to a 
reactor at the start of a reaction. 
• Blowdown: Rapid discharge of a vessel. 
• Calorimeter: See reaction calorimeter. 
• Condensed phase explosion: An explosion that occurs when the fuel is present in the form of a 
liquid or solid. 
• Confined explosion: An explosion of a fuel-oxidant mixture (usually in the gas phase) inside a 
closed system (e.g. vessel or building). 
• Consequences: A description of what would occur in the event of a hazard occurring. 
• Containment: A condition in which under no condition reactants or products are exchanged 
between the chemical system and its environment. 
• Continuous reactors: A reactor that is characterised by a continuous flow of reactants into and 
out of the reaction system. Common examples are the Plug Flow Reactor (PFR), the loop reactor 
and the Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR) but these are not considered in the HarsNet 
project. 
• Critical mass: Minimum mass that is required to enable the occurrence of an explosion. 
• Critical temperature: Maximum temperature of coolant at which all heat that is generated by a 
chemical reaction can still be transferred to the coolant (either gas or liquid). 
THEMATIC NETWORK ON HAZARD ASSESSMENT OF HIGHLY REACTIVE SYSTEMS 




• Decomposition: The breaking up of a chemical compound into by products. The temperature at 
which decomposition is observed depends on scale and is markedly dependent on the sensitivity 
of the measuring equipment. 
• Decomposition energy: The decomposition energy is the maximum amount of energy, which 
can be released upon decomposition. The product of decomposition energy and total mass is an 
important parameter for determining the effects of a sudden energy release, e.g. in an explosion. 
The decomposition energy can occasionally be obtained from literature or calculated 
theoretically, however it is mostly determined experimentally, often by DSC. 
• Decomposition temperature: Temperature at which spontaneous decomposition occurs. In 
practice, it is impossible to indicate the exact value of this temperature, because the reaction rate 
is only zero at absolute zero temperature (0 K) conforming to the equation of Arrhenius. 
Therefore, in measuring the decomposition temperature both sample quantity and sensitivity of 
the measuring device are very important. (See also onset temperature). 
• DIERS: Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems; Institute under auspices of the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers founded to investigate design requirements for vent lines in case 
of two-phase venting. 
• Dewar: A jacketed vacuum flask that can be used in calorimetry. The low rate of heat loss 
means that it can be used to simulate the behaviour of large reactors. See also adiabatic. 
• Differential scanning calorimetry (DSC): A technique in which the change of the difference in 
the heat flow rate to the sample and to a reference sample is measured while they are subjected 
to a temperature regime. Note that in many process safety laboratories DSC and DTA are used 
interchangeably. 
• Differential thermal analysis (DTA): A technique in which the change of the difference in the 
temperature between the sample and the reference sample is measured while they are 
subjected to a temperature regime. Note that in many process safety laboratories DSC and DTA 
are used interchangeably. 
• Endothermic: A reaction is called endothermic if energy (heat) is absorbed during the reaction. 
• Event tree (analysis): A graphical logical model that identifies possible outcomes following an 
initiating event. With suitable data it can be used to quantify the occurrence of an event. 
• Exothermic: A reaction is called exothermic if energy (heat) is released during the reaction. 
• Explosion: A release of energy sufficient to cause a pressure wave. 
• Fault tree (analysis): A method for representing the logical combinations of various system 
states which lead to a particular outcome (Top event). With suitable data it can be used to 
quantify the probability or frequency of an event. 
• Frequency: The number of specified events occurring in unit time. 
• HAZOP or Hazard and Operability Study: A systematic method for identifying possible hazards 
and potential operating problems in a plant or process by the application of so called 
‘guidewords’ (e.g. more, less, other etc.) to the plant or process flow sheet to study process 
deviations. 
• Hazard: A chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing damage to people, 
property, or environment. 
• Hazardous chemical reactivity: Any chemical reaction with the potential to exhibit rates of 
increase in temperature and/or pressure too high to be absorbed by the environment surrounding 
the system. Included are reactive materials and unstable materials. 
• Heat of reaction: The total quantity of thermal energy liberated or absorbed during a chemical 
reaction. 
• Heat Wait Search (HWS): An experimental technique in which a substance is heated in stages 
until very slow decomposition is detected. The experimental apparatus then becomes adiabatic 
and the course of the decomposition is monitored. 
• Induction period/time: Time interval (starting at operating conditions) after which a runaway 
shows its maximum effects. 
• Inherently safer: A system is described as inherently safer if it remains in a non-hazardous 
situation after the occurrence of unintended deviations from normal operating conditions. 
Inherently safer is used, rather than inherently safe, because it is not possible to eliminate all 
hazards. 
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• Inhibition: A protective measure where the reaction can be stopped chemically by addition of 
another material. 
• Isoperibolic: A system in which the controlling jacket temperature is kept constant. 
• Isothermal: A system condition in which the temperature remains constant. This implies that 
potential temperature increases and decreases are compensated by sufficient heat exchange 
with the environment of the system. 
• Isothermal calorimeter: A calorimeter in which the energy exchange with its surroundings is 
measured whilst the temperature of its contents remains essentially constant. Common types of 
calorimeter that can be operated in the isothermal mode include the autoMATETM, ChemisensTM, 
RC1TM and SIMULARTM. 
• Jacket temperature: The temperature of the fluid contained in the reactor jacket used to 
indirectly heat or cool the reactor contents. 
• Kinetic data: Data associated with the conversion rate of a reaction, such as the activation 
energy, pre-exponential factor and order of reaction. (See Arrhenius rate constant). 
• Maximum pressure after decomposition: The maximum pressure, which is obtained in a 
closed vessel. This pressure depends on the adiabatic temperature rise and the specific gas 
production. 
• Microcalorimetry: Isothermal techniques of high sensitivity in which heat fluxes from the 
converting sample material are measured very accurately. Differential Microcalorimetry is 
performed if the heat fluxes from the sample are compared with those of a reference material. 
• Mitigating measures: Measures to reduce the consequences of a runaway to an acceptable 
level. 
• MTSR Maximum Temperature of the Synthesis Reaction: The maximum temperature 
reached following the occurrence of the desired (synthesis) chemical reaction under adiabatic 
conditions starting at the designed process temperature. For a batch reactor the MTSR is 
equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the desired reaction. 
For a semi-batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic 
temperature rise of the synthesis reaction for those reactants that have accumulated during 
dosing. 
• Onset temperature: Defined as the temperature at which the heat released by a reaction can no 
longer be completely removed from the reaction vessel, and consequently, results in a 
detectable temperature increase. The onset temperature depends on detection sensitivity, 
reaction kinetics, vessel size and on cooling, flow and agitation characteristics. Scaling of onset 
temperatures and application of 'rules of thumb' concerning onset temperatures should be used 
with extreme care. 
• Permanent gas: A gas that cannot be condensed (or solidified) under the range of conditions of 
interest (eg temperature or pressure). 
• Phi-factor: A correction factor which is based on the ratio of the total heat capacity of a vessel 
(mass of vessel * Cp of vessel) and the total heat capacity of the vessel contents (mass of 
contents * Cp of contents). 
Phi = 1 + (mass of vessel * Cp of vessel) /(mass of contents * Cp of contents). 
The phi-factor is used to correct the measured heat release, and heat release rate, for the heat 
that is absorbed by the test cell. 
• Pre-exponential factor (also known as the frequency factor): Constant A (also denoted as Z, 
k*, ko or k∞ in the Arrhenius equation (also called frequency factor). The pre-exponential factor is 
associated with the frequency of collisions between molecules (entropy) and with the probability 
that these collisions result in a reaction. See also Arrhenius rate equation. 
• Preventive measures: Measures taken at the initial stages of a runaway to avoid further 
development of the runaway or to reduce its final effects. 
• Probability: The expression for the likelihood of occurrence of an event or event sequence 
during an interval of time or the likelihood of a success or failure of an event on test or demand. 
By definition, probability is expressed as a number ranging from 0 to 1. 
• Products: Chemicals produced during a reaction process. 
• Quenching: Rapid cooling of the reaction system in a short time (almost instantaneously).  This 
condition 'freezes' the status of a process and prevents further reaction or decomposition. 
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• Rate of reaction: The rate at which the conversion of reactants takes place. The rate of reaction 
(r) is a function of concentrations (F(c)) and the reaction rate constant (k): 
r = k.F(cA, cB,....,CX) 
The heat (q) produced by a reaction is a linear function of the rate of reaction, which makes the 
rate of reaction a basic parameter in determining the required cooling capacity during all stages 
of the reaction process. 
• Rate equation: See Arrhenius rate equation. 
• Reactants: Chemicals that are converted into (the required) products during the reaction 
process. 
• Reaction: The process in which chemicals (reactants) are converted into other chemicals 
(products). 
• Reaction calorimeter: A laboratory test apparatus for measuring thermal effects of chemical 
reactions or processes. For the purpose of this guidance, types of reaction calorimeters include 
isothermal, isoperibolic and adiabatic systems. 
• Reaction kinetics: The complex of data (thermodynamic and kinetic) that determine a reaction 
rate. 
• Reaction rate constant: The constant k in the rate of reaction. The reaction rate constant is a 
strong function of temperature as represented by the Arrhenius equation. 
• Reasonably practicable: The degree of risk in a particular job or workplace needs to be 
balanced against the sacrifice in time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty of taking measures to 
avoid or reduce the risk. Measures must be taken to eliminate or control the risks unless it is 
clear that the sacrifice incurred in doing so is grossly disproportionate to the level of the risk. 
However, the ability' to pay for additional control measures is not a deciding factor as to whether 
they are necessary. 
• Reflux: An operation in which vapour is produced, condensed and subsequently returned to the 
originating vessel. 
• Risk: The chance of something adverse happening where 'something' refers to a particular 
consequence of the manifestation of a hazard. Risk reflects both the likelihood that harm will 
occur and its severity in relation to the number of people who might be affected, and the 
consequences to them. 
• Risk assessment: The process of identifying the hazards present in any undertaking (whether 
arising from work activities or other factors) and those likely to be affected by them. Also 
evaluating the extent of the risks involved, bearing in mind whatever precautions are already 
being taken. 
• Runaway: A reaction that is out of control because the rate of heat generation by an exothermic 
chemical reaction exceeds the rate of cooling available. 
• SADT (Self-Accelerating Decomposition Temperature): The lowest ambient temperature at 
which auto-accelerated decomposition of an unstable substance is observed (minimum self-
heating rate of 5 °C/week), when the substance is packaged in its commercial container and is 
subjected to that temperature during one week in the testing facility (see also CSST). 
• Semi-batch: An operation in which some materials are added to the reactor at the start, with one 
or more other reactants added in a controlled manner during the reaction. See also semi-batch 
reactor. 
• Temperature of no return: The temperature under conditions of thermal decomposition at 
which the rate of heat generation is equal to the maximum rate of cooling available. 
• Thermally unstable: Chemicals and materials are thermally unstable if they decompose, 
degrade or react as a function of temperature and time at or about the temperature of use. 
• Thermodynamic data: Data associated with the aspects of a reaction that are based on the 
thermodynamic laws of energy, such as Gibbs' free energy, and the enthalpy (heat) of reaction. 
• TMR Time to maximum rate: The time taken for a material to self-heat to the maximum rate of 
decomposition from a specific temperature, usually under adiabatic conditions. 
• TMRad: Time to maximum rate from a specified temperature under adiabatic conditions. 
• Thermal runaway: see runaway. 
• Unstable substance/material: Substance or material that decomposes either in the pure state 
or in the state as normally produced. 
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• Venting: Emergency flow of vessel contents out of the vessel. The pressure is reduced by 
venting, thus, avoiding a vessel rupture due to over-pressurisation. The vent flow can be single 
or (a) multi-phase (one) with consequent differences in flow and depressurisation characteristics. 
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GOOD BASIC DATA 
 
Note:  This checklist is not exhaustive but represents minimum standards of good. 
All the answers must be given from the safety point of view. This checklist must be answered for each project. 
 
I CHECKLIST 
I.1 Have test data on reactive chemicals been gathered and evaluated versus worst case scenarios for the following: 
Process materials (substances), mixtures and wastes that are normal to the operation? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
I.1.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Mixtures that may result from abnormal conditions? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
I.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Materials of construction throughout the process (steel, iron, dust…)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
I.1.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! (may cause a catalytic effect to accelerate the reaction) 
Auxiliary materials (cooling tower, steam, chemicals that are normal to the operation…)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
I.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Materials of Instruments and maintenance (lubricants, thread compound, instrument filling fluids, seal fluids…)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
I.1.e 






I.2 Are materials and conditions that can cause accelerated corrosion or auto ignition in the system well known and are unacceptable 
conditions monitored for? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
I.3 Is the compatibility chart posted where all unit employees can use it?  
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
I.4 Are there predefined responses to the inadvertent mixing of the high hazard potential chemicals indicated on the compatibility 
chart?  
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (establish key lines of defence) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
I.5 Have side reactions in the process been researched and identified?  
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (establish key lines of defence) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
I.6 Have conditions for unwanted reactions been identified such as pH, water, contaminants, Temperature excursions…?  
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (establish key lines of defence) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
I.7 Do reaction data include total potential energy available in case a runaway reaction occurs? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (establish key lines of defence) 
 








I.8 Is any part of the process or storage subject to formation of shock sensitive materials? (peroxide, acetylide, azide or other) 
Substances:  
Is it controlled? 
YES How it is controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 




GOOD PROCESS ENGINEERING 
 
Note: This checklist is not exhaustive but represents minimum standards of good. 
All the answers must be given from the safety point of view. 
 
II CHECKLIST 
II.1. Are there critical instruments in the process? 
YES Have those critical for safety been identified (see list 1 on next page)? 
YES Has calibration and maintenance schedule been set for safety critical instruments? 
Instruments:  YES 
How? 
 
Instruments:  NO 
REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.2 Is computer control used? 
YES Do safety critical instruments have a control system that can be used in case of computer failure? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 





II.3 Can cooling (condenser or jacket) remove the heat generated in a worst-case scenario? 
YES How is it assured? 
 
Step(1):  NO 
REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.4 Are there critical liquid levels for: 
Agitation?  YES Are they controlled and easily available by the operator? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Temperature measurement? YES Are they controlled and easily available by the operator? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Maximum allowed volume? YES Are they controlled and easily available by the operator? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.4.d Sampling points? YES Are they controlled and easily available by the operator? 
                                                






NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Dip pipes? YES Are they controlled and easily available by the operator? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
pH measurement? YES Are they controlled and easily available by the operator? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Others:_______________ YES Are they controlled and easily available by the operator? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 









II.5 Has the system fitted a duplex thermometry (dual cross checking thermometry probes)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.6 Have relief devices been calculated for reactive chemicals runaway? 
Are they periodically revised? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.7 Have relief devices been calculated for two-phase flow? 
YES Justify your answer:  
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.8 Are relief device vent systems common to more than one system? 
Has the system been sized for backpressure when one or more systems relieve at the same time? 
YES Justify your answer:  
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.9 Have discharge velocity reaction forces been calculated and included in designs for PSV(1) and vent lines? 
YES Justify your answer:  
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
                                                





II.10 Has water supply been calculated for use simultaneously of sprinklers and hoses in various areas and maintenance of cooling in 
reactors / storage site? 
YES Justify your answer:  
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.11 Is the containment of residual water from the extinction of a fire properly designed for the worst-case scenario? 
YES Justify your answer:  
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (Containment in vats, sewers,) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
II.12 Has process backflow been effectively prevented in feed lines, nitrogen connections, air, steam, condensed steam, gas cylinders 
and from the scrubber? 
YES Justify your answer:  
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
List for II.1 
 Temperature probes 
 Pressure probes 
 Humidity probe 
 pH probe 
 Agitator axis rotation  
 Flow indicators 
 Security valves 
 Rupture disk 
 Addition valves and pumps 
 Addition vessels 
 Blow up 








GOOD PROCESS DESIGN 
 
Note: This checklist must be answered for each project. 
 
III CHECKLIST 
III.1 Has the repeatability of the process been checked? 
YES How? 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
III.2 Are quality and yield consistent under the proposed plant conditions to the results obtained in Laboratory? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
III.3 Has the reliably of the extrapolation of the results obtained in Laboratory or Pilot plant to Production been checked? 
YES How? 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





III.4 Do small temperature variations (at most ± 5ºC or ±10%) produce small changes in quality or yield? 
Step(1):  YES 
Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
III.5 Has the reproducibility of the process been checked? 
YES How? 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
III.6 Have less toxic materials been considered? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
                                                





III.7 Have non-flammable or less flammable materials been considered? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO Could it be a problem from the safety point of view? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
III.8 Can extended time during agitation cause a hazardous temperature rise? 
Step(1):  YES 
REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
                                                




6. GOOD PROCESS PRACTICE 
 
This chapter covers the evaluation of how the chemical process takes place. Whereas the previous 
chapters focused on general aspects of the chemical plant and process studied before it is actually 
performed, here the analysis is based on the different steps necessary to develop the desired 
product in the plant, starting from the study of the storage of all the substances in the plant, the 
reaction phase (which should be the part where most thermal hazards might appear) and other 
operations complementary of the chemical reaction, but which might also generate a loss of control 
of the thermal evolution of the process. 
 
The Good Process Practice checklists are structured as is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Good Process Practice Scheme. 
 
The Good Process Practice questionnaires must be used as follows: 
 
• Global Storage: it must be applied for the warehouse where substances are stored for long 
periods of time. It should be revised every time this facility of the chemical plant suffers a 
relevant modification. 
• Reactive / Products Storage: it must be applied once for all reactants used and once for 
all products generated in the considered process. This warehouse corresponds to the place 
where reactants and products are placed for a brief period of time before or after they are 
used or generated, depending on the case. 
• Global Reaction: it must be applied once for the whole process considering all the steps 
that include a chemical reaction. 
• Specific Reaction: it must be applied once for each chemical reaction clearly differentiated 
from another one. 
• Global Operations: it must be applied once for the whole process, considering those 
operations where no chemical reactions take place. 
• Specific Operation: the specified questionnaire must be applied every time that such 
operation is performed during the process. 
 
Once all the situations have been studied, the Process Safety Situations checklist can be 
used. This is a questionnaire that deals with existing intervention measures available in case of 
detecting a risk, and enumerates all the possible maloperation scenarios that may be 




















- / / 
 






Note: This checklist has to be applied to the warehouse, where all the substances are storage for a period of time (the answers shall include the 
possible different places for storage of flammable, unstable… substances). This checklist must be responded periodically or when changes have been 
done to the storage site.  
 
IV CHECKLIST 
IV.1 Is there the possibility of dangerous mix formation due to: 
Wrong labelling? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
IV.1.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Cleaning operations or reparation works? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
IV.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





Adding new chemicals in vessels already in use? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
IV.1.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Contact between substances? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and adequate safety interlocks used (vats and/or sewers of capacity to contain all 
the substances)? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (review state of substance container for any crack or fissure) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
IV.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Transport or wrong manipulation (fall, leave the container mistakenly closed…)? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and crosschecking of the state of container used? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
IV.1.e 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





Look-alike chemicals (name or packing) that can be put together in a mislabelled container or wrongly used? 
Substances:  
Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and crosschecking used?  
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
IV.1.f 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT!  
IV.2 Is showing any of the substances stored an auto catalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour (as polymerisation)? 
Substance:   Substance presence in Process(1):  YES 
Is it controlled with inhibitors? 
Is their concentration and temperature controlled periodically? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
In case of small quantities of substance (< 5L) is the ambient temperature controlled and are the inhibitors 
nearly? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO 
Other cases REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
                                                
(1) Name of the production project where this substance is used. 
 





IV.3 Is there the possibility of formation of a segregated phase (due also to weather effects)? 
YES Substance:   Substance presence in Process  
Are there measures to detect the formation of a segregated phase? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Are the formed phases thermally stable? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO Are there measures to manage or prevent the segregation (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! (Make a dynamic DSC of the mixture) 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
IV.4 Is there the possibility of decomposition of any of the stored substances at ambient temperature? 
Substance:   Substance presence in Process   YES 
Is a cooling device installed and T controlled in the storage site of this unstable substance? 
YES Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





IV.5 Are there measures to detect: 
A longer period of storage and control the status of the product? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
IV.5.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
A loss of cooling and control the status of the product? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
IV.5.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
An ignition of a reactive or product and activate automatic methods of suffocation? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
IV.5.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
IV.6 Is there any substance in sufficient amount subject to the application of the regulations (RAPQ and ITC)? 
Substance:  
Are the regulations properly implemented? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
IV.7 Are your chemicals stored according to compatibility criteria? 
YES Have they been identified and separated in the following groups (see list 1 on this section)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





List for IV.7 
 
• Flammable substances compatible with water 
• Flammable substances incompatible with water 
• No Flammable substances compatible with water 
• No Flammable substances incompatible with water 
• Unstable substances at greater Temperatures than the storage 
• Unstable substances or highly volatile at storage Temperature 
• Pyrophoric substances 




• Report on chemical substances that can act as unexpected catalysts for exothermic reactions (impurities, etc). 
• Report on inhibitors effectiveness. This property can be temperature dependant, for example, a too low temperature can cause separation of the 
inhibitor from the product.  
 




REACTANTS / PRODUCTS STORAGE 
 
Note: This checklist has to be applied to the place where the products obtained and the reactants in excess are placed for a small period of time after 
or during the process. This checklist must be answered for each project. 
 
V CHECKLIST 
V.1 Is there the possibility of dangerous mix formation due to: 
Wrong labelling? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
V.1.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Cleaning operations or reparation works? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
V.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





Adding new chemicals in vessels already in use or not cleaned? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
V.1.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Contact between substances? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it adequate safety interlocks used (vats, sewers…)? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
V.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Look-alike chemicals (name or packing) that can be mixed by error? 
Substances:  Presence in steps(1):  YES 
Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and crosschecking used? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
V.1.e 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
                                                
(1) A Step is any operation that has to be done in order to complete the process (addition, heating, agitation...) 
 





Mixing of waste streams? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
V.1.f 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
V.2 Is showing any of the substances stored an auto catalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour (as polymerisation)? 
Substance:   Substance presence in Steps:   YES 
Is it controlled with inhibitors? 
YES Is their concentration and temperature controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Is the ambient temperature controlled and are the inhibitors nearly?  
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





V.3 Is there the possibility of formation of a segregated phase (due also to weather effects)? 
Substance:  Substance presence in Steps:   YES 
Are there measures to detect the formation of a segregated phase? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Are the formed phases thermally stable? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO Are there measures to manage or prevent the segregation (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 





UNKNOWN CHECK IT! (Make a dynamic DSC of the mixture) 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
V.4 Is there the possibility of decomposition of any of the stored substances at ambient temperature? 
Substance:   Substance presence in Steps:   YES 
Is the temperature controlled in the storage site of this unstable substance? 
YES Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





V.5 Is there a system to prevent incompatible chemicals from being placed side by side? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
V.6 Are there measures to detect:  
A longer period of storage and control the status of the product or waste? 
YES Which? 
  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
V.6.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
An ignition of a substance or a mixture of substances? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
V.6.b 




• Report on chemical substances that can act as unexpected catalysts for exothermic reactions (impurities, etc). 
• Report on inhibitors effectiveness. This property can be temperature dependant, for example, a too low temperature can cause separation of the 
inhibitor from the product.  
 






Note: This checklist must be answered once for the whole project, considering all the steps where a chemical reaction takes place. 
 
VI CHECKLIST 
VI.1 Is there the possibility of dangerous mix formation (involving both reagents and products) due to: 
Wrong order of adding? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
VI.1.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Wrong chemicals used? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
VI.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Wrong rate of addition? 
YES Is it controlled? (The intermediate measures and safety margins of time of addition are available by the operators) 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VI.1.c 
NO Justify your answer: 
 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Wrong quantities of chemicals used? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
VI.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Heels? 
YES Is it controlled? 
YES 
 
How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
VI.1.e 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VI.2 Is dosing interlocked in any way with mixing to always assure turbulent conditions? 
YES How is it assured? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (Introduce an electric resistance in the reactor with several temperature probes, select 
an initial rate of agitation and increase the rate of agitation until the reaction mass is thermally homogenous. This is the rate of 
agitation that assures turbulent conditions that may be manually selected) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VI.3 In case of automatic dosing, is it interlocked with cooling system? 
YES Can dosing be totally stopped (dosing set inherently safe)? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 







Note: This checklist must be answered for each reaction included in one project. 
 
VII CHECKLIST 
VII.1 Is the reaction a full batch? 
YES Is there a justification for not being semi-batch? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VII.2 Is a solvent used? 
YES Is there the possibility of evaporate or eliminate it from the mass of reaction (solvent can be reactive, discomposes, reflux...)?  
Is its amount controlled during the reaction? 
YES How it is controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





VII.3 Are catalysts or inhibitors used? 
YES Is their quantity initially added controlled? 
Is the mass of reaction sufficiently agitated to assure the dissolution of the substance added? 
YES How it is assured? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer:  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VII.4 Is showing any mixture of substances an autocatalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour at MTSR? 
Mixture of Substances:  YES 
Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! (Perform an isothermal DSC of 12h at MTSR of the mixture and consequentially a Dynamic DSC segment (30-400 
K; 5 K/min) and compare it with another dynamic DSC of the same mixture performed without an isothermal segment  
 





VII.5 Is there the possibility of crystallisation or formation of a segregated phase in the reaction mixture (especially on cool down 
operations and at minimum jacket temperature)? 
YES Can it affect thermal behaviour of the reaction mass, reaction rate or T control, or is the phase thermally unstable? 
YES Are there measures to manage or prevent it (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VII.6 Is the maximum dosing rate known? 
Which?  YES 
Does it exceed the maximum safe dosing rate? 
YES REVIEW REACTOR SETUP (Introduce a second valve (in case of rupture) or orifice plate with flow control) 




UNKNOWN CHECK IT! (Perform a reaction calorimetry study and evaluate the maximum possible flow of cooling fluid) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





VII.7 Will accumulation increase dramatically (+10%) if the reaction temperature is low by 10K? 
YES In case of full batch, are there measures to prevent the modification of temperature? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
In case of semi-batch, is the T control interlocked in any way with dosing rate? (even manually) 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT!  
VII.8 Does cooling system work always below 80% of its maximum capacity? 
YES How is it guaranteed? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VII.9 Is T controlled frequently when the reaction is ended but the reactor is still full? 
YES How? 
 
Is the maximum safe temperature known of the mass reaction (MAXTSAFE)? 
Does the actual temperature (when no operations are in course) plus 100ºC exceed the maximum safe 
temperature or suspect that the mass reaction can be thermally unstable? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (make a DSC 30-400ºC at 5 K/min and estimate it) 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





VII.10 Is there the possibility of hot spot? 
YES Can temperature control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
YES How? 
 
Is the mass of reaction sufficiently agitated to assure turbulent flow conditions? 
YES How it is assured? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 




• As a general rule, exothermic reactions need always temperature, dosing and stirring control. 
• Report on known quick ways to stop the desired reaction (extra cooling, chemical inhibition, venting, quenching, etc). 
• Hot spots may be avoided by heating up not too quickly and under turbulent flow conditions. 
• Report on chemical substances able to influence the rate of reaction and substances that can poison catalysts and inhibitors or that can act as 
unexpected catalysts for the reaction (impurities, etc). 
• The maximum temperature that can be reached in case of cooling failure (MTSR) depends on the type of reactor. For example in case of a batch 
reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the desired reaction. For a semi-batch reactor the 
MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the “worst-case” accumulated reactants of the desired reaction 
[15]. 
• Some basic safety scenarios (as loss of stirring, loss of cooling, dosing control, etc) have to be studied for each step. 
 






Note: This checklist must be answered for each project.  
 
VIII CHECKLIST 
VIII.1 Is there the possibility of dangerous mix formation due to: 
Wrong labelling or picking up from storage? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
VIII.1.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Cleaning operations or reparation works? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
VIII.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





Unavailability of chemicals? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
VIII.1.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Badly connections or bad conditions of the system / pipe?  
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and lists of checking used? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
VIII.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Mixing of waste streams? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and reactivity charts easily available by operators? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (monitor the mixing for reactivity) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
VIII.1.e 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





Possibility of contact between substances? 
YES Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and adequate safety interlocks used (vats, sewers…)? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! (pipe’s elbow, pipe’s used in separation…) 
NO Justify your answer: 
VIII.1.f 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VIII.2 Is it known which is the correct valve position before starting one step(1) of the process? 
YES How is assured the correct valve position? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (Make a checklist of correct valve position) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
VIII.3 Is it known which is the maximum safe Pressure and Temperature reachable by the equipment in current conditions? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 





• Hot spots may be avoided by heating up not too quick and under turbulent flow conditions. 
• Report on chemical substances that can act as unexpected catalysts for exothermic reactions (impurities, etc). 
• Some basic safety scenarios (as loss of stirring, missing of inhibitors, etc) have to be studied for each operation. 
                                                
(1) A Step is any operation that has to be done in order to complete the process (addition, heating, agitation...)   
 




OPERATION-Addition / Dosing 
 
Note: This checklist must be answered for each project, taking into account all the steps where this operation is performed in the process.  
 
IX CHECKLIST 
IX.1 Is any reaction activated or provoked by the addition or dosing of the new substance to the mass of reaction? 
YES Substance Added:  
Which type of reaction is it? (endothermic or exothermic) 
Answer:  
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
MUST RESPOND THE CHECKLIST FOR REACTION (X.X) 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
IX.2 Is the maximum dosing rate known? 
YES Does it exceed the maximum safe dosing rate? 
YES REVIEW REACTOR SETUP (Dosing of Solids: Introduce a screw or train the operators / 
/ Dosing of Liquids: Introduce a second valve (in case of rupture) or orifice plate with flow control) 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! (Perform a reaction calorimetry study and evaluate the maximum possible flow of cooling fluid) 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
IX.3 Is the mass of reaction sufficiently agitated to assure the dissolution of the substance added / dosed? 
YES How is it assured? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (Introduce an electric resistance in the reactor with several temperature probes, select 
an initial rate of agitation and increase the rate of agitation until the mass reaction is thermally homogenous. This is the rate of 
agitation that assures Turbulent Conditions that may be manually selected) 
 








IX.4 Is the cooling system online before the start of addition / dosing on for precaution? 
YES Can dosing or addition be totally stopped (dosing set inherently safe)? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
IX.5 Is there the possibility of formation of a segregated phase in the reactant (due also to weather, time effects)? 
Substance:  
Are there measures to detect the formation of a segregated phase before the start of the addition / dosing? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
IX.6 Is there the possibility of decomposition of any substances at process temperature? 
Substance:  YES 
Is temperature controlled? 
YES How? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
IX.7 In case of addition of solids, is there a justification for not preparing previously a solution of the solid and dosing the dissolution? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 




OPERATION-Distillation / Reflux 
 
Note: This checklist must be answered for each project, taking into account all the steps where it is done this operation in the process.  
 
X CHECKLIST 
X.1 Is there the possibility of formation of hot spots? 
YES Can temperature control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
YES How? 
 
Is the mass of reaction sufficiently agitated to assure turbulent flow conditions? 
YES How it is assured? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
X.2 Can material be concentrated or built up on certain trays to the point of instability? 
Is it controlled? 
YES How it is controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
X.3 Is the amount of solvent controlled during the operation? 
YES How it is controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





X.4 Is it known which is the maximum safe temperature (MAXTSAFE) of the mass reaction and it is available by operators? 
YES MAXTSAFE:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (see chapter 2) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
X.5 Is temperature controlled frequently when the operation is ended but the reactor is still full? 
YES How? 
 
Does the actual temperature (when no operations are in course) plus 100ºC exceed the maximum safe temperature or suspect 
that the mass reaction can be thermally unstable? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
X.6 Have the effects of low and high flow rates on process stability around the distillation operation been evaluated? (reflux, overhead 
and bottoms…)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
X.7 It is known which are the characteristics of the auxiliary fluid of condenser or jacket? (MAXTSAFE, Temp boiling, Temp ignition…)  
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 





X.8 Is there the possibility of formation of a segregated phase (especially on distillation operations)? 
Step(1):  YES 
Are the formed phases thermally stable? 
YES Justify your answer: 
Step(1):  NO 
Are there measures to manage or prevent the segregation (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
                                                
(1) A Step is any operation that has to be done in order to complete the process (addition, heating, agitation...)   
 




OPERATION-Drying / Extraction / Crystallisation 
 
Note: This checklist must be answered for each project, taking into account all the steps where it is done this operation in the process.  
 
XI CHECKLIST 
XI.1 Is there the possibility of formation of hot spots? 
YES Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
YES How? 
 
Is the mass of reaction sufficiently agitated to decrease the probability of formation of hot spot? 
YES How it is assured? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XI.2 Can unstable components build up on mass reaction create a hazard? 
Is it controlled? 
YES How it is controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XI.3 Is the amount of solvent controlled during the operation? 
YES How it is controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





XI.4 Is there the possibility of crystallisation or formation of a segregated phase (especially on cool down operations)? 
Step(1):  YES 
Are the formed phases thermally stable? 
YES Justify your answer: 
Step(1):  NO 
Are there measures to manage or prevent the segregation (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
                                                
(1) A Step is any operation that has to be done in order to complete the process (addition, heating, agitation...)   
 




PROCESS SAFETY SITUATIONS 
 
Note: This checklist is not exhaustive but represents minimum standards of good. All the answers must be given from the safety point of view. This 
Checklist must be answered for each project. 
 
XII CHECKLIST 
XII.1 Are there measures to detect and control the reaction if:  
There is a loss of stirring? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
XII.1.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
There is a loss of electricity? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
XII.1.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
There is a loss of general cooling service? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
XII.1.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
There is a loss of dosing control? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
XII.1.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
There is a loss of recycle? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
XII.1.e 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





There is a loss of supply of compressed air? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
XII.1.f 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XII.2 Has agitator failure (power failure) been evaluated during all steps to determine if a runaway can occur? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
Step(1):  NO 
REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XII.3 Are the hazards of restarting an agitator during a batch identified and understood (potential for an accelerated reaction)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (training) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XII.4 Are there measures to regain control of an uncontrolled reaction? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (Extra Cooling, Quenching, adequate Venting, Chemical Inhibition…) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XII.5 Are there measures to control the leakage if one of the pipes of addition vessels breaks? 
YES Which? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (vats, sewers…) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XII.6 Does the failure of any heat transfer system (pump, pipe, heat exchanger…) result in an uncontrollable condition? 









UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





XII.7 Can tube wall temperature in exchangers cause degradation or runaway over time? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (reduce the temperature of the heating fluid) 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XII.8 Would a fire in trenches, ditches, sewers, etc., expose the plant or loading area? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XII.9 Can chemicals residues accumulate on high surface area (packing or tower components) to create a hazard during maintenance or 
at other times? 
Is it controlled? 
YES How it is controlled? 
 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 







Note: This checklist is not exhaustive but represents minimum standards of good. 
All the answers must be given from the safety point of view. This Checklist must be answered after the process has been done in production in order to 
evaluate the errors occurred or the possible improvements that can be applied.  
 
XIII CHECKLIST 
XIII.1 Have Process Safety / Reactive Chemicals incidents / accidents or human errors occurred during the process? 
Situation:   
 
Have any changes been done to prevent recurrence? 
YES 
 
Justify your answer: 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XIII.2 Has any risk situation arisen from (general storage, storage of reactants and products):  
Cleaning operations or reparation works? (sparks, explosive atmosphere…) 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION  
XIII.2.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Look-alike chemicals (name or packing) that can be put together in a mislabelled container or wrongly used? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION  
XIII.2.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





Mixing of waste streams? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION  
XIII.2.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Transport or wrong manipulation (fall, leave the container mistakenly closed)? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION  
XIII.2.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XIII.3 Has any risk situation arisen from (reaction, operations):  
Wrong chemicals used? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION  
XIII.3.a 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Wrong rate of addition? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION  
XIII.3.b 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Wrong quantities of chemicals used? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION  
XIII.3.c 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Contact between substances? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION  
XIII.3.d 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 





XIII.4 Has the mass of reaction been agitated sufficiently to assure the dissolution of all the substances added? 
YES PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XIII.5 Has cooling (condenser or jacket) removed the heat generated during all the steps in the process without reaching its maximum 
capacity? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
Step(1):  NO 
REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XIII.6 Has temperature been controlled frequently during all the steps of the process? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
Step(1):   
Maximum process 




MaxTsafe (see chapter 2):  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
XIII.7 Has any of the safety situations occurred or being about to take place? 
YES Justify your answer: 
 
NO PROCEED TO THE NEXT QUESTION 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
                                                
(1) A Step is any operation that has to be done in order to complete the process (addition, heating, agitation...)   
 




8. MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
NOTE: A checklist like the following one should be filled up for each plant considered. 
 
XIV CHECKLIST DONE?
XIV.1 There should be a written policy of how chemical synthesis will be carried out 
in safety. 
 
XIV.2 The policy should be issued to all graduates, operators and managers allied to 
production. 
 
XIV.3 Senior managers should demonstrate their commitment to the policy.  
XIV.4 A plan to conform to the policy organisation should be drawn up.  
XIV.5 The person(s) responsible for obtaining the basic safety data must be 
nominated. 
 










The person responsible for implementing the measures must be named.  
XIV.8 The senior production manager must sign off the Risk analysis as acceptable 
and complete. 
 
XIV.9 The person responsible for supervising measures should authorise the start-up 
on the basis of a complete report of deficiencies at the start of production and 
expected completion date. 
 
XIV10 A procedure of management of change to Monitor, Audit, Recover process 
plant and system must be in place. 
 
XIV.11 Production must ensure that all required measures are in place and 
operational on a routine basis. 
 
XIV.12 Senior management should promote an annual internal audit of all process to 
ensure they conform to policy. 
 
XIV.13 There should be an annual review of the process safety situation across all 










All processes Risk Analysis must be reviewed every 5 years or when a 
significant change occurs to the plant or the process. 
 
XIV.15 Is there a Permit-to-Work1 scheme in operation?  
Does the Management of Change include a written safety procedure for: 
• Plant modifications (material construction, Venting…)? 
 
• Process modifications?  
• Software modification?  
• Documentation modification?  









• Changes in raw materials?  
1- A Permit to Work is a written document system, which assesses the hazard of any non-routine 



















Have the scenarios and potential consequences for chemical spills and gas releases been 
reviewed with: 
• Supervision?  
• Plant Operators / Technicians?  
XIV.17 
• Other Affected Employees (Maintenance, Constructors, Distribution, 
Contractors)? 
 
XIV.18 Does the plant have written procedures detailing how to mitigate releases of 
chemicals in the plant (pump to another vessel, apply foam, temporally plug 
hole…)? 
 
XIV.19 There should be a formal emergency valve-testing program to ensure that all 
equipment is protected from excessive pressure. 
 
XIV.20 The design data and basis for all equipment and pressure/vacuum relief 
systems should be documented (Max P, Max T, Max flow or capacity…). 
 
XIV.21 Is a special training on reactivity conducted/tested/documented for each 
individual working in the unit? Is the compatibility chart included? 
 
XIV.22 Are all employees who regularly work around the chemicals (maintenance, 
distribution, contractors, constructors, visitors…) included in general training? 
 
XIV.23 Are case histories of past incidents in your unit and in the chemical industry 






Have potentially wrong mixtures or procedures been addressed?  
XIV.25 There should be a written policy of how the personnel must proceed in case of 
an emergency has been declared. 
 
XIV.26 The policy should be issued to all graduates, operators and managers allied to 
production and to all the people who work/enter frequently in the plant. 
 
XIV.27 The person(s) responsible for co-ordinating the actions that must be done in 
case of emergency must be nominated (Chief of emergency). 
 
XIV.28 The persons responsible for co-ordinating the actions that must be done in 
each department in case of emergency must be nominated (Co-ordinators of 
emergency). 
 
XIV.29 Are there different alarms according to different degrees / localisation of 
hazard? 
 
Are all the alarms properly identified by: 
• Plant Operators / Technicians / Co-ordinators of emergency? 
 XIV.30 
• Other Affected Employees (Maintenance, Constructors, Distribution, 
Contractors, Visitors)?  
 
XIV.31 The co-ordinators of emergency must ensure that all the alarms and speakers 
are in good status and that they can be listened from any place of the 
department in normal conditions.  
 
XIV.32 Does the plant conduct routine, periodic emergency drills on the release of 
toxic chemicals, ignition of substances…?  
 
XIV.33 Does the emergency drill include the activation of key lines of defence and its 
















Do all the personnel know which is their meeting point with their co-ordinator of 











XIII.35 There should be a way of communication between the chief of emergency and 
the co-ordinators of emergency when no electricity / telephone is available.  
 
XIII.36 The safe way of stopping any activity in case of evacuation should be 
documented and transmitted to all the personnel (Operators, Technicians, 
Maintenance, Distribution, Constructors…). 
 
XIII.37 The different possible routes of evacuation for each department must be 
selected, analysed, documented and transmitted to the co-ordinators of 




The person(s) responsible for improving and implementing the measures 
decided to be applied after the evaluation of the performance of the emergency 





















































HarsMeth version 2 
 
 
A short cut chemical process safety assessment 
procedure for SMEs 
 
 




















Name of operation: IV.1 CHARGING / REACTION 
 
1 Is there a possibility of dangerous mixtures formation due to: 
Wrong order of addition? 
Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Wrong quantities of reactants? 
Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 If a solvent is used, is its nature known? 
YES Are the necessary measures for its use taken? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 Is it necessary to prepare solutions prior to the reaction? 
YES How and where are they prepared?  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4 Can water be added to the inicial phase or during development of the reaction? 
When is it added?  YES 
What is the aceptable proportion?  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5 Is the proportion and quantity of solven controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
6 Has the compatibility of the solvent with the construction materials been taken into consideration? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
7 Is the charging and handling of catalyzers and inhibitors controlled? 
YES How? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
8 Do any of the substances (or their mixtures) used show autocatalytic or polymerizing behaviour? 
Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4 
 
9 Is there the possibility of precipitation or formation of segregated phases in the reaction mass? 
Can the thermal behaviour of the reaction or the unstable phase be affected? 
Are there measures to handle the segregation?  
SÍ Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, 
such as agitation control, cooling control) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
10 Is dosing connected to the agitation system in order to always ensure turbulent conditions?  
YES How is it guaranteed? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
11 Is the temperature of the reaction mass controlled when the reaction is finished but the reactor is still 
full? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
12 Is there the possibility of formation of hot spots? 
Can the temperature control detect a non homogeneous distribution of temperature? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
13 Is there a temperature control system to detect a failure in the cooling system? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
14 Is it strictly necessary to take samples during the development of the reaction? 
YES How is the sampling done? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
15 Is it necessary to keep a control of the reaction? 
How is it performed? YES 
Is there a possibility to eliminate such control in future batches? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
16 Is it necessary to control / desactivate the reactant excess before performing the following operation? 
YES How is it performed? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
5 
Name of operation: IV.2 ADDITION / DOSING  
 
1 Is any reaction activated by the addition or dosing of new substances to the reaction mass? 
YES Substance:  
What kind of reaction? (Endothermic o exothermic)  
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 Is the maximum safety dosing speed known? 
YES Is it ever exceeded? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT!  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 Is the mass of reaction sufficiently to ensure the integration of the substances added / dosed? 
YES How is it assured? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES (Choose another reactor, concentrate the reaction 
mass, scale-up) 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4 Is the cooling system operative before starting the addition / dosing in case the thermal conditions of 
the process require so? 
YES Can the process be stopped completely in case of failure of the cooling system? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5 Is there the possibility of decomposition of any substance at the process temperature? 
Substance:  
Is the temperature controlled? 
SÍ How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
6 In case of addition of solids, is there a justification to not prepare a solution earlier and dosing the 
solution? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
7 In case of automatic addition / dosing, is it connected to the cooling system? 
Can the dosing be stopped completely? 
YES How? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 




Name of operation: IV.3 DESTILLATION / REFLUX 
 
 
1 Is there the possibility of formation of hot spots? 
YES Can the temperature control detect a non homogeneous distribution of temperature? 
YES How? 
Is the reaction mass sufficiently agitated in order to ensure turbulent flux 
conditions? 
SÍ How is it assured? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 Can the reaction mixture be concentrated to a point of becoming thermally unstable during the 
operation? 
Is it controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 Is the solvent quantity controlled during the operation? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4 Is the maximum safety temperature (MAXTSAFE) for the reaction mass known and is this value 
available to the operators? 
YES MAXTSAFE:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5 Is the temperature controlled after the operation is ended but the reactor is still full? 
YES How is it controlled? 
Does the temperature under these conditions (no other operation in course) plus 100ºC 
exceed MaxTsafe or is it suspected that the reaction mass may be thermally unstable? 
YES REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO Justify your answer: 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
6 Once the liquid level reaches a point at which it is not in touch with the temperature probe anymore, is 
the temperature still controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
7 Have thee effects of low and high flow speed on the stability of the process been evaluated? 
YES Which effects have been identified? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 







8 Are the conditions of the auxiliary fluids of condenser or jacket known? (MAXTSAFE, Tboiling, 
Tignition…)  
YES What are those conditions? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES  
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
9 Is there the possibility of formation of segregated phases? 
Step:  
Can the formation of segregated phases be a problem from the safety point of view? 
Are there measures to control segregation? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Are the phases formed thermally stable? 
YES Justify your answer: 
Step:  
Are there measures to control segregation? 
YES Which? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
NO 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
10 Is it necessary to control the presence of water in the installation? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
11 In order to collect the distilled products, is it taken into consideration: 
Whether the appropriate containers for their storage are available? 
YES Which is the procedure to select the container? (depending on compatibility, further use of 
product…) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT 
Whether the appropriate measures for handling them have been taken? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like grounding to earth, use of 
gloves, masks, protective clothing) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
12 Is it necessary to collect the solute or the waste mixture from the reactor? 
Are there appropriate containers for their storage? 
YES Which is the procedure to select the container? (depending on 
compatibility, further use of product…) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Are the appropriate measures for their handling taken into consideration? 
YES Which is the procedure to select the container? (depending on 
compatibility, further use of product…) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
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Name of Operation IV. 4 PRECIPITATION  
 
1 Are the conditions for precitpitation and the characteristics of the precipitated mass known? 
Which are the conditions?  YES 
Which are the characteristics?  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 Is the quantity of solven enough / appropriate to perform the operation? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 In case of obtaining a too thick mass, or in case of deficient agitation, how is the emptying to 
centrifuge performed? 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 Is a solvent added to avoid precipitation? 
Solvent:   YES 
What is the chemical compatibility with the rest of substances? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4 Is a seeding process necessary for the precipitation? 
YES How is the seeding process performed? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5 Is the volume agitation ratio controlled during precipitation? 
YES Are stirring conditions appropriate for the volume of precipitation? 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
6 Is there an appropriate heat exchange between the reactor and the cooling jacket? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
7 Once the liquid level reaches a point at which it is not in touch with the temperature probe anymore, is 
the temperature still controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 




Name of Operation: IV. 5 CENTRIFUGE 
 
1 Is the inertization system connected before starting the operation? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 Is the appropriate quantity of N2 controlled in order to perform the operation? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 Is the solvent flammable? 
Solvent/s:  
Is the material to use prepared against static electricity 
YES Material type:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4 Is the quantity of solvent in the mass to be centrifuged appropriate? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5 In order to collect filtration waters, is it taken into account: 
The nature of the solvents? 
YES What is the chemical compatibility with the rest of substances? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Whether there is a container available for the storage? 
Container:  
Is inertization provided for the container? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT 
Whether the necessary measures for their handling are provided? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like grounding to earth, use of 
gloves, masks, protective clothing) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
6 Is the nature of the washing solvent used? 
Washing solvent:  YES 
Necessary amount:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
7 Is inertization provided during washing? 
YES How is it assured? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
8 In case of failure of the O2, analyser, which is the minimum time necessary to use N2 for inertization and 
ensure minimum concentration of O2? 
YES Time:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
10 
 
Nombre Operación: IV. 6 FILTRACIÓN / TRANSFER 
 
1 Is the temperature at which the filtration has to be performed known? 




NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 Is it necessary to pass solvent through the filter before starting the operation? 
YES How is it performed? (Temperature, hoses need pre-heating?) 
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 In case of filtering a catalyzer: 
Is the nature of the catalyzer known? 
YES Catalyzer:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Is it necessary to humidify the filtration mixture (pyrophoric catalyzer)? 
YES Substance:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Are the necessary measures known? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like grounding to earth, use of 
gloves, masks, protective clothing) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4 In case of collecting a catalyzer:  
Are there appropriate containers available?  
YES How is it collected? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Are the necessary measures known? 
SÍ Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5 Once the operation is finished, is there a washing of the filtering system? 
How is it performed? 
Is the nature of the washing solvent known? 
YES Solvent:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Is the filter finally dismantled? 
Is the nature of the filtration medium known? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment 
used) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer:  
YES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
NO Justify your answer: 
 




6 In order to collect the filtered mixture, is it taken into consideration: 
In what vessel is it collected? 
YES How is it collected (appropriate volume) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT 
Are the necessary measures known 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like grounding to earth, use of 
gloves, masks, protective clothing) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
7 In order to collect the filtration medium is it taken into consideration: 
Whether there are appropriate containers available?  
YES How is it performed? What is the destination? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT 
Are the necessary measures for its handling taken? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like grounding to earth, use of 
gloves, masks, protective clothing) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
8 Is there a procedure to act against possible solvent leaks? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 





Name of Operation: IV. 7 EXTRACTION / DECANTING / pH FIXING 
 
1 Is the nature of the different solvents known? 
Solvent:  YES 
What are their characteristics? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 Is it necessary to change the pH to enable the extraction? 
Is it necessary to add an acid or a base? YES 
Is the thermal behaviour known?  
NO Justify your answer: 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 In case of more than one pH adjustment, are the necessary measures known? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used: container to be used, remove 
excess of acid/base, washing equioment) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
4 Is the phase of the product known at all times? 
YES Phase:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
5 Is the interface treatment known 
YES How is it performed? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
6 Is there the possibility of formation of emulsions? 
YES How are they treated? 
NO Justify your answer 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
7 Is the necessary time to separate the phases (before considering an emulsion known? 
YES Time:  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
8 Is there a control of phases during decanting? 
YES How is it performed? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
9 Is there a control at the end of decanting? 
YES How is it performed? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
10 Is the final destination of the different phases known? 
YES How are they handled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
11 Do the decanted phases require filtering? 
YES How is it performed? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 




Name of Operation: IV. 8 DRYING 
 




How are they controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 In order to charge the humid product, is it taken into consideration: 
Whether the appropriate trays are available?  
YES Are they clean?  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT 
Whether the appropriate measures for their handling are taken? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like use of gloves, masks, 
protective clothing) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Whether the exposure to solvents during charging is controlled 
YES Is the nature of the solvents known? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 In order to discharge the dry product, is it taken into consideration: 
Whether the product has been cooled in order to handle for a better handling?  
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Whether the necessary measures are taken in order to avoid dust accumulation? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
Whether the appropriate measures for their handling are taken? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like use of gloves, masks, 
protective clothing) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 




Name of Operation: IV.9 MICRONIZATION / GRINDING 
 
1 Is it known whether the substance in dust form can generate explosive atmospheres? 
YES Necessary parameters: 
Minimum Flammable Energy (mJ):  
Minimum Flammable Temperature (ºC):  
Maximum Flammable Temperature (ºC):  
 
Minimum Explosive Concentration (g/m3):  
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
2 Are the parameters and conditions of the operation known? 
YES Describe: (feeding velocity, compressed gas pressure in micronizer, micronizer pressure, 
hammer or blades position, sieve used, water connection, etc.) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
3 During ensambling, disambling and cleaining, is it verified whteher the equipment is disconnected from 
electricity supply? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT 
4 Is it checked whether the equipment is clean before charging the product? 
YES Justify your answer: 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT 
5 Are the necessary measures taken for charging / discharging according to the nature of the product? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like use of gloves, masks, 
protective clothing) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
6 Is the inertization of the equipment before charging controlled? 
YES How is it controlled? 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
7 Are the necessary measures taken in order to avoid dust accumulation?  
YES Justify your answer: 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
UNKNOWN CHECK IT! 
8 Are the necessary measures taken during the operation? 
YES Justify your answer (describe protective equipment used, like grounding to earth, use of 
containers protected against static electricity) 
NO REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
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In order to carry out chemical reactions on a plant scale, over a long period of years, in safety it is 
necessary to control many different factors over the life of the process.  However at the very basis of 
process safety, its fundamentals, are three principles: 
 
1) Good Engineering Design and Practice. 
2) Good Process Design. 
3) Good Basic Data about the materials used and about the process. 
 
1) GOOD ENGINEERING 
Clearly, unless good basic chemical engineering standards are met no amount of additional data or 
analysis will redeem the situation. For example, if the electricity supply is subject to frequent (more 
than once a month) and prolonged (more than one hour) interruption then THIS is the problem and it 
must be fixed first. A similar argument applies to all other utilities, water, steam, air, nitrogen, 
communications and computer functions. At a lower level each safety element (e.g. a thermometer 
or pressure gauge) must have normal industrial reliability and good standards applied to purchase 
and maintenance are essential. 
 
In order to assist companies assess their chemical engineering systems a checklist is provided 
(Section III). 
 
2) GOOD PROCESS DESIGN 
Good robust process design is also essential. If a process cannot meet the requirements of quality, 
yield and throughput it will be constantly changed and updated to meet demand. Eventually this 
updating process will lead to unsafe conditions unless strict control of the process changes is 
maintained. 
 
In order to assist in the production of a good basic process a checklist is provided (Section IV). 
 
3) GOOD BASIC DATA 
Once the plant and the process are established on a sound basis, then it is imperative that the 
fundamental thermokinetics of the desired process and any side reactions and decompositions are 
determined and understood. In addition much physical data on raw materials, intermediates and final 
products is required. 
 




These elements must be brought together in an interactive and systematic manner by means of a 
Risk Analysis. The Risk Analysis will identify hazards arising from 1, 2 and 3 and the interaction 
between them. These hazards can be assessed for the probability of occurrence and the severity of 
the consequences or more simply the Risk. 
Once the Risk has been assessed, measures can be put in place to control the Risk to an 
acceptable level or better still eliminate the Risk completely. 
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II. GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
 
STEP 1 Look for the hazards 
STEP 2 Decide who may be harmed and how 
STEP 3 Evaluate the risk arising from the hazards and decide whether 
existing precautions are adequate or if you need to do more 
STEP 4 Record your significant findings 
STEP 5 Review your assessment from time to time and revise it if necessary 
 
This generic methodology can be performed at different levels of detail.  One step further in detail is 





Safety assessment of the process
under normal operating conditions
Systematic identification of possible
deviations from normal operation
Process or plant
must be modified
yes Can the process still be
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As outlined in this flow chart normal as well as upset operating conditions have to be assessed 
individually. One example on how to perform such an assessment for normal operating conditions is 






Assessment of substances under
process conditions
Assessment of the desired process including side
reactions
Assessment of the heat output rate of the reaction
Estimation of the heat output rate, e.g. semi-batch
reactions:
dQR/dt = ΔHR / feed time
Assessment of deviations
Process or plant has to
be modified
Are all input and output
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The conduction of the complete hazard analysis requires experts and sophisticated equipment. 
 













replace a material with a less hazardous substance or a hazardous 
reaction with a less hazardous reaction; 
 
use smaller quantities of hazardous substances in the process at any 
one time (also known as process intensification); 
 
use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous form of a material or 
facilities which minimise the impact of a release of hazardous material 
or energy (also known as attenuation); 
 
design facilities that eliminate unnecessary complexity and make 
operating errors less likely and which are forgiving of errors (also 
known as error tolerance). 
 
 
Once these 5 elements are in place: 
 
1) Good Engineering Design 
2) Good Process Design 
3) Good Basic Data 






Then all five elements can be Planned, Organised, Controlled, Monitored, Audited, Reviewed 
and Spot-checked (POCMARS) by a formal (written) according to ISO 14000, for example, or 
informal Management System. The system is shown schematically in the appended Process 
Safety Overview (Figure 3) and a checklist for a basic management system is appended. 
 
Clearly few companies will run formal management systems which cover every aspect 
referred to in the overview, except possibly for high hazard operations. 
 
However the basic elements of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 must be in place to ensure a minimum 
level of safety. 
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5.5) Management of Change 



























































1.1 Calibration/Maintenance 2.1 Reproducible  3.1 System 
           Thermochemistry 
 
1.2 Chemical    2.2 High Yield    3.2 Decomp 
       Thermochemistry 
   Engineering 
1.3 Instrument  Standards  2.3 Eliminative  3.3 Environmental Impact 
 
1.4 Software    2.4 Impurity Tolerant  3.4 Chronic (+ acute) 
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III. GOOD ENGINEERING DESIGN 
All Answers should be Yes 
 
 CHECKLIST YES/NO 
1.1 Have safety critical instrument been identified?  
1.2 Has calibration and maintenance schedule been set for safety 
critical instruments? 
 
1.3 Is there a separate maintenance and calibration schedule for 
non-safety related instruments? 
 
1.4 For addition controlled operations (semi-batch) is there a shut-
off valve in the supply linked to agitator stopped? 
 
1.5 For addition controlled operations (semi-batch) is there a shut-
off valve in the supply linked to reaction mass temperature 
high? 
 
1.6 For addition controlled operations (semi-batch) is there a shut-
off valve in the supply linked to reaction mass temperature 
low? 
 
1.7 Are the reagents in use compatible with the material of 
construction? 
 
1.8 If computer control is used do safety critical instruments have 
hard wire back up (a control system that can be used in case 
of computer failure), e.g. 1.5, 1.6? 
 
1.9 For new processes can cooling (condenser or jacket) remove 
heat of reaction? 
 
1.10 Is there a Permit-to-Work scheme in operation (a written 
document system which assesses the hazard of any non 
routine job to be carried out in a chemical area and defines 
safety precautions to be applied)? 
 
1.11 Is there a Management of Change procedure for plant 
modifications? 
 
1.12 Is there a Management of Change procedure for software 
modification? 
 
Have all critical liquid levels in vessels been identified for:  
Agitation?  
Temperature measurement?  
Maximum allowed volume?  
Sampling points?  
Heels?  
Dip pipes?  
Other measurement (e.g. pH, P, etc.)?  
1.13 
Is this data available to the Operations Team?  
1.14 Has a pre-campaign checklist for valve positions, etc. been 
made available? 
 
1.15 Are maximum working pressure and temperature known?  
1.16 Is overpressure relieve provided?  
 
Note: This checklist is not exhaustive but represents minimum standards of good. 
IV. GOOD PROCESS DESIGN 
Ideally a full Quality Risk Analysis should be carried out (which will include yield). This will look at 
the effect of the following on the Quality and Yield: 
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• Materials quality as supplied. 
• Materials quantities as charged. 
• Process variations (time, common impurities, temperature, pressure, pH, rate of heating, 
catalysts and rate of addition etc.). 
• Storage and handling. 
• Safety Stops will be identified where Quality and Yield will be least affected (this is also done for 
thermal safety see section 3). 
However the following minimum requirements should be met. 
 
All Answers should be Yes 
 
 CHECKLIST YES/NO
2.1 Does the reaction proceed normally and similarly on 
repeated laboratory experiments? 
 
2.2 Are quality and yield consistent under the proposed 
plant conditions? 
 
2.3 Do small (± 10ºC) temperature variations produce small 
changes in quality or yield? 
 
2.4 Is the average yield better than 90%?  
Is the reaction mass unaffected by:  
• Water?  
• Air?  
• Rust?  
2.5 
• Excess of any adduct?  
2.6 Has the process been carried out with identical results 
by two different people? 
 
2.7 If the reaction is full batch (all-in) is there a written 
justification for it not being semi-batch (addition 
controlled)? 
 
2.8 Have less toxic materials been considered?  
2.9 Have non-flammable (less flammable) solvents been 
considered? 
 
2.10 In semi-batch is the accumulation (or work-out, the time 
after the stop of the addition during which is necessary 
to hold the reaction mass at temperature to allow the 
reaction to go to completion) low? 
 
2.11 Is there a written safety procedure to follow to introduce 
a process modification to the plant? 
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V. THE KEVIN DIXON-JACKSON SHORT CUT 
 
Clearly obtaining all the basic data and carrying out a rigorous Risk Analysis for every process 
would be very consuming of time, money and human resource. In order to achieve acceptable 
results in a short time the following truncated methodology may be followed. It is stressed at this 
stage that this is simply an “90/10” approach whereby 90% of the problems will be dealt with for 
10% of the effort. In critical situations where the energies involved are high and where highly toxic 
(to man or the environment) materials or by-products are used then a detailed methodology must be 
followed. Where there is doubt about criticality expert advice must be obtained. 
 
For batch and semi-batch reactions the following flow chart can be used. This flow chart leads to a 
selection of checklists, which should be completed prior to carrying out the abbreviated risk analysis 
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CHECKLIST FOR AN EXISTING FULL BATCH PROCESS 
 
V.1 CHECKLIST 
1.1 What is the maximum safe starting temperature (TSAFE)? 
1.2 What is the thermal stability (TMRad) at the final mass 
temperature? 
1.3 What is the boiling point of the mass? 
1.4 Which components (catalysts/reagents/solvents) are critical at the 
charging stage? 
1.5 What is the temperature rise without cooling (MTSR)? 
1.6 Is cooling (jacket/condenser) needed? 
1.7 What happens if cooling fails? 
1.8 If the process conditions are changed (temperature, concentration, 
solvent, catalyst etc.) is there a procedure to review 1.1 to 1.7? 
 
NOTES:  1) TSAFE can be calculated from experimental tests, simulations or a value known to 
be safe for the specific plant can be considered (e.g. the maximum T reached by the 
process without the appearance of safety problems). 
 
2) TMRad can be calculated from experimental tests or a safety value known for the 
specific plant can be considered (see note 1).  
 
3) MTSR can be known from experimental tests or simulations. To define which 




CHECKLIST FOR AN EXISTING SEMI-BATCH PROCESS 
 
V.2 CHECKLIST 
2.1 Is cooling required during the addition (if yes estimate heat of 
reaction)? 
2.2 Is a work-out required (if yes, estimate % of accumulation on
work-out)? 
2.3 What is TMRad of final reaction mass at normal operating 
temperature? 
2.4 What is TMRad of reaction mass if cooling fails and accumulation 
causes the temperature to rise? 
2.5 Will accumulation increase dramatically if the reaction temperature 
is lowered by 10ºC? 
2.6 Does speeding the addition increase accumulation? 
2.7 If the process conditions are changed (temperature, concentration, 
solvent, catalyst etc.) is there a procedure to review 2.1 to 2.6? 
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CHECKLIST FOR A NEW FULL BATCH PROCESS 
 
Write up a justification for full batch as opposed to the safer semi-batch operation. 
 
V.3 CHECKLIST 
3.1 What is the final mass temperature? 
What variation (expressed as a %) from the expected process value 
of the following parameters should be considered as critical to avoid 
that the final mass temperature increases: 
• Start temperature +? 
• Catalyst concentration? 
• Solvent concentration? 
• Reagent concentration? 
3.2 
• Substrate concentration? 
3.3 What is TMRad at final mass temperature? 




CHECKLIST FOR A NEW SEMI-BATCH PROCESS 
 
V.4 CHECKLIST 
4.1 What is rate of heat production under normal conditions? 
4.2 What is TMRad of final mass at normal process temperature? 
4.3 What is % accumulation? 
4.4 What is ΔTad due to accumulation? 
4.5 What is TMRad at temperature rise due to accumulation under fault 
conditions? [4.4 + T in 4.2] 
4.6 How does temperature change + 10ºC affect 4.1 and 4.3? 
4.7 If the process conditions are changed (temperature, concentration, 
solvent, catalyst etc.) is there a procedure to review 4.1 to 4.6? 
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Fig. 5  Schematic presentation of a cooling failure scenario according to Gygax. 
  Consequences:  a = desired reaction  b = secondary effects 
  1: time to cooling failure 
  2: temperature increase due to loss of cooling 
  3: temperature increase due to secondary reactions 
  4: temperature increase under normal operating conditions 
  5: time to reach the maximum temperature due to synthetic reaction (accumulation) 
  6: adiabatic induction time of the secondary process 
 
Applying the worst case principle, it must be assumed that the cooling failure occurs at the point in 
time where the maximum accumulation potential is present. This could be due to agitation failure, 
cooling pump failure, electricity failure, or thermometer failure. 
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It is helpful for the evaluation of the cooling failure scenario to discuss four temperature levels and 
their interactions, as was first developed by Stoessel: 
 
• the process temperature, which corresponds to the initial temperature in a maloperation 
scenario (TP). 
 
• the temperature to be reached under upset conditions, e.g. the MTSR. 
NOTE: MTSR should be calculated in the worst case scenario of the considered process, e.g. 
for semi-batch should be considered three scenarios: batch (all reactants are mixed at the 
beginning of the process, adiabatic conditions are assumed); stop (dosing is stopped after a 
cooling failure. Only the actual accumulation is considered at each time); non-stop (dosing is not 
stopped when adiabatic conditions are established. Actual accumulation and remaining heat of 
reaction should be considered), and the worst one have to be considered. 
 
• the temperature at which the adiabatic induction time of a possible decomposition reaction falls 
below a company specific limit value, ADT24 or equivalent limit value. 
 
• the boiling point of the reaction mass (Tb). 
 
The possible different positions of the temperature levels relative to each other are presented in 































Fig. 6. Scenarios with increasing criticality according to Stoessel. 
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CASE 1: in a case one scenario, neither the boiling point of the mixture nor the dangerous region in 
which the decomposition reaction becomes effective within a critical time is ever reached. Such 
processes may be regarded as inherently safe with respect to the process deviation evaluated. 
 
CASE 2: also in the second case, which differs from the first by the absence of the boiling point 
barrier between MTSR and ADT24, the process may be regarded as safe. 
 
CASE 3: in the third case, the boiling point with its latent heat of evaporation may be looked upon as 
a safety barrier, provided the condenser is adequately designed. If the process is performed in a 
closed system, the apparatus must be designed for the maximum expectable overpressure or be 
equipped with a pressure relief device. 
 
CASE 4: scenarios with case four characteristics must be evaluated as to whether or not the 
evaporation capacity provides sufficient safety. If this is not the case, additional organisational or 
technical measures have to be implemented. Should the operation be performed in a closed 
system, then the temperature corresponding to the relief valve’s set pressure may not be much 
higher than the level of Tb. 
 
CASE 5: the fifth case must in any case be rated problematic. Plant and/or process modifications 
usually cannot be avoided in such situations. 
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VII. OPERATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS 
 
Once a reaction has been carried out successfully on a plant scale it can be repeated in safety 
provided exactly the same conditions are applied each time. 
 
The challenge is therefore to provide exactly the same conditions each time a reaction is carried 
out. This can only be done if no errors occur, no failures occur and no external events take part. 
 
Over the life of a process this also means that no deliberate or accidental changes to the process or 
process conditions (temperature, time, addition rate, order of changing, quantities etc.) can be 
allowed without risk. 
 
It is in fact impossible to run a process even a small number of times without error, change, failure 
or external event. So that a system must be employed to ensure that where change, failure external 
event or error occur there will be a back-up which will make the systems safe. 
 
The search for critical errors, failures etc. and the provision of back-up is called Risk Analysis and 
the back-up are called Measures. 
 
Ideally a formal written Risk Analysis should be employed. In the chemical industry Hazop (1) and 
Check-list (2) methods are the most popular. These are thorough and exhaustive methods and are 
highly recommended. 
 
(1) Hazop I.Chem E, 165-189 Railway Terrace, Rugby CV21 3HQ - ISBN 0 852954271 
 
(2) Ciba Risk Analysis - K Dixon-Jackson, Ciba Specialty Chemicals, Charter Way, Macclesfield, 
SK10 2NX 
 
However, the following general checklist will give a good if incomplete Risk Analysis and if the 
measures suggested are implemented and maintained risks will be reduced significantly. 
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OPERATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 
 
As a general rule for addition controlled exothermic reactions temperature control and agitation are 
essential. A shut-off to the feed should be hard wired to agitator stopped and temperature high and 
temperature low. This should be in addition to process control by operators or software. 
 
As a general rule temperature measurement is critical for process control. It should be policy to fit 
(or retrofit on a planned basis) dual cross checking thermometry probes (duplex thermometry). 
 
VII.1 CHECKLIST YES/NO
Can chemicals with similar names or in similar packages 
be easily mixed up? 
1.1 
If yes, promote cross-checking and sign off on batch 
sheet. 
 
Are part bags or part drums used? 1.2 
If yes, adjust charges to use only full bags or drums. 
 
Are there supply lines which contain chemicals but which 
will not be used? 
1.3 
If yes, disconnect and blank-off all redundant lines. 
 
Are any of the quantities charged critical? 1.4 
If yes, promote cross-checking and sign off on batch 
sheet. 
 
Is the order of charging critical? 1.5 
If yes, promote cross-checking and sign off on batch 
sheet. 
 
Is the rate of addition critical? 1.6 
If yes, fit orifice plate for liquid and control flow. For solids 
provide training for operators. 
 
1.7 Are any other parameters critical (e.g. pH, pressure, 
moisture, etc.)? 
 





Overall where thermally critical conditions have been identified there are two general approaches: 
1. Fit an engineering solution, or 
2. Change the process to reduce the criticality. 
 
In general option 2 is to be preferred as it offers permanent solutions and reduces capital costs and 
levels of risk. 
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1. Engineering Solutions 
 
The following list is provided to provoke thinking along the correct lines. The exact solutions for a 
determined hazard varies widely from case to case and expert advice should be sought where 
doubt exists. 
General 
• Avoid common mode failure. Whatever safety engineering solution is imposed it must work 
when the initial cause of the loss of control is still active e.g. loss of electricity, water etc. 
• Fit high reliability safety equipment. The safety system will be rarely activated but it must work 
with ultra high reliability if called upon. 
Test and Maintain 
• Essential safety equipment must be tested and maintained on a predetermined routine basis. 
Detailed Engineering Solutions 
• Drown out / Dump. In critical conditions send the batch to a drown-out vessel to cool, dilute and 
quench. Thinner, volume, mixing and transfer time need careful consideration under fault 
conditions. 
• Quench. In critical situations add a diluent to prevent runaway. Again all the consideration in the 
case above apply. Also an inhibitor can be added in some cases. 
• Vent and Contain. It may be possible to allow the reaction to runaway and safely discharge via a 
vent pipe and relief system to a safe place. Exact thermal data is required to size the vent and 
expert input is essential. 
• Back-up utilities. Back up supplies which avoid common mode failure are possible for electricity 
(diesel engines), water (header tanks), agitation (N2 purge), UPS for computer control, 
Instrument Air (local reserve cylinders), etc. 
• Occasionally if jacket control is lost and reflux occurs, control can be re-established by an 
independent water supply to the condenser (also the reverse is occasionally possible if reflux 
control is lost). 
 
2. Change the Process 
 
• Reduce the amount of accumulation. High levels of accumulation can always be reduced. 
Typical methods to achieve this include: 
♦ Increase the addition time 
♦ Increase the reaction temperature 
♦ Change the catalyst 
♦ Reverse the additions 
♦ Dose wait, Dose wait 
♦ Vary the dose over the addition time 
♦ Dilute the reaction 
♦ Ultimately one can use a different synthetic route 
• Increase the TMRad 
♦ Dilute the reaction 
♦ Reduce the accumulation (lower MTSR) 
♦ Operate at a lower temperature 
♦ Use a different solvent or synthetic route 
♦ Consider continuous rather than semi-batch to reduce volumes 
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VIII. MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
NOTE: A checklist like the following one should be filled up for each plant considered. 
 
VIII.1 CHECKLIST DONE? 
1.1 There should be a written policy of how chemical synthesis will 
be carried out in safety. 
 
1.2 The policy should be issued to all graduates, operators and 
managers allied to production. 
 
1.3 Senior managers should demonstrate their commitment to the 
policy. 
 
1.4 A plan to conform to the policy organisation should be drawn 
up. 
 
1.5 The person(s) responsible for obtaining the basic safety data 
must be nominated. 
 












The person responsible for implementing the safety measures 
must be named. 
 
1.8 The senior production manager must sign off the Risk analysis 
as acceptable and complete. 
 
1.9 The person responsible for the implementation of all the safety 
measures should report on completion and deficiencies at the 
expected start of production and expected completion date for 
all outstanding items. 
 
1.10 Procedures must be in place which insure that any significant 
change to the plant, the control system, the process, the 
operating instructions or the software are subject to a written 
Risk Assessment prior to the implementation of any change. 
 
1.11 Production must ensure that all required measures are in place 
and operational on a routine basis. 
 
1.12 Senior management should promote an annual internal audit of 
all process to ensure they conform to policy. 
 
1.13 There should be an annual review of the process safety 
situation across all production areas and places shown up to 











All processes Risk Analysis must be reviewed every 5 years or 
when a significant change occurs to the plant or the process. 
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• Accumulation: A build-up of unreacted materials. 
• Activation energy: Constant Ea in the exponential part of the Arrhenius rate equation 
associated with the minimum energy difference between the reactants and an activated complex 
(transition state which has a structure intermediate to those of the reactants and the products), 
or with the minimum collision energy between molecules that is required to enable a reaction. 
• Adiabatic: A system condition in which no heat is exchanged between the chemical system and 
its environment, i.e. no heat transfer occurs to or from the environment surrounding the sample, 
including the sample container. 
• Adiabatic induction time: Induction period or time to an event (spontaneous ignition, 
explosion, etc.) under adiabatic conditions starting at operating conditions. 
• Adiabatic calorimeter: A calorimeter in which reactions proceed with little exchange of heat 
between the sample container and its surroundings. Common types of adiabatic calorimeter 
include the ARCTM, PHI-TECTM and VSPTM. The RSSTTM calorimeter may be considered as 
pseudo-adiabatic under some circumstances. 
• Adiabatic temperature rise: The increase in temperature of a reacting mixture as a result of 
exothermic chemical reaction, when there is no heat transfer to or from the environment. 
ΔT = ΔH/Cp 
ΔT Adiabatic temperature rise (K)  Cp  mean heat capacity (J/kg/K) 
ΔH Heat release (J/kg) 
• Apparent activation energy: In practice, reaction rates are often determined by physical 
processes (e.g. mass flow, diffusion, mass transfer area) as well as by chemical processes.  
The activation energy observed in these cases is called the apparent activation energy. 
• Arrhenius rate equation: The rate of a chemical reaction (k) increases exponentially with 
increasing temperature (T). This relationship is represented by the Arrhenius equation k = A . 
exp (-Ea/RT). See also pre-exponential factor. 
• Arrhenius plot:  Graph that shows the logarithmic rate of heat production ln(q) versus the 
inverse temperature (1/T) in Kelvin. This results in a straight line with a gradient  
-Ea/R. In practice, the rate of reaction is often affected by physical processes (e.g. diffusion), 
which results in the occurrence of an apparent activation energy. 
• Autocatalysis: The increase of the rate of reaction due to the catalysing effect of the reaction 
products.  
• Basis of safety: The combination of measures relied upon to ensure safety. The basis of safety 
for a reactor highlights those aspects of the design and operation (hardware, protective systems 
and procedures) that are safety critical. The basis of safety can only be selected once all the 
significant hazards have been identified and evaluated. 
• Batch process: An operation in which all the reactants including any solvent are added to a 
reactor at the start of a reaction. 
• Blowdown: Rapid discharge of a vessel. 
• Calorimeter: See reaction calorimeter. 
• Condensed phase explosion: An explosion that occurs when the fuel is present in the form of 
a liquid or solid. 
• Confined explosion: An explosion of a fuel-oxidant mixture (usually in the gas phase) inside a 
closed system (e.g. vessel or building). 
• Consequences: A description of what would occur in the event of a hazard occurring. 
• Containment: A condition in which under no condition reactants or products are exchanged 
between the chemical system and its environment. 
• Continuous reactors: A reactor that is characterised by a continuous flow of reactants into and 
out of the reaction system. Common examples are the Plug Flow Reactor (PFR), the loop 
reactor and the Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR) but these are not considered in the 
HarsNet project. 
• Critical mass: Minimum mass that is required to enable the occurrence of an explosion. 
• Critical temperature: Maximum temperature of coolant at which all heat that is generated by a 
chemical reaction can still be transferred to the coolant (either gas or liquid). 
THEMATIC NETWORK ON HAZARD ASSESSMENT OF HIGHLY REACTIVE SYSTEMS 




• Decomposition: The breaking up of a chemical compound into by products. The temperature at 
which decomposition is observed depends on scale and is markedly dependent on the 
sensitivity of the measuring equipment. 
• Decomposition energy: The decomposition energy is the maximum amount of energy, which 
can be released upon decomposition. The product of decomposition energy and total mass is an 
important parameter for determining the effects of a sudden energy release, e.g. in an 
explosion. The decomposition energy can occasionally be obtained from literature or calculated 
theoretically, however it is mostly determined experimentally, often by DSC. 
• Decomposition temperature: Temperature at which spontaneous decomposition occurs. In 
practice, it is impossible to indicate the exact value of this temperature, because the reaction 
rate is only zero at absolute zero temperature (0 K) conforming to the equation of Arrhenius. 
Therefore, in measuring the decomposition temperature both sample quantity and sensitivity of 
the measuring device are very important. (See also onset temperature). 
• DIERS: Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems; Institute under auspices of the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers founded to investigate design requirements for vent lines in case 
of two-phase venting. 
• Dewar: A jacketed vacuum flask that can be used in calorimetry. The low rate of heat loss 
means that it can be used to simulate the behaviour of large reactors. See also adiabatic. 
• Differential scanning calorimetry (DSC): A technique in which the change of the difference in 
the heat flow rate to the sample and to a reference sample is measured while they are subjected 
to a temperature regime. Note that in many process safety laboratories DSC and DTA are used 
interchangeably. 
• Differential thermal analysis (DTA): A technique in which the change of the difference in the 
temperature between the sample and the reference sample is measured while they are 
subjected to a temperature regime. Note that in many process safety laboratories DSC and DTA 
are used interchangeably. 
• Endothermic: A reaction is called endothermic if energy (heat) is absorbed during the reaction. 
• Event tree (analysis): A graphical logical model that identifies possible outcomes following an 
initiating event. With suitable data it can be used to quantify the occurrence of an event. 
• Exothermic: A reaction is called exothermic if energy (heat) is released during the reaction. 
• Explosion: A release of energy sufficient to cause a pressure wave. 
• Fault tree (analysis): A method for representing the logical combinations of various system 
states which lead to a particular outcome (Top event). With suitable data it can be used to 
quantify the probability or frequency of an event. 
• Frequency: The number of specified events occurring in unit time. 
• HAZOP or Hazard and Operability Study: A systematic method for identifying possible 
hazards and potential operating problems in a plant or process by the application of so called 
‘guidewords’ (e.g. more, less, other etc.) to the plant or process flow sheet to study process 
deviations. 
• Hazard: A chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing damage to people, 
property, or environment. 
• Hazardous chemical reactivity: Any chemical reaction with the potential to exhibit rates of 
increase in temperature and/or pressure too high to be absorbed by the environment 
surrounding the system. Included are reactive materials and unstable materials. 
• Heat of reaction: The total quantity of thermal energy liberated or absorbed during a chemical 
reaction. 
• Heat Wait Search (HWS): An experimental technique in which a substance is heated in stages 
until very slow decomposition is detected. The experimental apparatus then becomes adiabatic 
and the course of the decomposition is monitored. 
• Induction period/time: Time interval (starting at operating conditions) after which a runaway 
shows its maximum effects. 
• Inherently safer: A system is described as inherently safer if it remains in a non-hazardous 
situation after the occurrence of unintended deviations from normal operating conditions. 
Inherently safer is used, rather than inherently safe, because it is not possible to eliminate all 
hazards. 
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• Inhibition: A protective measure where the reaction can be stopped chemically by addition of 
another material. 
• Isoperibolic: A system in which the controlling jacket temperature is kept constant. 
• Isothermal: A system condition in which the temperature remains constant. This implies that 
potential temperature increases and decreases are compensated by sufficient heat exchange 
with the environment of the system. 
• Isothermal calorimeter: A calorimeter in which the energy exchange with its surroundings is 
measured whilst the temperature of its contents remains essentially constant. Common types of 
calorimeter that can be operated in the isothermal mode include the autoMATETM, 
ChemisensTM, RC1TM and SIMULARTM. 
• Jacket temperature: The temperature of the fluid contained in the reactor jacket used to 
indirectly heat or cool the reactor contents. 
• Kinetic data: Data associated with the conversion rate of a reaction, such as the activation 
energy, pre-exponential factor and order of reaction. (See Arrhenius rate constant). 
• Maximum pressure after decomposition: The maximum pressure, which is obtained in a 
closed vessel. This pressure depends on the adiabatic temperature rise and the specific gas 
production. 
• Microcalorimetry: Isothermal techniques of high sensitivity in which heat fluxes from the 
converting sample material are measured very accurately. Differential Microcalorimetry is 
performed if the heat fluxes from the sample are compared with those of a reference material. 
• Mitigating measures: Measures to reduce the consequences of a runaway to an acceptable 
level. 
• MTSR Maximum Temperature of the Synthesis Reaction: The maximum temperature 
reached following the occurrence of the desired (synthesis) chemical reaction under adiabatic 
conditions starting at the designed process temperature. For a batch reactor the MTSR is 
equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the desired 
reaction. For a semi-batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the 
adiabatic temperature rise of the synthesis reaction for those reactants that have accumulated 
during dosing. 
• Onset temperature: Defined as the temperature at which the heat released by a reaction can 
no longer be completely removed from the reaction vessel, and consequently, results in a 
detectable temperature increase. The onset temperature depends on detection sensitivity, 
reaction kinetics, vessel size and on cooling, flow and agitation characteristics. Scaling of onset 
temperatures and application of 'rules of thumb' concerning onset temperatures should be used 
with extreme care. 
• Permanent gas: A gas that cannot be condensed (or solidified) under the range of conditions of 
interest (eg temperature or pressure). 
• Phi-factor: A correction factor which is based on the ratio of the total heat capacity of a vessel 
(mass of vessel * Cp of vessel) and the total heat capacity of the vessel contents (mass of 
contents * Cp of contents). 
Phi = 1 + (mass of vessel * Cp of vessel) /(mass of contents * Cp of contents). 
The phi-factor is used to correct the measured heat release, and heat release rate, for the heat 
that is absorbed by the test cell. 
• Pre-exponential factor (also known as the frequency factor): Constant A (also denoted as Z, 
k*, ko or k∞ in the Arrhenius equation (also called frequency factor). The pre-exponential factor is 
associated with the frequency of collisions between molecules (entropy) and with the probability 
that these collisions result in a reaction. See also Arrhenius rate equation. 
• Preventive measures: Measures taken at the initial stages of a runaway to avoid further 
development of the runaway or to reduce its final effects. 
• Probability: The expression for the likelihood of occurrence of an event or event sequence 
during an interval of time or the likelihood of a success or failure of an event on test or demand. 
By definition, probability is expressed as a number ranging from 0 to 1. 
• Products: Chemicals produced during a reaction process. 
• Quenching: Rapid cooling of the reaction system in a short time (almost instantaneously).  This 
condition 'freezes' the status of a process and prevents further reaction or decomposition. 
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• Rate of reaction: The rate at which the conversion of reactants takes place. The rate of 
reaction (r) is a function of concentrations (F(c)) and the reaction rate constant (k): 
r = k.F(cA, cB,....,CX) 
The heat (q) produced by a reaction is a linear function of the rate of reaction, which makes the 
rate of reaction a basic parameter in determining the required cooling capacity during all stages 
of the reaction process. 
• Rate equation: See Arrhenius rate equation. 
• Reactants: Chemicals that are converted into (the required) products during the reaction 
process. 
• Reaction: The process in which chemicals (reactants) are converted into other chemicals 
(products). 
• Reaction calorimeter: A laboratory test apparatus for measuring thermal effects of chemical 
reactions or processes. For the purpose of this guidance, types of reaction calorimeters include 
isothermal, isoperibolic and adiabatic systems. 
• Reaction kinetics: The complex of data (thermodynamic and kinetic) that determine a reaction 
rate. 
• Reaction rate constant: The constant k in the rate of reaction. The reaction rate constant is a 
strong function of temperature as represented by the Arrhenius equation. 
• Reasonably practicable: The degree of risk in a particular job or workplace needs to be 
balanced against the sacrifice in time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty of taking measures to 
avoid or reduce the risk. Measures must be taken to eliminate or control the risks unless it is 
clear that the sacrifice incurred in doing so is grossly disproportionate to the level of the risk. 
However, the ability' to pay for additional control measures is not a deciding factor as to whether 
they are necessary. 
• Reflux: An operation in which vapour is produced, condensed and subsequently returned to the 
originating vessel. 
• Risk: The chance of something adverse happening where 'something' refers to a particular 
consequence of the manifestation of a hazard. Risk reflects both the likelihood that harm will 
occur and its severity in relation to the number of people who might be affected, and the 
consequences to them. 
• Risk assessment: The process of identifying the hazards present in any undertaking (whether 
arising from work activities or other factors) and those likely to be affected by them. Also 
evaluating the extent of the risks involved, bearing in mind whatever precautions are already 
being taken. 
• Runaway: A reaction that is out of control because the rate of heat generation by an exothermic 
chemical reaction exceeds the rate of cooling available. 
• SADT (Self-Accelerating Decomposition Temperature): The lowest ambient temperature at 
which auto-accelerated decomposition of an unstable substance is observed (minimum self-
heating rate of 5 °C/week), when the substance is packaged in its commercial container and is 
subjected to that temperature during one week in the testing facility (see also CSST). 
• Semi-batch: An operation in which some materials are added to the reactor at the start, with 
one or more other reactants added in a controlled manner during the reaction. See also semi-
batch reactor. 
• Temperature of no return: The temperature under conditions of thermal decomposition at 
which the rate of heat generation is equal to the maximum rate of cooling available. 
• Thermally unstable: Chemicals and materials are thermally unstable if they decompose, 
degrade or react as a function of temperature and time at or about the temperature of use. 
• Thermodynamic data: Data associated with the aspects of a reaction that are based on the 
thermodynamic laws of energy, such as Gibbs' free energy, and the enthalpy (heat) of reaction. 
• TMR Time to maximum rate: The time taken for a material to self-heat to the maximum rate of 
decomposition from a specific temperature, usually under adiabatic conditions. 
• TMRad: Time to maximum rate from a specified temperature under adiabatic conditions. 
• Thermal runaway: see runaway. 
• Unstable substance/material: Substance or material that decomposes either in the pure state 
or in the state as normally produced. 
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• Venting: Emergency flow of vessel contents out of the vessel. The pressure is reduced by 
venting, thus, avoiding a vessel rupture due to over-pressurisation. The vent flow can be single 
or (a) multi-phase (one) with consequent differences in flow and depressurisation 
characteristics. 
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The main target of the CCRs project is to obtain a simple tool to quickly 
evaluate the safety level of a chemical plant liable to suffer a runaway 
reaction. In order to define a tool to assess chemical hazards, one of the 
most important points is to find a coherent and defined starting point from 
which analyse all the factors that may influence or cause an accident. 
 
Investigating the hazard’s anatomy, some basic components can be 
identified: 
 
• CAUSE – it is an individual and certain event that will trigger the 
appearance of a hazard. Causes are defined depending on the process 
that is being assessed; they are not of general application, but the 
consequences that arise from them may be common to all processes. 
Preventive safety measures will depend on the causes defined. 
 
• CRITICAL FACTORS - a critical factor is a generic hazard that is able to 
appear in a certain process as a consequence of an initial cause. Generic 
hazards or factors are defined on a theoretical basis. All factors defined 
must always be studied to find out which ones are important in the 
process. If the factor is likely to appear in the process causing a 
hazardous situation, then it is called CRITICAL FACTOR. Critical factors 
will define the parameters that must be tracked in the installation to 
control the process and to set up the alarm conditions and the safety 
measures. 
 
• CHEMICAL BEHAVIOUR – is the behaviour that chemicals exhibit under 
process conditions or under credible special conditions. The most 
interesting chemical properties for a runaway assessment are those 
related with exothermic activity and reactions with other substances. 
Chemical behaviour together with critical factors is of importance to define 
which are the dangerous conditions for a chemical system. 
 
 
A factor-based strategy was thought to be the best possible way to define a 
tool for a hazard assessment. It would focus on defining generic situations for 
hazard assessment. 
It is important to notice that a generic factor will be classified as critical or not 
depending on the chemical behaviour of the substance involved and the 
process conditions considered. From the conjunction of chemical behaviour, 
process conditions and Critical Factor the Hazardous Process Deviation 
arises. This deviation may develop and constitute an accident or kept under 
control with the emergency safety measures and became a near miss. 
Factors make easy to define which data are required for their evaluation, and 
from that data the tests can be specified. Moreover, once detected the critical 
ones, it will be clear which errors or failures will trigger them. 
 
In the first version of CCRs, six factors were defined to assess a runaway 
event; it was believed that with these most of the runaway scenarios were 
taken into account. The factors were mainly derived from the 10 runaway 
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courses described by Gustin (“Runaway Reactions, Their Courses, and the 
Methods to Establish Safe Process Conditions”, ISSN 0272-4332, vol.12, 
issue 4, 1992). 
 
The chemical process had been split in three areas, which are thought to be 
essentially different from each other. In this way it is possible to explain better 
the influence of a factor on a certain process zone. These areas are:  
• Storage (not intended change on physical or chemical properties) 
• Process (changes on physical properties but not on chemical structure or 
properties) 
• Reaction (changes on both physical and chemical properties). 
 
 
2. Changes brought to the new version of CCRs 
 
 
2.1 Revision on Critical Factors 
In the new version of the methodology the factors are reduced to five, 
considering the fact that the Critical Factor “Bulk Adiabatic Behaviour” can be 
included in the “Temperature Hazard” one, as the effect is essentially the 
same on the process. 
Moreover, instead of “Non-Arrhenius Reactions”, the definition “Autocatalytic 
Reactions” is preferred thinking that it is easier to comprehend. 
 
The factors used now are:  
 
• Mistaken Chemicals – this factor focuses on scenarios where a chemical 
mixture showing a violent and exothermic behaviour is achieved by error. 
As the system has not been designed to handle the reactive behaviour 
triggered, the heat released will surely exceed the normal cooling 
measures, thus leading the system to enter on runaway conditions. The 
“Incompatible Chemicals” scenario is enclosed by definition in this factor. 
A hazardous situation may also appear while handling the right 
chemicals: an error on proportions, concentration or mixing order may 
cause an undesired exothermal behaviour, even if the intended reaction is 
taking place. 
 
• Autocatalytic Reactions – there are chemical reactions that do not follow 
the Arrhenius law. In this type of reactions, the rate of reactions may 
change at a constant temperature. Chemicals exhibit this behaviour must 
be handled with grate care. Even if the reaction mass or bulk in storage 
vessels is well below a safety temperature, the reaction may lead to a 
runaway if the handling time is too large at that temperature. Examples of 
this behaviour are autocatalytic and radical chain polymerisation 
reactions. 
 
• Segregation – the segregation of a phase may be a hazard for different 
reasons. The most important one is that the segregated phase may show 
unstable exothermic behaviour. Besides, segregation may also affect the 
composition of the main phase from where the new phase separates, 
making it unstable. The third way in which segregation is dangerous is 
because it may jam measurement devises like level, temperature or 
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pressure indication. Loss of stirring or too low temperature are typical 
causes of segregation. A grater problem occurs when the segregated 
phase is highly unstable and can have shock sensitive or detonating 
properties. 
• Accumulation – the accumulation problem arises from a misbalance 
between reactant consumption and dosing rate. The concentration of the 
controlling reactant in the bulk will be higher or lower depending on 
dosing rate and temperature. If this concentration reaches a too high 
value, then the reaction is triggered too fast and high exothermal 
behaviour appears which may cause a runaway. As an accumulation 
scenario is directly related to the problem of dosing a reactant, this factor 
is only described for the Reaction zone, and not defined for Storage or 
Process zones. 
 
• Temperature Hazard – this kind of hazard may arise from two different 
situations: a too high global temperature or a too high local temperature 
or hot spot. A too high global temperature situation may be reached 
because of an extra heat input to the system by error or a too low heat 
removal. On the hot spot scenario care must be taken with mixture 
showing a sensible behaviour to heat: a hot spot may initiate an 
exothermic reaction that can propagate through the whole reaction mass. 
Hot spots are especially critical on vessels containing substances with 
detonating, deflagrating or self-igniting properties. 
 
 
2.2 Review on CCRs first version structure and application 
While applying the first version of CCRs to test processes in collaboration 
with a few SMEs, some problems were encountered: 
 
• The first one is to detect a critical factor considering all parts of the 
process related to each of the three areas at the same time. It is thought 
that the easiest way to settle this is to subdivide the process into steps 
and to refer each step to one of the three areas. The reason of this choice 
is that chemical industries commonly subdivide processes in steps and as 
a consequence this analysis criterion may be easier understood.  
Therefore, the factor detection follows a scheme that is peculiar to each 
area. In this way, the analysis should be more complete and easier to 
carry out, considering all the problems involved with each single step. 
 
• Another problem found in the analysis of the first version is that during the 
identification of a critical factor there is no way to consider the safety 
measures utilised by the company to prevent hazards due to this factor. 
For this reason, it has been developed a “what if/checklist” in which a 
“yes/no tree” of questions permits to consider the criticality of the factor 
due to its chemical behaviour and process conditions, and to control if the 
safety measures implemented are sufficient. 
 
• Data collection is another problem of the old cards’ version: a lot of data 
are asked in each factor’s card and most of them are related to different 
factors at the same time. Moreover, is not specified in which conditions 
they have to be calculated. For this reason, all necessary data have been 
moved in a separated part of the cards, structured in two tables: one 
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regarding the chemical properties of each substance involved in the 
process (included construction materials and wastes); the other 
concerning with process and reaction conditions, where properties are 
referred to each single step. In this way all necessary data can be found 
in one site and be used in every moment during the safety analysis. 
 
 
3.  Structure of the new version of CCRs 
 
The new version of the methodology is structured as follows: first of all, the 
cards are subdivided in Data Collection Cards and Data Analysis Cards. 
In the Data Collection Cards are included: 
• A Chemical properties table (that has to be filled with known data about 
the substances involved in the process) 
• A Process and Reaction Conditions table (that has to be filled with data 
about each step of the process) 
• A general Compatibility Chart 
• A Compatibility Chart specific of the process considered 
• A “Data Sources”, in which a list of books and Internet sites where to find 
literature’s data and estimations methods is presented. 
 
This data collection is intended to make easier answering to the “what 
if/checklists” contained in the Data Analysis Cards, having all the necessary 
data in one site. 
 
In the Data Analysis Cards a number of questions structured as a “yes/no 
tree” are proposed. Each step of the process has to be referred to one 
process area and then the proper list of questions has to be followed. For 
each step all the critical factors that can come up in each area are 
considered and for each factor a list of questions to investigate its criticality is 
presented. The what if/checklist questions are structured in the way that at 
the end of each “tree” of questions only two possibilities can be achieved: 
• A justification of the non criticality of the factor considered, due to the 
chemical behaviour of the substances involved, the process conditions 
considered or the safety measures used. The intent is to make think the 
person that is doing the analysis, to be sure the question has been 
considered in all its points of view. 
• Or “REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES” when the factor is found as 
critical and a review on process or safety measures is necessary. 
 
Afterwards each list of questions for each area, a scheme to be used in 
answering is included. 
As a general rule, literature’s and estimated data can be used only to obtain 
a roughly safety analysis of the process and a pointer to the steps that need 
to be deeply investigated. For a complete analysis, only experimental data 
have to be considered. 
 


















































              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
 
NOTES: 1 - Considered in the all possible phases on which the substances are used in the process (storage, reaction, etc). 
  2 - Enterprise's internal identification of the substances. 
  3 - Degree of purity as specified in each process. 
  4 - Inhibitors, triggering agents, chemical substances able to influence the rate of reaction, etc. 
  5 - Temperature to leave of which a different phase from the one expected under normal conditions appears. 
  6 - Pressure to leave of which a different phase from the one expected under normal conditions appears. 
  7 - In case of lack of data for mixtures, make one medium of the values of the single substances. 
  8 - Stable or unstable, considering the maximum storage period. 
  9 - High, medium, low. 
  CALCULATE ALL THE VALUES USING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM UNITS. 
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REACTION and PROCESS CONDITIONS 
 











at the end of the 
step 
MAXTSAFE(8) Influence of hot 
spots 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
NOTES: 1 - Subdivide the process in steps and define if the step refers to process (P) or reaction (R). 
  2 - Consider all the substances present in each step. 
  3 - Use the experimental value if known, otherwise consider one medium of the values of the single substances. 
4 - It can be known from: experimental calculations, literature or internet source (see DATA SOURCE)or simulations programs (as 
CHETAH). 
5 - The maximum temperature reached following the occurrence of the desired (synthesis) chemical reaction under adiabatic conditions 
starting at the designed process temperature. For a batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic 
temperature rise of the desired reaction. For a semi-batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic 
temperature rise of the accumulated reactants of the desired reaction. 
 6 - Specify if the reaction is an Arrhenius, catalytic (homogeneous or heterogeneous) or autocatalytic type. 
7 - Increase of temperature of the reaction mass under adiabatic conditions due to accumulation of the heat released, coming from 
both the synthesis reaction and all the possible secondary reactions involved. 
8 - If known, use ADT24; if not, MAXTSAFE can be calculated as the critical T at which in a short time decomposition or other thermal 
evolution of the final reaction mass takes place. It can be evaluated with a DSC, considering the T of the first exothermal peak less 70º 
(if beta=5K/min) or less 100º (if beta=10K/min). 
  CALCULATE ALL THE VALUES USING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM UNITS 














6    6
7   7
8   8
9      9
10     10
11      11
12      12
13         13












2-Construction materials and wastes have to be included in the substances 
considered.
3-The colors at the bottom of the table are referred to the NFPA index. 
Include this identification in order to better comprehend the substance's 
chemical behaviour.






Solubilization of toxic 
substance
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• From Internet: 
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REACTION – Checklists 
 




CRITICAL FACTOR:  Mistaken chemicals 
 
CHECKLIST: 
1. Is there the possibility of a dangerous mix formation (involving both reagents and products) due 
to: a) wrong order of adding? 
b) wrong chemicals used? 
c) wrong rate of addition? 
d) wrong quantities of chemicals used? 
If yes, go to 1.1); if no, go to 1.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
1.1) Is it controlled? 
If yes, go to 1.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
1.2)  How is it controlled? 
1.3)  Justify your answer. 
2. Is a solvent used? 
If yes, go to 2.1); if no, go to 2.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
2.1) Is its amount controlled? 
If yes, go to 2.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
2.2)  How is it controlled? 
2.3) Justify your answer. 
3. Are catalysts or inhibitors used? 
If yes, go to 3.1); if no, go to 3.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
3.1) Is their concentration controlled? 
If yes, go to 3.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
3.2)  How is it controlled? 
3.3) Justify your answer. 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Autocatalytic reactions 
 
CHECKLIST: 
4. Is showing any of the substances involved (or a mixture of them) an autocatalytic or radical chain 
reactive behaviour? 
If yes, go to 4.1); if no, go to 4.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
4.1) Is it controlled? 
If yes, go to 4.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
4.2)  How is it controlled? 
4.3)  Justify your answer. 
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CRITICAL FACTOR:  Segregation 
 
CHECKLIST: 
5. Is there the possibility of crystallisation or formation of a segregated phase in the reaction mixture 
(especially on cool down operations and at minimum jacket temperature)? 
If yes, go to 5.1) and then to 5.2); if no, go to 5.5); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
5.1) Can it affect thermal behaviour of the reaction mass or T control? 
If yes, go to 5.3); if no, go to 5.5); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
5.2) Is the phase thermally unstable? 
If yes, go to 5.3); if no, go to 5.5); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
5.3) Are there measures to manage or prevent it (mixing, separation, re-homogenisation, etc)? 
If yes, go to 5.4), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
5.4)  Which? 
5.5)  Justify your answer. 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Accumulation 
 
CHECKLIST: 
6. Is the maximum dosing rate known? 
If yes, go to 6.1); if no, CHECK IT! 
6.1) Does it exceed the maximum safe dosing rate? 
If yes, REVIEW REACTOR SETUP; if no, go to 6.2); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
6.2) Justify your answer. 
7. Is dosing interlocked in any way with mixing to always assure turbulent conditions? 
If yes, go to 7.1); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
7.1) How? 
8. Will accumulation increase dramatically if the reaction temperature is low by 10K? 
If yes, go to 8.1); if no, go to 8.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
8.1) Is T control interlocked in any way with dosing rate? 
If yes, go to 8.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
8.2) How? 
8.3) Justify your answer. 
9. In case of automatic dosing, is it interlocked with cooling system? 
If yes, go to 9.1); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
9.1) Can dosing be totally stopped (dosing set inherently safe)? 
If yes, go to 9.2); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
9.2) How? 
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CRITICAL FACTOR:  Temperature Hazard 
 
CHECKLIST: 
10. Does cooling system work always below 80% of its maximum capacity? 
If yes, go to 10.1); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
10.1) How is it guaranteed? 
11. Is T controlled when the reaction is ended but the reactor is still full? 
If yes, go to 11.1); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
11.1) How? 
12. Is there the possibility of hot spots? 
If yes, go to 12.1); if no, go to 12.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
12.1) Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
If yes, go to 12.2); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
12.2) How? 
12.3) Justify your answer. 
13. Is any kind of interlock between cooling system failure and dosage stop present? 
If yes, go to 13.1); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
13.1) How is it realised? 
14. In which of the five criticality levels defined by the harsmeth methodology (according to Stoessel) 
is your process, using MAXTSAFE as safety limit value? 
NOTES: if |MAXTSAFE – MTSR| < 50º, a deeper analysis should be done to prevent possibly 
mistakes in the calculation of the limit value.  
If 1 or 2: the process is “thermally” SAFE, but the reaction mass should not be held for longer 
time under heat accumulation conditions. 
If 3: If the evaporative cooling is able to keep the reaction mass under control, check that 
the equipment is designed for that purpose; if not, a backup cooling system or 
quenching has to be previewed. If the process is performed in a close system, the 
apparatus must be designed for the maximum expectable overpressure or be 
equipped with a pressure relief device. 
If 4: as in 3, but the additional heat release due to the secondary reaction has to be taken 
into account. If the operation is performed in a close system, the T corresponding to 
the relief valve’s set pressure may not be much higher than the boiling point of the 
reaction mass. 
If 5: NEED OF PLANT and/or PROCESS MODIFICATIONS, in order to achieve a lower 
criticality level (reduce the concentration, change from batch to semi-batch, optimise 
semi-batch operating conditions in order to minimise the accumulation, change to 
continuous operation, etc). 




• As a general rule, exothermic reactions need always T, dosing and stirring control. 
• Report on known quick ways to stop the desired reaction (extra cooling, chemical inhibition, 
venting, quenching, etc). 
• Hot spots may be avoided by heating up not too quick and under turbulent flow conditions. 
• Report on chemical substances able to influence the rate of reaction and substances that can 
poison catalysts and inhibitors or that can act as unexpected catalysts for the reaction (impurities, 
etc). 
• The maximum temperature that can be reached in case of cooling failure (MTSR) depends on the 
type of reactor. For example in case of a batch reactor the MTSR is equivalent to the process 
temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the desired reaction. For a semi-batch reactor 
the MTSR is equivalent to the process temperature plus the adiabatic temperature rise of the 
“worst-case” accumulated reactants of the desired reaction.  
• Some basic safety scenarios (as loss of stirring, loss of cooling, dosing control, etc) have to be 
studied for each step. 
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REACTION - Answers 
 
Answers of the checklist 




CRITICAL FACTOR:  Mistaken chemicals 
 
1. a) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) ______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ___________________________________________________________ 
 b) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 c) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 d) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
2. If yes, 2.1) If yes, 2.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 2.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If yes, 3.1)  If yes, 3.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 3.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Autocatalytic reactions 
 
4. If yes, 4.1)  If yes, 4.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 4.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
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CRITICAL FACTOR:  Segregation 
 
5. If yes, 5.1) If yes, 5.3) If yes, 5.4) __________________________________ 
   If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 5.5) _______________________________________________ 
5.2) If yes, 5.3) If yes, 5.4) __________________________________ 
   If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
 If no, 5.5) _______________________________________________ 
If no, 5.5) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Accumulation 
 
6. If yes, 6.1)  If yes, REVIEW REACTOR SETUP 
If no, 6.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, CHECK IT! 
7. If yes, 7.1) ____________________________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
8. If yes, 8.1) If yes, 8.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 8.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
9. If yes, 9.1) If yes, 9.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
CCR version 2 8/10/2001 
21 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Temperature Hazard 
 
10. If yes, 10.1) ___________________________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
11. If yes, 11.1) ___________________________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
12. If yes, 12.1) If yes, 12.2) ______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 12.3) ___________________________________________________________ 
13. If yes, 13.1) ___________________________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
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CRITICAL FACTOR:  Mistaken chemicals 
 
CHECKLIST: 
1. Is there the possibility of a dangerous mix formation due to:  
a) wrong labelling? 
b) cleaning operations or reparation works? 
c) adding new chemicals in vessels already in use? 
d) possibility of contact between substances? 
If yes, go to 1.1); if no, go to 1.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
1.1) Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and, in d) case, safety interlocks used? 
If yes, go to 1.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
1.2)  How? 
1.3)  Justify your answer. 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Autocatalytic reactions 
 
CHECKLIST: 
2. Is showing any of the substances stored an autocatalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour (as 
polymerisation)? 
If yes, go to 2.1); if no, go to 2.4); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
2.1) Is it controlled with inhibitors? 
If yes, go to 2.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
2.2) Is their concentration controlled? 
If yes, go to 2.3), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
2.3)  How is it controlled? 
2.4) Justify your answer. 
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CRITICAL FACTOR:  Segregation 
 
CHECKLIST: 
3. Is there the possibility of formation of a segregated phase (due also to weather effects)? 
If yes, go to 3.1); if no, go to 3.4); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
3.1) Are the formed phases thermally stable? 
If yes, go to 3.4); if no, go to 3.2); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
3.2) Are there measures to manage or prevent the segregation (mixing, separation, re-
homogenisation, etc)? 
If yes, go to 3.3), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
3.3)  Which? 
3.4)  Justify your answer. 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Temperature Hazard 
 
CHECKLIST: 
4. Is there the possibility of decomposition of any of the stored substances at ambient temperature? 
If yes, go to 4.1); if no, go to 4.4); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
4.1) Is a cooling device installed and T controlled in the storage site of each unstable substance? 
If yes, go to 4.2); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
4.2) Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
If yes, go to 4.3); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
4.3) How? 





• Report on chemical substances that can act as unexpected catalysts for exothermic reactions 
(impurities, etc). 
• Some basic safety scenarios (as loss of stirring, loss of cooling, longer storage period, missing of 
inhibitors, etc) have to be studied for each step. 
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STORAGE - Answers 
 
Answers of the checklist 




CRITICAL FACTOR:  Mistaken chemicals 
 
1. a) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 b) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 c) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 d) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Autocatalytic reactions 
 
2. If yes, 2.1)  If yes, 2.2) If yes, 2.3) __________________________________ 
   If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 2.4) ____________________________________________________________ 
CCR version 2 8/10/2001 
25 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Segregation 
 
3. If yes, 3.1) If yes, 3.4) _______________________________________________ 
If no, 3.2) If yes, 3.3) __________________________________ 
   If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 3.4) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Temperature Hazard 
 
4. If yes, 4.1) If yes, 4.2) If yes, 4.3) __________________________________ 
   If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 4.4) ____________________________________________________________ 
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CRITICAL FACTOR:  Mistaken chemicals 
 
CHECKLIST: 
1. Is there the possibility of a dangerous mix formation due to:  
a) wrong labelling or picking from storage? 
b) cleaning operations or reparation works? 
c) unavailability of chemicals? 
d) possibility of contact between substances? 
If yes, go to 1.1); if no, go to 1.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
1.1) Are operators sufficiently trained to avoid it and, in d) case, safety interlocks used? 
If yes, go to 1.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
1.2)  How? 
1.3)  Justify your answer. 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Autocatalytic reactions 
 
CHECKLIST: 
2. Is showing any of the substances involved an autocatalytic or radical chain reactive behaviour? 
If yes, go to 2.1); if no, go to 2.4); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
2.1) Is it controlled with inhibitors? 
If yes, go to 2.2), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
2.2) Is their concentration controlled? 
If yes, go to 2.3), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
2.3)  How is it controlled? 
2.4) Justify your answer. 
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CRITICAL FACTOR:  Segregation 
 
CHECKLIST: 
3. Is there the possibility of crystallisation or of formation of a segregated phase (especially on cool 
down operations)? 
If yes, go to 3.1); if no, go to 3.4); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
3.1) Are the formed phases thermally stable? 
If yes, go to 3.4); if no, go to 3.2); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
3.2) Are there measures to manage or prevent the segregation (mixing, separation, re-
homogenisation, etc)? 
If yes, go to 3.3), if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
3.3)  Which? 
3.4) Justify your answer. 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Temperature Hazard 
 
CHECKLIST: 
4. Is there the possibility of hot spots? 
If yes, go to 4.1); if no, go to 4.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
4.1) Can T control detect inhomogeneous distribution? 
If yes, go to 4.2); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
4.2) How? 
4.3) Justify your answer. 
5. Is there the possibility of decomposition of any substance at process temperature? 
If yes, go to 5.1); if no, go to 5.3); if unknown, CHECK IT! 
5.1) Is T controlled? 
If yes, go to 5.2); if no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES; if unknown, CHECK IT! 
5.2) How? 





• Hot spots may be avoided by heating up not too quick and under turbulent flow conditions. 
• Report on chemical substances that can act as unexpected catalysts for exothermic reactions 
(impurities, etc). 
• Some basic safety scenarios (as loss of stirring, missing of inhibitors, etc) have to be studied for 
each step. 
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PROCESS - Answers 
 
Answers of the checklist 




CRITICAL FACTOR:  Mistaken chemicals 
 
1. a) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 b) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 c) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 d) If yes,  1.1) If yes, 1.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no,  1.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Autocatalytic reactions 
 
2. If yes, 2.1)  If yes, 2.2) If yes, 2.3) __________________________________ 
   If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 2.4) ____________________________________________________________ 
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CRITICAL FACTOR:  Segregation 
 
5. If yes, 3.1) If yes, 3.4) _______________________________________________ 
If no, 3.2) If yes, 3.3) __________________________________ 
   If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 3.4) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
CRITICAL FACTOR:  Temperature Hazard 
 
3. If yes, 4.1) If yes, 4.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 4.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
4. If yes, 5.1) If yes, 5.2) _______________________________________________ 
If no, REVIEW YOUR SAFETY MEASURES 
If no, 5.3) ____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
